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Figure 1. Pieter Bruegel. The Triumph of Death 
                  c. 1562. Panel 117 x 162 cm. 














































The following thesis represents an attempt to account for the novelist Don DeLillo’s 
last three novels (Underworld (1999), The Body Artist (2001), and Cosmopolis 
(2003)) through the examination of what I conceive as DeLillo’s philosophy of 
language. It is my assertion that the crucial and articulating aspect of DeLillo’s 
philosophy of language is his investment in, and investigation of, irony. As I argue, 
DeLillo’s novels presume a certain conjugation of what I refer to as the work of irony 
(the seemingly impossible work of tendering both the allegorical imperative of 
naming and the ironic imperative of Otherness) with the work of art. In other words, 
DeLillo’s theory of language reveals his theory of art and, thus, his own theory of 
writing. This aesthetic philosophy becomes the critical tool with which DeLillo 
evaluates the various symbolic economies of a culture and its individuals caught 
within late capitalism.  
The impossibility of defining irony becomes, for DeLillo, a metaphor by which to 
understand language itself as what I refer to as a fallen and tender economy, 
constituted by an Otherness, which language can only tender. In his novels, DeLillo, I 
argue, suggests that language and subjectivity ought to be conceived of as forms of a 
faith in an Otherness, impossible to represent as such, to which all speech, violence, 
art, commodity and reproduction are indebted, and which we may mourn and 
represent – as we must – more or less faithfully, more or less blindly, and, by virtue of 
irony, more or less tenderly. The possibilities of faith and the ethical in art and 
representation, thus, for DeLillo, arise through an attention to an Otherness that can 
only be tendered through the very tenderness (fallenness, profanity, weakness) of 
allegory and language. To understand this is to understand the role of irony in 
DeLillo’s philosophy, and also to understand DeLillo’s profound commitment to 
language, his renovation of allegory through its mortification by irony and, thus, its 
remembering and mourning of Otherness. In this regard, DeLillo shares much with 
the melancholia of deconstruction as evinced within the language philosophies of 
Jacques Derrida and Paul de Man, in particular, Derrida’s economic consideration, 
différance, and his notion of the work of mourning, both of which, I argue, offer the 
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Sitting in her empty house, meditating on time itself, Lauren, the artist of DeLillo’s 
The Body Artist1 discovers her lover, a recent suicide, announced to her again and 
again throughout memory, and in the figure of Tuttle, a spectral figure she discovers 
in her home, through whom she is bared to announcements of Otherness. Thinking of 
Tuttle Lauren considers the following: 
There has to be an imaginary point, a nonplace where language intersects with our perceptions 
of time and space, and he [Tuttle] is a stranger at this crossing, without words or bearings […]     
   He violates the limits of the human. (TBA, 99) 
 
Lauren achieves the work of the artist and the ironist in this text precisely because she 
faces up to the impossible and ironic demand posed by DeLillo as the essential 
experience of full human consciousness: firstly, an imagining of the “nonplace” of 
irony, the ‘intersection’ of language with “time and space”, but secondly, an 
imagining of an Otherness in violation of this intersection, an Otherness that, for the 
artist, reveals the tenderness of the “human” in revealing the limitations of one’s 
language. Imagining the tenderness of one’s allegories, the contingent nature of one’s 
words where they intersect with the world is, essentially, a prerequisite for all 
DeLillo’s artist figures. I should add too, that such an awareness is necessary also to 
the sort of constellation of concerns and writers I make in this thesis under the rubric 
of what I see as DeLillo’s investigation of aesthetics, his theory of language and the 
work of art. 
     The emphasis on tender limitation brings with it a certain Kantian currency, 
particularly that reflex to the sublime where one’s cognition of the limits of 
representation is seen as proof of the possibility of imagining something Other, 
something beyond the known, beyond one’s imagining. The ghosting of religious awe 
is appropriate here, as in all DeLillo’s novels that investigate language for the 
possibility of the revelation – keyed to irony – of what one of DeLillo’s characters 
calls “the fallen wonder of the world”.2 Chief among such “wonders” for DeLillo is, 
                                                 
1Don DeLillo, The Body Artist. New York: Scribner, 2001. 
2 Don DeLillo, The Names. London: Picador, 1999. p.339. 
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of course, language – what I refer to as allegory.3 In effect DeLillo’s texts perform a 
re-evaluation of language, a cherishing of the tenderness of allegory, and, with this, 
the fallenness of human subjectivity. DeLillo’s texts take as their focus that which 
lies, like some underworld, in excess of language and subjectivity, a sacred Otherness, 
often contextualised as memory, that can be thought of as the impossible condition, 
beyond representation, from which the human possibilities of representation come. 
My argument is that through investigation of the limitations of subjectivity, conducted 
via a philosophy of language, an aesthetic philosophy, DeLillo, in a way that suggests 
much in common with the likes of Derrida, de Man, and Benjamin, articulates ethical 
and faith-oriented concerns through what I call the work of art.  It is my argument that 
central to this project, and therefore central to DeLillo’s work, is irony, conceived of 
as the articulation of an impossible but all-pervasive Otherness that reveals, by virtue 
of its articulating force, the tenderness of being human, the tenderness of language 
and art, suggesting in the process how acts of cultural production might continue in 
integrity and good faith in a world dominated by the modes of reproduction definitive 
of late capitalism.  
     The Body Artist, as the critic Philip Nel writes, “offers a lyrical meditation on 
language, memory, and the modernist (and romantic) project of bridging the gap 
between word and world”.4 What this “gap” or aporia means, how it is interpreted, or 
whether we interpret this division more as a question of delay or difference, reveals, I 
argue, how irony is interpreted and applied, as much by DeLillo’s critics and 
commentators as by writers on irony and deconstruction. What I think needs to be 
pointed out is that Nel’s suggestion, that DeLillo attempts to “bridge the gap” in The 
Body Artist, is inaccurate, and that this inaccuracy reveals not only a particular failing 
in the criticism of DeLillo’s novels, but also, and perhaps as a consequence of this, a 
particular failure to recognise the vital and thoroughgoing importance of irony in 
DeLillo’s texts. This misprision of irony in the critical work on DeLillo’s novels 
leads, I argue, to a further impoverishment seen in the paucity of readings that observe 
and associate DeLillo’s philosophy of language with the exigencies derived from 
                                                 
3 Richard Wolin describes allegory as a word for the condition of human subjectivity after the fall, a 
name for the condition that we occupy, the profane “world of knowledge, where the original, divine 
relation between things and their proper meanings – their names – has been sundered” (Richard Wolin, 
Labyrinths: Explorations in the Critical History of Ideas. Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press, 
1995. p.70). 
4 See Philip Nel’s article “Don DeLillo’s Return to Form: The Modernist Poetics of The Body Artist”. 
Contemporary Literature, Vol 43, No.4. Winter 2002. p.736.  
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faith-based and ethical concerns. It is my argument that this sort of constellation of 
assumptions and concerns culminates in a theory of the work of art that from the 
moment of articulation stems from DeLillo’s engagement with what I define as irony. 
     To return to the Nel quotation: we might well concur that, yes, the ‘gap’ is 
important to DeLillo in this particular novel, but not to the purpose of achieving some 
connection between word and world, but rather, to highlight the ‘gap’ as a way of 
investigating the relationship between word and world – how, as Lauren considers it, 
we make things (Others, phenomena, the world etc.) “seem” like something else. The 
Body Artist is, then, a novel about allegory, but allegory produced in the context of 
irony. Were we to cast DeLillo as a theorist or philosopher of language (like Derrida, 
Benjamin, or de Man) I would suggest that the goal of his inquiry would not be this 
gap or aporia, but merely the medium of it. The ‘goal’ of his enquiry – and this is the 
significant feature of my own engagement with irony – is what such irony avails, calls 
forth, and how the aporia it articulates is treated, regarded, how it is tendered by 
language users, and, thus, how it helps define and describe the “limits of the human”. 
     DeLillo’s novels have always presented variations on the sort of “intersection” or 
crossing I have begun with, where a character must consider the application of word 
or name to the experience or perception of something Other. Such translations, as I 
shall continue to argue, reveal in DeLillo’s texts the relationship of subjectivity to 
irony and Otherness. It is not surprising, then, to find Nick Shay in Underworld5 at a 
similar crossroads of language and Otherness (this time figured as the 
“unknowability” of God) to Lauren, searching for some pure word “alive with naked 
intent” (296), an “edging into darkness, into the secret of god” (U, 297). Nick is 
looking for a word to capture the “unmadeness”, the “negation”, that is the force of 
the Other, the force installed in the ‘trope’ of irony. Shay’s desire to name the 
unnameable, to penetrate and contain this Otherness through language, is definitive of 
the sort of absence of a ‘theory’ of irony that helps delineate in DeLillo’s novels the 
helpless from the imaginative, the faithless from the faithful, the consumer from the 
artist.6 Such a ‘theory’ of irony, productive of such distinctions is, in effect, observed 
by Curtis Yehnert in the following quotation in which, usefully, he also expresses 
                                                 
5 Don DeLillo, Underworld. Picador: London. 1999. 
6 Of course, for the purposes of illustration I am being deliberately simplistic here; one only has to 
consider the motif of maturation that complicates Nick’s relationship to irony in Underworld to see 
how different positions, faithful, venal, imaginative etc. mix within the subject. 
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some of the presiding assumptions I suggest DeLillo holds to in the writing of his 
texts. As Yehnert says, DeLillo 
[…] shares with the more traditional postmodernists the conviction that language gives form to 
both self and world; in doing so it reflects not so much a picture of reality as the force of our 
impulse to make sense of our experience by investing it with coherence, symmetry, and closure 
that is imaginary, a fiction. He differs from those postmodernists in his particular focus on this 
paradox: Forms mediate and falsify, yet forms provide meaning and coherence. Language 
screens us from but also connects us to the world of real things. […] DeLillo’s major characters 
long for the pure, transparent Word, for the language that would give them immediacy, return 
them to themselves, which they imagine as simple and whole. That desire is impossible to 
satisfy because of the nature of language and of the self: there is no pure, original Word, which 
would “need no other sound” for meaning (End Zone, 89), Gary Harkness discovers instead that 
words suggest meaning only through a system of difference. Longing to get beyond words, 
Bucky Wunderlick resorts finally to silence, until he begins to understand the paradox of 
language’s mediation: though it precludes the absolute true, still it opens a space for invention; 
it prevents direct knowing but provides for individual interpretation; it denies immediacy but 
offers a connection (flawed as it is) to others and to the world.7  
 
What Yehnert singles out as the “paradox” DeLillo’s texts “focus” on is what I refer 
to as the ironic consciousness – again, an attention to that gap between word and 
world that, as Yehnert construes it, itself becomes the place of “invention”, 
“interpretation” and “connection (flawed as it is) to others and to the world”. 
Essentially, what Yehnert discusses here is the paradox of irony, which is to say, 
irony conceived of as the following impossible articulation: on the one hand, 
“mediation” and representation, the word or allegory or name, on the other hand, the 
ironic force that differs and denies, that “precludes the absolute true”, the 
undermining force that exposes all knowledge as better or worse “fictions” and 
falsifications. Irony is crucial because it can be said to articulate both the radical 
nature of Otherness, as well as the necessity of the fall into language, into allegory. 
Irony offers us a way of thinking of the intersection of profane words with the sacred 
and impossible Other. The politics, ethics, faith-related issues consequent to such a 
vision of irony are, I suggest, what DeLillo explores in his late novels, through his 
philosophy of language; they are the substratum to the case his texts make for the 
work of art. 
     As Yehnert indicates, while language may ‘come’ from the world, the Other, 
language never contains this Otherness. Like the subject who must use language and 
whose experience of being is defined by their being-in-language, all allegories of the 
world are separated from the world, both different and deferred from the world. As 
                                                 
7 Curtis A. Yehnert, “‘Like Some Endless Sky Waking Inside’: Subjectivity in Don DeLillo”. Critique, 
Vol. 42, no.4, Summer 2001. p. 362. 
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such, however, language can be said to be entirely adequate to our experience of the 
world, but must always be seen as “fallen”. The crime and greater violence, DeLillo 
implies in his novels, lies in the misprision of this fallenness, and the systematic 
misprision of the actual and ironic nature of allegory. Such a consideration of allegory 
and its misprision is chiefly the ‘subject matter’ of DeLillo’s Underworld, but in order 
to understand this we have to understand the relationship of irony and allegory.  
Failure to recognise this fallenness is, I suggest, commensurate with the failure to 
recognise the ironic nature of our being subjects, and, primarily, this failure manifests 
in DeLillo’s novels as the dissembling or occlusion of the radical nature of our 
allegoricity. That is to say, without the ironist’s vision (DeLillo’s vision) allegory 
itself is devalued. Without the sense of allegory’s fallenness, and what comes from 
this, the articulation of something beyond itself, something Other, is lost, and 
language itself becomes impoverished as a consequence. In the promulgation – 
through what we could call ‘bad faith’ misprision – of the myth of allegory’s self-
sufficiency (the assumption of its settlement of irony’s aporia), allegory, thus 
conceived, ceases to demand of the allegorist any further imagining, any greater 
inquiry, any demand for responsibility or competence. Through irony, that which 
mortifies allegory, ruining its façade in the name of all that remains in excess of its 
‘meaning’, allegory itself is seen anew, is cherished, given the possibility of a further 
‘turn’ in the widening gyre of context, signification and referentiality. It is the 
ironist’s vision that enables one, such as DeLillo, to view language (allegory) as our 
fallen wonder. 
 
(ii) Irony and Allegory 
 
The impossibly perfect, that is, the linguistically innocent, book (already a contradiction) 
devoted to irony would be one without categories - and perhaps without that first, inherited taint, 
agent, and category, the word irony itself. This, I hasten to add is not that book.8  
 
This thesis too is not about irony, but rather takes as one of its principal themes the 
epistemological tenderness we are exposed to in our attempts to reckon with irony. 
Such a reckoning is, I propose, the way of mapping the intercourse with Otherness 
committed to by DeLillo in his novels.  Considered in general terms one’s experience 
of irony can be said to be an experience that focuses for the subject (or artwork) 
                                                 
8 Alan Wilde. Horizons of Assent: Modernism, Postmodernism, and the Ironic Imagination (1981). p. 8 
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through language or form, an incoherence, gap, or aporia9, a point of non-coincidence 
à la the experience of interruption (usually termed parabasis or anacoluthon in 
theories of irony). In this aporia an articulation of something Other to the subject, 
Other to the work, a revelation of one’s facticity or blindness, a revelation of one’s 
estrangement from a world deemed to have been settled by allegory, is possible. Such 
a revelation, which is what I suggest signifies the experience of irony, is such because 
it reveals one’s relationship to reproduction, representation, identity, and difference, 
and usually, for the subject, this is a consequence of a sudden awareness of the 
constructed and social nature of the discourse in which they function allegorically as 
private and discrete identities. 
     The Otherness that irony can be said to articulate (without ever representing it) 
exists in irony’s aporia, the gap between what is said (the “literal” meaning), and what 
is really meant (the unsaid). This gap or aporia is the common defining element of all 
definitions of irony. This said, one must however insist that to define irony as aporia 
is to radically problematise the very notion of making definitions.10 Nevertheless, this 
is quite specifically one of irony’s effects: the impossibility of ever fully determining 
the “actual” meaning of an ironic utterance is thus paralleled in all attempts at 
defining irony as a concept (in any sort of complete, systematic, or structural way). Of 
course irony’s refusal and resistance of definition is well known; indeed, one might 
say that irony has come to thematise this refusal, and, as such, its theme (of 
unthematizability) has often become its identity. The point irony is often used to make 
is one that highlights the underdetermination of all theory, and, as I take it, it is by this 
point that we are given the opportunity to recognise the radical tenderness of our 
allegories. In treating irony (and speaking of it) we acknowledge that we must detour 
through allegory and name something that is, ostensibly, unnameable, and though, as 
shall be one of my points, there are better (tender) or worse (less-tender) names and 
ways of coming to name, there will always be something lost or forgotten in the 
translation. For DeLillo, how this loss is remembered by individuals and cultures, 
how it is seen in relation to the production of and reproduction of signs, objects, 
works, identities etc., dictates the possibility of the ethical in the aesthetic work. In the 
                                                 
9 As Hayden White has pointed out aporia is “the favoured stylistic device of irony.” See Metahistory: 
The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth Century Europe (1973). p. 34. 
10 De Man makes essentially the same point in his article “The Concept of Irony” where he notes the 
problem of defining irony by constantly deferring and undermining his own definition of it. See 
Aesthetic Ideology. Minneapolis; London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.  
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space of this “loss”, difference (cultural difference for example), Otherness, memory, 
history, possibility itself, are located. Thus, for DeLillo to consider the question of 
irony – a theory of Otherness and loss – albeit in the context of the work of art, is also 
to consider the ethical.  
     The point of my theory of irony is to suggest the necessarily ironic nature of all 
theory and allegory, not just theories of irony. In general, but specifically for the 
purpose of this thesis, no ‘definition’ of irony is meaningful that does not attend to the 
necessary relationship within irony of the ironic to the allegorical, a relationship of 
tendering conducted between the unsaid and the said, the ‘other’ meaning and the 
literal meaning. As Linda Hutcheon has written: irony is not a simple "antiphrastic 
substitution of the unsaid (called the "ironic" meaning) for its opposite, the said 
(called the "literal meaning")".11 Rather, irony 
happens – in the space between (and including) the said and the unsaid; it needs both to happen. 
What I want to call the 'ironic' meaning is inclusive and relational: the said and the unsaid 
coexist for the interpreter, and each has no meaning in relation to the other because they literally 
'interact' to create the real 'ironic' meaning. (Irony's Edge, 12) 
 
This interaction, as I see it, is ‘definitive’ of irony proper. The model it proposes, 
where the said and the unsaid are seen as mutually dependent on one another, is the 
model DeLillo assumes in the relationships of self and Other, the present and 
memory, the possible and the impossible, the profane and the sacred, from which his 
philosophy of language is drawn. It is perhaps no coincidence then that in another text 
on irony it is possible to find a mapping of the sort of deconstructive critique DeLillo 
applies in Underworld to the economy of the sign and the commodity. The following, 
a gloss on de Manic irony by Gary Handwerk is, I suggest, an accurate description of 
what DeLillo would also see as the predicament of the subject and the operation of 
allegory within the capitalist system. 
The subject for de Man is inherently limited by the duplicity of language. It is ignorant in regard 
to what might be denominated as truth. Even worse, it is ignorant of the locus and origin of its 
own ignorance, hence also of any truth it might happen to speak. The subject is therefore unable 
to undo its ignorance, yet this very incapacity renders it especially prone to believing that it has 
indeed undone it. This occurs as the recurrent process of metaphoric totalization. The subject 
uses language to convert a world structured by the contingency of metonymic connections into 
one dominated by metaphoric necessity. One can therefore always trace a metaphoric chain of 
substitutions, by which the world is unified, back to an illicit equivalence at its origin, a leap 
from metonym to metaphor. This original leap is the source of the incompatibilities that 
generate allegorical deconstruction. 12
 
                                                 
11 See Linda Hutcheon, Irony’s Edge: The Theory and Politics of Irony (1974).  p.12. 
12 See Gary Handwerk, Irony and Ethics in Narrative; From Schlegel to Lacan. (1988). p.10. 
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That it is possible to read a text investigating a theory of irony as a critique of the 
symbolic (sign) system of capitalism (because the two seemingly distinct economies, 
one of language and the other of the commodity, are really the same), is the great 
insight of Underworld, and DeLillo’s work more generally. It is, also, the insight 
much of my own work in this thesis proceeds from; this isn’t new: Benjamin noted  
throughout his career the intertwined fate in modernity of the sign/allegory and the 
commodity, and, as with Benjamin, it is on the strength of DeLillo’s commitment to 
language – its tenderness, the fallenness, as I have been saying, of allegory – that the 
promise of a re-reading of allegory, a more faithful appraisal of its ironic truth, and 
with this, a re-valuing of the sign and the commodity within the economies of the 
postmodern may yet be realised. To do this is also, as I suggest, to reconsider the 
prospects of the work of art within the economic context it cannot be divorced from. 
To this end, DeLillo proceeds in Underworld to expose to irony, all denominational 
ignorance, to perform, through irony, the “deconstruction” of a culture’s (and an 
economy’s) allegories. In attempting to trace back the allegorical “chain of 
substitutions” to the “illicit equivalence at its origin”, DeLillo is performing a critique 
of the state of allegory in the capitalist economy; his purpose, one might say, is to 
ironize and ruin the appearance of allegory as “metaphoric totalization”, as 
simulation, as consumable, and restore to it its tenderness as “contingency”, as 
“metonymic connection”. Such an endeavour, the salvation of allegory from the 
misprisions of a totalising capitalist symbolic, where “everything connects” (U, 465) 




In all of what has been said to this point about language, allegory and irony, the most 
crucial and defining aspect of DeLillo’s texts, indeed, the aspect that explains most 
clearly the necessity of DeLillo’s engagement with irony, is that of Otherness.13 
                                                 
13The concept of the Other brings with it a certain Phenomenological history and, largely, this is the 
background to my own use of the ‘concept’, particularly as it has been discussed in the critique of 
Phenomenology by Derrida and Levinas. Their critique, however, is not something I need to reproduce 
here in this thesis. In simple terms, the Other (the instance of Otherness, the personal Other) is the non-
self, that which is different, that which, in the sign, exceeds what it is taken to present. Otherness, is 
what Derrida defers to when he places at the heart of his ‘deconstruction’ and theory of language such 
an ironic ‘principle’ as différance, a tender allegory (an allegory that tenders its own impossibility as a 
concept or principle) for the processes of difference and delay that bespeak the force of Otherness that 
can never be reduced to a final and complete meaning. Otherness is also what we can think of as 
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Irony, as I’ve said, is crucial to DeLillo’s work (the aesthetic work of writing) since it 
formalises a relationship with this Otherness through its very dependency on allegory, 
on language and writing. The experience of Otherness, the essential experience of 
irony is, I argue, a consequence of the mutual contamination (or relationship) of the 
said and the unsaid: the force of the unsaid on the said is such that language is 
renewed, the said, exposed as tender, is thus exposed to demands for re-interpretation, 
new uses, better words; at the same time, the said, because of its very fallenness, 
becomes a testament, a material token, a memento or trace, lit by the light of what lies 
beyond it, an Otherness that disappears in the appearance of the word. The revelation 
of Otherness that occurs at the level of the sign is paralleled in the experience of the 
subject as well, as Handwerk points out: “The subject discovers in irony the degree to 
which it is dependent upon an alien language, speaking with the voice of the other” 
(173). This is an important idea for DeLillo since it becomes the basis for his 
recognition of the difference, estrangement, and fallenness of the self, a basis for the 
ethical, other-wise imagining required of the artist.  
     Otherness is, of course, the subject of the artist Lauren’s implied inquiry in the 
quotation with which I began this introduction; quite apart from the figure of Tuttle, 
DeLillo’s most explicit rendering of the Other in all his novels,14 the Otherness 
Lauren experiences, and that promotes the philosophical questioning that structures 
her narrative, is identifiable as the experience of loss. Such an experience is what 
interrupts her assumptions about language, interpretation, representation and their 
relation to the world (the Other, “space and time”), but also, is what enables her to 
produce her work of art. For DeLillo, as I will often insist, one’s engagement with 
Otherness is a prerequisite for the production of art, in fact, is itself the very work 
required of art, and this work – a tarrying with the impossible – is conducted through 
irony.  
                                                                                                                                            
applicable to language itself in so far as language always exists before the subject, constitutes the 
subject, but is also outside and alien to the subject, even though the subject must use language in order 
to experience subjectivity. In DeLillo’s texts the interpersonal Other, as well as the Otherness revealed 
as the subject’s own dimly perceived motives and desires (articulations of the unconscious) are 
common manifestations of this Otherness. DeLillo also records the Otherness of signifying systems and 
economies; their massive size, their unknowability, and, at times, the sense of their mystical 
functioning is a popular concern of his. The two great formulations of Otherness for DeLillo are, 
however, memory and time. Indeed, the two are fused by DeLillo, along with these other examples, in 
the evocation of an unfathomable realm of possibility, past, present, and future all combined – an 
infinite, impossible, reservoir in which we live, the profane inhabitants of an immanent universe.  
14 Though versions of Tuttle can be found in characters like Willie Mink (White Noise), Lee Harvey 
Oswald (Libra), and Benno Levin (Cosmopolis). 
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     Through the impossible articulation of irony we come to recognise how Otherness 
renders the tenderness of our ‘temporal predicament’ – Otherness, we might consider, 
is time itself (‘always’ and ‘already’) before it is made (allegorical) “time”, in 
language, or here, from Underworld, in music: 
[S]he’d heard a boding in the bass notes that startled her. And this was the other thing they 
shared, the sadness and clarity of time, time mourned in the music – how the sound, the shaped 
vibrations made by hammers striking wire strings made them feel an odd sorrow not for 
particular things but for time itself, the material feel of a year or an age, the textures of 
unmeasured time that were lost to them now, and she turned away, looking past her lifted hand 
into some transparent thing he thought he could call her life. (U, 229) 
 
The mourning quality of the concerto’s notes – notably made concrete and literal in 
the reference to the striking hammers of the piano – represent the quality of allegory 
when mortified by irony, stripped of its appeal to totality, stripped of its impossible 
mimetic ambition. Here the treatment of time becomes a metaphor for that other great 
association of Otherness, memory. The music is the key to recollection, and as time is 
turned into the notes of the concerto, time is mourned, turned into something, an 
allegory, a myth, the tenderness of notation (signs, words). In a sense, the concerto 
achieves what DeLillo’s fiction also achieves: a mourning of the “unmeasured” – the 
Otherness that is lost, but whose absence is also recognised as a condition of the 
possibility of translating something Other into an allegory, a name or theory, a piece 
of music, or a work of literature. In this way the piano stands in for the possibilities of 
representation, and literature as DeLillo practices it. 
     This mournful concerto is a suitable metaphor for DeLillo’s own compositions 
because it develops as its theme the Otherness of the world (of memory), that its notes 
can never capture, but are, no less, compelled by. The notes tender this Otherness – 
standing in for it, while at the same time, revealing their own tenderness, that is, their 
fragility or fallenness, the fact of their reduction to a material contingency. This 
fallenness is what makes such allegories articles of faith. What we might call 
“allegorical tenderness” is then what DeLillo celebrates, the ability to keep time 
(Otherness) as something other than the pure unmitigated, unimaginable and 
overwhelming force of alterity. Such a force would, without our tender mediation of 
it, render us dumb, awestruck subjects. In such a silence Otherness itself, lacking 
differentiation through language, would cease to be Other. However, any endeavour 
such as DeLillo’s that finds itself celebrating naming and allegory, mediation and 
tenderness, can do so only as a “theory” (a tender theory, a theory of tenderness) of 
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irony – a thinking of irony in excess of theory. “Time”, in the same way that allegory 
mourns irony, depends on its incorporation “in us”, its presenting, we might say, its 
allegorical embodiment. Thus, “time [Otherness] depends on us. We carry it in our 
muscles and genes, pass it on to the next set of time-factoring creatures, our brown 
eyed daughters and jug-eared sons, or how would the world keep going” (U, 235) [my 
brackets]. Carrying time “in us”, that is to say, allegorising time and Otherness, 
tendering presence in the name of Otherness and irony, is exactly what keeps the 
“world” going, and this is the pact the name has with a certain desire in relation to 
Otherness.  
     Such an understanding of Otherness and its relationship to allegory, and with this, 
DeLillo’s celebration of allegory as a tender form, a form committed to the process of 
tendering the Other, is apparent in White Noise. This novel, so celebrated for its 
visions of simulation and simulacra, but so often limited to readings of postmodern 
depthlessness, presents an encounter with Otherness that completely outstrips and 
undermines the precession of simulacra the novel ostensibly records. Otherness in this 
novel appears as the excess beyond the understandings and motivations of DeLillo’s 
characters, and yet the purpose of this is to place in relief the novel’s most 
consistently foregrounded, and tender, human folly: the addiction to signs, making 
signs, story-making, story-telling, and allegory. The “point” of White Noise is not so 
much about the predominance of modes of relentless simulation consequent to a 
certain saturation of consciousness by media and agents of consumption (although 
White Noise undoubtedly chronicles this), but rather to see such events and conditions 
as more or less useful, compelling, or faithful allegories for something in excess of the 
limits of representation. Simulation and representation continually recur in the novel 
because its author is committed to testing and exposing such versions of reality (such 
allegories), for their effects, their relative tenderness, their relative ‘truth content’, if 
you like, against an environment more demonstrably and demotically simulacral. 
     In front of the “Most Photographed Barn in America” White Noise’s Murray 
Siskind tells Jack Gladney: “we’re not here to capture an image, but to maintain one” 
(WN, 12), that is to say, to maintain allegoricity. The given is that the Barn is Other, 
even in its very utility, its demotic quiddity, the barn, as object in the world, is 
somehow untouchable beyond its mediated aura, and perhaps with this notion we (the 
reader) will recognize that we are in the postmodern; but what makes this recognition 
merely a condition of DeLillo’s fiction is the fact that Murray and Jack are still there 
 18
to tender the allegory of the barn despite what is assumed about the postmodern and 
the split between word and world. DeLillo’s point would seem to be that we still have 
to be responsible for simulation, for allegory, more so in the postmodern, if we 
recognise that everything is allegorical. In front of the barn allegory itself becomes the 
issue and the article of faith, and this is because, as Sister Hermann-Marie later tells 
Jack, “[o]ur pretense is a dedication” (WN, 319). Real faith, real belief is, then, that 
which consists in allegory, that is, allegory demystified by irony, or what amounts to 
knowing the différance (the constant process of deferral and difference) at the heart of 
language.  Jack is, however, horrified by the Nun’s confession: “you’ve been praying 
for nothing all these years?” he asks, to which the nun replies “[f]or the world, dumb 
head” (WN, 318). The Nun’s faith is, we might say, ‘faithful’, because she is aware of 
the “pretense” of the allegories of faith, because hers is a faith that, in order to be truly 
faithful and not merely the execution of a duty, must be ironic. 
     Our faith is language15 when it is understood, through irony, as the possibility of 
Otherness: the Nun exercises her faith in the Other – as an artist like DeLillo does – 
by first of all exercising her faith in language and, in doing so, making plain her belief 
that all the allegories of a language of belief (religion) are themselves only allegorical. 
To pray for the Other (whether this means God or “the world, dumbhead”) is to 
conduct prayer through the fallenness of language – its tenderness – acknowledging as 
one does so that the only faithful application of language to Otherness is one 
composed in irony where the Other is articulated by what our allegories cannot 
articulate. The Nun’s “dedication” to “pretense” is simultaneously a dedication to 
language and to Otherness. In the revelation of language’s (and our own) fallenness, 
the Other is most faithfully articulated as Other – at once a renunciation and a loving 




     As should be apparent from my title this thesis insists on a central allegory: 
tenderness. Tenderness is an allegory that bears within itself, as its allegory (as its 
theme or meaning), the very force of irony that exposes all allegories, names and 
theories as conceptually tender, as weak or delicate, as merely vessels for a process of 
                                                 
15 As James Axton says in The Names: “[t]his is what we bring to the temple, not prayer or chant or 
slaughtered rams. Our offering is language” (331). 
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representation, as fallen, profane and human tokens of something always Other. 
Throughout this thesis, this allegory (tenderness), along with its variants: tender and 
tendering, is proposed as a sort of base demand, an assumption underpinning a certain 
philosophy of language, subjectivity and art, articulated in DeLillo’s novels. I suggest 
also that because such a philosophy is premised on the consideration of the Other, or 
Otherness, issues of faith and the ethical are brought to bear on what are essentially 
aesthetic considerations. Essentially, then, this thesis is an exploration of tenderness, 
as an “ironic allegory” crucial to the work of DeLillo. Before saying a little more in 
this introduction about this ironic allegory (tenderness), I must first set out the main 
ways in which I interpret the term in this thesis.16 In what I say by way of the 
following definitions of tenderness I should add that it is usual for me to imply several 
of the following connotations at any given time in my use of the term, and that, 
despite the order in which I mention the following definitions, I do not suggest any 
particular hierarchy among them. 
     “To tender”, meaning to make an “offer” or “appeal for acceptance”, catches 
something of this sense, and as I see it, suggests the process (tendering) we commit to 
in trying to put names to people, objects, ideas etc., a process we, in fact, are 
constantly inside in so far as all our allegories, coming from the Other, are always 
destined to (serve as words or allegories for) the Other. We tender the world with 
language, just as the relationship we have with others, the experience of 
intersubjectivity, is also a process of tendering. The recognition of the primacy of the 
Other to all language-acts provides qualification for a further elaboration: the Other 
exposes to us the tender (the “delicate”, “weak”, underdetermined, “contingent”, 
“fragile”) nature of our allegories, and thus, ourselves as subjects (subject to 
language). Nevertheless, language is all we have, in fact, it is the “currency” we have 
with which to negotiate the world – allegories, we might say, are tokens of the law of 
language, they are like “legal tender” and as such they enable our commerce with 
Others within the economy of language. Allegories we might say, stretching further 
the sense of tender, are our “vessels of conveyance”. Where we propose with care and 
consideration certain allegories or readings we are tender, “sensitive” to the effects of 
such commerce, the possibility of pain, an other’s pain or well-being, and thus to be 
                                                 
16 For the sake of reference I am obliged to note that I have consulted The Oxford English Dictionary 
(Second Edition). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989 (vol xvii, pp768-772), in the process of glossing my 
various uses of this term. All terms appearing in quotation marks in the above are taken from the 
definitions provided in this text. 
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“tender of” or to “become tender” is also to have reflected on the Otherness of the 
other-person, to have reflected on the Otherness of the Other. In order to become 
tender we must propose as tender (as forms of tenderness) our theories or 
philosophies, our judgements or actions. Thus, to regard or treat others with 
tenderness (to “hold dear”, “esteem” or “cherish”) is also to make tender (supple, 
“fragile”, “sensitive”) our offerings and representations.  The possibility we have of 
recognising the tenderness of our allegories (that all we can do is tender them, offer 
them), of recognising ourselves as tender of Others, and of recognising ourselves as 
sites of tenderness within the world, comes to us as a possibility of irony, the medium 
of the articulation of Otherness. Allegories are tender – “immaterial”, “easily broken”, 
vulnerable to “tactless treatment”, but this tenderness (the fact of their constant 
tendering of new referents) is also a defining feature of allegory. So we must have a 
“tender regard” for allegory and language, and for this reason DeLillo holds language 
“dear”, as something to “cherish”. The result is what the Oxford describes as a “tender 
philosophy”, one that is “susceptible to moral or spiritual influence”. A theory of 
irony, or art, or, say, the late novels of Don DeLillo, will be tender, as I propose it, 
since it will not sustain anything so rigorous as a ‘theory’, except perhaps, as a theory 
of tendering which is itself always also a tendering of theory, a deconstruction of the 
very process that leads us, inevitably, to allegory.  
     A tender allegory will be one that, in light of its profound relationship to irony – its 
role as a trace-like articulation of Otherness – tenders further meanings and referents 
because of its underdetermination of referentiality; a tender allegory will bear within 
its structure the force of its undoing, its negation or reversibility (the possibility that it 
could mean its opposite). The writer or artist of such an allegory is content to sign this 
irony in the structure of their allegories because they understand that this is the very 
principle of the economy of language, the principle by which such possibilities of 
difference and invention (any possibility that relies on an imagining beyond the 
known) are possible. Such allegories tender new possibilities in thought, 
interpretation, representation etc., by recognising the tenderness of their structure, and 
how this is itself a trait of the constitutive, and instituting force of Otherness. Non, or 
less, tender allegories will, in the first instance, be conceived of in such a way as to 
occlude the knowledge of irony in their structure.         
     What DeLillo’s novels tender is the process to allegory, not so much the allegories 
themselves, but what is risked, what is wasted, what is engendered and what is lost in 
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the tendering of this Otherness through the tenderness of language. The gap or aporia 
that Philip Nel observed becomes in DeLillo’s novels (and for some of his characters) 
the space of an Otherness by which our allegories may be judged more or less tender, 
an ethical and faith-oriented space where DeLillo asks the reader to exert the greatest 
scrutiny in assessing the qualities of our intersections of words with world. My 
argument, then, is that any useful vision of irony inheres not in theorising irony as 
something in particular, but rather in deconstructing the inevitable allegorization of 
irony into theory. Any good reading of DeLillo’s novels recognises that it is not so 
much what these texts are “about”17 that is important to DeLillo, so much as reading 
the demand expressed in the texts that they present and we uncover the work involved 
in the making of meaning, that we examine the tendency to allegory that DeLillo’s 
texts constantly seek to deconstruct. This is why artist figures and artworks feature so 
prominently in these novels. My focus is not so much what irony or a DeLillo text is 
translated as, but rather the process of translation itself that is drawn attention to by 
DeLillo’s investigation of irony in his fiction. To this end DeLillo’s texts not only 
examine the tenderness of what we call meaning, but observe also, and qualify, our 
tendering of allegories. In this regard, DeLillo is himself a practitioner of 
“deconstruction”, not so interested in the connections made within a text (a culture 
etc.) as much as he is interested in examining the urge to connect; in the process 
DeLillo reveals not only the structure of meaning, but also the ambitions, 
assumptions, and motives beneath such connection-making. 
 
(v) DeLillo’s Deconstruction 
 
DeLillo, like his contemporary, Derrida, is a writer of memory and Otherness, and for 
myself, in a thesis that reads DeLillo with what I take as the tender-theory most 
sympathetic and contemporaneous to his work, deconstruction, what is apparent is 
how both authors explore the question of Otherness through their engagement with 
                                                 
17 But, of course, DeLillo’s texts are also about things, but always this ‘about’ is contextualised by the 
way DeLillo’s texts foreground or examine their own semantic and signifying structures, as well as the 
processes of making meaning enacted in the cultures and by the individuals his novels are ‘about’. 
And, of course, in my tendering of the novels, I shall constantly be suggesting what his allegories are 
about as well. 
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irony.18 Already I have made mention of memory and Otherness and suggested their 
relationship to what I refer to as irony, and although the relating of these terms is 
crucial to the argument of the thesis, I would, for now, like to sketch how these terms, 
as I use them, come to tender each other, and for this I refer to Derrida and what he 
calls the “suffering from the loss of memory”19 that is at the heart of Derrida’s 
writing. What I am about to suggest is that what Derrida means by this “suffering” 
and loss of memory is also what I mean by irony. One consequence of this 
“suffering”, in fact an inevitability, is that the Derridean notion of mourning is seen to 
describe the experience of being subject.  
If there were an experience of loss at the heart of all this, the only loss for which I could never 
be consoled and that brings together all the others, I would call it loss of memory. The suffering 
at the origin of writing for me is the suffering from the loss of memory, not only forgetting or 
amnesia, but the effacement of traces. I would not need to write otherwise; my writing is not in 
the first place a philosophical writing or that of an artist, even if, in certain cases, it might look 
like that or take over from these other kinds of writing. My first desire is not to produce a 
philosophical work or a work of art: it is to preserve memory.20
 
This “loss of memory” is what happens when we name and incorporate the world, the 
Other, through allegory. Derrida, typically, leaves us here with an irony or aporia in 
so far as the attempt to “preserve memory” is one conducted through the “effacement 
of traces”, which is to say, through the loss of memory, through ‘suffering’. Here, we 
begin to see the ironic structure of Derrida’s mourning, something I will examine in 
my first chapter. 
     Like DeLillo, what Derrida means by ‘memory’, here, is Otherness in general – all 
that is lost to the subject from the moment of the present, from the subject’s 
articulation of the present, and their recourse to allegory. Irony is, I suggest, the best 
way we have of understanding the loss that Derrida situates at the “origin of writing” 
                                                 
18 I should mention here that I do not read Derrida’s writings as an influence on DeLillo’s work; rather, 
I observe how both men appear to be writing in a way, and in relation to a set of demands and 
assumptions, that suggest that both writers could be termed deconstructionists. I use the term 
“deconstruction” reluctantly, and if it has any meaning at all here it lies in the fact of those co-
ordinating sympathies that bridge the differences between DeLillo and Derrida. This is not a thesis on 
deconstruction, but I do find that Derrida’s texts, especially those that deal with what he calls mourning 
(and because of his affinities with the likes of Benjamin, Levinas, and de Man), help signal the 
significance of DeLillo’s texts – his engagement with irony, his ethics, the question of faith, the work 
of art – like few other theorists or DeLillo scholars can or have. 
19 The phrase carries within its ease a subtlety worth considering: the “loss of memory” is one thing to 
consider fairly straightforwardly as the forgotten, or all that fails to be retained in the memory of the 
subject. But what this phrase also suggests is that loss is of memory; that loss is crucial to the working 
of memory, and that what is called memory is, in fact, something constituted by the losses it suffers in 
much the same way that the economy of signs is constituted by its non-presences, its differences and 
delays. 
20 See Points…:Interviews, 1974 – 1994 (ed. Elizabeth Weber; trans. Peggy Kamuf and others). 1995. 
p. 143. 
 23
as Otherness and memory. This is the loss for which we, like Derrida, can never 
successfully mourn, and in fact, must hope never to have ‘resolved’, as this is the loss 
that gives life to the economy; indeed, we might say that this loss is the desire of the 
economy. Derrida presents us here with a way of thinking Otherness, as well as 
“memory”, as the “effacement of traces” or all that is not kept in the presenting of the 
present, in the presence of presence. As Derrida says, were it not for this loss 
(something recognised in irony) “I would not need to write otherwise”21. The gap or 
aporia observed in irony (the “loss”) – the force of irony itself – is responsible for 
writing, is the compelling force of allegory. As such we can see how, within this 
thinking of writing and language, it is irony that impels the writing, though this 
writing will never actually achieve the “consolation” Derrida desires. Irony, we are 
now in a position to say, demonstrates that it is Otherness (the Other), that impels 
writing. Irony is an articulation (an impossible one since it formalises a relationship to 
the unnameable) of Otherness. Irony impels the name with the same breath that it 
mourns what the name misses. We mourn what remains Other. In the very act of 
preserving memory, we suffer again the loss of memory, though this is what is always 
at stake in writing and naming, and is what, in fact, allows for resistance, difference, 
interpretation, invention, Otherness and the ethical in our writing and reading 
practices. This paradox, as DeLillo would see it, is, I take it, the salutary point of 
irony. 
     But why write, then? How can writing assert difference and the possibility for 
better or worse instances and practices; how can it support critique, if all art and 
literature are merely rehearsals or repetitions of loss? What sets apart some acts of 
preservation (of memory) as ethical, more truthful, more original than others? Derrida 
gives us the following by way of an answer and, in a sense, I’d suggest this is the 
ambient condition to DeLillo’s novels of memory and naming as well. So, against the 
charge of mere repetition, Derrida must be clear about the repetition involved in his 
mourning or tendering of literature, philosophy and art.  
When I say: “I love repetition,” I am lamenting the impossibility of repeating. I would like to 
repeat all the time, to repeat everything, which is affirmation. […] This is an affirmative desire 
in the sense in which Nietzsche defined the eternal return in its relation to desire: let everything 
return eternally. I have the feeling there is loss when I know that things don’t repeat and that the 
repetition I love is not possible; this is what I call loss of memory, the loss of repetition, not 
repetition in the mechanical sense of the term, but of resurrection, resuscitation, regeneration. So 
                                                 
21 In typically Derridean fashion we are to read here both the force of Derrida’s injunction to write 
(“otherwise” he would need not) as well as his desire to “write otherwise” – to write in respect of the 
Other, in memory of Otherness, to write with irony and resistance. 
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I write in order to keep. But keeping is not a dull and dead archiving. It is at bottom a question 
of infinite memories, of limitless memories which would not necessarily be a philosophical or 
literary work, simply a great repetition. What I admire in the philosopher, what interests me 
most in others, finally, is that they try to construct the most economical machines for repeating. 
They place themselves at that point of the discourse where one has the greatest mastery over it, 
over discourse as an act of memory, of all memory in advance, which permits the formalization 
in an economical manner for the maximum of things to be said and thought. In this sense, for 
me, the philosopher is above all a guardian of memory: someone who asks himself questions 
about truth, Being, language, in order to keep, between truth and keeping. 22
 
What is referred to here, as the “most economical machine for repeating”, is then that 
text that, through its relationship to irony, continually tenders Otherness, and thus the 
repeating of all that might be lost, all memory. In Derrida’s terms the promise of 
‘repeating’, qualified in the previous quotation as “regeneration” and “resurrection”, 
is that of the “maximum of things to be said and thought”. The hope for such 
inexhaustible textuality is also then the hope for the resistant text, the text of irony as 
Culler has pointed out.23  
     Those whom Derrida calls “guardian[s] of memory” are, then, in DeLillo, those 
whom we come to think of as the artists of his novels. Once again we have returned to 
the intersection or crossing with which I began. Here this crossing lies at the juncture 
of memory (Otherness) and the articulation of this in the act of repeating (naming). 
Similarly, this is the crossing of what Derrida, after Heidegger, calls “truth and 
keeping”.24 The artist or writer, as much for DeLillo as Derrida, I would argue, will 
be the figure who, for example, keeps themself between memory and presence, like 
the writer who occupies a place between Otherness and theory (naming), irony and 
allegory. For the artist to “keep between” these is to maintain the economy of 
language (to commit to allegory) but also to maintain the promise of the “maximum 
of things to be said and thought”; this promise can only be ‘kept’ (in allegory) in the 
name of irony. To do this is to “ask questions about truth, being, [and] language” and 
when Derrida and DeLillo write texts, as I argue they do, ‘about’ Otherness (in the 
manner of mourning, the manner of irony) this is what they are attempting to do. 
Thus, Derrida can say: “what opens meaning and language is writing as the 
                                                 
22 See Points… (p. 144). This quote also helps explain the difficulties (if not also the anal-retentive 
quality) of reading Derrida, as it is his willingness for everything to repeat, and for as little as possible 
to be lost that sees his texts going all out to keep, preserve and relate as much of the irony, Otherness 
and memory that will be lost with the inevitable and necessary flexion into narrative, allegory and 
presence. 
23 See Flaubert: The Uses of Uncertainty (1974) where Culler speaks of  “[…] the negative capability 
which is reputedly the feature of the greatest works” (190). 
24 “Truth”, we might say, is the force of irony seen as the ‘truth’ that language shelters the loss of 
memory. Keeping is allegorical, is allegory itself. 
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disappearance of natural presence”.25 What opens meaning and language is irony, and 
the best, most ethical and literary writing will be that which bares itself to this 
knowledge. 
 
(vi) The Chapters 
 
 
My first chapter “Tendering Allegory: The Tenderness of Irony and Deconstruction”, 
serves to elaborate my ‘theory’ of irony through the ‘ironic’ principles of Derrida’s 
‘deconstruction’. Emphasis in this chapter falls mainly on Derrida’s notion of 
mourning, though I do prepare the reader for this discussion by contextualising irony 
within Derrida’s economy of terms and ‘concepts’. The point, however, is to 
demonstrate how in order to propose an idea of tenderness one must first find a tender 
(ironic) language for it. Such a language is prepared in deconstruction (an 
“impossible” theory, as Derrida has himself described it), and as I see it, this is 
because while deconstruction can be said to propose a ‘theory’ of irony, it does so 
only because it constantly highlights the irony of theory – of ‘doing’ theory. As a 
consequence of such an examination of irony (or Otherness for Derrida) we must – 
and this is the exigency Derrida places at the heart of deconstruction – make all 
appeals to knowledge, truth, world, Other, etc., as tender as possible. The language 
discussed in this chapter – of faith, the ethical, the Other, temporality – is, I argue, to 
be found in DeLillo’s texts, and is, in fact, an expression of DeLillo’s general and 
philosophical assumptions about subjectivity, language and the work of art. In this 
chapter we will see that the aporia of irony in deconstruction becomes the 
impossibility that Derrida has explicitly expressed hope for in the name of 
deconstruction.26 Impossibility, as thought in deconstruction, becomes the tender 
point of Derrida’s theory, its tenderness, but also its raison d’être as argument, 
invention, and mourning – an economy of tenderness. 
     My second chapter “The Fallen Wonder of the World” deals with DeLillo’s The 
Body Artist and, as I read it, can be seen as a “fable” (or allegory) of deconstruction. 
This is to say, The Body Artist employs, most clearly of the novels discussed in this 
thesis, the “language” and assumptions we found in Chapter One on deconstruction. 
                                                 
25 See Of Grammatology (trans. Gayatri Spivak). 1974. p.159. 
26 Derrida has often declared the opinion (in fact I’d say it amounts to a hope of his) that deconstruction 
is impossible and that it loses nothing from admitting this. See, for example, “Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other”. Reading de Man Reading (1989). p.36.  
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For this reason I place my discussion of The Body Artist in the thesis before my 
discussion of the earlier novel, Underworld.  In a sense, The Body Artist is a novel 
that tenders the idea of invention within the experience of irony, in the memory of 
Otherness, and in such a way as to make consideration of where we stop when faced 
with the infinity and impossibility of irony; although saturated in the perspective of its 
protagonist and narrator, the novel is ostensibly a meditation on the more generally 
human issue of translating the world of experience as one’s experience of the world – 
how, where, and when we chose to tender, with names, the world. What I refer to as 
the “world” here, in line with my association of it with Otherness, is what crashes in 
on Lauren with the sudden suicide of her lover; death, trauma, and loss, thus present 
her with an experience of Otherness that is also the experience of exposing one’s 
subjectivity, one’s philosophy to ironization. Lauren’s passage through this 
experience is what generates her art-work (which is also, of course, remembering the 
death of her partner, a mourning work). In contrast to much of Underworld, The Body 
Artist is “about” an attempt made by a single person to let irony and Otherness have 
its sway as much as is possible without rejecting language, time, and subjectivity or 
lapsing into violence and paranoia. 
     As I’ve said, I begin with The Body Artist in my discussion of DeLillo’s texts since 
I read it as a sort of author’s handbook to the other novels. Not surprisingly, then, the 
text can be seen to be organised around a series of rhetorical and philosophical 
questions: “how much myth do we build into our experience of time” (TBA, 98), the 
artist asks, and indeed, one of the governing themes of the novel and my treatment of 
it is the relation of time (Otherness) to allegory. The question Lauren asks towards the 
end of the novel, “is reality too powerful for you?” (C, 122), is very much about the 
Otherness that lies in excess of our mythologized and mediated “realities”, about the 
‘real’ that exists in excess of language, narration and subjectivity; it is a question 
about what is at stake in our translations of the ‘real world’, and what sort of 
translation of this powerful alterity is possible. Essentially, DeLillo seems to be 
saying, it takes something that we call art to manage such a translation, though this is 
an ‘art’ that can only be ‘promised’ or tendered and, moreover, only promised by, and 
in, irony. What makes the text a treatise on tenderness is this sense of irony. As 
Lauren comes to realise, the limits of allegory, myth and language, when seen as 
tender, are crucial to the creation and ‘promise’ of art.  
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     My third chapter deals with DeLillo’s Underworld. All that is private, discrete, 
singular and miniature in The Body Artist’s exploration of Otherness is prepared for, 
and made possible in some sense, by the massive scope of Underworld and its broad 
and rigorous analysis of the public, economic, and political responses of a culture to 
Otherness. Underworld, like The Body Artist, shares the concern with the work of art, 
but also takes in its ambit a plurality of cause and effect relations originating in 
Otherness: violence and paranoia recur as common effects, but so too, DeLillo 
appears to suggest, does the culture’s reflex of commodity production and 
consumption. Again, as with The Body Artist, the primary context for this novel’s 
investigation of Otherness is memory, evoked often as an underworld of waste and 
excess that exists beyond  (beneath) the limited and rigidly enforced allegories of the 
capitalist system. Underworld is “about” the systems (read capitalism) that enable a 
certain forgetting of memory, as well as the construction of false, tender-less memory 
– how the capitalist system works to disremember its past (the Other, the experiences 
of Otherness lodged in a culture’s collective memory), and the consequences of this 
on the host culture’s modes of representation. 
     Art, memory, and allegory are constantly the major themes of the three novels I 
look at; all are linked by their relation to Otherness and irony. Taken together, these 
texts map out DeLillo’s principles of writing, his philosophy of language, subjectivity 
and art. My final chapter thus finds in DeLillo’s latest novel Cosmopolis, a reprise and 
elaboration of many of the themes and concerns discussed in the thesis so far. Eric 
Packer, the protagonist of Cosmopolis, can be read as a composite or mnemonic to all 
the characters that dominate DeLillo’s texts; as his name suggests, he is one of the 
pack, all packed into one. Cosmopolis is ‘about’ theory, more specifically, about the 
sort of application of theory that DeLillo’s own novels have so often been subjected 
to, and knowing of DeLillo’s distaste for such overly-theoretical readings, it might be 
seen that Cosmopolis, in fact, subjects theory to an encounter with Otherness. What 
the novel comes up with is a kind of deconstruction of theory that leaves us on the 
tender boundary (or “intersection”) of irony and allegory.  
 
*  *  * 
 
     The essential experience of irony (as figure of impossibility) is Otherness, an 
Otherness that can be thought, as DeLillo and others appear to, as the memory of all 
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the “abandoned meanings” (WN, 184), “[t]he sand-grained manyness of things that 
can’t be counted” (U, 60), the excess lost in one’s experience of the present. Irony 
bares us to this excess and, as such, irony is revealed as the articulation of a notion of 
memory (the impossible memory of Otherness) that turns out to be the most vital and 
necessary impossibility of the whole economy within which subjectivity inheres. In 
tendering what I am calling the ethical (ironic) work of DeLillo’s texts, I hope also to 
show the tenderness of irony and its “ethical” demand. Throughout what follows in 
this thesis, I argue that irony is the primary mode of DeLillo’s late novels; from his 
engagement with irony comes his philosophy of language which, seen as a practice of 
tenderness, enables an ethical means of articulating his great subject matter: 
Otherness. By such a tender philosophy DeLillo is able to declare his faith in 
language (the fallen form) as well as his faith in an Otherness in excess of language. 
Irony, it appears, enables DeLillo, through the medium of his texts, to use language to 
talk about language, more generally, to speak from with certain conditions – 
ontological, linguistic, and economic – that prescribe the possibilities of speech and 
writing, because of its articulation of Otherness.  For this reason this thesis will be 
“about” the impossible (something that undermines my use of “about” in the previous 
pages) and its betrayal in the possible. Impossibility (Otherness) we might say is my 
subject, though I articulate it here through irony. The consequence of this is also a 
kind of hope or promise embedded in the writing of DeLillo (and Derrida), a claim for 
a philosophy of tenderness proposed as a philosophy of writing or art.  
     Of course, to propose a theory of tenderness (as I’ve outlined it) in this thesis is to 
return to the question of irony (and mourning), though this time as the problem of 
writing about irony and mourning. One can’t say what irony is, just as one can’t, 
finally, achieve “successful mourning” as, on both counts, irony and mourning will be 
diminished or cancelled by this effort. As such, both present a sort of aporia or 
impossibility that language cannot assuage. This is as much a problem of writing a 
thesis on irony as it is, in the end, of writing itself, and specifically the ethical writing 
of Derrida and DeLillo. Indeed, one might even say that it is this awareness that is 
what animates the writing of these two figures; it is the insight at the heart of their 
work, and the exigency of their expression and articulation. This, then, would be one 
of Derrida and DeLillo’s major points: writing, in so far as it may be ethical or that it 
may come to be “literature”, needs to be seen as a ‘form’ and ‘practice’ of irony, and 
this is not an insight that ceases with the notion of writing as phonemic inscription, 
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but one that extends to that more generalised concept of writing Derrida signifies by 
his use of the word “textuality”, which implies all acts of translation and transaction 
between memory, Otherness, and the present, within and across subjectivities, 
societies and cultures. The inability to make fully present DeLillo’s “meaning” is thus 
paralleled in the impossibility of defining irony, though this failure is the point of the 
endeavour, as it is the ‘lesson’ of literature and the ‘truth’ of language.27 Essentially, 
this is the lesson of irony – the irony of irony, of Otherness and impossibility. I can 
only tender a theory of irony, just as I can only tender readings of DeLillo’s texts. 
Any discourse I set out will itself be vulnerable (tender), as it must tender itself in 
relation to an Otherness it can never fully articulate. But this is what turns out to be 
the demand of DeLillo’s “deconstruction”, and the basis for what it would deem the 
ethical, and for what installs the necessity of vigorous reading practices. Theory must 
always be tendered – deconstruction for example, like a DeLillo text, is tender 
because it bears the pressure of the tendering process – that is to say, it is a 

















                                                 
27 See de Man: “[t]o the extent that it is necessarily misleading, language just as necessarily conveys 
the promise of its own truth” (Allegories of Reading, 277). Here we can see that ‘truth’ is an effect of 
irony (the force that is “necessary misleading”), while language can promise its truth only through 
irony.  
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In many regards all of what has been said so far about the relationship of the 
impossible Other, its articulation through irony, and the relationship of both Otherness 
and irony with allegory (the possible, the fallen and profane sign), is expressed in a 
single image taken from DeLillo’s The Body Artist. Lauren comes across this ‘image’ 
after venturing into the cupola of the house in search of the origin of a noise – a 
“calculated stealth” (41) – she has heard before, but now hears again after the death of 
her partner. In looking for the source of this noise she is, without knowing so, looking 
for the figure of Otherness, Tuttle, she finds the next day. What is important about this 
passage is the suggestion DeLillo appears to make in it that the discovery of the Other 
is always associated with the discovery of a sign of the Other. On this day Lauren 
does not find Tuttle, but rather  
a twirling leaf in the air beneath a tree branch that extended over the roof. There was no sign of 
a larva web from which the leaf might be suspended, or a strand of some bird’s nest-building 
material. Just the leaf in midair, turning. (TBA, 41)  
 
What we note here is the evocation of an impossibility (the oddity of this turning leaf) 
made conspicuous through association with a sign (the leaf). What DeLillo is 
presenting is a parable of the inevitable relationship of allegory (sign) and Otherness. 
In looking for the Other, Lauren finds an allegory – the allegory of the leaf, a herald 
of Otherness, but also a reminder of the inevitable turning fall of language. The point, 
it seems, is this: an openness to the possibility of the Other may reveal our experience 
of allegoricity, and vice versa, an experience of our allegoricity may open us to a 
perception of the Other. The leaf, turning impossibly in mid-air, is not only an 
allegory of this Otherness, but in the manner expressed by Benjamin, is in fact an 
allegory of allegory. For Benjamin the “turning” of allegory (and here we must 
remember that the word trope – what allegory is – means to turn28) is its defining 
characteristic as fallen trope, “somersaulting” in the abyss of signification.  
As those who lose their footing turn somersaults in their fall, so would the allegorical intention 
fall from emblem to emblem down into the dizziness of its bottomless depths, were it not that, 
                                                 
28De Man, after Northrop Frye, reminds us that trope means turn, the turning of language away from 
the literal, for example. See “The Concept of Irony” in Aesthetic Ideology [hereafter AI]. 
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even in the most extreme of them, it had so to turn about that all its darkness, vainglory, and 
godlessness seems to be nothing but self-delusion.29
 
     The perception of allegory, not as some stable entity, some contractual 
mimeticism, but as this tumbling and turning fall from one sign to another, from one 
referent to another, so much so that allegory comes to reverse itself and negate its 
anterior meanings, is dependent on the conception of irony at work in allegory; 
indeed, it is by such an ironic vision that one’s perception of Otherness may be 
availed by the perception of allegorical tenderness – the very allegoricity of allegory, 
its constitution as constantly tendered and re-tendered, a constantly tendering trope 
impelled by an Otherness impossible for it to contain. The Other becomes the 
consideration affected by such tumbling allegories, since in all their turning they most 
faithfully signify an Otherness that must necessarily be beyond them. In a manner that 
suggests the structure of dialectic, the very profanity of such allegories indicates the 
necessity of a sacred Otherness that they can only mourn or trace, as signs of the 
absence of this Other. The way such “ironic allegories” remain faithful to Otherness is 
by virtue of their constant “misreading” and misrepresentation of it; by the force of 
their fallenness they stimulate and institute new allegories, new readings, new 
interpretations; the tumbling turn of allegory is a way of conceiving of possibility 
itself within the semiotic economy, and the result of all this ironic undoing of 
allegorical coincidence is difference.  
     As Susan Handleman has said of Benjamin’s vision of allegory, it becomes “that 
very mode of philosophical contemplation which strives for the salvation of 
phenomena by the ruthless unmasking of their fallenness – a melancholy science”.30 
Paul de Man, it ought to be said, does not share with Benjamin such theological 
overtones or even, for that matter, Derrida’s emphasis on the Other, but this 
                                                 
29 See Benjamin’s The Origin of German Tragic Drama (trans. John Osborne). 1985. p.232. I’ll take 
the opportunity here to provide a little background to the quotation and, with this, elaborate a little on 
some of Benjamin’s language. Thus, what Benjamin refers to as the “afterlife” of a work – its 
endurance, if you like – is a consequence of the possibility of its iteration, the turning of the work, as an 
allegory, upon itself into different readings, new referents – all of which constitutes the ruination of 
allegory, its “mortification” which is a kind of Benjaminian synonym of criticism, or what we can think 
of as the work of exposing the limits of a work for the sake of exposing its relation to its iterative 
potential, its reproducibility. The revelation of “self-delusion” means that in recognizing the subjective 
nature of all allegories – their contingency, their iteration – we might reveal to ourselves that we are not 
helpless regarding hegemonic allegorical structures, since allegory has it in its structure (irony) to be 
re-written, re-read; allegories of “darkness”, thus, by the force of irony (this “turning”) may turn again 
to be resurrected as allegories of light. 
30 See Handelman, Fragments of Redemption: Jewish Thought and Literary Theory in Benjamin, 
Scholem, and Levinas. (1991). p. 124. 
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appreciation of allegory as well as this mournful melancholy science is what is 
nevertheless central to de Man’s ‘theory’ of irony and more generally the work of 
deconstruction as performed in the texts of Derrida and DeLillo.31 This chapter, as 
I’ve suggested in my introduction, sets out to describe the assumptions and economic 
considerations at work in deconstruction that are performed in DeLillo’s texts. 
Essentially I seek to ‘define’ irony through deconstruction (as a melancholy science or 
mode of mourning), and through irony’s relationship to allegory. As such, this chapter 
is, in fact, an exploration of allegory, but allegory understood as an effect of the 
‘turning-force’ that is irony. Allegory, as I will continue to argue in my chapters 
devoted to DeLillo’s texts, needs to be seen as an effect of ironic articulation, as a 
“fallen wonder”, a trace left by the mourning of something Other. If it is possible to 
detect a rhyme of sorts at play in the comparison of DeLillo’s impossible, turning leaf 
and the somersaulting of Benjamin’s allegories – both of which are images crucially 
involved in the evocation of Otherness – this is because in investigating language and 
allegory, both writers are tendering a “theory” of irony. Indeed, this is a way of 
considering the most faithful approach to theorising irony, recognising that one can 
only ‘theorise’ irony through the process of tendering allegory, since irony is never 
anything, is never an object or sign, never remains behind as a narrative, but is only 
ever tendered in an allegory. Allegories remain, even as mournful objects, the ruins of 
what they no longer contain; allegory is how we can ‘know’ irony, speak of it, render 
it, since, as has been said of irony “objectively, there is nothing there to interpret”.32 
For a theory of allegory to be a faithful theory of allegory it must, in the first instance 
be a theory of irony. As I will suggest throughout this chapter, to tender a theory of 
irony is to reveal the tenderness of allegory.  
     Essentially, this chapter proposes a theory of irony through the “language” of what 
I see as the tender and ironic “theory” par excellence, deconstruction. Such a 
language, as evinced, “theorized” and tendered by de Man and Derrida provides not 
only the assumptions behind my philosophy of tenderness, but also the assumptions 
that underpin DeLillo’s work. Deconstruction, I argue, is structured like irony, in fact, 
structured as something very much like the necessary failure of apprehending irony or 
                                                 
31The theological emphasis of Benjamin in relation of irony and allegory (language) is, in the 
poststructural work of Derrida and DeLillo, supplemented and redefined to evoke an Otherness no 
longer tied to the notion of the transcendental, but rather a more earthly evocation of an immanent 
infinity (Otherness, memory) that can be thought of as the matrix of human possibility. 
32 See Teskey, Gordon. Allegory and Violence. (1996).p. 61. 
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what it articulates, Otherness. As I will show, deconstruction generates meaning and 
an economy because of its ironic infrastructure, its perpetual proposal of ironic, 
aporetic structures. Indeed, in so far as deconstruction can be said to always inhabit 
that which it critiques, it is always already an ironic form, but in such a way as to 
tender its own processes while tendering what lies beyond those processes. 
Deconstruction places itself in quotation marks, we might say, à la Benjamin; it 
endorses, perhaps is even a name for, the tumbling turning force of re-interpretation 
and difference, a somersaulting and ironic fall through supplemental signifiers where 
the force of deconstruction is equivalent to that of criticism, ruination, mortification, 
revealing the fallen, profane and tender “trope” as trace of the Other. In simple terms, 
this chapter on deconstruction provides us with a way of understanding what I see as 
DeLillo’s philosophy of language, and from this, understanding what I refer to in 
DeLillo’s novels as the work of irony in the work of art. 
 
(ii) Irony in the Work of deconstruction. 
 
 
The version of ‘deconstruction’ I propose is composed of a tendering of de Man’s 
philosophy of language and Derridean economic and ethical concerns, in other words, 
a consequence of introducing de Man’s irony to Derridean différance. To understand 
the importance of the play of allegory and irony (the goal of this section of the 
chapter), and as such, the primacy of irony to the entire Demanic economy, we have 
to first understand de Man’s primary assumptions about language. Werner Hamacher, 
in typically Demanic fashion, tenders such assumptions, but not before taking 
language itself to the brink of some failure, the impossibility of its promise. 
Language for de Man is … a promise; as finite, language is never already constituted, language 
always is promised; but since its promise can never be fulfilled by itself as promised, this 
promise, at once the suspension of language, brackets itself – language – and confesses, since it, 
despite its endless suspension, thus despite its impossibility, is ‘effective,’ that it is a failed 
linguistic performance, a parapraxis, and lapsus linguae. 33
 
The promise of language lies in what Hamacher would see as its impossibility or 
Otherness, where language is “never already constituted”, is not yet a constituted 
language. Language cannot fulfil this promise, but it can be faithful to this promise, 
nonetheless, through the “confession” of its failure; because of its very failure to fulfil 
the promise, language promises again. This is why we can experience difference in 
                                                 
33 See Reading De Man Reading (eds. Wlad Godzich; Lindsay Waters). 1989. p. 198. [hereafter RDR] 
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language and why, even in the most faithful interpretations, translations and 
repetitions, Otherness is opened on to. The settling of the promise in language – 
bracketing so as to give it duration and narrative – is what we call allegory, but the 
promise in excess, that makes the allegory possible even as it evades it, making 
further repetitions and interpretations possible, is what I refer to as irony. 
     Since, for de Man, language is a form of lapsus, we can say that the truth of 
language, and the truth of its promise, is irony. In irony, in this sense, we might 
situate both the promise (of Otherness) as well as the truth of the lapsus (and in this 
regard, the truth of allegory). Thus, in Allegories of Reading, to which Hamacher is 
himself responding, de Man writes, “to the extent that it is necessarily misleading, 
language just as necessarily conveys the promise of its own truth”.34 With such an 
understanding we are left to understand that “truth” will be misleading, and that what 
is misleading will always, in some sense, also be true of language. But truth is the 
promise that language conveys in its “going astray”, and for this reason a true promise 
could only be an irony.35 The truth of language is that it misleads. Therefore, the most 
faithful use of language will be that which admits its misprisions. Such is the force of 
this misleading quality of language that in our encounter with texts it is not a theory of 
reading so much as a theory of “misreading” we require, a theory of tendering 
premised on the awareness of the “fallen” tenderness of our uses of language.  It is for 
this reason that de Man is able to say something “true” and, at the same time, say 
something about truth when he says “[c]uriously enough, it seems to be only in 
describing a mode of language which does not mean what it says that one can actually 
say what one means”.36 Moreover, it is only in this way that we might also say 
something truthful about what it means to use language. 
     Perhaps needless to say, but for de Man, the “mode of language” most faithful to 
‘meaning’ is, of course, the ironic mode, or, more specifically, the mode de Man 
refers to as “literary language”. De Man values literary language precisely because of 
its relationship to failure and error as the very possibilities of its generation of 
meaning, its generation of what he calls misreadings. 
                                                 
34 See Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. 1979. p. 
277. [referred to hereafter as AR]. Here I associate what de Man refers to as the “necessary misleading” 
with the force of irony, thus relating irony and the “truth” of language in de Man’s thought. 
35 I use Wayne Booth’s phrase “going astray”, taken from his A Rhetoric of Irony, ironically here, 
contra  to his pejorative assessment of irony.   
36 See de Man. “The Rhetoric of Temporality” in Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism. 1983. p.211. [hereafter BI] 
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Literature as well as criticism – the difference between them being delusive – is condemned (or 
privileged) to be forever the most rigorous and, consequently, the most unreliable language in 
terms of which man names and transforms himself. (AR, 19)  
 
“Condemned” and “privileged”, “rigorous” and “unreliable”, these paradoxes are the 
conditions of literary language, and the relationship of such language to truth, of truth 
itself as a failed promise. De Man’s term for such a condition is rhetoricity, again, 
another name for a mode of language, as distinct from figural language, that appears 
to trace in its ‘structure’ a debt to irony. Thus, what de Man calls rhetorical language 
is figural language (naming etc) which has become aware of itself as figural, as split 
from the world it naïvely thought to have truly, naturally and faithfully mirrored. 
Rhetorical language (literary language) testifies to the ‘truth’ of language, its 
aberration and failure and thus to the truth of allegory – that is always the other face 
of irony. Because of the rhetoricity of language all readings are thus, for de Man, in 
fact, misreadings. As de Man has said: “[b]y a good misreading, I mean a text that 
produces another text which can itself be shown to be an interesting misreading, a text 
which engenders additional texts”.37  
     A good misreading is, then, what de Man praises in Derrida’s reading of 
Rousseau’s Confessions, just as it is also what he values about the ‘literary language’ 
of Rousseau’s text, an ironic text that goes beyond the allegorical or figural mode, 
[…] for as it accounts for its own mode of writing, it states at the same time the necessity of 
making this statement itself in an indirect, figural way that knows it will be misunderstood by 
being taken literally. Accounting for the ‘rhetoricity’ of its own mode, the text also postulates 
the necessity of its own misreading. It knows and asserts that it will be misunderstood. [this is 
why de Man applauds Derrida for his reading of Rousseau that goes out of its way “not to 
understand him” (135)] It tells the story, the allegory of its misunderstanding: the necessary 
degradation of melody into harmony, of language into painting, of the language of passion into 
the language of need, of metaphor into literal meaning. In accordance with its own language, it 
can only tell this story as a fiction, knowing full well that the fiction will be taken for fact and 
the fact for fiction; such is the necessarily ambivalent nature of literary language. (BI, 136) [my 
brackets] 
 
A text that accounts for its own “rhetoricity” and thus “postulates the necessity of its 
own misreading” is a text that will most resemble what I have been referring to, in the 
name of DeLillo’s texts, as the work of art. A reading, or text, or interpretation, 
practised in this way, opens itself to the truth of textuality and Otherness, but only 
because first of all such a reading is situated in a text, just as an irony must always be 
grounded in an allegory. As de Man says, 
                                                 
37 Quoted in Vincent B. Leitch. Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction. 1983. p.186. 
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[S]ince interpretation is nothing but the possibility of error, by claiming that a certain degree of 
blindness is part of the specificity of all literature we also reaffirm the absolute dependence of 
the interpretation on the text and of the text on the interpretation. (BI, 141) 
 
Hence, we cannot justify “transcendental readings”, but rather must read the text 
closely and competently. The most tender readings – those that for DeLillo I suggest 
qualify, and redeem, the work of art – are those that, in a profoundly contextual 
manner (which is to say, from within a host text) most faithfully reproduce the text’s 
very relation to its own reproducibility by the radical mortifying (ironising) of its 
allegorical presentations. This is only possible of the tenderest misreadings that, 
themselves, tender the contract we have, and that our texts and signs ought to be seen 
to bear, with Otherness. Deconstruction, we might say, in view of irony, always 
tenders an allegory of a misreading, but, as de Man has taught, the possibility of 
misreading is also the possibility of understanding. De Man’s theory of misreading is 
a theory of what I have been calling tendering – a mournful or melancholic process of 
tendering certain contingent errors or failures to the purpose of generating a semiotic 
economy whose relationship to error, loss, irony, is what generates further semiotic 
events, signs, etc. Such an economy enables the ethical at the point at which the 
impossible Otherness traced through its instances of error, is recognised as the excess 
it is a possibility of. 
     In effect, it is by what de Man says about irony – the impossible promise of 
language – and its other, its constituent, allegory, that we shall understand the 
tenderness of deconstruction. Hamacher, again, in a manner proleptic of my own 
destination in this chapter, ties this work, this relationship of allegory and irony, to the 
work of deconstruction – mourning – when he writes the following: 
No allegory can grasp the incidences of irony by which it is disrupted, none can catch up with 
the positing violence of the imperative, but each one – for each one remains exposed to its 
positing – must undertake the attempt to translate it into a cognitive content. The allegory of the 
imperative is the endless labor of mourning the traumas inflicted by irony. But the imperative is, 
as positing, as exposed, itself the irony in whose light its allegory disintegrates. (RDR, 199) 
 
Hamacher here provides us with an allegory for the relationship of allegory to the 
“positing violence” and turning force of irony. Something, also, of the melancholia of 
the ironist is shown here too in the mourning quality definitive of de Man’s language- 
conscious self. But the ‘traumas’ of irony are also what we might consider as the 
processes of tendering installed by irony; in irony’s ruining of allegory it also posits 
anew the allegorical imperative. Every allegory, every manifestation of “cognitive 
content”, mourns all that it cannot hold; the promise allegory fails to keep is 
 37
consequent to its contract with irony – the result is mutually beneficial: the 
proliferation of allegories on the one hand, and the faithful maintenance of Otherness, 
on the other. Irony, in this sense, is the imperative that posits allegory while, at the 
same time, exposing allegorical cognitions to the undermining force from which they 
are in the “first instance” constituted. Thus, allegory, when conceived of in its relation 
to irony, is not just the theme of the translation of Otherness into cognitive content, 
but moreover, the thematization of translation itself, as mourning, as continual, 
perpetual tendering process – the promise of the name, the promise the name cannot 
keep. So, in the language of Derrida, the work of mourning sets out the tenderness of 
our relation of language and the Other – which is to say, our relationship to and of 
irony. 
     What is meant by tenderness is, then, both the way irony tenders allegory via the 
imperative to posit a name or sign, as well as the way allegorical cognitions become 
tender and vulnerable, through exposure to the force of irony. But there is more to 
allegory than this, as we shall see, since irony itself, in depending on allegory, 
becomes tendered by allegory also – which is to say, allegories (our names, 
definitions, theories and traditions etc.,) are responsible for giving irony its chance to 
promise again, to repeat, to iterate.  To understand this better we need to return to de 
Man’s “The Rhetoric of Temporality”, and in particular to the trope of allegory. As de 
Man teaches, allegory can be thought of as irony turned towards narrative and 
duration. Irony, essentially a “synchronic” moment or “happening”, tenders allegory 
at the very entry point of language – the point at which irony is rendered, given an 
effect of presence, and is felt as a cognition or figure of something Other. In tendering 
language, irony becomes allegory, as that which reveals the economy of tropes, 
figural and rhetorical, and the system of equivalences whereby a word or concept 
stands in for, becomes a tender for, that which is Other to it, that which escapes its 
presence. In this way (this, “standing in for”) allegory gives to us the sense of 
narrative, of duration, of being-in-time, and consequently the effects known as history 
and tradition. Allegory always misses the world, the Other, and irony, though it is 
installed by these forces. But in exchange for this misapprehension, allegory offers the 
experience of contiguity and presence, albeit a “fabled” or “fictional” experience of 
presence and present, that acts as a chain of cognitions and equivalences in the 
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manner familiar to us after post-structuralism as the relationships between signifiers 
and other signifiers.38 Thus de Man writes:  
[I]t remains necessary, if there is to be allegory, that the allegorical sign refer to another sign 
that precedes it. The meaning constituted by the allegorical sign can then consist only in the 
repetition of a previous sign with which it can never coincide, since it is of the essence of this 
previous sign to be pure anteriority. (BI, 207) 
 
The force of this non-coincidence (anteriority) sealed within the trope of coincidence 
– one sign substituting for another – reveals the paradox of allegory that is, in fact, a 
definition of irony articulated through a definition of allegory. Allegories cannot be, 
as such, without being in relation to other allegories, as signs to other signs,39 and it is 
from this play of repetition (what Derrida refers to as iteration) involving the 
similarity, dissimulation, and non-coincidence of signs, that the system builds 
continuity, effects of presence and history.  
     However, and in typically Demanic fashion, such effects of presence and 
temporality (self, history), as possibilities of allegory, are possibilities of what 
allegory actually ‘represents’ – systemic aberration: 
And just as the indeterminacy of reference generates the illusion of a subject, a narrator, and a 
reader, it also generates the metaphor of temporality. A narrative endlessly tells the story of its 
own denominational aberration and it can only repeat the aberration on various levels of 
rhetorical complexity. Texts engender texts as a result of their necessarily aberrant semantic 
structure; hence the fact that they consist of a series of repetitive reversals that engender the 
semblance of a temporal sequence. (AR, 162) 
 
Aberrance, we might then consider, is equivalent to the somersaulting Benjamin 
ascribes to allegory; aberration manifests as allegory. This is because allegory is 
always a property of irony, though, for Derrida, irony and allegory are faces of the 
same coin,40 but de Man is seemingly less equivocal, and on various occasions 
appears to indicate that irony’s Otherness to allegory is in fact the Otherness from 
which allegory is made possible. Thus, de Man’s often repeated closing phrase from 
Allegories of Reading: 
                                                 
38De Man: “The fundamental structure of allegory reappears here in the tendency of the language 
toward narrative, the spreading out along the axis of an imaginary time in order to give duration to 
what is, in fact, simultaneous within the subject” (BI, 225). The simultaneous quality referred to here is 
that of irony which is also the moment of synchrony that we can think of as the constant and ever 
recurring moment of différance, of plenitude. When de Man mentions an “imaginary time” he is talking 
of the fictional nature of narrative, and the factitious quality of human experience. 
39 We can think of allegory as the “relations of mapping one sign with another, of sublating one sign by 
another” (Reading de Man Reading. p.xxiii) 
40 See Memoires for Paul de Man (11; 81). De Man refers to them as the “two faces of the same 
fundamental experience of time” in Blindness and Insight (p. 236). 
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Irony is no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological 
cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of understanding. As such, far from closing 
off the tropological system, irony enforces the repetition of its aberration. (301) 
 
The implication seems to be that while allegory is tropological, irony (which in some 
sense remains a trope) is metatropic, that which enables “tropological cognition” 
itself. In this scheme, irony is seen to be a constituting force by virtue of its “undoing” 
of cognitions, figures and tropes. Allegories ‘succeed’ because they ‘fail’, and it is 
irony that therefore engenders this economy of differences and deferrals – the 
constant inexhaustible repetition of “aberrations” that enable the effects of positive 
content within the play of negation. It needs to be remembered, however, that irony 
cannot, as such, be metatropic or outside language, because of its relationship to 
allegory. 
     What appears to be emerging here, in this tendering of a theory of irony, after de 
Man, is the mutual and mutually contaminated structure of allegory and irony. This 
structure, characterised as a kind of melancholy science or mournful work, is exactly 
what I mean by my use of the term irony. One way of understanding irony in the 
Demanic economy is provided by de Man in his article “The Concept of Irony”, 
where he draws on Northrop Frye’s definition of the trope (the tropes of language) as 
“a pattern of words that turns away from direct statement or its obvious meaning” 
(164). Trope thus defined, as “that turning away, that deviation between literal and 
figural meaning” (164) provides the context for de Man’s “definition” of irony as the 
“trope of tropes”, the truth or force of all tropes, the “one that names the term as the 
‘turning away’” (165). In the same article de Man refines this “definition” a little 
when he describes irony as the “permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes”. 
“[P]ermanent parabasis” is Friedrich Schlegel’s formulation of what we might more 
simply express as permanent or perpetual interruption, and in the context provided, 
this amounts to the interruption or digression from the tendering of the very structure 
or narrative of the tropes of language. As de Man says 
The allegory of tropes has its own narrative coherence, its own systematicity, which irony 
interrupts, disrupts. So one could say that any theory of irony is the undoing, the necessary 
undoing, of any theory of narrative, and it is ironic, as we say, that irony always comes up in 
relation to theories of narrative, when irony is precisely what makes it impossible ever to 
achieve a theory of narrative that would be consistent. Which doesn’t mean that we don’t have 
to keep working on it, because that’s all we can do, but it will always be interrupted, always be 
disrupted, always be undone by the ironic dimension which it will necessarily contain. (AI, 179) 
 
Rather than merely restating irony as permanent parabasis, de Man says it is the 
“permanent parabasis of the allegory of tropes”. What is significant about de Man’s 
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qualification is his association of parabasis with allegory. In effect de Man is ironising 
the theory of irony as parabasis (what Kierkegaard would call “infinite, absolute 
negativity”) by making it relational to allegory. As such, de Man articulates the 
crucial consideration in all ‘theories’ of irony – the move that tethers irony to allegory 
in a mutual contamination, a relation of tendering. This also suggests the perpetual 
ironisation of any theory (allegory) of language and its tropes, suggesting that all 
theory is tender. Which means that any theory of irony, or allegory, or art, is destined 
to be underdetermined, an act of misprision, or blindness. All insights (into text, 
language) as de Man has made clear are constituted in, and repeat, forms of blindness; 
the best, however, are those that recognise misprision as the structure of their 
possibility, as genesis41 to the repetition of readings, the iteration of differences, 
other-expressions. Recognition of the tenderness of theory (its underdetermination) 
reveals the best theory as a process of tendering. 
     By ironising the notion of “permanent parabasis” in this way, de Man makes irony 
an economic consideration, that is to say, one that tenders the economy of signs, text 
and meaning. In this way, as I have been suggesting, irony becomes tender through its 
necessary relation to, and dependency on, allegory (narrative, duration, sign, name); 
only through allegory is an irony recognisable as irony. On the one hand, then, de 
Man’s definition of irony emphasises impossibility, on the other, it suggests the 
requirement, in such a definition, of the possible, of fallen allegory. In this regard, we 
find in irony an enactment of Benjamin’s dialectic of the sacred and the profane. 
Irony as parabasis, as experience of Otherness, is always bound by an allegorical 
context – an arrangement de Man finds evident in Laurence Sterne’s discussion of 
irony as “the constant interruption of the narrative illusion by intrusion” (AI, 178). 
Such moments of parabasis, moments of irony, are to be found then in what we term 
the metatextual moments of a text, those punctum moments Barthes identifies in 
photography, where a subject stares back at the audience, breaking the contract of 
subject and object, and like other moments of textual self-awareness when an author 
disrupts the façade of their narrative to address the reader. Such examples all resemble 
appeals to an Other, all are examples of a tendering of Otherness through a making 
tender (the ruining of a work’s illusion), that reveals the tenderness of textuality. 
Another way of thinking this is to say that irony is the means by which we use the 
                                                 
41 As Claire Colebrook puts it: “Irony, for de Man, is like Derrida’s différance: a radically anterior 
condition of conceptuality that itself is ‘not a concept’”. Irony in the Work of Philosophy. 2002. p.194. 
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only tools available (language, metaphysics, ontology) to rethink the way we use the 
tools available. This is essentially the irony of deconstruction, the task of attempting 
the most faithful reflection on itself for the purpose of revealing to philosophy (itself) 
its Otherness. 
 
*  *  * 
What Derrida calls the “movements of deconstruction” are recognisable as the turning 
force of ironies that 
[…] do not destroy structures from the outside. They are not possible and effective, nor can they 
take accurate aim, except by inhabiting those structures. Inhabiting them in a certain way, 
because one always inhabits, and all the more when one does not suspect it. Operating 
necessarily from the inside, borrowing all the strategic and economic resources of subversion 
from the old structure, borrowing them structurally, that is to say without being able to isolate 
their elements and atoms, the enterprise of deconstruction always in a certain way falls prey to 
its own work.42  
 
What emerges, it seems, is a growing homology between irony and (the “enterprise” 
of) deconstruction, especially in so far as both rely, for the efficacy of their 
economies, on what the relationship between allegory and irony evidences: a 
dependence on texts, histories, traditions and norms, as well as a relationship of 
belonging and breaking. In deferment to irony, and recalling the considerations of de 
Man, Kevin Hart, for example, illustrates the tendering of irony and deconstruction: 
Needless to say, perhaps, not even deconstruction can claim immunity from irony in this state of 
affairs. A deconstructive reading of a text, despite what it does to previous readings, will always 
be an allegory of the text and, as such, be subject to a deconstruction to the second degree. At 
this level of sophistication, irony is as described by Friedrich Schlegel, ‘a permanent parabasis’. 
So for de Man irony is always one step ahead of allegory: as a contingent temporal sequence, of 
course, but also because the possibility of being ironised is written into the structure of allegory. 
If this is true, de Man is perfectly correct to remark that ‘Irony is no longer a trope but the 
undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in 
other words, of understanding’. Or in the vocabulary we have refined: irony is not simply a 
trope, it is also, when generalised, both the condition of possibility for all tropes and the 
condition of impossibility for any cognition which is not conditioned by tropes.43
                                                 
42 Of Grammatology. (p.24). Notably the same passage quoted here turns up in Hart’s text (The 
Trespass of the Sign: Deconstruction, Theology and Philosophy. 1989. p.157) where, usefully enough, 
he places it in the context of the relation of allegory and irony: 
 To translate this [the passage from Of Grammatology] into the language of rhetoric: allegory 
supplies the necessary structure for its ironic subversion, and of course the subversion brought 
about by irony is itself open to be overturned to the extent to which the ironic becomes 
canonised as ‘literature’ (as with Swift) or ‘philosophy’ (as with Socrates). In passing from 
allegory to irony there is a movement that is at once violent and miniscule, through the agency 
of an adopted tone or attitude. So while allegory in no way entails irony or vice versa, 
deconstruction can be seen to subvert allegory by realising the ironic possibilities inherent in its 
structure. (158) 
 
43 The Trespass of the Sign. p.158. 
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     A pure irony could never be, it would never leave its trace; this is why ironies 
share their structure with allegory, and why irony gets caught, in fact, constantly 
hopes for its apprehension – its reading, its writing, its naming. Permanent parabasis, 
as such, is a myth, indeed an allegory of irony’s insatiable, atemporal and incessant 
force of undoing. Permanent parabasis is a possibility of irony, but never is irony; 
indeed, we might say that it is the impossibility – akin to the movement of différance 
or the Other – that makes irony and its effects possible. The ‘irony’ of irony is that it 
can never be, as such. Rather, the effect of irony is what we are left with, and what 
that is, is the appearance of its disappearance, the allegory or “meaning” that we 
always take to be the irony we have caught. 
     Because deconstruction hopes for its own impossibility, and in a sense, tries to 
resist its own allegorization (that is to say, resists becoming a “Theory”), it resists 
naming irony. However, in the manner of de Man, this is primarily what enables 
deconstruction to constantly address irony proper. The way deconstruction writes 
irony (that is to say, specifically avoids writing it) is by attending as closely as 
possible to allegory, in fact, by inhabiting allegory in the same way in which 
Derrida’s texts always inhabit the texts and traditions they deconstruct. By writing 
allegory in deconstruction, Derrida is constantly tendering irony (irony can only be 
tendered, it can never be, as such, be known or made fully present) through its other 
face, allegory.44 This is the lesson, as we shall soon see, of the trace in relation to 
différance. Thus, Derrida writes irony in the name of the Other (in the name of de 
Man), the disappeared, the dead, and what will always already have been lost.  
 
 
(iii) The Economy of Tenderness. 
 
As I’ve already said, the purpose of this chapter is to establish the link between irony 
and tenderness through the ‘ironic’ language and economy of Derridean and Demanic 
‘deconstruction’. As we have seen, one way of doing this is through a tendering of de 
Man’s philosophy of language (premised on his investigation of irony and allegory). 
Another way is to examine the tenderness of Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ as 
concentrated within the key Derridean concern, différance. This section in this chapter 
                                                 
44 In “Psyche: Inventions of the Other” Derrida refers to allegory as the “other face” of irony. See 
Reading de Man Reading, p. 34. 
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is, thus, primarily devoted to the tendering of différance as a form of irony, as 
condition to tenderness. In anticipation of what I will shortly articulate, let me say 
briefly, here, that much of the significance of différance to the present study inheres in 
the fact of its tendering of its own conceptuality, even as it ruins or defers 
conceptuality at the same time; différance, as a sort of metonymy for the entire 
Derridean economy, highlights Derrida’s constant tendering of language in light of an 
Otherness in excess of language. All of what we see as ethical and faithful in 
deconstruction comes from différance, a demand articulated (à la melancholy and 
mourning) through irony. 
     Towards the end of the last section one of my emerging themes was that of the 
homology between irony and deconstruction, and in another ‘economical’ expression 
of the economy of deconstruction – its relational, tendering infrastructure – Derrida 
provides us once again with a context for the tendering of a “definition” of irony 
when he writes of the “force” of deconstruction: 
The result, both paradoxical and foreseeable, is that the very thing which exceeds at the same 
time the theoretical, the thematic, the thetic, the philosophical, and the scientific provokes as 
gestures of reappropriation and suture, theoretical movements, productions of theorems, which, 
in the sort of hyperactivity, turmoil, turbulence which has characterised the past twenty years, 
are themselves so many forms of resistance, but this time in another sense […]. This time the 
resistance institutes – it is indeed essentially instituting – [a] consolidating and stabilizing 
structure.45  
 
The pairing of such imperatives, excess and suture, turmoil and stabilization, are 
themselves effects of the force of deconstruction, of the force of an irony that evokes 
a state of excess – an Otherness – through the production of allegories, theories and 
reappropriations. The possibility of this sort of homology of irony and deconstruction, 
a sort of substitution of irony as a ‘name’ for the work of deconstruction, is a 
possibility Derrida acknowledges as descriptive of deconstruction itself. 
The word “deconstruction”, like all other words, acquires value only from its inscription in a 
chain of possible substitutions, in what is too blithely called a “context”. For me, for what I have 
tried and still try to write, the word has interest only within a certain context, where it replaces 
and lets itself be determined by such words as “ecriture,” “trace,” “différance,” “hymen,” 
“pharmakon,” […] etc. By definition, the list can never be closed, and I have cited only names, 
which is inadequate and done only for reasons of economy.46
                                                 
45 (Derrida, “Some Statements and Truisms About Neo-Logisism, Newisms, Positisms, and Other 
Small Seismisms” in  Modern Literary Theory: A Reader (eds. Patricia Waugh; Philip Rice). 1996. 
p.370. 
46 See Jacques Derrida in Derrida and Différance (eds. David Wood; Robert Bernasconi). 1988. p.4. 
The key phrase here is “reasons of economy” which, as Derrida would have it, means, at the very least, 
both the demand to make an ‘economical’ expression of something complicated, and the demand to 
outline the workings of an economy of meaning, a symbolic economy. Issues of economy are always 
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This is, we might say, an economic expression of deconstruction, not only for its 
detailing of a Derridean economy, but also, and importantly, for the quality of its 
concession to explanation and naming. So we can read the above as a kind of 
abridgement – a certain fall, from différance, but kept in language – because names 
operate in an economy of différance, as I shall show, and because, inevitably, it is to 
an economy we will have to return, in the manner of a certain law, in the way of 
context, history and tradition. The inevitability of this return to language, again a kind 
of fall or return to allegory, is made possible by différance. 
     At some base level of all Derridean texts, the demands faced by the subject to 
relate their being-in-language with their being-in-the-world, can be expressed as the 
difficulty of having to tender ‘deconstruction’ for comprehension in language in such 
a way as to satisfy both the greatest precision and the greatest clarity. Such demands 
are evident in the very structure of Derrida’s différance – a concept that, of itself, can 
be seen to recapitulate the entire ironic infrastructure of deconstruction through the 
visible but unheard sign of the letter “a” in its inscription. So, when Derrida writes on 
the appearance of the “a” in différance in effect he is also attending to the moment of 
irony. The “a”, we might say, can be seen as irony in action, a sign or trace of the 
Other (the autre) in writing. 
Thus, even if one seeks to pass over such an infraction [the insinuation of the a; the moment of 
undecidability] in silence, the interest that one takes in it can be recognised and situated in 
advance as prescribed by the mute irony, the inaudible misplacement, of this literal permutation. 
One can always act as if it made no difference. And I must state here and now that today’s 
discourse will be less a justification of, and even less an apology for, this silent lapse in spelling, 
than a kind of insistent intensification of its play.47 [My brackets] 
 
Irony will have been the mute force or “infraction” in all deconstruction – present, but 
crucially, not present, there but not there – as it appears in the character of the small 
letter “a”. So what we are looking for in Derrida’s texts is this ghosted presence of 
irony, the figure as non-figure, the concept as non-concept, that thematizes, in itself, 
the ghosting of Otherness in writing. This “a” is the “undecidable” presence in 
différance (with its silence in the speaking of the word) in the same way that irony is 
that which traverses between the sayable and the unsayable, between the written and 
the spoken, between the same and the different, and, pace de Man, between 
(diachronic) allegory and (synchronic allegory) irony itself.  
                                                                                                                                            
crucial for Derrida, especially in the way in which they thus focus the demands of tendering that 
always situate Derrida’s acts of writing between language and Other, text and reader.  
47 Derrida. Margins of Philosophy (trans. Alan Bass). 1981. p.3. [hereafter referred to as MP] 
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     But just as différance, thus explicated, is seen to tender Otherness through its 
inculcation of an articulating irony (the “a”), it must still be tendered in language, and 
thus, for the sake of clarity, Derrida permits a sort of definition of différance that 
hinges on its treatment as a concept when he writes: 
In a conceptuality adhering to classical strictures “différance” would be said to designate a 
constitutive, productive, and originary causality, the process of scission and division which 
would produce or constitute different things or differences. (MP, 8) 
 
Derrida’s point in conceding to tender a “definition” of différance, to make an 
economical expression of it, is that différance itself is the very law of the semiotic 
economy of language; différance is the principle of tendering.48 Thus, the attempt to 
“define” différance involves a recapitulation of the work of the semiotic economy, the 
production of different things (readings, meanings, etc.); différance is a “name” for 
the “originary causality” that continually constitutes and renovates language, but only 
because, as the “name” différance makes clear, it comports within itself an irony (the 
“a”) that maintains an open channel to Otherness. To put it crudely, différance 
recapitulates the ‘force’ of deconstruction and deconstruction’s constant tendering of 
economic considerations, because it operates as an irony, saying one thing, meaning 
an-other. On the subject of différance and in relation to the question of economy 
Derrida writes: 
It [différance] is the economical concept, and since there is no economy without différance, it is 
the most general structure of economy, given that one understands by economy something other 
than the classical economy of metaphysics, or the classical metaphysics of economy. Second, 
the movement of différance, as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is 
the common root of all oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as […] 
sensible/intelligible, intuition/signification, nature/culture, etc. As a common root, différance is 
also the element of the same (to be distinguished from the identical) in which these oppositions 
are announced. Third, différance is also the production, if it can still be put this way, of these 
differences, of the diacricity that the linguistics generated by Saussure, and all the structural 
sciences modeled upon it, have recalled is the condition for any signification and any structure. 
These differences […] are the effects of différance; they are neither inscribed in the heavens, 
nor in the brain, which does not mean that they are produced by the activity of some speaking 
subject. From this point of view, the concept of différance is neither simply structuralist, nor 
simply geneticist, such an alternative itself being an “effect” of différance.49   
 
This is one of the most crucial and economical expressions of différance you will find 
among Derrida’s texts, and the reason for this is that he allows for a tendering of 
différance to conceptuality. Thus, différance is the “economical concept” even as it is 
                                                 
48 Indeed, it perhaps needs to be pointed out that tendering (translation in this sense) is, we might say, 
the subject matter of deconstruction, since it is the process Derrida always performs in his texts – hence 
interviews and explanations, repetitions, re-writings and supplements are characteristic of Derrida’s 
deconstruction.  
49 Derrida. Positions. (Alan Bass. trans.) The University of Chicago Press: Chicago. 1982. (p.8). 
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also what gives the idea of “economy”, and “concept”, as well as the phrase: 
“economical concept”, their effects as concepts. Like irony, différance is not actually 
a concept, but rather the “common root” of all conceptuality and all conceptual 
oppositions. Irony in this sense is also root to the so-called non-ironic instance of that 
which forms the oppositional structure within which irony itself is so often posed. 
Différance is what gets the whole system of concepts, the whole economy of effects 
and differences, going. Vincent Descombes, in an “economical” gesture of his own, 
expresses this in writing the following, installing différance as the effect of an 
originary delay: 
The concept of an ‘originary delay’ is paradoxical but necessary. If from the origin onwards 
(each time there is origin), from the ‘first time’ onwards, there were no différance, then the first 
time would not be the ‘first time’, for it would not be followed by a ‘second time’; and if the 
‘first time’ were the ‘only time’, it would not be at the origin of anything at all. […] [I]t must be 
said that the first is not the first if there is not a second to follow it. Consequently, the second is 
not that which merely arrives, like a latecomer, after the first, but that which permits the first to 
be the first. The first cannot be the first unaided, by its own properties alone: the second, with all 
the force of its delay, must come to the assistance of the first. It is through the second that the 
first is the first. The ‘second time’ thus has priority of a kind over the ‘first time’: it is present 
from the first time onwards as the prerequisite of the first’s priority without itself being a more 
primitive ‘first time’, of course; it follows that the ‘first time’ is in reality the ‘third time’.50
 
Again, we find in a mapping of the temporal and spatial effects of différance a tracing 
of irony. Difference is here seen as the force that makes all economies possible; all 
effects of a “first time”, of presence or allegory, name or ‘origin’ are made possible 
by the forces irony and difference share: difference, delay, and dispersion. Irony is 
prerequisite of allegory just as Descombes implies that the Other is prerequisite of 
identity. What Descombes refers to as the originary delay – the spacing and 
differences of différance – is what enables talk, and economies, of “origin”, 
conceptuality, and presence. As Descombes suggests, there will always already have 
been something (Otherness) from which such effects of presence have come. The 
articulation of this Otherness occurs in Derrida’s différance. 
     Différance, like irony, is, then, the articulation of Otherness; as such, both are 
structured as tender processes, processes that thematise their own conceptual 
tenderness. This is the reason why Derrida can say that différance is a “possible 
substitution” for the word deconstruction. Deconstruction “works”, by proposing its 
own chain of substitutable terms that always bear the trace of each other and that are 
themselves constantly shifting with new terms and readings – in this way, what one 
may call Derrida’s economy is always built on elements that are themselves 
                                                 
50 Vincent Descombes. Modern French Philosophy. 1980. p.145.  
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contaminated by the trace of the Other. In a sense, then, deconstruction is 
fundamentally allegorical; it perpetually exposes itself to the very processes of 
allegorical deconstruction it performs on allegories. In this regard, deconstruction is 
faithful to différance, not merely because it observes differences within and between 
subjects, between objects, signs or events, but because it makes thematic the exposure 
of its own difference from itself, perpetually. This is a model for the impossible 
relationship Descombes parodies by his own act of impossible articulation, of self, 
and Other, the contaminate temporal and spatial structure of différance. 
     In observing the tumbling turning of tropes in the Benjaminian abyss,  
‘deconstruction’ itself – hence, the difficulties of using the word as a noun – tumbles 
and turns, is re-written, and re-read in the chain of supplements invented by its own 
constant tendering of Otherness. In this regard, what we call ‘deconstruction’ is 
nothing more than an ironic allegory for the tendering law of the economy of 
language. As Derrida says, 
Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it 
refers to the other, to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. Such a 
play, différance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality, 
of a conceptual process and system in general. For the same reason, différance, which is not a 
concept, is not simply a word, that is, what is generally represented as the calm, present, and 
self-referential unity of concept and phonic material. (MP, 11) 
 
So, différance, in the manner of irony (“not simply a word”) is a ‘name’ for the 
economic principle of deconstruction, describing the operations of the Derridean 
economy, and the “very possibility of conceptuality”. What Derrida refers to as the 
“systematic play of differences” recognises that within the economy no sign, word, or 
subject can exist without being tender of, and tendered by, another sign, word, or 
subject. Différance is then the condition for all identity, allegory, unity, or boundary – 
all seemingly discreet instances within the economy are thus the possibilities of what 
is always different from them, that is to say, all that is always Other to them. As a 
consequence of this, every sign or subject is always within Otherness, within what I 
have referred to as an immanent world, a world, if you like, of memory; but what this 
also means, since every instance of this economy is composed of differences, is that 
all that is different and Other can, depending on the tender qualities of one’s 
‘reading’, be traced within the specific or individual subject or sign. This revelation of 
the Other within the work or subject or allegory, and the obverse, the revelation of the 
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utter dependency of allegory and subject on what is beyond them, is the revelation of 
irony, the revelation of différance. 
     What all this means, in relation to the production of a work of art, a novel, or any 
“invention”, is that any such work that aspires to be a faithful representation of 
anything at all, must be a work that is faithful to the memory of differences – the 
Otherness – it inheres in, and is a possibility of. Which is to say, that it must be an 
invention that remembers Otherness, and that, to some degree, reproduces the very 
forces of reproduction (the economy) that are always traced within the work itself. 
The invention – indeed, as we will see in the next section – for it to be an invention 
must represent its debt to différance and irony. All that Derrida calls the ethical, and 
what, I suggest, for DeLillo qualifies his own theories on the work of art, issues from 
this debt.  
 
(iv) The Irony of Invention 
 
The question of the ethical in deconstruction can be seen to be posed as the question 
of irony couched in the context of what Derrida refers to in the following quotation as 
possibility. As we will see, the structure of this possibility is written in the sign as the 
possibility of misreading; contingent failures of understanding are the conditions of 
possibility. For us to mean what we say it must be possible for our meaning to be 
mistaken. The possibility of this failure, as I’ve been saying, is what generates the 
semiotic economy; the possibility of this failure is “ineradicable” and is what I term 
irony. This is the background to the work of invention (art, interpretation) that, as we 
will see, must pass through the chiasmatic structure of irony. Derrida explains this 
irony and the possibility of the ethical like this: 
It is simply that the possibility of something evil, or of some corruption, the possibility of the 
non-accomplishment, or of some failure, is ineradicable. And it is so because it is the condition 
for every felicity, every positive value – the condition for ethics for instance. So if you want to 
eradicate the possibility of this negative then you destroy what you want to save. Thus ethics 
couldn’t be ethical without the ineradicable possibility of evil. […] The possibility of infelicity, 
non-fulfilment, is part of what it is that we want to save under the name of ethics, felicity, 
fulfilment and so on. For me this concept of possibility, of possibility as something which has to 
be saved at the moment that it may ruin what we want to save, this ‘possibility as impossibility’, 
is the most unavoidable argument today.51
Throughout this section I propose Derrida’s thoughts on the issue of invention, and its 
relationship to the ethical, as a way of providing context for what we will later 
                                                 
51 See Glendinning, Simon (ed.) Arguing with Derrida. 2001. p.54. 
 49
consider the work of art in DeLillo’s novels. To return to Derrida’s quotation, 
however, we can see that two questions arise and are applicable to this goal of 
qualifying the idea of invention and the work of art: firstly, how to maintain this 
“possibility” – the ironic aporia from which new readings come from the Other – as 
possibility? Secondly, how do we successfully make distinct the possibility of “some 
corruption” from some “felicity”? Derrida gives us an answer to both questions when 
he says it is the concept of possibility “as something that has to be saved at the 
moment that it may ruin what we want to save” that is the issue, the “most 
unavoidable argument today”. To answer my first question is also, then, to satisfy the 
second. In other words, our focus as interpreters, readers, subjects, should not fall on a 
particular reading produced by a text, but rather, the reproducing structure of a text: 
not what a text says, but how it makes such readings possible. In attending to a work’s 
work of reproduction – its reproducibility, how it generates meanings, how it is 
generated by differences it cannot master – and in producing works that help reflect 
on this process we are able to usefully distinguish between the more or less tender 
meanings these works produce. The better, more ‘felicitous’ readings will thus be 
those that in representing the unrepresentable condition of their own possibility 
remain open to re-inscription, and re-examination; as more faithful articulations of 
Otherness, such readings never become fixed. To borrow again from Benjamin, the 
“possibility of evil”, we might say, may turn again another somersault.  
     On the strength of these first two sentences Derrida, in effect, situates irony – as 
the possibility of failure – as the “condition for ethics”. The question of the ethical, as 
with notions of truth, argument, faith or decision, thus rests on the irony of possibility, 
which is to say that for the said possibility (an instance of the ethical, in this case) to 
be possible it must maintain, as possible, that which would make the given possibility, 
impossible (as that which may “ruin what we want to save”). For this reason, the idea 
of “radical evil” has a place in the ethical. The argument of “possibility as 
impossibility” is what keeps philosophy open, what enables argument and keeps it 
going as possibility. “Possibility as impossibility”, or that which is “saved” as it is 
“ruined”, is an articulation of irony and its necessary relation to allegory. Philosophy 
must relate to impossibility, as to irony, as an aporia to be affirmed: 
For the very same structure that interrupts the propriety of philosophy and opens it to its ‘other’ 
always also opens up the possibility for what philosophy (as such) can never anticipate. The 
‘other’ of philosophy that is no longer its other. Thus opening up the possibility of the invention 
– the advent or ‘in-coming’ (invenire) – of what has yet to be thought. As Derrida writes: […] 
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For a deconstructive operation possibility would rather be the danger, the danger of becoming 
an available set of rule-governed procedures, methods, accessible approaches. The interest of 
deconstruction, of such force and desire as it may have, is a certain experience of the 
impossible: that is, […] of the other – the experience of the other as the invention of the 
impossible, in other words, of the only possible invention.52  
The only invention faithful to the conditions of possibility (Otherness, excess) must 
be an invention of impossibility, of irony. As I’ve said, no irony can be ironic without 
its allegorical ‘content’ and this is further borne out in Derrida’s thoughts on 
invention: the work done, of misreading, tendering, in the name of a certain 
impossibility, relies as irony does on allegory, on the economy of the possible – that 
which has become convention, rule and method. In a sense the “instituting moment” – 
the moment of decision, the flex of irony into allegory – is the crucial moment in 
deconstruction in which the tension of a limit or border, between the possible and 
impossible, reveals a thematics of irony and aporia. This instituting moment is 
violent, in a way, since it has “no guarantee”: it is a rupture, a newness and risk that is 
violent because it is “guaranteed by no previous rules” and cannot be anticipated.53 
This is, of course, the risk and contingency of irony. But, effects of irony are not 
produced ex nihilo, and as such, any risk of violence an ironist like Derrida may enact 
on norms, rules and conventions, is done by practicing and respecting them closely.54  
     An invention, then, for Derrida, is never seen as such until it is subsumed within 
convention (ever heard of an invention you haven’t heard of?), and when it is, like the 
mark, word or signature, able to be repeated, utilized and engaged within certain 
contexts. So, strictly speaking, even the most private irony cannot be ironic until it is 
repeated, and thus, is no longer solely private. This is because for an invention to be 
an invention it must first be susceptible to repetition, re-inscription, exploitation, 
generality – common availability, as Rudolf Gasché has pointed out, and this holds 
true for irony itself.55 As Gasché says, singularities, inventions, fantasies, private 
ironies “must in their very singularity already be inhabited by generality, by the 
public, otherwise they would not be recognizable, that is, intelligible as what they are” 
                                                 
52 See Arguing with Derrida. (p.133). 
53 See John D. Caputo. Deconstruction in a Nutshell: A Conversation with Jacques Derrida. 1997. p.6. 
[Hereafter referred to as DN] 
54 A paradox (or irony) inheres here, since, in order to break with the norm/rule and invent a new 
norm/rule, you have to follow (or iterate) to some degree the old norm/rule. As Derrida says “[t]here is 
no responsibility, no decision, without this inauguration, this absolute break. That is what 
deconstruction is made of: not the mixture but the tension of memory, fidelity, the preservation of 
something that has been given to us, and, at the same time, heterogeneity, something absolutely new, 
and a break” (DN.,6). 
55 See Rudolf Gashé, Inventions of Difference: On Jacques Derrida. 1994. pp.9-10. [Hereafter, ID] 
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(ID, 15). The singular is always already contaminated by the Other (this holds true for 
the subject also as we could not perceive who we ‘are’ were it not for the Other’s 
Otherness to us). Thus, there is always some degree of misprision involved in any 
statement or correlation of irony with perspectivism, relativism, and the contention 
that ‘anything goes’ in the so-called world of postmodern interpretation. What 
deconstruction attempts to do, and this is also what I argue DeLillo attempts to 
perform in his texts, is to expose the process to allegory, revealing the cognitions and 
equivalences, substitutions and combinations, metonyms and metaphors that are 
always involved in the translation of Otherness into conceptuality. In this way 
deconstruction repeats all that it critiques. As a discourse it inheres in context, within 
the texts it examines. At the same time, however, and through this repetition, a 
deconstruction uncovers the law of différance (irony) at the core of textuality and 
language, and because it is faithful to this, is ethical in its regard for the very 
possibilities of repetition and reading, proposes something new, a “break”, an 
invention, a new work. The difficulties of “deconstruction” can, in a sense, be 
explained when we consider that what it is attempting amounts to a translation of 
translation.  
     It is on the question of invention in Derrida’s essay: “Psyche: Inventions of the 
Other”56 that the issue of irony and the work of Derrida’s deconstruction returns to 
the work of de Man. In “Psyche” the idea of invention is linked to the tension and 
relationship between allegory and irony. “Truth and deceit” are taken as the 
parameters for Derrida’s reading of de Man’s work and theory of allegory, and 
become the orienting concerns of a ‘theory’ of invention that, as I’ve said, in effect, 
offers us also a theory of irony, and, through the example of Francis Ponge’s poem 
“Fable”, a ‘theory’ of the work of irony in the work of art.57  Through Ponge’s 
                                                 
56 See this essay in Reading De Man Reading. [Hereafter RDR] 
57                         “Fable” 
 
By the word by commences then this 
text 
Of which the first line states the truth 
But this silvering under the one and 
       other 
Can it be tolerated? 
Dear reader already you judge 
There as to our difficulties … 
 
(AFTER seven years of misfortune 
she broke the mirror.)    
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“Fable” Derrida shows us how the interaction of irony and allegory becomes adequate 
to the “truth” of truth, and truth as invention. Derrida explains the significance of the 
poem, what it is ‘about’, if you like, when he writes how, 
Fable tells of allegory, of one word’s move to cross over to the other, to the other side of the 
mirror. Of the desperate effort of an unhappy speech to move beyond the specularity that 
constitutes itself. We might say that Fable puts into action the question of reference, of the 
specularity of language or of literature, and of the possibility of stating the other or speaking to 
the other. (RDR, 31) 
 
In effect Ponge’s poem asks its reader if a mirror (psyche is French for a type of 
mirror) theory of language, a mimetic theory lacking a relation to Otherness, can be 
“tolerated”. The poem, a reflection on the prison-house of allegory, breaks the mirror 
(as in the narrative epoché that ruptures the poem) of its own illusion by the 
ironisation or ruination of its own allegoricity (its pretensions as a fable), revealing as 
it does so what Derrida sees as an allegory of truth, and the truth of truth as always 
allegorical, always an invention. For our own purposes the poem reveals the truth 
content of the work of art consistent to the language philosophy of DeLillo and de 
Man. Truth, as it turns out, is subject to irony; for it to be ‘truthful’, an instance of the 
truth needs to undergo the mortification characteristic of the ironisation of allegory. 
Derrida spells this out when he writes: 
I wish to dedicate this reading to Paul de Man because of the resemblance Ponge’s fable, 
bespeaking a unique intersection of irony and allegory, bears to a poem of truth. It presents itself 
ironically as an allegory ‘of which the first line states the truth’: the truth of allegory and 
allegory of truth, truth as allegory. Both are fabulous inventions, by which we mean inventions 
of language (at the root of fable/fabulous is fari or phanai: to speak) as the invention of 
language as the same and the other, of oneself as (of) the other. (31) 
 
Such a poem of truth is what DeLillo aims for also in his own texts that insist on the 
invention of the self, like the work of art, “as (of) the other”, to ironise allegory as 
both “same and other” and, thus, tender. Where we find truth, we might say, is in the 
intersection of irony and allegory. To present “ironically as an allegory” is to present 
the truth of allegory and thus, the truth of truth, since truth is allegorical, truth is 
always (“as an allegory”) a fable. “Fable” is a performance that confronts itself, and 
this is why it is able to articulate what is ‘true’ of literature and rhetorical language, as 
well as deconstruction. Thus, in the Demanic scheme Derrida defers to here, what is 
true of language is what is true of truth. As de Man himself has said: 
All language is language about denomination, that is, a conceptual, figural, metaphorical 
language. … If all language is about language, then the paradigmatic linguistic model is that of 
an entity that confronts itself. (RDR, 34) 
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Thus, language is “about” naming, about the drama of allegorization, which means 
that, because allegory is, as I’m suggesting, an aspect or imperative of irony, for a 
certain use of language to be truthful, it must be a use that confronts itself. All faithful 
articulations of Otherness, must, thus, proceed from the ironic and faithful 
mortification of the specular illusion of allegorical coincidence. To know an irony is 
to have an allegory, but a “true” allegory is only one that has been ironised. The 
significance of Ponge’s “Fable” is that it reveals, through the notion of “truth”, the 
work of irony in allegory and in language. Moreover, as an artwork, it reveals also 
what I shall soon qualify as the work of art DeLillo appears to subscribe to with his 
own texts. “Fable” thus represents, as Derrida sees it, “an allegory stating ironically 
the truth of all allegory […]” (38). Which is to say, that all allegories are composed by 
an Otherness, in irony, that no allegory or language can merely reflect. Here, in a text 
written by Derrida on de Man and on, among other things, allegory and irony, 
invention, deconstruction itself as revealed through Ponge’s poem, and on the demand 
constantly iterated throughout deconstruction for the most ethical tendering of 
Otherness, we find the force of irony, albeit, tendered within a text seemingly on 
allegory.  
     Because “Fable” presents the irony of its allegory it is thus true to the economy of 
différance, the trace58, iteration and the economic considerations of tenderness. As a 
work of art, “Fable”, in effect, tenders itself, tendering allegory in the name of truth, 
which means its allegories have been made tender by irony. We can say it is irony that 
is Derrida’s true subject since irony is what “demystifies” allegory (de Man) and in so 
doing, offers the truth of the “truth” that is always allegorical. Thus, with irony in 
mind, perhaps, Derrida once again points out the inextricable association of ironic 
invention and allegoricity: 
Ponge’s Fable, however inventive it may be, and in order to be so, is like any fable in that it 
calls for linguistic rules, social modes of reading, and reception, stabilized competences, a 
historical configuration of the poetic domain and of literary tradition, and so forth. (RDR, 44) 
 
Irony, for it to be ironic, depends on allegory and the contexts, rules, modes and 
competences it is invented from. Ponge’s poem is thus a fable (or allegory) for irony 
                                                 
58 The trace is a sort of Derridean revision of the sign, revised so as to signify that the sign is composed 
in and of Otherness. The sign, as trace, is at once the appearance of a trace of this Otherness, and at the 
same time the mournful trace of all that vanishes or disappears from the trace in the moment of its 
appearance – all, we might say, that from the translation of Otherness into the sign, falls back into 
Otherness, and memory, all that is different and has been deferred. In the trace Derrida insists on the 
structure of the symbolic economy as différance.  
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and invention, but also for deconstruction in so far as it discloses the allegoricity of 
allegory, as well as the becoming-allegorical of all deconstruction, all irony and 
invention. The reason why Derrida can refer to it as a poem of truth is that it 
deconstructs (reveals the irony of understanding) the very process of allegorization – 
of tropological cognitions – it is itself, inevitably and unavoidably, also an instance of. 
As such there is never the invention of truth as such, but rather the invention of “truth 
as proposition” (RDR, 51). 
     What we call deconstruction, then, is that which names a profound respect and 
faithfulness to the “poetics”, economy, and laws of what it critiques by never stepping 
outside these laws, never introducing arbitrary ‘stopping points’ or transcendental 
truths. Deconstruction must be subject to itself (just as Ponge’s poem is), and in 
speaking of the allegorical economy of signs it must show that all speech of, and 
about, allegory is itself allegorical. Deconstruction (that “merging of chance and 
necessity”59) is a fable, a “fabulous invention” about the truth.  Deconstruction thus 
observes that Otherness is the always and already of the economy, and that it is this 
Otherness – articulated through irony – that enables the subject of the economy the 
possibility of satisfying its need for presence, stability and assent. Ponge’s “Fable” is 
a fable (an allegory) of impossibility, an allegory of deconstruction. Thus, the poem 
resembles an allegory of irony, as an example of a tender allegory – one that reveals 
the work of art and the relation of its condition to its reproducibility (différance). 
Again, in apparently speaking of the work of another writer, Derrida is also speaking 
of his own practice, since the above is what he himself repeats through his 
deconstruction and critique of reflection and specular philosophy; deconstruction, to 
this end, is always presenting allegories of the ‘becoming-allegorical’ force that 
qualifies the subject’s experience of being-in-language. What this means is that 
Derrida’s texts must always be acts of irony.  DeLillo, too, sets his texts to recognise 
Otherness in the mirror (psyche) of language. 
     All of this tendering of allegory in the name of the Other, articulated, however, 
through allegory nonetheless, brings us back again to a certain irony or double bind: 
                                                 
59 As Derrida says: 
The very moment of this fabulous repetition can, through a merging of chance and necessity, 
produce the new event […] by bending the rules with respect for the rules themselves in order to 
allow for the other to come or to announce its coming in the opening of this dehiscence. That is 
perhaps what we call deconstruction. (RDR, 59) 
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the irony of the ethical raised in the issue of representing the unrepresentable, 
tendering the impossible. Simon Critchley responds to this issue when he asks 
[…] if ethics is defined in terms of respect for alterity, how is alterity respected in a discourse 
upon that alterity? Is not a book on ethics a denial of ethics, and must not ethics be a denial of 
the book?60
 
What we shall see is that allegories are ethical in as far as they are ‘true’ allegories, 
which is to say, allegories that have been ironized. The ethical allegory (for all ethical 
statements are allegories) will be that which bears the countersignature of the Other 
and is written in irony. As we shall soon see, what is involved here is the balancing of 
a respect for alterity with the necessity to name; this is the paradox, or irony, that 
Derrida see as the work of mourning. 
 
(v) The Tenderness of Mourning 
 
In simple terms, mourning, as Derrida configures it, is an expression of the loss that, 
as I’ve often said, is the essential and constituting experience of being-in-language; 
this loss tenders language (calls for names) in the same gesture that it marks the 
tenderness (contingent and fallen qualities) of language as well. This doubleness, 
essentially the feature of irony is, as Paul de Man and Derrida see it, what keeps the 
economy of language ‘going’, iterating. Derrida’s mourning is a formulation that 
recognises this ironic structure, and, in doing so (and this is why it is ‘deconstructive’) 
recognises its own tenderness as a formulation; mourning is, as Derrida conceives of 
it, impossible. This understanding however, in typically Derridean fashion, is what 
makes mourning a more ethical and faithful articulation of what is a dilemma for faith 
and ethics – the issue posed by the necessity of representing the Other. What I refer to 
as the ‘tenderness of mourning’ is a consequence of the fact that mourning is 
structured as an irony (as an impossibility); all claims to the ethical and to notions of 
good-faith representation that may then be associated with Derridean mourning, 
spring from this ironic structure. Mourning, we might say, is the ironic formulation of 
late Derridean deconstruction because, more than any of Derrida’s other 
‘formulations’, mourning assumes the tendering of Otherness as its raison d’être. In a 
sense, Derrida’s mourning (a relatively late formulation in his career) represents a 
condensation of all his previous texts in so far as it foregrounds and tenders in the 
                                                 
60 See Critchley. The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida and Levinas. 1992. p.12. 
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most economical and most focussed way the demand of tendering Otherness that has 
always been Derrida’s constant concern. Memoires for Paul de Man,61 is a text that 
makes clear the tenderness of mourning, the tenderness of one’s (Derrida’s) memories 
of a bereaved Other (de Man), of one’s relation to Otherness and memory on the 
larger scale, and the tenderness of ‘deconstruction’; Memoires is also a text about the 
tender-theory at the core of Derrida’s memory of de Man’s work, the relationship 
between allegory and irony – the relationship constitutive of mourning itself, in this 
regard it is crucial that Derrida goes so far as to spell out the relationship of irony to 
all this. In Derrida’s words: “together (allegory and irony) they form the rhetoric of 
memory” (M, 81). With my own and, I argue, DeLillo’s conjugating of memory and 
Otherness in mind, we might add here that irony proper (allegory and irony together) 
is what forms the “rhetoric” of Otherness. 
      The question of mourning in deconstruction is always connected to the question of 
writing and, specifically (in texts such as Memoires for Paul de Man, The Work of 
Mourning, Spectres of Marx) of writing about the dead Other. Of course, this is a 
personal issue for Derrida, and he is loath to systematize or generalize his mourning 
since, commonly, the instance for his work on mourning has been the death of a 
friend (de Man, Lyotard, Levinas, and Foucault are examples); but what emerges as 
the paradox, or irony, of writing of the dead (and let’s remember in writing about 
Plato, Nietzsche, or Heidegger, Derrida has always been speaking with the dead) is 
the aporia that mourning, in general, designates: not wishing to write, incorporate and 
thus disrespect the Otherness of the deceased, but also not being prepared to leave the 
Other alone and silent in their alterity by not writing or speaking of them. Derrida 
elaborates this double-headed structure of mourning as the difference between what 
he calls possible and impossible mourning. “Possible mourning” is seen as the 
interiorization within ourselves as image, ideal or idol, the Other who is dead and only 
lives in us. “Impossible mourning” leaves the Other their alterity, and is therefore that 
mourning which refuses the subject the possibility of taking the Other within oneself, 
within one’s narcissism. Derrida asks us which is the “most unjust betrayal?”(Mem, 
6): one is of memory, the other, of forgetting, but neither option will be meaningful if 
not for the economic necessity of their contamination of each other. It is the insistence 
                                                 
61 See Derrida. Memoires for Paul de Man (trans. Cecile Lindsay; Jonathan Culler; Eduardo Cadava; 
Peggy Kamuf). 1989. [Hereafter Mem.] 
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on this contamination, something that occurs in the gap both forms expose – the site 
of Otherness – that qualifies mourning as an ironic “structure”.   
     Simply put, this is the sort of aporia that mourning, as Derrida refers to it, 
designates, the gap opened between what we might call the representation of 
Otherness and the Othering of representation. As Derrida has pointed out, for 
mourning to succeed it must fail: it must fail to incorporate the Other, to make what is 
absent present in the sign, but just as urgently, mourning must also fail not to write “in 
the name of” or “in memory of” and in so doing repeat the loss of the Other all over 
again. Hence, mourning becomes for Derrida the frame in which to consider questions 
of faith and ethics as they relate to the demand to represent Otherness as Other 
without falling into silence, passivity, or apathy. There is no resolution in Derridean 
mourning, rather, what we are left with is what we could think of as a continual 
process of translation organised around a resistance that, perhaps in the manner of 
desire, calls forth the continual work of negotiation and tender, calling forth more or 
less tender allegories. As a consequence of this no final consolation or completion can 
be attained, but in the necessary and successful failure of mourning we are given a 
vision of language and subjectivity, in irony, as related forms of tenderness, and as 
tender to an economy of mourning – an economy of irony in which the possible 
(names, allegory etc) is reliant on impossibility (Otherness). 
     The pairing of the allegorical and the ironic, as I have indicated it, subsumed as a 
relationship within the force of irony, thus emerges as a relationship – of 
contamination, dependence, necessity and economy – expressive of a certain ironic 
“infrastructure” within deconstruction. As such, the ironic relationship models other 
relationships – narcissism and Otherness, memory and forgetting, repetition and loss – 
crucial to the articulation of deconstruction. The Other, as Other, is untouchable and is 
always in a sense, beyond us; as we have seen in relation to invention, the Other is 
impossible, an excess, though this is what gives meaning to mourning and makes it 
ironic.62
Ironically, it is only through this failure to fully recollect the Other that we “succeed” in 
mourning the Other as Other. For Derrida, then, the “il y a,” the rest, the excess, is only “there” 
for us as the loss that calls us to mourning. But as a “loss,” the remains are not there for us. 
There is always an allegorical dimension to mourning. And, therefore, “true” mourning is itself 
                                                 
62 The use of this word “beyond” here needs some attention since the Other is not beyond us in a 
transcendental sense; rather, this beyond is what we are inescapably “in”. This is to say that language, 
philosophy, concepts etc., in coming from the Other, are thus of this “beyond”, which, nevertheless, 
philosophy can never “fully recollect” or represent. The way in which language reveals itself as 
constituent of this Otherness is via the economy of différance, but also, I must add, via irony. 
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impossible. Yet the trace of the Other remains in the act of mourning. It is in mourning, then, 
that we remember the remains. But ironically, it is the very failure of mourning as mimetic 
interiorization that allows us to attempt fidelity to the remains. The inevitable failure of memory 
to enclose the Other, opens us to the “beyond”.63   
 
When Drucilla Cornell says (in the above) that “true mourning is itself impossible” 
because it always involves an “allegorical dimension”, we ought also to read this as a 
statement about the impossibility of irony; irony will always fall into the allegorical 
dimension. Mourning depends, then, on its failure, on its disappointment, or what 
Derrida refers to as a “tender rejection” (Mem, 35) of allegory. 
     What qualifies mourning’s “tender rejection” is, however, irony itself, albeit, the 
form of irony carried within Derrida’s definition of allegory as the “possibility that 
permits language to say the other and to speak of itself while speaking of something 
else; the possibility of always saying something other than what it gives to be read, 
including the scene of reading itself” (Mem, 11). In seemingly deferring to allegory, 
Derrida is ironically slipping us an allegory of irony, specifically an allegory that 
contains the knowledge that we can only indicate the beyond (the excess) 
allegorically. Derrida is here repeating, or remembering, de Man in his own 
suggestive tendering of allegory and irony, recalling as he writes that “I have […] 
always thought that de Man smiled to himself when he spoke of the narrative structure 
of allegory, as if he were secretly slipping us a definition of narration that is at once 
ironic and allegorical […]” (Mem, 11).64  
     Derrida’s formulation of mourning thus offers us a way of recognising that all 
concepts, all naming, and all memories have written within them the possibility of 
irony. In terms more appropriate to a language of mourning, this recognition of irony 
is like the recognition of a form of death comported within the sign, a death in which 
is built the moment of naming. Mourning, thus conceived, recalls that death or 
                                                 
63 See Drucilla Cornell. The Philosophy of the Limit. 1992 (p.73) [Hereafter PL] 
64 With this in mind it is possible to see in Derrida’s work, the prevalence of the ironic countersignature 
signed by Derrida in allegory. In quoting de Man Derrida appears to begin a kind of concession to 
irony: 
Paul de Man is bent on demonstrating ‘the implicit and rather enigmatic link’ for allegory and 
irony; we have already glimpsed it for synecdoche, prosopopeia, or parabasis. Irony too is a 
figure of disjunction, duplication, and doubling. It often produces a disjunction by which ‘a 
purely linguistic subject replaces the original self’, according to the scheme of amnesic memory 
of which we have spoken. And yet, precisely because of the disjunctive structure that they share, 
allegory and irony draw between them this singular contract, and each recalls the other. Of 
course, the former is essentially narrative, the latter momentary and pointed, but together they 
form, in fact, the rhetoric of memory which recalls, recounts, forgets, recounts, and recalls 
forgetting, referring to the past only to efface what is essential to it: anteriority. (Mem., 81)  
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finitude is the condition for all meaning and effects of sense and subjectivity. Irony is, 
in this regard, the ‘trope’ of death.65 What is true of the sign is also true for the 
subject; for both, the moment of death or irony articulates their status as tender sign or 
subject: “[d]eath constitutes and makes manifest the limits of a me or an us who are 
obliged to harbor something that is greater and other than them; something outside of 
them within them” (Mem, 34). Death presents the conditions for the ethical in 
highlighting the difference between same and Other, placing into relief the tenderness 
of “me” and “us”. In this way, a work of art (like Ponge’s) that mortifies (gives death 
to) its own appearance or representation – its own allegoricity – is one that tenders 
both the economical imperatives of language as well as Otherness through the 
reproduction of its structural affinities with irony and death. Moreover, in the work of 
art, thus conceived, we find a faithful reproduction of the condition of subjectivity – 
the truth of subjectivity as a condition explained through Derrida’s mourning, where 
The ‘me’ or the ‘us’ of which we speak then arise and are delimited in the way that they are 
only through this experience of the other, and of the other as other who can die, leaving in me or 
in us this memory of the other. This terrible solitude which is mine or ours at the death of the 
other is what constitutes that relationship to the self which we call ‘me,’ ‘us,’ ‘between us,’ 
‘subjectivity,’ ‘intersubjectivity,’ ‘memory.’ The possibility of death ‘happens,’ so to speak, 
‘before’ these different instances, and makes them possible. Or, more precisely, the possibility 
of the death of the other as mine or ours in-forms any relation to the other and the finitude of 
memory. (Mem, 33) 
 
The experience of the self – of a “me” or “us” – is as it is because of the Other that is 
beyond us, in excess of us. But we are never so aware of this (of our “us-ness”, our 
“me-ness”) as when another dies. Through the death of another person we are made 
aware – via the possibilities and impossibilities of mourning – of our relation to the 
Other, and, thus, are made aware of ourselves, of the nature of our “us”-ness and of 
the finitude of our own memories (allegories). The death of the other offers an ironic 
experience that draws attention to the tenderness of our sense of self as well as the 
tenderness of language – which is to say, then, combining these two notions – the 
tenderness of being a subject. The work of mourning can, thus, be seen to enable the 
thought of the ethical because it radically ironises the entire infrastructure of 
subjectivity – language, representation, relationships, perception and apperception. 
What is important about such a consideration of irony, here formulated as mourning, 
is that it describes the necessary work required for faithful and ethical reproduction – 
                                                 
65 Incidentally, this association of irony and death explains why it is that I can refer to DeLillo’s novels 
of memory as works of mourning. Moreover, the link between irony and death is something I return to 
in my chapter on Underworld, specifically in my discussion of Bruegel’s painting “The Triumph of 
Death”. 
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precisely the work of the artist in a DeLillo novel. A faithful artwork will be one that 
rehearses its death as part of its work. In all of this, the demand to continue with 
language, in light of the Other, in the most accurate, clear, compassionate and tender 
way, is still the greatest demand of subjectivity, is, in fact as DeLillo suggests through 
his novels, a form of faith. Indeed, this is a faith qualified, as we will see in my 
discussion of The Body Artist, by a debt to Otherness revealed through an artist’s 
attention to différance, or what Derrida, I argue, refers to as the “ironic moment […] 



























Chapter 2: The Body Artist 
 
(i) The Fallen Wonder of the World 
     
By virtue of his subtly metafictional legerdemain DeLillo’s The Body Artist, I argue, 
is to be read as a text composed, in the manner of the Proustian mémoire 
involontaire,66 within the memories of its artist and ‘author’ Lauren Hartke; the text is 
a return or replay, certainly a remembering, of her experiences of trauma and 
mourning occasioned by the suicide of her husband, Rey Robles. The experience of 
this trauma is, as I argue it, an experience of radical Otherness. What is significant 
about this is that, as a record of an artist’s hosting of Otherness (an experience, as we 
shall soon see, embodied in the figure, Mr. Tuttle), The Body Artist becomes a record 
of the work entailed in the production of a work of art. Such work, what I have 
referred to previously as the work of mourning (a working with irony), is, as I read it, 
revealed as crucial to the distinction of the faithful and ethical artwork; this is an art 
form that, for DeLillo, I argue, is qualified by an artist’s ‘deconstruction’ of 
ideological or allegorical reality, a mortification of language, and an examination of 
all that is assumed in representation and reproduction. Such work, as I refer to it, 
performed by Lauren, is to the purpose of what, in Chapter One of this thesis I have 
indicated are the ethical and impossible demands of mourning – the respecting of the 
unrepresentable Other, combined with the all too human necessity of representing 
Otherness.67  
     Central to Lauren’s work of mourning is the figure Tuttle whose manifestation to 
Lauren is like a “daydream variation” (14), an experience likened to that of imagining 
one’s way into a story in a newspaper before being aware one is doing it (14); Tuttle, 
                                                 
66 See Handelman: “[A] memory which reaches to an archaic, almost transpersonal level […] a 
nonsubjective memory, emanating from a realm other than active personal cognition or chronological 
narrations of past events […] this involuntary memory is released in a sudden moment of recognition 
from an encounter with an object” (FR, 152). 
67 Such an examination of the processes involved in the work of art, as true of Lauren’s performance 
Body Time as it is for the novel itself, is nothing short of a complete examination of the philosophical 
underpinnings of language and writing. As such, The Body Artist ought to be read in the context of one 
of DeLillo’s complaints about the usual readings his texts receive: “what’s almost never discussed is 
[…] the language in which a book is framed” says DeLillo, “one receives a broad analysis of, perhaps, 
the social issues in one’s work but rarely anything about the way the writer gets there”. [Quoted by 
Philip Nel in “Don DeLillo’s Return to Form: The Modernist Poetics of The Body Artist”, p.736.] 
Indeed, this thesis, an examination of the relationship of allegory and irony in what I call irony proper, 
is designed to disclose how DeLillo’s texts “get” to present their “social issues” through an 
examination of the philosophy of language proposed in this thesis. 
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we might consider, ‘represents’ something like the unrepresentable delay prior to 
cognition. Another way to think of Tuttle is as the foreign hair (usually called a 
“foreign body”) Lauren picks from her mouth in the opening scene of the novel: the 
hair itself, perhaps, can be seen to stand in for Otherness, though it is more accurate to 
see Tuttle as the ghosted return (and hence, delayed) sensation – the “complicated 
sense memory of someone else’s hair” (11) – of this Otherness as it returns and is 
repeated through something like body-memory. Tuttle himself is not what I would 
call the Other in the text, but is more properly an effect of Otherness, in particular, an 
effect of the radical undoing of Lauren’s allegories of being, time and space caused by 
her traumatic exposure to Otherness.68 In effect, Tuttle is the unmediated return or 
repetition of this Otherness that, throughout the text, Lauren ‘comes to terms’ with – 
that is to say, translates, mediates and represents. As such, Tuttle is the delay – the 
very irony or différance of which I have been speaking – prior to allegory and 
representation, that we can think of as ‘origin’ to writing and the whole economy of 
the sign. Tuttle, as something Lauren’s body recovers or remembers of Otherness, and 
as an articulation of Otherness that mortifies Lauren’s ontological and epistemological 
regimes of time, space and language, “represents” knowledge before knowing, 
memory before remembering, time before allegory.69
     In a text that signals in its title that it is ‘about’ an artist, all of what DeLillo will 
present as definitive of that appellation rests on Lauren’s relationship to this 
“impossible man” (58), this irony incarnate, Tuttle. Through Lauren’s relationship 
with Tuttle, and her reproduction of him in her performance piece Body Time, DeLillo 
makes an argument about the ethical demands necessary to the work of art. In the 
process of this argument DeLillo, qua Lauren, ‘deconstructs’ all the usual 
assumptions pertaining to allegory, representation, language and subjectivity. In a 
sense, Tuttle defines Lauren as an artist since his presence in the text is attributable to 
her openness to Otherness, her capacity to tender the impossible, her 
“hyperpreparedness” (16) for what she doesn’t yet know. Tuttle, we could say, is 
                                                 
68 For the best reading of Tuttle’s significance and ‘status’ in the novel see Laura Di Prete’s “Don 
DeLillo’s The Body Artist: Performing the Body, Narrating Trauma” [Contemporary Literature, Fall 
2005, Vol 46, #3] where she accounts for him as a “staging of traumatic reenactment” (484). My own 
chapter, originally written in 2002, shares many of Di Prete’s assumptions, but differs in its focus on 
irony, différance, language and the work of art. 
69 Examples of this can be found littered throughout the text. See: “She got up to get something […] 
She knew it would come to her because it always did and then it did” (16); “But when he wasn’t there 
she knew he wouldn’t be, if that makes sense” (96). 
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produced or created by Lauren’s body (what we’d expect of a body artist) in a manner 
similar to the way in which her body still senses or experiences the presence of the 
hair on her tongue after it has been removed; in this regard, Tuttle is the body’s 
ghosting of Rey and Otherness, conducted through her senses in a way that is more 
faithful to the experience of Otherness because it is ‘represented’ through a medium 
(her body) other than that of language or consciousness.70 Lauren’s qualities as an 
artist are thus a consequence of her qualities as host to Tuttle.71
     The arrival of Tuttle is, we might say, an epiphenomenon of the moment at which 
the symbolic world (the world, rendered in language, of ideology, or what Lauren 
refers to as “myth” (98)) all falls away. Tuttle, we could say, is an emissary, a 
revenant or (more popularly) “ghost”72 of the real who, in the language of 
deconstruction, presents to Lauren the Otherness of time – as pure exteriority or 
alterity – to the experience of being and subjectivity. Thus, Tuttle is described as 
violating “the limits of the human” (100), as an evocation of Lauren’s traumatic 
experience of Otherness, the “howling face, the stark, the not-as-if of things” (90), 
and as “the thing you know nothing about” (99).  This last phrase is a description apt 
for all the things Tuttle, as a figure of prosopopoeia constellates: the body, the Other, 
and time. Through Lauren’s engagement with irony and différance, embodied in 
Tuttle, Lauren is able to faithfully translate the trauma of Otherness into the work of 
art, an art form, characterised by what I have previously referred to as the mourning 
of the Other – an ethical art consequential to an artist’s work with irony – that in 
DeLillo’s novels, reads as a blueprint for the tender poststructural artwork. As such, 
The Body Artist is primarily about the process of translating Otherness into allegory.    
     The question of the ethical is raised by the consideration of how, faced with the 
Other and knowing ourselves to be constituents of an immanent Otherness, we use 
language and make representations faithful to this Otherness. In the novel the 
                                                 
70 The notion of the body as medium of Otherness is something that, in effect, Handelman points out: 
“The body itself is a paradigmatic example of an exteriority not constituted by my consciousness; it 
permanently contests the prerogatives of consciousness to ‘give meaning’” (FR, 253). The body 
introduces an aporia into the self-relation; suggesting the difference within self, the subject cannot be 
identical to itself because of its “exposure, vulnerability, passivity” – as an “other-in-the-same” (FR, 
253). 
71 By “host” I refer to the two obvious readings of this term offered in the novel: firstly, Lauren as 
Tuttle’s host when he appears as an uninvited guest in her house, and secondly, Lauren as body-host to 
the series of memories, impressions, sensations, intuitions that comprise Tuttle, housed in Lauren’s 
body.  
72 Indeed, in later editions of The Body Artist a tag line referring to the text as a “postmodern ghost 
story” has become part of the marketing of the novel. 
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possibility of the ethical is expressed by such considerations as how much we permit 
Otherness to act on our interpretations, and how much of this Otherness we translate 
into our representations. Moreover, Lauren’s questions about mourning: “why 
shouldn’t the death of a person you love bring you into lurid ruin?” and “why should 
you accommodate his death?” (116) present the reader with a way of bringing into 
focus the issue of mourning with the more epistemological and ontological questions 
the text asks of us: “[i]s reality too powerful for you?” (122) and “how much myth do 
we build into our experience of time?” (98). These questions are what Lauren in The 
Body Artist undertakes to answer; in doing so Lauren provides the reader with a 
theory of art that DeLillo, I suggest, could well endorse as his own theory of the 
novel.73
     The rest of this chapter is divided into three parts: the first takes up the motif of the 
fall as mentioned in the preceding chapters, in furtherment of certain assumptions 
about language DeLillo appears to maintain, and develops these assumptions in 
relation to a notion of allegoricity built around perhaps the single most crucial 
qualifying term of the text – the equivocal ontological category, “seems”. In the 
second part of this chapter I use the character Mr. Tuttle to explore issues pertaining 
to the treatment of time and the Other in the novel. In the final section of this chapter I 
seek to make some qualifying remarks about what, with The Body Artist, I think 
DeLillo offers the reader as the ‘work of art’. 
  
 
(ii) Time seems to pass. 
 
You know more surely who you are on a strong bright day after a storm when the smallest 
falling leaf is stabbed with self-awareness. (7) 
 
As a parable of Lauren’s experience of Rey’s death, the “storm” of trauma and the 
“bright day” of heightened self-consciousness that follows it, both of which are 
assumed within the experience of Otherness, represent the knowledge gained by 
                                                 
73 In answering these questions in this chapter we also construct a bridge between the theory chapter 
(Chapter One) and the Underworld chapter (Chapter Three) – a ‘bridge’ that provides the reader with 
the set of assumptions and the philosophical vocabulary with which to read the rest of the thesis. This is 
why I place discussion of The Body Artist (2001), before my discussion of Underworld (1998). I would 
add that this is a ‘reading’ justified by a text such as The Body Artist that is itself a study of the 
exigencies and assumptions involved in the work of irony towards the work of art, and, at the same 
time, an exposition of DeLillo’s great themes, language, subjectivity, memory, time and Otherness. 
 65
Lauren of the fallenness of the human condition, our being-in-language.74 The 
“falling leaf” is a metaphor for Lauren’s fall into self-awareness,75 a fall entirely 
commensurate with both her exposure to Otherness and the undoing, or ironising, of 
all her perceptual and representational assumptions consequent to this exposure. As I 
have suggested, it is a statement about her qualities as an artist that Lauren allows 
herself as open an experience of this fall as she does; as well as she “can” Lauren 
allows this Otherness to express itself, and much of what constitutes her work in the 
text resembles a kind of ‘book-keeping’ of her responsibilities and tendencies 
involved in the inevitability of her representation and mediation of this Otherness.76 
The series of misprisions, misperceptions, and mistranslations that, as Lauren (and 
DeLillo) is aware, constitute our “grip” on the world, are, in good faith, forestalled, by 
Lauren, their passage into repression, forgetting and paranoia. Moreover, such 
misrepresentations become the reason Lauren, as the closing pages of her narrative 
suggest, returns to the fallen condition of allegoricity. Importantly, DeLillo appears to 
be saying, it takes imagination, a process of tendering, and art to manage this 
translation of Otherness into allegory, and essentially, this is the “point” of The Body 
Artist. In the mourning of her husband that structures the text we find, in Lauren the 
artist, also that mourning located in the work of deconstruction – a process premised 
on the impossible balancing of alterity and representation, the impossible work of 
maintaining both the ironisation of allegoricity and, at the same time, a commitment 
to the allegorisation of alterity’s articulation through irony. 
     The text, a composition often resembling a record or diary of an artist’s work 
towards the making of a certain representation, reveals Lauren’s thoughts on 
representation and Otherness, and throughout the text we (the reader) find instances of 
what we can refer to as fallen representation, that is to say, allegories exposed to 
irony; commonly, images, perceptions, sensations, and phrases are recorded by 
Lauren both for what they propose and for what they miss. In a sense, the artist’s 
                                                 
74 Ostensibly, it is Rey’s suicide that is the occasion of the “fall” in the text. Connected to this fall, 
however, because it is a fall experienced and ‘represented’ by an artist (Lauren), is also the sense 
discussed in the preceding chapters of the human fall into language from the impossible Otherness of 
the world. Moreover, the trauma of Rey’s death serves as a reminder of the repeated trauma of 
signification – the non-coincidence, absence or loss harboured within the sign itself, that constitutes 
and continually renews the economy of language.  
75 In fact, this is precisely, the fall of the self into language-consciousness that, for de Man, is definitive 
of the ironist.  
76 Notably, in her first meeting with Tuttle Lauren recognises that he is “inevitable” (41); essentially his 
appearance is inseparable from Lauren’s powers of representation. 
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mourning is conducted through the mortification of her allegories. Thus, a man 
Lauren observes “sitting on his porch […] arms spread, a broad-faced blondish man, 
lounging”, a man who Lauren sees “complete”: “[a] lazy and manipulative man, in 
real estate […] divorced and drink haunted” (70) is, moments later, revealed to be 
nothing more than 
 a paint can placed on a board that was balanced between two chairs. The white and yellow can 
was his face, the board was his arms and the mind and heart of the man were in the air 
somewhere, already lost in the voice of the news reader on the radio. (70) 
 
In effect, the paint-can man is eidetically painted by Lauren’s imagination in such a 
way as to suggest her sensitivity to language. It is as if the word “paint” prompts 
Lauren’s ‘painting’ of the man, the information on the radio providing the 
biographical details. In this moment of translation we are presented with both an 
image (an allegorical construction) as well as the deconstruction of the artist’s 
perceptual tendencies. Later in the text a “dead squirrel” in Lauren’s driveway is 
revealed as a “strip of curled burlap” (111) and later still, after her reproduction of her 
Japanese neighbour in her performance piece, Lauren sees the Japanese woman again 
and notes how “[h]er hands were fisted up inside the sleeves of her jacket” (115), a 
detail Lauren “curse[s] herself for not having thought of for the piece […] it was 
everything she needed to know about the woman” (115). The point, it would appear, 
is that Lauren’s unreliability as a narrator is not repressed, but is, in fact, a credential 
of her responsibility as narrator; as an artist her misperceptions – the tenderness of her 
allegories, we might say – become a feature of her ethical regard for Otherness, for 
things, and for allegory, seen in the very tenderness of her tendering of both allegories 
and things (Others). In her acts of allegory and representation, what Lauren is also 
reproducing is the permissibility of allegorical deconstruction, of the work of irony 
within her allegories; thus, we are witness to the way the word “paint” can tender its 
verb (to paint, as Lauren does) and, in another way, we are made witness to the re-
arrangement of spatial units of meaning (the paint can, board, etc.) to the purpose of 
constructing a difference (the “blondish” man). 
     To present in the act of representation or reproduction the very force, or 
possibility, of reproduction in such a way, is to ‘present’ the unpresentable of irony or 
différance77 and, thus, to open representation, as much as possible, to the articulation 
                                                 
77 The ‘presentation’ of such différance is what we might think of as the presentation of that which has 
no content, but is rather the delay or difference between forms of content, allegories, from which 
content is made distinct 
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of Otherness. This, for DeLillo, as I will continue to argue, appears to be exactly the 
sort of disclosure (or tendering) DeLillo, qua Lauren, understands as the work (the 
demand and responsibility) of the artist, a sort of definition too of the work of art. 
Such an understanding, essentially that of différance and irony at work in the artist’s 
perceptions and representations, is what the following quote appears to provide: 
You stand at the table shuffling papers and you drop something. Only you don’t know it. It takes 
a second or two before you know it and even then you know it only as a formless distortion of 
the teeming space around your body. But once you know you’ve dropped something, you hear it 
hit the floor, belatedly. The sound makes its way through an immense web of distances. You 
hear the thing fall and know what it is at the same time, more or less, and it’s a paperclip. You 
know this from the sound it makes when it hits the floor and from the retrieved memory of the 
drop itself, the thing falling from your hand or slipping off the edge of the page. Now that you 
know you dropped it, you remember how it happened, or half remember, or sort of see it maybe, 
or something else. The paperclip hits the floor with an end-to-end bounce, faint and weightless, 
a sound for which there is no imitative word, the sound of a paperclip falling, but when you 
bend to pick it up, it isn’t there. (89) 
 
All of that which we represent, all ‘knowing’, all allegories, all effects of identity, as 
in this example, are produced in the delay from, and difference to, the actual event. 
The event itself, even the self-consciously prosaic event of the fall of a writer’s paper 
clip, remains in its Otherness.78 The motif of the fall, returned to in the image of the 
falling paper clip, is thus associated with the tender fallenness of language, its 
‘belatedness’; there is no “imitative word” for the sound the paper clip makes when it 
hits the floor, and despite the allegory of its “end-to-end bounce” that Lauren 
imagines, “half-remember[s], or sort of see[s] maybe”, when she bends down “to pick 
it up, it isn’t there”.79 All language, this passage seems to suggest, given its context of 
mourning-recollected, is the recollected mourning of an event, moment or sensation 
that recollection or representation can never catch up with. The point is that all 
                                                 
78 In so far as the event is something we remember, and remember differently from the ‘actual’ event, 
then this Otherness is also what we can refer to as memory. In the image of a fall, we are given here, by 
DeLillo, a paragraph illustrative of the fallenness of subjectivity – a fall into time and space, a fall into 
belatedness and mediation. Moreover, what we find in such a passage is evidence of a certain 
deconstructive ‘premise’: that all effects of subjectivity result from remembering. Drucilla Cornell 
points this out, and in doing so associates memory and Otherness, when she writes that our experience 
of subjectivity is not something constituted in the present,  
 
nor does the subject exist as a presence in and for itself. Instead the subject recollects himself in 
the act of remembrance of the Other in himself; an Other, however, that is beyond his memory, 
since she remains other. In spite of the limit of memory, the remembrance of things past is the 
story of the subject, the only one he can tell. For Derrida, the subject only becomes a self in and 
through the possibility of mourning. (PL, 76) 
 
79 Of course, this whole paragraph, coming as it does well after the appearance of Mr. Tuttle in the 
novel, helps ‘explain’ Tuttle as something remembered, made up, intuited, from memory, it helps 
‘explain’ him as an important missed-perception, a sort of return of something ‘not known’ (trauma, 
Otherness) held in memory. 
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language is generated by delay and difference and that this experience of différance 
(irony) is the experience of origin that is original to the actual original experience. 
Which is to say that all language, because of the principle of différance, has its origins 
in Otherness, the very thing that marks language as tender, as a belated ruin, and as 
fallen. For this reason, all allegories bear irony within them. For an artist, such as 
Lauren, the work of art is indissociable from the ethical and faithful conviction that all 
allegories are, thus, ironic, but also, that this awareness is what makes for better or 
worse representations, making it possible to make distinct (in a DeLillo text if 
nowhere else) the work of art from other forms of representation and reproduction.   
     In effect, this passage reads almost as a sort of credo for the work of an artist in a 
DeLillo novel; in its proposition of an allegory of tenderness (its theme of subjectivity 
as fallenness) it also proposes the tenderness of allegory, as something remembered, 
reconstructed, an effect of ironised allegory that unveils not the ‘thing’, but rather, our 
seeing of the ‘thing’, making us aware how our representations make things seem 
“doubtful – not doubtful but ever changing, plunged into metamorphosis, something 
that is also something else, but what and what” (36). Lauren’s capacity to recognise 
her own tenderness, as a subject and as an artist, rests on this revelation of her fallen 
allegoricity. With this quotation, we are offered a definition of allegory (“something 
that is something else”), but one that is, notably, tethered to the restless turning and 
returning work of irony: marking the tenderness of allegory, but also the way allegory 
constantly tenders new allegories (“but what, and what” [?]). This last implied 
question is itself an expression we may liken to the “end-to-end” somersaulting of 
allegory. 
     Such an awareness of one’s allegoricity belongs to the ironist, and Lauren confirms 
this later in the text when she considers that “she thought in words sometimes, 
outright and fully formed. She wasn’t sure when this began to happen, a day or a 
month ago, because it seemed to have been the case forever” (113). The revelation 
here lies not in the recognition that she thinks in words, but that she always has, and 
that until a “day or month ago” – sometime around or after the Other-experience of 
Rey’s death – this was something she had habitually overlooked. Her understanding 
is, then, precisely one of the tenderness of allegoricity: that although we take our 
allegories of the world for granted, as clear and accurate representations of the world, 
in truth, such allegories only make the world seem like the something we make it out 
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to be. Indeed, as it appears to occur to Lauren, stuck in grief and sitting in traffic, the 
word “seems” contains within it the seductive power of allegory.  
When you reach the top of the incline, something happens and the cars begin to move 
unhurriedly now, seemingly self-propelled, coasting smoothly on the level surface. Everything 
is slow and hazy and drained and it all happens around the word seem. All the cars including 
yours seem to flow in dissociated motion, giving the impression of or presenting the appearance 
of, and the highway runs in a white hum. 
   Then the mood passes. The noise and rush and blur are back and you slide into your life again, 
feeling the painful weight in your chest. (31) 
 
In “seem” we have a word for the mediating, mitigating force – a sort of tenderness 
articulated by other “weak” words such as Lauren considers: “somehow”, “as-if”, 
“maybe” – located somewhere between the “noise and rush and blur” of unmediated 
Otherness (grief, trauma, non-linear time) and the seamless consumption of non-
tender allegories.80 Seem: “It all happens around [this] word,” we are told, including, 
of course, the novel’s narrative that begins: “Time seems to pass” (7). As readers of 
this text of an artist’s remembering we are meant to conjugate the seeming nature of 
allegory with the seeming time of narrative, to the purpose of unveiling The Body 
Artist’s project: the mortification of its arrangement of time, its mortification of its 
allegorical constructions, a deconstruction of an artist’s work of translation, and 
representation. All of which is to the purpose of exposing what is assumed beneath 
what seems to be true or accurate, exposing the processes that go undetected in 
translating one thing into another – to the purpose of displaying allegorical 
tenderness, and saving allegory from becoming “predictable and trite” (43). Again, “it 
all happens around the word seem”: the word itself (the word) has a sort of agency 
here, the power of language to translate and transform is the power of allegory – the 
traffic only seems to slow because of our being subject to language, and because it is 
possible in language – by the word – for this to seem to happen. The noise and blur 
continues in actuality, in its Otherness, but in the interim Lauren experiences what 
words, narrative, and by extension, art can offer, reprieve and consolation – 
smoothing, levelling, giving an “impression” of order. DeLillo’s floating phrase: 
“giving the impression of or presenting the appearance of” serves here as yet another 
of Lauren’s definitions of allegory. The traffic on the highway, a feature of a 
mourner’s insight into the feeling of estrangement from the ordinary traffic of human 
                                                 
80 In coming to terms with the ‘Otherness’ of Tuttle, Lauren reflects on the tenderness of her language: 
“Somehow. The weakest word in the language. And more or less. And maybe. Always maybe. She was 
always maybeing” (92). But tenderness, as expression of weakness, is also a condition of imagining 
(and thus tendering, as I’ve been insisting); the artist’s work, in the wake of Otherness and loss, is 
always to be “maybeing”. 
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life, is also a metaphor for the traffic of allegorical language and its time keeping 
function. In this metaphor we note, then, how the tenor of the metaphor (language, 
allegory, signs) is conjugated to its vehicle (the cars) in such a way (another “stab” of 
a writer’s self-awareness) as to highlight that this is a quotation about language itself, 
how language mitigates and mediates an Otherness it is in fact inseparable from. 
     Language itself – its tenderness – is, then, what an artist in a text such as The Body 
Artist is bound to notice, since so much of the text is involved in the disclosure of its 
very textuality. The ‘seeming-ness’, we might say, of the language of the text must, in 
the manner of irony and mourning, be ‘deconstructed’ by Lauren (DeLillo) so that this 
very language (allegory, narrative) might faithfully be renewed in the work of art. For 
this reason it is, again, language that Lauren notices in its falling effect when she 
considers how “[s]he ran the water from the tap and seemed to notice. It was the first 
time she had ever seemed to notice this” (8). To “seem” becomes the verb, as in “to 
be”.81 Here the verb clause of the first sentence suggests there is something in 
particular to notice, but notice instead (the act of noticing) becomes like the object of 
the sentence. The point is that even those things we take for granted in the act of 
perception are themselves objects; the ordinariness of noticing here becomes strange, 
new seeming, like the word notice does in the sentence. Language is drawn attention 
to and this is because Lauren’s whole allegorical-world is under the pressure of 
mortification. The falling water, of course, is what Lauren is noticing and it is the 
secret object of the sentence, a secret because it seems to be missing at the end of the 
sentence. DeLillo is, again, making a point about language and how it is always a 
mediation of the real, the way in which language can become its own object, just as 
noticing (and because of DeLillo’s punning on this word) or to notice, is itself an 
object worth considering and not just a means to an end. In this regard what falls, 
what comes turning and tumbling out of the tap is words, allegory. Like the leaf, the 
tap water, falling from the faucet, also suggests time: the time taken for the stream of 
water to run from opaque to clear (8), like language moving from the unknowable 
Otherness of its provenance to the translucency with which we assume it functions. 
The tumbling of allegories, as de Man points out, is what engenders our temporal 
predicament. The time taken for one thing to seem as if another is precisely our 
experience of temporality, a temporality indexed to allegory, and, in DeLillo’s image 
                                                 
81 To seem, or not to seem to be, in The Body Artist, is the postmodern question. “I seem, therefore I 
am” might well be another formulation of the same concern. 
 71
of the falling water, to the time of the fall. Lauren’s mortified allegories however, 
indicate that time has become Other, that she has lost her usual measure of time 
because of her exposure to Otherness. Lauren’s tendering of allegory is thus a 
possibility of the fact that her allegories have become rhetorical, subject to irony, that 
even the most routine and seemingly insignificant of actions, perceptions and phrases 
have become strangely noticeable. 
  
(iii) Time and the Other: “How much myth do we build into our 
experience of time?”  
 
What we have come to see in the previous section as Lauren’s mortification of 
allegory is very much an effect of her experience of time’s Otherness. Indeed, her 
undoing of allegory is part of her attempt to allow herself to feel time as it might 
otherwise be, rather than as it “seems”; as an artist, Lauren appears prepared to let this 
Otherness wash over her, to permit, as much as is possible, an unmediated tendering 
of her sense of self and her allegorical arrangements of time and space.82 The 
distinction between the world as it “seems” and the world as it might otherwise be 
signals The Body Artist as a self-consciously poststructuralist text, but what is 
remarkable about this text is that its narrator constantly meditates on the qualities of 
her translation of the Other into representation. Primarily, this meditation on allegory 
takes the form of an investigation into the Otherness of time, a sort of deconstruction 
of the allegoricity that as de Man has written is responsible for what he calls our 
“temporal predicament”.83 What this section sets out to do is introduce those 
                                                 
82 This notion of Otherness, as I’ve suggested, is crucial to the work of irony (the work of art) proposed 
in the text because the text reveals it as its a priori condition. All of that which is proposed in this 
thesis as the ethical or faithful aspects of the work of art, as pertains to the tenderness of DeLillo’s 
philosophy of language, proceeds from this regard for Otherness. 
83 As I’ve suggested in the earlier chapters, within the poststructural the recognition of the relationship 
of sign and language to Otherness reveals (as de Man has shown through his investigation of allegory 
and irony) the “temporal predicament” of the subject. Because the subject’s experience of being subject 
is one inscribed in language – in a semiotic economy governed by the ‘law’ of différance – the 
experience of subjectivity is best described as a living through the Other. All experiences of self, the 
present, presence and continuity etc. are effects of delay and difference; the self is an effect of all that 
vanishes from it, which is to say, the self is posited by an economy of differences, and is thus linked to, 
and an effect of, all that is different from the self. What this means, à la Derrida, is that all events of the 
present and all imaginings of the future come from Otherness – an Otherness that both DeLillo and 
Derrida appear to suggest can be thought of as memory. In short, we remember ourselves, we 
remember the present, the past, and the future; the ‘real’ experience of time is, as such, the experience 
of Otherness, distinct from what time “seems” to be as we translate it into linearity, continuity, 
narrative and allegory. 
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categories of time and Otherness as they are presented in the text. The purpose is to 
make clear the conditions of Otherness to which Lauren responds. Mostly this section 
seeks to foreground some basic assumptions about the Other so that we may read The 
Body Artist as the record of a process begun in trauma (the exposure of Otherness) 
that moves through memory to language, and the production of an ironic artwork. 
What I will argue is that The Body Artist meditates over the steps taken by the fallen-
subject in a kind of rehearsal of what I have described earlier as the concerns and 
assumptions of DeLillo’s ‘deconstruction’. In the novel, the medium for this 
meditation, the articulation of Otherness through which Lauren’s ‘deconstruction’ is 
performed, is Mr. Tuttle. As we shall see, Lauren’s engagement with Tuttle 
effectively provides the context for what I have called the work necessary to the 
production of art, and primarily this is because Tuttle, for Lauren, is a sort of 
manifestation of différance; as an articulation of Otherness specific to Lauren, he 
resembles an impossible embodiment of irony.     
     Essentially, Lauren’s relationship with Tuttle parallels the process of the 
translation of the Other. Tuttle, as I have suggested earlier, is to be understood as an 
emanation of Lauren’s own Otherness; his presence is, in the text, likened to a sort of 
sub-conscious, involuntary body-memory. In effect, Tuttle is both the undecidable of 
interpretation as well as the “inevitable” (41) moment of representation. To attend to 
Otherness for Lauren is to attend to Tuttle, and what makes this novel a work about 
the work of an artist is that Lauren’s engagement with the experience of Otherness is 
conducted through her concerns with representation, interpretation, translation, and 
reproduction. As I shall argue, what intrigues Lauren about Tuttle, and what it is that 
suggests the primacy of his role in the work of her art, is the notion that as an 
emanation of différance and irony, Tuttle is, in fact, representative of the very force of 
reproducibility, the possibility of reproduction that keeps the economy of language 
and representation going.84 As Lauren appears to recognise (and this is why she starts 
using the Dictaphone) Tuttle becomes the occasion for an encounter with the 
conditions of difference, delay, Otherness and memory that reveals to Lauren 
something of the Otherness of Otherness, the Otherness of time and, with this, the 
tenderness of allegory. 
                                                 
84 The inevitable translation of Tuttle that Lauren eventually performs is, à la Benjamin, not a literal 
reproduction of Tuttle as something else, but as a reproduction of what he in fact ‘embodies’: 
différance, or what, as I’ve indicated, we can think of as reproducibility – a capacity he is noted for in 
his reproduction of Rey’s voice, words, mannerisms, body, and Lauren’s memories, voice etc. 
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     As I’ve suggested, what precedes Tuttle’s ‘arrival’ is the shock and trauma of 
Rey’s sudden death. In this state of shock Lauren’s encounter with Otherness reveals 
itself primarily through what she feels to be a loss of allegorical time, specifically, of 
time as a narrative. As we have already seen, faced with the Otherness of time, 
language itself (the medium by which we ‘keep’ time) as Lauren perceives it, is 
revealed for all its allegoricity. As Lauren notes, language is revealed as “arbitrary” 
(91), “words hang in the room, predictable and trite” (43).85 Rather than repressing 
this experience, Lauren, as artist, chooses to investigate it, asking in the process 
“[h]ow much myth do we build into our experience of time”(98). Her question is 
about the application of language and narrative to the unmediated, blurring Otherness 
of time, and raises the issue of what is at stake in our translation of this Otherness into 
myths, ideology, narrative, names and language. In the process of answering this 
question, both Lauren and the text endeavour to permit Otherness its fullest possible 
articulation, a radical re-tendering of all that for Lauren has been assumed as the 
“parameters” (66) and conditions of her existence. Such a willingness is thus reflected 
in her comments towards the end of the novel when she asks: “[w]hy shouldn’t the 
death of a person you love bring you into lurid ruin?” (116). 
      However, in the days immediately after Rey’s death, and in the early stages of her 
exposure to the Otherness of time, Lauren seeks out ways of measuring time. In a 
state of grief Lauren decides that her “plan” should be to “organise time until she 
could live again” (37) and this she does through a metric of chores and routines, 
counting the times each day that people ring to console her (36), making the “forty-
minute march to an abandoned crafts center” (37), and using the ferry for its 
“schedule” of arrivals and departures (37). One effect of Lauren’s experience of 
mortified allegorical time is that she learns to see more clearly its constructedness. 
Indeed, in the web-cam “feed” from Kotka, Finland, it is something of the tenderness 
of allegorised time, a quality, almost, of nostalgia, combined with her new sense of 
time’s Otherness that compels her viewing. Moreover, in the Kotka feed Lauren finds 
a reflection of her own experience of time. 
   She sat and looked at the screen. It was compelling to her, real enough to withstand the 
circumstance of nothing going on. It thrived on the circumstance. […] It was the sense of 
organization, a place contained in an unyielding frame, as it is and as you watch, with a reading 
of local time in the digital display in a corner of the screen. Kotka was another world but she 
could see it in its realness, in its hours, minutes and seconds.  
                                                 
85 What I am referring to here as the time of the Other, the Otherness of time, as I will soon make clear, 
is not to be seen as a quality of timelessness but possibly the opposite, an ecstasy of unmediated time. 
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[…] She didn’t know the meaning of this feed but took it as an act of floating poetry. It was best 
in the dead times. It emptied her mind and made her feel the deep silence of other places, the 
mystery of seeing over the world to a place stripped of everything but a road that approaches 
and recedes, both realities occurring at once, and the numbers changed in the digital display 
with an odd and hollow urgency […]. (38) 
 
What appeals to Lauren is the “organisation” of something Other, an other place, and 
with this, also, the evocation of circumstance and indeterminacy (“dead times” 
separated by the coming and going of traffic), all composed in an “unyielding frame”. 
Furthermore, the recording of local time combined with the spatio-temporal drama of 
cars approaching and receding confirms for Lauren the sense that “time [does] seem 
to pass” (7). Thus, from the perspective of her own profound temporal disorientation, 
the Kotka feed becomes an act of tender human poetry, one that reveals the human 
need for measurement and the surveillance of time, and a certain calibrated 
relationship to circumstance. And yet, because of the “unyielding frame” Lauren feels 
also the tenderness of the feed, the notion that it actually represents something beyond 
measurement, its own allegorical tenderness revealed through the contingency of 
framed, metricated time, contextualised by the raw open power of circumstance. In 
this last regard the feed can be read as poetic precisely because of its articulation of 
this irony. Moreover, the mortification of allegorical time as an “odd and hollow 
urgency” is the result of a spatial evocation of a temporal ‘irony’: two possibilities, 
coming and going, future and past made simultaneous with each other. In the 
dislocation between the feed footage and the digital display the very framing of an 
Otherness is highlighted, in a model of self-awareness validated in the sort of 
artworks DeLillo’s artists so often seem to approve of.  
     In the image from Kotka Lauren intuits a sort of rhyme for her experience of 
Tuttle. A similar intuition explains Lauren’s fascination with Mariella’s phone 
message. In both cases, Lauren recognises things in the world that represent her 
experience of Otherness, time and the condition of being in language.  
She called Mariella and got the machine. A synthesized voice said, Please / leave / a mess/age / 
af/ter / the / tone. The words were not spoken but generated and they were separated by brief but 
deep dimensions. She hung up and called back, just to hear the voice again. How strange the 
discontinuity. It seemed a quantum hop, one word to the next. She hung up and called back. One 
voice for each word. Seven different voices. Not seven different voices but one male voice in 
seven time cycles. But not male exactly either. And not words so much as syllables but not that 
either. She hung up and called back. (67) 
  
The machine message captures something of Lauren’s new understanding of language 
and its intersection with time and space, and like the Kotka feed is also perceived as a 
 75
kind of poetry.86 This is because to Lauren’s ears its articulation of spatial and 
temporal disjunctions is reminiscent of a ‘representation’ of différance. Lauren 
recognises in the message something of the differing and deferring forces at work in 
language: she ‘sees’ the words as spatial units separated by line breaks, and hears 
them as separated by “deep dimensions” of time. In one voice she hears the voices of 
Others caught in other time cycles – a metaphor for the infiltration of Otherness into 
not just the most routine phrases, but into statements of identity – a metaphor not only 
for Lauren’s later ventriloquism of the voices of others, but also for the manifestation 
of Lauren’s Other: Tuttle. 
     Tuttle’s status as Other in the text corresponds directly to his status as figure of 
time, “sheer and bare” (92) and unmeasured.87  
Maybe this man experiences another kind of reality where he is here and there, before and after, 
and he moves from one to the other shatteringly, in a state of collapse, minus an identity, a 
language, a way to enjoy the savor of the honey-coated toast she watches him eat. 
    She thought maybe he lives in a kind of time that had no narrative quality. (64) 
 
The Otherness of time is, then, specifically, that which is shorn of allegory, exactly 
what is referred to here as the quality of narrative. Such an Otherness, as I’ve been 
suggesting, is thus remarked on here for its ‘shattering’ of linguistically-given spatial 
and temporal arrangements: “here and there, before and after”. Thinking her way 
through Tuttle’s presentation, Lauren finds herself articulating an experience of 
Otherness that re-elaborates this shattering of oppositions: “She didn’t know how to 
think about this. There was something raw in the moment, open-wounded. It bared her 
to things that were outside her experience but desperately central, somehow, at the 
same time. Somehow, what is somehow?” (63). On this last note a sense of the 
tenderness of language is returned to Lauren; “somehow” expresses the need for some 
different expression, a different word, an absent word or concept, as well as the need 
to extemporise and, within the moment of delay and difference, return to language 
“like a line in a piece of fiction” (91). The translation of this Other experience is 
                                                 
86 Apart from the fact that Lauren scans the line for its rhythms and syllabic structure, its arrangement 
of silences, the phrase is also represented in the text with the poetic convention of back slashes 
indicative of line breaks or syllabic scansion. 
87 This idea is frankly addressed in the text when Lauren considers how in her conversations with 
Tuttle “[t]here was a missing beat. It was hard for her to find the tempo […] She […] couldn’t locate 
rhythmic intervals or time cues […] There were no grades of emphasis here and flatness there. She 
began to understand that their talks had no time sense […]” (65). Furthermore, Tuttle’s name is 
onomatopoeic for the sound of a clock. We find reinforcement of this interpretation when his 
movement is described as “a tick and tock, like the first toy ever built with moving parts” (62); he is 
like something invented with which to teach a fundamental understanding of time, time as Other.  
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attempted by Lauren, who looks for assistance in the language of science, a language 
of “parameters”; and what she begins to recognise is that a crucial capacity for 
division and separation is missing for Tuttle and that, as a result, he is “not able” (43) 
to construct in language the temporal and spatial allegories we use to experience a 
“now”. 
He didn’t know how to measure himself to what we call the Now. What is that anyway? It’s 
possible there’s no such thing for those who do not take it as a matter of faith. Maybe it was a 
physicist she needed to talk to, someone, she wasn’t sure, who might tell her what the 
parameters were. She hated that word. She used it but didn’t know what it meant and used it 
anyway. (66)  
 
The “Now” is, via allegory, another category of what “seems”; but in the time of 
Otherness that Tuttle articulates, all “now” time is past-time remembered, is memory-
time. “Now” is, we might say, an imposed “parameter”, an effect of an allegorisation 
of time. Indeed, something of this effect appears to be intuited by Lauren in her 
consideration of the word “parameter”. As Lauren possibly misuses it, “parameter” 
becomes a sort of ironic example (because of what the word means) for the mistaking 
of the world, an instance of the allegorical tenderness of all attempts to construct, 
measure and demarcate a “now”.  
     It is Tuttle who is the occasion in the text for the revelation of such allegorical 
tenderness and, as I’ve already signified, this is because he is, in effect, a sort of 
ventriloquism of Otherness. In his speech we find a re-imagining, a tendering, (by 
Lauren) of the experience of being from the impossible perspective of the Other. As 
an articulation of Otherness, Tuttle speaks in an ironic language, the language of 
différance.   
   Being here has come to me. I am with the moment, I will leave the moment. Chair, table, wall, 
hall, all for the moment, in the moment. It has come to me. Here and near. From the moment I 
am gone, am left, am leaving. I will leave the moment from the moment. (74) 
 
In Tuttle’s opening sentence the entire tradition of ontology, and with this, the 
primary allegory of “being” as origin is ironised; seen through the lens of différance, 
“being” is reconceived as an effect of a certain delay: “here” and “come” thus indicate 
spatial and temporal categories that suggest that “being” is something that has 
‘arrived’, and is thus the consequence of a deferral. This is the knowledge Otherness 
(the articulation of Otherness provided for Lauren through Tuttle) provides the subject 
with. Tuttle’s speech represents an examination from the perspective of someone 
recently estranged from her familiar arrangements of time, space and language, of the 
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condition of human subjectivity, and the human proclivity to represent and reproduce 
its ontological and philosophical assumptions. Tuttle continues: 
   Coming and going I am leaving. I will go and come. Leaving has come to me. We all, shall 
all, will all be left. Because I am here and where. And I will go or not or never. And I have seen 
what I will see. If I am where I will be. Because nothing comes between me. (74)88  
 
 When Tuttle says “coming and going I am leaving” ‘his point’ is that regardless of 
the direction inscribed in language, all language is witness to a “leaving”; différance, 
the force or process personified in Tuttle’s “I”, is a name for the perpetual leave-
taking of all that in being “with the moment”, “will leave the moment”: Tuttle 
(Lauren) is here evoking the drama of différance, the tracing of the Other that 
vanishes in the appearance of a sign, word or allegory. As an imagined manifestation 
of différance, Tuttle’s “I” expresses certain impossibilities of a temporality that 
language can only indicate by way of paradox: “I will go or not or never”, as well as 
equivocation, and a sense of immanent motility seen in the inhabiting of multiple 
tenses and spaces that results in the subordination (the loss of agency) of the subject-
position, the “I”: “[a]nd I have seen what I will see. If I am where I will be”.  
     In keeping with the evocation of différance Tuttle’s speech is such a study in, 
Tuttle’s phrase “we all, shall all, will all be left” is a statement about the inevitability 
of the sign and the subject returning to memory, residing in Otherness. Both sign and 
subject are, after all, always already effects of the delaying and differing of 
Otherness. This point is made when we consider how Tuttle’s two passages are 
dominated each by “coming” and “leaving”. From “being here has come to me” to 
“leaving has come to me” both indicate an experience of arrival. If “being here” and 
“leaving here” are both possibilities of something that has “come”, then both are 
returns, both are simultaneously possible,89 and the model of time this assumes is not 
then one of linear teleology, but one of messianic immanence, the time of the Other 
where everything is a remembrance of what will come.90 Tuttle, as Lauren imagines 
                                                 
88 So when Tuttle says “leaving has come to me” we can read this as code for that sense of falling from 
the world, and entry into language, that I have been referring to, that is reinforced by the word itself, 
“leaving” which refers back to the images of leaves that throughout the novel have been associated 
with self-consciousness, lability, and language turning in impossibility. 
89 Here we return to the “floating poetry” of the Kotka web-cam, and the significance of its 
arrangement with circumstance; the road that both approaches and recedes, “both realities occurring at 
once” (38) is thus a metaphor for the simultaneity of past and future, the experience of the immanent 
time of the Other. 
90 Messianic time can be thought of as the insistence that through every moment in time, every allegory 
of a present, Otherness may come, may return or be recognised. Essentially, this is a description of the 
possibility that in every allegory a difference or other-meaning might be read. 
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him, is thus “a man who remembers the future” (100) and this is precisely a statement 
of the Derridean experience of faithful subjectivity, explained along the principles of 
différance. Because the subject is always a deferral and difference from all that is 
Other and, in this way, is also always an aspect of all that is Other, then all that the 
subject names as past, present, future or difference, is merely the return of all that will 
have been, is, in fact, a remembering of all that is Other that the subject is helplessly 
caught up in, like a matrix of possibility.91  
 
*  *  * 
 
You are made out of time. This is the force that tells you who you are. Close your eyes and feel 
it. It is time that defines your existence. 
   But this is the point, that he laps and seeps, somehow, into other reaches of being, other time-
lives, and this is an aspect of his bewilderment and pain. (92) 
 
What is referred to here as Tuttle’s “bewilderment and pain” is the result of his status 
as radical tenderness, as intersection of language and Otherness, différance – the 
tendering articulation of memory and Otherness through language, and, at the same 
time, the making tender of language (revealing its tenderness) by its exposure to 
Otherness. Tuttle is such a figure of articulation, a manifestation of irony, precisely 
because of this tendering dynamic. On the one hand, he is an allegory of Lauren’s 
experience of Otherness, an Otherness that, through Lauren’s skills as a body artist, 
finds its way into language. On the other hand, he is irony itself, the force that 
mortifies all language and with this, all relations to time and space, and the notion of 
subjectivity. Thus Lauren, thinking through Tuttle, is able to see how time is “the only 
narrative that matters” (92) even though, in Tuttle, she is also able to see that time is 
“something like itself, sheer and bare, empty of shelter” (92). Glimpsing, thus, the 
necessity of allegory as well as the fact of allegory’s tenderness, Lauren comes to an 
understanding about the central irony of her mourning. Such mourning, as Lauren’s 
arrangement with irony, is to be read as the context elaborated in Lauren’s following 
rumination. 
   It was the kind of day in which you forget words and drop things and wonder what it is you 
came into the room to get because you are standing here for a reason and you have to tell 
                                                 
91 Such an understanding of the “always already” nature of the time of the Other (what the novel 
indicates in its last pages with its use of the future perfect tense) explains the odd prescience with 
which both Lauren and Tuttle appear to intuit events yet to happen. What Rey refers to as Lauren’s 
“hyperpreparedness” is, in fact, a consequence of her artistic sensitivity to time, and in particular, her 
willingness to translate Otherness as Otherness as faithfully as is possible.  
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yourself it is just a question of sooner or later before you remember because you always 
remember once you are here. 
   The thing is communicated somehow. (83)  
 
We find here another metaphor for the condition of fallen subjectivity, our tenderness, 
and how we are tendered by Otherness. This insight comes to Lauren as a result of 
both her experience of Otherness, the mortifying of the “standard sun-kissed 
chronology of events” (83), and her re-imagining of the ‘truth’ of “being here” 
through Tuttle. Subjectivity is a story (“narrative”) told in delay; the world happens 
and we can ‘know’ it through our bodies and translate it into language. In this way the 
thing – the object in the world (das ding) – is communicated, but only “somehow”. 
This, the word, as we have learned through Lauren’s meditations on it, is an epithet 
for our allegoricity, the weakness (92) and tenderness of language. What DeLillo 
appears to suggest in a book so conspicuously ‘about’ art and reproduction, is that the 
experience of Otherness is crucially linked to the possibility of art. What we might, 
therefore, say, is that for DeLillo, the defining feature of a work of art is that it must 
faithfully treat (mourn) the Otherness it is bound by human necessity to translate as 
allegory. Such an art-work will be that which mortifies its own methods of translation 
and reproduction – indeed, just as Lauren mortifies her own mode of signification, her 
body. The ‘form’ DeLillo appears to suggest, by way of Tuttle’s utterances, that is 
adequate to this work is irony – the articulation of Otherness à la différance. The 
flexion between Otherness and representation – precisely the “intersection” Lauren 
finds herself at – is conducted through différance; this intersection, we might say, is 
also the ironic crux of the possibility of signification.   
 
(iv) The Work of Art 
   When she could not remember what he looked like, she leaned into a mirror and there he was, 
not really, only hintingly, barely at all, but there in a way, in a manner of thinking, in some 
mirrors more than others, more than rueful reproduction, depending on the hour and the light 
and the quality of the glass, the strategies of the glass, with its reversal of left and right, this 
room or that, because every image in every mirror is only virtual even when you expect to see 
yourself. (112)    
Lauren’s “manner of thinking” is what we can refer to as ‘thinking Otherwise’, that is 
to say, thinking, as an author, in and through the third person, and in a text that 
inquires into issues of retrospection and representation, the image of Lauren trying to 
recall an-other in her mirror becomes instructive, not least for the metaphor of vision 
and mediation (every image is “only virtual”), but also for the sense of the Other as a 
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reflection of the self – the self as another’s Other.92 In Lauren’s mirror we also find a 
metaphor for language as “rueful reproduction”, as mournful, fallen medium – 
something suggested by the imprecision of the pronoun “he” that could be taken to 
refer to Rey or Tuttle, or even Lauren’s impersonation of them. The imprecision 
highlights the rueful qualities of both the mirror and language, but also the theory of 
language as “mirror” of reality. Lauren is hoping to find in the mirror the Other in 
herself, a process ‘reflected’ in language through its mortification, its exposure to an 
Otherness it cannot represent, and this is why the quotation turns back on itself, 
becomes a statement about itself – a reflection on the rueful nature of reflection – 
complicit within the project of representation. Just as Lauren mortifies her body so as 
to enable the articulation of another (body), as a writer she must also mortify (ironise) 
language – revealing its tenderness, its failure as mirror – so as to tender the Other in 
representation. In short, this is the work of the artist I shall elaborate on in this final 
section of this chapter, a work that, more generally describes the quality of the text, 
The Body Artist, which, as ‘authored’ by the artist herself, is subjected to the same 
mortifying processes of remembrance, re-construction and replay that characterise her 
own dramatised or recorded translation of the Other into art.  
     The tenderness of the novel, its arrangement with irony, is revealed when we 
consider that it is composed as a retrospection, a remembering, a return to a period of 
time immediately before, and then after, Rey’s suicide; the tenderness of the novel is 
thus a consequence of its revelation of the processes and decisions, the translations 
and constructed allegories, that underpin the text as a reconstruction, as a 
remembering. As I’ve suggested, the text is to be read as an artist’s deconstruction of 
the work of representation – the very way the work represents what it represents. All 
of which is to say that the work of art DeLillo proposes, through Lauren, in The Body 
Artist, is best exemplified by the work the reader of the text holds in their hands. The 
work of art, for DeLillo – and this explains the metafictional tendencies of the novel – 
is the work that reveals the work entailed in reproduction. As I’ve shown already, 
such a conviction is apparent in DeLillo’s merging of the novel’s content as its form: 
which is why we can say that the novel is ‘about’, among other things: the 
deconstruction of allegorical and narrative temporality, the conspicuous elaboration of 
                                                 
92 Here we note a blurring of the subject that makes Tuttle, Rey and Lauren all subjects of Lauren’s 
gaze. The point is to blur the division between self and Other and to foreground the ethical notion that 
the self is always constituted to some degree by the Other and as Other; there can be no ethics without 
the capacity that Lauren demonstrates to see herself as an Other. 
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a narrator’s ‘unreliability”, a heightening of textual materiality where the narrator 
appears to shatter certain conventions of novelistic narrative via irruptions of self-
consciousness (“What’s it called?” (9); “Many things are interesting, fool” (82)), 
which, along with a more general narrative self-awareness (Lauren’s unfinished 
sentences, elisions, rhetorical questions, and equivocations: “he ate breakfast or he 
didn’t” (86)) serve to foreground for the reader this notion that the text is a recording 
of its own reproduction.   
     Moreover, certain other novelistic assumptions are also overturned: the inclusion 
of Rey’s obituary and Mariella Chapman’s article on Lauren and her performance, 
disrupt and mortify the notion of the well-made novel, and, of course, but for 
Mariella’s relatively minor reference to it in her article, the supposed centre-piece of 
the novel, the artwork Body Time that the text appears to offer as its culminating 
achievement, is absent from the text. In its absence, we have only its mediated 
translation by Mariella. Indeed, the absence of the artwork from the novel is apposite 
to the novel’s prioritisation of the work and ethics of reproduction (revealed in the 
text, as we’ve seen, through Lauren’s investigation of Otherness, of Tuttle as 
manifestation of irony) over what is reproduced; DeLillo’s text is ‘about’ the 
conditions and demands an artist must be faithful to in the process of making 
“meaning”, rather than an attention to the “meaning” made.  Lauren’s own comments 
about the performance, along with her rejection of Mariella’s suggestion that it is 
about the death of Rey, make this clear when Lauren says: “Maybe the idea is to think 
of time differently” (107).  As we’ve seen, this endeavour to think of time differently 
is also an effort to strip back allegorical coincidence, not least of all the sort of 
allegorical reading that would posit Rey’s death as the subject matter of the 
performance. “When time stops, so do we. We don’t stop, we become stripped down, 
less self-assured” (107) continues Lauren, indicating as she does so not only her 
constellation of allegory, temporality and identity, but also, that the sort of artwork 
validated by Lauren (and DeLillo, I argue) is one that in tendering the Other, 
tendering the processes involved in the act of representation, will be one that 
manifests a certain absence, Otherness, and resistance to determination. For this 
reason the absence of the ‘artwork’ (Body Time) from the novel is entirely consistent 
with Lauren and DeLillo’s ironic philosophy. In this, the final section of this chapter, 
I will look at some of the qualities that, for DeLillo it seems, help define the work of 
art. Such qualities, by virtue of The Body Artist’s status as an artist’s work-journal, are 
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elaborated through Lauren’s various rehearsals, practices and processes; among these 
I consider her treatment of time, her body preparation, and what I refer to as her 
renovation of allegory.  
     Essentially, this idea of the renovation of allegory – a constant theme and concern 
of all the DeLillo texts discussed in this thesis – begins on the very first page of The 
Body Artist in the elaboration of an opening section (that I will continue to refer to as 
the breakfast scene) that can be considered a sort of ironic set-piece, a self-
consciously “written” and, to some degree, metafictional composition. The opening 
section of the novel is intended to be seen as a retrospection, a reconstruction of the 
actual morning before Rey’s suicide that the artist and author, Lauren, composes as an 
example of the kind of tender representation, the work elaborated throughout the rest 
of the text, has been preparation for. In a sense, this composition re-places into the 
world of the “seem” an Otherness so often overlooked. Within the documentary 
mimeticism of the breakfast scene, with its studied representation of a couple’s 
routine distance from each other, their unspoken division of possessions, spaces, and 
roles, and its presentation of an unexamined and overlooked allegorical system, the 
artist/author inscribes a ghosting of Otherness: the foregrounding of the scene’s status 
as a remembering93 is thus a foil for the self-conscious placement within this scene of 
objects, details and experiences cathected with the “future” experiences of loss, 
Otherness, and Tuttle, the novel will, itself, soon elaborate on.   
   One such ghosted detail is presented in the text in the form of an irony, a certain 
deferral of meaning neither the text nor Lauren ever resolves, when Rey announces at 
breakfast: “I want to say something but what?” (8). Typically for DeLillo, it is in the 
evocation of an absence – this unsaid and withheld piece of information – that 
Otherness (all that is yet to come in the novel) is articulated. In this way, Rey’s 
silence anticipates his eventual suicide – ghosts, in fact, the entire work of the novel 
Lauren will perform. Lauren misses the chance of discovering his meaning, primarily 
through inattention, but also through a kind of overlooking that is the consequence of 
                                                 
93 The scene, we note, begins with the deictic expression: “It happened this final morning” (7), that by 
itself indicates the quality of remembering and retrospection that is not to be overlooked as a given of 
narrative temporality. We are directed to this awareness later in the text when Lauren, in the first 
person asks: “do you recognise what you said weeks earlier to someone you loved and would never see 
again [?]” (87). The breakfast scene for all its seemingly precise recall of dialogue, is an imagined 
replay, that we, the readers, are supposed to see as a tender, constructed, self-consciously imagined 
replay, a studied evocation of Otherness and loss, ghosted in allegory, inserted into the “seeming” 
surface of language. 
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a vanity of interpretation: “I know anyway. So tell me” (18). Rey has, at this point, 
resolved to keep his peace on the matter, but he sees here the chance to end the 
discussion, saying with an irony Lauren also overlooks “yes. You’ve read my mind” 
(18). The irony ramifies as the reader of the text, in retrospect, realises that this 
parable of intimate estrangement, of representation subordinated to routine 
miscommunication, will culminate in Rey’s suicide. In effect, the reader is thus given 
a dramatic irony to remember, that is to say, the remembering of a certain unknown 
knowledge, a knowledge entirely out of step with the narrative temporality as, per 
convention and routine, we make our knowledge of Others “seem”. As we have seen 
in the previous section on time and the Other, this is precisely the experience Lauren 
documents throughout her narrative, and is now embedding in the opening scene of 
the text. 
     Such a textual effect is the correlative of that hair in Lauren’s mouth, analogous 
also to the experience of some event peripheral to consciousness and knowledge, 
something on the outer edge of experience and one’s capacity to represent experience 
that “takes a second or two before you know it and even then you know it only as a 
formless distortion of the teeming space around your body” (89). Rey’s “great” ironic 
“amplified smile” (18), like the hair Lauren picks from her mouth, is an example of an 
Otherness that unsettles and perturbs the surface appearance of things – in this case, 
the surface appearance of mimetic representation that the breakfast scene is designed 
to put the reader in mind of, especially with its motif of attempted precision of 
description – Lauren’s repeated attempts to describe the smell of the soya granules, 
the sound, like “b’s” and “r’s” of the birds leaving the feeder, and her close 
observation of the apparitional blue jay. Indeed, the blue jay can be seen to be another 
example of the text floating a hair into the reader’s consciousness, an image of irony, 
essentially, in so far as the presentation of the bird in the text is, at once, both an 
occasion of description, observation and allegory and the presentation of something 
entirely in excess of observation and allegory. As with the previous examples, the 
bird, remarkable in the text for this quality of irony, ghosts a certain understanding 
(tenders various readings) that cannot initially be explained. In its own uncanny 
manner the bird signifies something known without being known, something finally 
remembered as known – a future knowledge to be remembered. Thus, the blue jay can 
be seen as a metaphor for, and foregrounding of, Tuttle, but also represents 
considerations of blindness, perception and the representation of Otherness, a 
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commentary on the routinely missed Otherness of those we live with, and the 
establishment of motifs of mimicry and impersonation (21-22). The point is, the scene 
is designed to comport within it all that the novel will, in the course of its narrative, 
unpack and present; with the image of the blue jay we are given the impression of this 
‘knowledge’ ostensibly before it is communicated, and in this respect, the novel is 
replicating something like an encounter with Otherness – but an Otherness that for the 
(first time) reader, like Lauren, will have to be remembered, reconstructed, “written 
like a line in a piece of fiction” (91).94  
     In the breakfast scene we are tempted to find signs or portents of Tuttle’s arrival in 
the details of its studied and composed description, to find evidence that might 
explain his invention, his appearance in the text; but DeLillo is actually asking us to 
do the reverse, since the breakfast scene is itself a retrospection, a composition 
posterior to, but evocative of, Rey’s suicide and Tuttle’s appearance. Thus, the 
breakfast scene, we might consider, is not composed for the purpose of finding 
justification of the Other’s manifestation, but, rather, to make a point about the 
manifestation of Otherness in the detailed recording of the ordinary and everyday.  
The Body Artist, we might say, is a ghost story in reverse: it is not that we discover a 
ghost haunting the ordinary, but that the “ordinary” is itself always already the ‘ghost’ 
of Otherness, that hauntings are essentially conditional to language, and that this is the 
discovery (of irony) crucial to the possibility of art as well as allegory.  
     It is for this reason then, that DeLillo gives his ‘ghost’ (Tuttle) only the scraps of 
allegorical representation to utter, only the phatic content of two lives lived in their 
ordinariness, for speech; Tuttle’s comments, as Lauren notes, consist of a cobbling 
together of “routine remarks” (51) that have been overlooked, but now, through 
Tuttle, are replayed, and repeated differently. The effect Tuttle has on such 
overlooked remarks is something Lauren incorporates into her work, especially  
her slow-motion repetitions of everyday gestures, checking the time on your wrist or turning to 
hail a cab, actions quoted by rote in another conceptual frame, many times over and now slower 
and over, with your mouth open in astonishment and your eyes shut tight against the intensity of 
passing awareness. (58) 
 
                                                 
94 The experience the reader is exposed to as a ‘remembering of the future’ is acknowledged in the 
conspicuous shift in Lauren’s narrative voice into the future perfect (“she will already have been there 
[…]” (122); “they will already have slept and wakened” (123)) that occurs after Lauren’s performance 
of Body Time and her return to the house. This temporality is indicative of the “always already” of what 
in deconstruction, Derrida refers to as the time of the Other. 
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To repeat differently, to renovate the “routine”, as Lauren does here, and to permit 
Otherness its articulation through the “everyday”, all requires a slowing down of time, 
a winding back of allegorical immediacy and presence, opening the space for the 
consideration of différance. Essentially, this is the work Lauren (and the reader) must 
perform when faced with the demand to translate and allegorise Tuttle – when faced 
with the demand of what Lauren sees as his inevitability (41). Inevitability (as in the 
category of the immediate) is what Lauren has to strip back in order to think 
Otherwise. As I have said, the issue for the text (and for ethical irony) is not the 
inevitable appearance of Tuttle (or the Other), but the question of this condition of 
inevitability as it relates to our representations of Otherness and the world. In the first 
moment of meeting (the “inevitable”) Tuttle, Lauren, we are told, “felt her way back 
in time to the earlier indications that there was someone in the house and she arrived 
at this instant, unerringly, with her perceptions all sorted and endorsed” (41). The 
novel ‘deconstructs’ this inevitability – reconstruing it not as something “sorted and 
endorsed”, but as a tenderness, an effect produced by the process of tendering the 
Other in language. Without the questioning of Tuttle as “sorted and endorsed” the 
novel would not be able to present tenderness, imagination or irony, because the act of 
retrospection and recuperation would be complete. Instead, Lauren proceeds to 
undermine this inevitability – her perceptions cannot be trusted – and she openly errs 
in her imaginative work, and this seems necessary to the work of irony and art. 
Indeed, with de Man in mind, we might consider the work Lauren performs here as 
the work of a good-faith, non-innocent misreading. In effect, then, Tuttle becomes an 
awareness for Lauren to measure against habits and routines of representation and 
time, an occasion by which to mortify and thus, renovate allegory.  
     For this reason Lauren takes Tuttle with her to the “sprawling malls”, “the world in 
geometric form, patterned and stacked […] long aisles of products and […] shoppers 
in soft shoe trance” (64). Lauren wants to reveal to herself, through whatever might 
“warrant his regard”, what she has “forgotten how to see” (64). Tuttle is like a lens, 
then, Lauren uses to peel back the routine things we/she no longer look at properly, 
and the context for this looking is specifically, allegory – allegory as it has become 
like the “geometric” and “patterned” forms of the malls, like a product or commodity, 
something to maintain the trance-like state of the shoppers. The point is that it is by 
tendering Otherness, and the consequent ironisation of allegory – what I have been 
referring to as Lauren’s work – that such a vision (and critique) of allegory, and thus, 
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the demand for a more faithful remembering of the allegorical, is made. A similar 
point is made later in the novel when Lauren considers the newspapers she reads. 
Again, a sense of allegory’s diminishment into commodity-trance-form begins with a 
reflection on her own processes of allegorical representation: “the stories she told 
herself did not seem hers exactly. She was in them so heedlessly they seemed to come 
from a deeper source […] a thing that was overtaking her […] [t]hey did not come 
from the newspaper” (115). The “source” she refers to is what I have been calling the 
Other. What is significant about this point is that Lauren recognises that ‘her’ 
“stories”, her allegories, are linked to Otherness, are possibilities of Otherness, and 
with this understanding comes a sense of the complexity and tenderness of allegory, 
indeed, of representation. However, this is an understanding belied in the form of the 
newspaper – a “slick hysteria of picture and ink, the world so fleetingly easy to love 
and hate, so reliable and forgettable in its recipes and wars and typographical errors” 
(115). Here, allegory is reduced to “recipes”, a consumer law governed by the ease of 
oppositions (“love” and “hate”); moreover, such allegory, in being seemingly reliable 
(routine, stable, irony-less) is also forgettable and thus, represents a forsaking of 
memory and Otherness. In such a state allegory, as the quote suggests, is relegated to 
the tenderless-ness of incompetent application, a constituency of “typographical 
errors”. 
     As I’ve said, for Lauren, Tuttle is a kind of mirror or lens by which, she is able to 
explore in imagination some possibilities of herself, those she has lived with and 
forgotten, and qualities of relationship as they might Otherwise be. For this reason 
Tuttle is both the Other person and, reflexively, the third person to Lauren herself, a 
figure she is given to consider in the mirror: not Tuttle, but herself, transformed into 
the Other – a spook – who, as the unseen, is looked through, but also as a lens is used 
to see with. 
This was her work, to disappear from all her former venues of aspect and bearing and to become 
a blankness, a body slate erased of every past resemblance […] In the mirror she wanted to see 
someone who is classically unseen, the person you are trained to look through, bled of familiar 
effect, a spook in the night static of every public toilet. (84) 
 
Lauren attempts to turn her body into a “venue” for “looking through”, precisely a 
medium of reproduction – in the manner of irony or différance – to the purpose of 
articulating the Other (person) we don’t see, we overlook, or in the punning phrase 
used above, “look through”; Tuttle, as the mirror, body, and lens that Lauren sees 
through, enables her to see differently, to learn to see allegorically all over again, 
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indeed, to “look through” allegory as a newly ground lens. The result, for Lauren, as 
for the reader of The Body Artist, is the renovation of allegory.  
     The emphasis on the body in the investigation of Otherness is metaphor for the 
presence of Otherness within language and allegory. What this analogy suggests is 
that both body and language are mediums of the Other, given that we are well attuned 
enough to read them closely enough. When tendered faithfully, both the body and 
language (allegory) become textual – become in fact what the text The Body Artist is 
itself an example of – an artwork, an Other articulation of Otherness, worked through 
irony and différance. We note, then, the process of mortification that Lauren subjects 
her body to, and how this work of intense examination (pushing the limits of 
flexibility, endurance, and resistance, stripping and purging, as well as the work of 
alteration, and supplementation), mirrors the authorial work of composition and 
analysis. Indeed, body and language are both caught up in the process of something 
like editing, and brought together by Lauren in the way she conceives of her treatment 
of her body, using “clippers and creams that activated the verbs of abridgement and 
excision” (76). Her body practice is analogous to her textual practice; her scrutiny of 
her body becomes a metaphor for close reading: “she studied her fingers and toes. 
There was a way in which she isolated a digit for sharp regard, using a magnifier and 
a square of dark cardboard […]” (76). The work of examination borders on what we 
might call a deconstruction of her body, something, perhaps, hinted at by Lauren 
when she reflects: “how nearly scholarly the pleasures of extraction” (84). 
     The reason for such sustained examination and deconstruction of allegory, as 
evident here in Lauren’s re-tooling of her body, but also, as the experience of the 
novel’s textuality, is to the purpose of re-tendering and renovating of our ways of 
seeing, hearing, translating and representing. All of which is relevant to the sort of 
conjecture Lauren makes earlier in the novel when she considers Tuttle: “[…][s]he 
wondered what he saw, or failed to see, or saw so differently she could never begin to 
conjure its outlines” (50). Simply put, Lauren’s ‘text’ responds to such a conjecture 
by putting forth in presentation the conditions of its own reproduction and its own 
representational tenderness, articulating, as it does so, the Otherness of others, even 
those – a husband, or a mother (124) – we have lived with. Although the canvas is 
small and intimate here, Lauren’s work in The Body Artist represents a theory of the 
work of art that forms the basis for the philosophies of language and reproduction that 
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serve the critique of a capitalist culture DeLillo pursues throughout the enormity of 

































Chapter Three: Underworld 
 
Part One: The Triumph of Death 
 
 
It’s called an Indian burn – remember? One hand grinding one way, the other going the other, 
twisting hard, working fast (Underworld, 48). 
 
… [T]ogether, they [allegory and irony] form, in fact, the rhetoric of memory … (Memoires for 
Paul de Man, 82). 
 
In a punctum-like moment in Underworld an almost self-aware narrating voice asks 
‘us’ to “remember”. But what is it to remember, and what is memory? DeLillo gives 
us an answer when he gives us the question, which is to say; he gives us an allegory 
for memory (the “Indian burn”) even as he makes of this allegory a question 
(“remember?”), almost a demand. Memory itself is always remembered, tendered by 
allegory. So it is memory, then, that is accessed by this double-handedness – two 
hands working at once in opposite directions, in a metaphor, I suggest, for the work of 
allegory and irony, and for the tender impression their work leaves on us (not least, 
the skin). In a novel that, as DeLillo has said, is “about memory” (how the “past is 
constantly with us”)95 this play, a twisting together of allegory and irony, can be seen 
as the structuring rhetoric of a text that moves between the demands of naming and 
representation involved in remembering, and the “underworld” Otherness of memory 
itself.96 Of course, in order to feel the “burn” of tenderness, both hands (allegory and 
irony, naming and forgetting) have to be working at the same time, together, though 
Underworld demands to be read as a record of the ways in which a culture has largely 
avoided such tenderness through adherence to what can be seen as an economy of 
motivated misrecognition, a “commodity-symbolic” predicated on the systemic 
avoidance of Otherness.97 Such an avoidance – a denial of irony, a refusal of memory, 
and with this, the radical etiolation of allegory – is characterised throughout 
                                                 
95 See Richard William’s interview with Don DeLillo “Everything Under the Bomb”. Guardian, 
January 10, 1998. 
96As I suggest throughout this chapter, what DeLillo proposes as memory is also what I propose with 
my conception of Otherness.   
97 The phrase “commodity-symbolic”, that I use throughout this chapter as an expression of 
capitalism’s construction of an economy of desire and consumption based around allegory, comes from 
Molly Wallace and her article “‘Venerated Emblems’: DeLillo’s Underworld and the History-
Commodity” in Critique. Summer 2001, vol. 42, no. 4. 
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Underworld as a culture’s failure to mourn Otherness.98 From the question of 
mourning and the relationships subjects have to Otherness comes DeLillo’s entire 
ethics of art and subjectivity, as well as his critique of systems of connection and 
consumption. It is my assertion that DeLillo’s ‘argument’ in Underworld is one that 
responds to the forces of commodification, the production of consumer allegories, by 
proposing the tenderness of allegory, and that to do this means theorising irony. Such 
a ‘theory’ of irony recognises irony as both a vital and constituent force within 
allegory repressed by the system of capitalism DeLillo critiques. 
     What DeLillo calls the “Indian burn” is also like the “existential burn” (U, 406) of 
Otherness, and a sense of this is already secreted in the childish exoticism of the 
phrase itself, with its reference to something or someone “Indian”. DeLillo has always 
had an ear for the seemingly unremarked or unremembered Otherness within the 
language of the everyday. It is a part of his Emersonian attention to the quotidian, and 
demonstrates a level of intimacy with language that, in the novel, the Jesuit Father 
Paulus becomes a spokesperson for. In the text, Father Paulus speaks to Nick Shay 
about the sort of person his school aims to produce: someone who “develops a certain 
depth, a spacious quality, say, that’s a form of respect for other ways of thinking and 
believing” (538). This is, I suggest, also the project for DeLillo’s Underworld. “Let us 
unnarrow the basic human tubing” (538), says Paulus, and in Underworld it is 
DeLillo’s artist-figures who take this conviction as the defining quality of their work; 
such figures thus move toward “an ethical strength” that shows them who they are and 
how one “is meant to address the world” (538). Firstly, then, the hope of this “ethical 
strength” comes from an attention to language, an almost prayerful attention to the 
tenderness of language that, although it is all we have with which to tender the Other, 
can only fail to make this Other present. And yet the world remains to be tendered; 
one is “meant to address the world”. So we are left here with the problem of mourning 
– how to treat Otherness, as we must. Essentially, this is Underworld’s great theme, 
the treatment of Otherness, explored with essay-like rigour through variously tender 
and tender-less versions of mourning and irony, variously tender and tender-less 
allegories. 
                                                 
98 But, more immediately, Underworld is a text of mourning because its core cast of characters, Nick, 
Matt, Marvin, Klara, and Bronzini are all in mourning for something or someone lost, all defined by a 
relationship to death or absence, all motivated by their experience of Otherness.  
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     What I call Otherness, then, along with memory, is, for my own project, as well, I 
think, as for DeLillo’s, the issue for Underworld, just as I argue it is for The Body 
Artist and Cosmopolis. Primarily, this is what makes DeLillo’s texts so compatible 
with Derrida’s later writings. It is important to ground DeLillo’s assumptions 
pertaining to Otherness in the early stages of a chapter such as this, and to this end we 
might consider the Bruegel painting, The Triumph of Death (see fig. 1, p.93). In 
Underworld this painting stands as a tableau expressive not only of the goings-on of 
that day, October 4, 1951 (the Pennant game at the Polo Grounds, New York; the test, 
by the Soviets, of a nuclear device) and not least the goings-on of a culture’s 
misrecognised and submerged mourning, but also of DeLillo’s own insights and 
assumptions about the constellation of subjectivity, temporality, and language. The 
painting, a text within a text, serves, for DeLillo, to highlight the work of 
interpretation and translation. In fact, the painting depicts this work, while itself 
becoming an “other-site” for multiple meanings and connections in the novel, but in 
such a way as to make its subject-matter the urge to connection rather than the 
meaning of connections made.99 The painting presents us with a variety of competing 
and, at times, contrary interpretations. Chief among such interpretive possibilities is 
the translation or representation of Otherness as the figures of the dead who “fall upon 
the living” (50). This equation of death with Otherness is something the painting 
seems designed to both suggest and complicate. As such, DeLillo appears here to 
present a sort of framing (mise en scène) of the ironies of death – such as how, in the 
manner of the Other, death is not so much the result of an interpretation of 
‘something’, but rather the force of interpretive possibility itself, indeed, the very 
force of the Other I take to be Underworld’s ‘subject-matter’. At first we may 
conceive of Bruegel’s army of the dead as the returning (in fact, always already 
returned) Otherness of the present. In this regard, the painting can be read as a 
recording of what I have previously termed the “time of the Other”. 
     A sense of this temporality is immediately apparent in the sense of unprepared-
ness and incredulity in such figures as the nobleman, only ‘now’ drawing his sword 
when apocalypse is already upon him; the King (or Emperor), we note, reclines in a  
                                                 
99 This is an important distinction to make since, contrary to what some commentators of Underworld 
have said, this novel is not a celebration of the logic of connection, but rather, performs a sort of 
critique of the desire to connect – specifically a critique of what we might call, tender-less connections. 
Indeed, the often voiced notion that “everything’s connected” (U, 289) has to be checked against 
DeLillo’s own comments that “meaning is a con game” and that “paranoia is easy” [see Begley 




state of utter bemusement, while a pair of lovers in the lower foreground continue to 
court one another, only a suggestion of anxiety in the twist of the lute player’s head; 
the backgammon and card game has only recently been disturbed, as have the diners 
at the dinner table, and yet the suddenness and feel of the unexpected these characters 
suggest seems entirely out of step with the broader temporality of the picture 
suggested by that “flaring sky in the deep distance”(50), and the depiction of the 
dead’s progress from a smoking horizon upon the living. These human figures in the 
foreground of the painting seem denizens of a different temporality to that of the 
skeletal soldiers in the rest of the picture. The human figures occupy a temporality we 
might consider calling something like the living present, though this is a present in 
which we see the eruption of the past – memory, the repressed, the dead. The ‘time’ 
of the dead (as in the arrival of the Other) is thus indexed to the depth of perspective 
in the picture (the smoking horizon), and still the living have been caught unaware. 
We see here the temporality of the Other, and of Underworld itself, that presents the 
past as coterminous with the present. The painting is about the unforeseen coming of 
the Other, the thing that in Derrida’s language will already have happened. The 
painting, in this sense, can also be read as a metaphor that over five hundred years 
later will be updated by the advent of the Internet; these death-figures represent (as we 
will see later) the spread of information and technology associated also throughout 
Underworld with radiation. 
     In the painting we are given an occasion by which to consider different ways of 
reading the ‘dead’, different ways of thinking about what “death” means and 
signifies.100 DeLillo wants to remind the reader how death (loss and absence) is 
related to the possibility of the sign and the name, which is to say, he wants to remind 
us that by necessity, the sign is not summed up in a presence, but that it disappears 
leaving only a trace. Essentially, death operates here, in DeLillo’s presentation of the 
                                                 
100 There perhaps needs to be a distinction made here over the use of the word “death” in relation to 
language and allegory. A reductively allegorical “language”, without a relation to irony, and as seen in 
the paranoid or logocentric visions of several of DeLillo’s characters, is what we can call a dead 
language. But it is dead because it has closed down its relationship with the force of death, which, as 
Derrida has shown, is the animating principle of language, naming and writing; death gives language 
the possibility of iteration and difference. Again this boils down to the question of mourning. Ironic 
language (allegory purified by irony) maintains a relationship with the force of death and so can, in this 
way, be said to be a language of death. What I suggest DeLillo finds to critique about the commodity-
symbolic of capitalism is, then, how it gives death to death. Of course there is a strong precedent for 
this notion in White Noise with its involvement with “Dylar”, that medication designed to cure the 
patient of the fear of death, and Americana confirms this notion with its quotation of St. Augustine: 
“[a]nd never can a man be more disastrously in death then when death itself shall be deathless” (21). 
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painting, as signifier of irony; in its synchronous moment, irony “renders” both the 
name and an awareness of the necessary death the name holds within itself. Irony is, 
then, an index to the non-presence of the underworld of excess – of memory and 
Otherness. Through irony, this Otherness is articulated by virtue of irony’s unmasking 
of the sign as limited, as mournful tenderness.  
     In the Bruegel print, Death, we note, cannot appear but as allegory for death. The 
dead arrive under the sign of the cross, their coming is heralded by this sign, and is, in 
fact, indivisible from the appearance of the sign: death is already allegorised – their 
arrival is also the arrival of a new or different allegory. Moreover, death is 
anthropomorphised as skeletons with “wispy dicks” (50); these dead appear as an 
undefeatable but curiously human army, indeed, an army of metaphor101 – we note a 
group of skeletons conferring at the top of the picture, as though referring to some 
plan, the soldiers of the dead wear robes or sheets and even take to wearing the 
garments of their victims. Moreover, the dead exhibit human desires and appetites: 
this is not death as the Other, but death as a translation, and so towards the bottom of 
the picture deathly mockery becomes human venality as one of the skeletons runs its 
fingers through the King’s gold; another of the dead pursues a woman in such a way 
as to suggest the sexual, grasping at her from behind, his hands at her breasts.102 We 
note too, the skeleton in the bottom right-hand corner who joins the lovers in their 
duet, taking up the lute, while another, pouring out the diner’s wine gourds, seems to 
signal the allegorical nature of the entire onslaught, and its relationship to a kind of 
trickery, by his adoption of a masquerade. Death is seen to appropriate the desires, 
affectations and artifices, even the failings and longings of the living whom the dead 
have come not merely to hasten to the underworld, but in fact to replace. As such we 
can read in Bruegel’s painting something DeLillo dramatises in the novel: how 
something seemingly as Other, unknowable and timeless as death can become 
somehow familiar, allegorical, and temporal, translated into the present. As DeLillo 
perhaps sees it, the painting illustrates how a resistance, even that of irony or art, can 
be turned into an allegory, and by extension, a commodity or product. The Triumph of 
Death, we might consider, is, in this regard, prescient to the triumph of capitalism 
                                                 
101 Indeed, as Nietzsche might have seen it, a “mobile army of metaphors” – and, what is more, 
metaphors of class, power, ideology as well. The point is, as I think DeLillo sees it, the painting is 
‘about’ signs, semiotics, and language – the representing of death as much as death itself. 
102 Hoover also has noted a similar suggestion: “a second dead woman in the middle ground, straddled 
by a skeleton. The position is sexual, unquestionably” (50). 
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because, by this reading, it is a parable of the ‘death of death’, the allegorisation of the 
force of irony and its articulation of Otherness.   
     The “triumph” of death that the painting represents is not then simply the triumph 
of this skeletal army (though, at an allegorical level, it is this as well), but rather the 
death of death – the very story of death’s translation into something more knowable, 
familiar, human. The painting thus represents the turning of Otherness into a 
technology, of allegory, yes, but also a technology of war. Nothing escapes in the 
picture, not even death, for it, too, has been allegorised, and but for the fool depicted 
in the bottom right-hand corner of the print, this would be true: in his gaze we see 
death’s real triumph – the unlocatable, unnameable excess of the picture, the thing 
that escapes, the moment of absence and loss the painting can only make us aware of, 
and cannot ‘represent’. If the dead, in truth, are intended to represent allegory (in a 
sense, the ‘truth’ of representation seen as the inevitability of translation and 
misrecognition) then the actual moment of Otherness, the punctum (again), or irony, 
exists not in the painting (not as something mourned by the painting through an act of 
incorporation), but as something pointed to, beyond its frame, its reality, something 
unaccountable by the painting’s own terms. That something is, of course, as I have 
just suggested, the ‘you’ or Other who views the painting and catches the stare of the 
fool, about to crawl under the diners’ tablecloth. The fool’s gaze, one of utter surprise, 
registers what in Derrida’s scheme we recognise as the emergence or experience of 
Otherness – one’s seeing preceded by one’s being seen. The fool appears to look in 
the direction of the mask-wearing skeleton; his expression, as noted, of utter surprise, 
is one of seeing something unexpected, normally unseen, something un-represented, 
as though at an irony the painting cannot and does not explain, but he is also looking 
at us, at our unseen gaze, looking at our looking. In an instant, the fool sees both the 
Other (us, and death as possibility) and the mask (allegory of death), and this becomes 
the punctum of the painting, its moment of unmasterable irony – its presentation of 
“truth’. In this way, the painting becomes an act of mourning: a representation, yes, 
but one that signifies its own limits, and the very ‘subject’ it cannot apprehend – its 
Other. The painting is a presentation of tenderness. 
     The effect, we note, recurs in the novel through DeLillo’s use of the second person 
“you” narration, and is remembered in the closing image of the Eisenstein film 
Unterwelt with its depiction of a face that stares down through the camera lens, back 
to the viewer, as it transforms and dissipates into the surrounding landscape. 
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Something of this effect is apparent also in Klara’s artwork that makes its ‘subject’ 
the desert that frames the work in the manner of the parergon. In all cases, the 
appearance of Otherness comes, like the injunction with which I began, “remember” 
(14), as a sort of punctum, (the presentation of irony without representation) 
connecting Otherness and memory as names of an unmasterable excess. The point, it 
seems, is that DeLillo does not ‘represent’ Otherness, but only in so far as he aims to 
set out the question of its representation. DeLillo mourns Otherness and in so doing 
investigates this mourning, this condition of irony, in the culture. Like the work of 
Bruegel, Eisenstein, Klara, even Lenny Bruce, and towards the end of the text, the 
considerations of Nick and the work of Ismael (Moonman) Munoz, Otherness 
becomes an effect of DeLillo’s investigation into the limits of the economy of 
language and subjectivity, an effect of the conscious recognition of the tenderness of 
our allegories and how this tenderness attends to the truth of language, economy, and 
systems that appear to work to simulate, repress, and control this truth, and with this, 
the apparition of the Other.     
     So Underworld is, among other things, about representation, the treatment of 
Otherness and the role of allegory and irony in the mourning of Otherness. As a part 
of its ethical drive towards a theory of art, Underworld is a text that probes the 
vulnerabilities of allegory as well as its melancholy beauty. To do this is to think 
through the subject’s placement in Otherness and memory, and it is to perform an 
analysis of irony. What turns DeLillo’s characters from mourners into “unnarrowed” 
ethical beings (artist-figures) is the recognition by such figures of the irony at the 
heart of all mourning (that we are constantly in mourning by virtue of being in the 
world, being-in-language) and how, with this recognition, they re-discover the value 
and the importance of loss, death, absence, and waste – how death, for example, 
becomes the condition of the system of signs by which claims for subjectivity, of 
ethics, faith, and art, may be made. This recognition is that of tenderness, recognised 
in DeLillo’s texts not merely by those who “address the world” but those who address 
the demand to address the world – his artists.   
     If the commodity has usurped allegory in the modern, postmodern world, then it is 
a theory of language – in particular, a theory of the economy of language keyed to 
notions of Otherness, waste, death, and irony as Derrida has, to varying degrees, 
outlined – that is crucial to a re-thinking of the commodity-symbolic and the 
possibilities of art and the ethical within such a system. What DeLillo appears to 
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suggest with Underworld is that a thinking of language – a theory of allegory and 
irony – is what is vital in rediscovering the aura of commodity in a way that 
demonstrates what has always been true of signs and allegories, that they are tender 
of, to, and for, better or worse readings, by more or less agent, aware, and tender 
consciousnesses. In the way in which Benjamin has spoken of the ‘reversibility’ or 
‘somersaulting’ of allegory – a testament to irony’s power and presence in all allegory 
– DeLillo appears to believe in the reversibility of commodity, which is to say, how 
we may unrepeat our blind repetitions and, therefore, obey the law of différance 
crucial to the tenderness of being and naming as well as what we call art and the 
ethical. What this means for DeLillo is a renewal of the mourning of Otherness and 


























 “Organising Loneliness”. American Allegorists and Mourning. 
 
(i) “We are the Astonishment” 
 
“How human is it to see a thing as something else?” (U, 64). The question, posed by 
Nick Shay, exposes perhaps the central issue for any evaluation of allegory (no less, 
rhetoric and representation), but also can be read as the question that underpins the 
entire philosophical undertaking of Underworld.103 In attempting to answer this 
question, DeLillo embarks on an analysis of rhetoric – those allegorical and ironic 
imperatives that, as I have suggested, set out the work of mourning. By such analysis, 
DeLillo attempts to distinguish the commodity-symbolic, the ‘language’ and system 
of capitalism (with its ‘logic’ of connection, paranoia, simulation, repetition and 
recycling), against the claims he makes for tender human subjectivity as expressed 
through the work of art, and that condense around a conception of irony. Such claims, 
as I shall develop them, that take as their subject the melancholy “fallen wonder” of 
being-in-the-world and being-in-language, rely, for DeLillo, on this conjugation of 
irony and mourning, indeed irony as mourning. However, in order to understand the 
significance of such irony, we must first contextualize it against what DeLillo must 
see as the hegemonic force of late capitalism, with its “false faith” (825), and its 
burning off of “nuance” (785) expressed by the reduction of allegory to a technology 
of the commodity-symbolic. As we shall see, such a reduction of allegory, segregating 
                                                 
103 As a corroboration of this we note a similar question posed by the teacher Albert Bronzini to his 
class: 
 
   How is it that a few marks chalked on a blackboard, a few little squiggly signs can can change 
the shape of human history. […] I want to know how it is that a few marks on a slate or a piece 
of paper, a little black on white, or white on black, can carry so much information and contain 
such shattering implications. Never mind the energy packed in the atom. What about the energy 
contained in this question? This is the real power. How the mind operates. How the mind 
identifies, analyses and represents. What beauty and power. What marvels of imagination does 
it require to reduce the complex forces of nature, all those unseeable magical actions inside the 
atom – to express all this with a bing and a bang on a blackboard. (735) 
 
Underworld is, then, about what is referred to here as the “real power”, the forces “contained in th[e] 
question”, in the technology of allegory, theory, and “how the mind operates [and] identifies, analyses 




it from irony, effects a sort of systemic and motivated misrecognition (and repression) 
of both irony and Otherness. 
     To understand why and how such misrecognition operates at a cultural level is to 
understand the false mourning and refusal of irony as evidenced by the two mourners 
and allegorists this section is organised around: Nick Shay and Marvin Lundy. In 
many ways, this association of an individual’s mourning with that of the State’s 
“willingness to act out its own massive fantasies” (421) finds its most singular 
expression, for DeLillo, in the actions of Lee Harvey Oswald. Oswald (one of those 
“soft white dreamy young men who plan the murder of a famous individual, […] as a 
way of organizing their loneliness and misery, making a network out of it, a web of 
connections”104), for DeLillo, it seems, comes to express the very logic of commodity 
and connection he appears to have stood against. In this regard, Oswald is as 
American as the bomb; both the bomb and Oswald’s “absurd” act belong to the same 
order: operating as a mode of mourning that supplants loss, Otherness and the Other 
with networks of connection. If the force of this supplanting and connection-making 
is true to my vision of tender-less allegory then it is also, as DeLillo expresses it, true 
of what he refers to as technology. For DeLillo, Oswald’s desire for the symbolic 
compensation of webbed connections is an expression of the allegorical force of 
technology that singles out America as “the only super power on the planet”.105 
Which is to say, that the hegemonic force of tender-less allegory and mourning in late 
Twentieth Century America is demonstrated by the achievement of American 
technology. As DeLillo puts it, technology    
[…] is our fate, our truth. It is what we mean when we call ourselves the only superpower on the 
planet. The materials and methods we devise make it possible for us to claim our future. We 
don’t have to depend on god or the prophets or other astonishments. We are the astonishment. 
The miracle is what we ourselves produce, the systems and networks that change the way we 
live and think.106
 
What is described as American “power” is, then, a form of mourning understood as 
the massive force and success of that culture’s acts and instances of representation 
and translation – its technologies, politics, media, narratives, aesthetics, all of which I 
                                                 
104 See DeLillo’s “The American Absurd” in Harper’s Magazine [Febuary, 2004]. p.32. For DeLillo, it 
seems, Oswald’s actions represent an intensity of what is more generally the culture’s need to organise 
their mourning in response to the exposure to Otherness. As DeLillo says, what was “at stake” that day 
was “our trust in a coherent reality”. Oswald’s act, as DeLillo suggests, was “vintage American 
violence, lonely and rootless, but it shaded into something older and previously distant, a condition of 
estrangement and helplessness, an undependable reality. We felt the shock of unmeaning” (Harper’s., 
34). 
105 See DeLillo’s “In the Ruins of the Future” in Harper’s Magazine. December 2001, pp.31-40. 
106 DeLillo. Ibid. 
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choose to signify by my use of the term allegory.107 “Our truth” is the notion that we 
are fated to translate, represent, and communicate through technology, as through 
allegory, our being-in-the-world. Technology – as networking force, the force of 
systems and capital – is allegorical; it commutes the mourning of loss or Otherness for 
systems of connection and commodity production, and to this extent, enables the 
allegorical ‘organising of loneliness’ I began with. 
     For DeLillo, in twentieth century American capitalism the condition of being-
allegorical has come to resemble a sealed circuit in which Otherness (the power of 
astonishment) has been replaced by a simulation of Otherness, an allegory created 
through technologies of communication and commodity production. As DeLillo has 
said, “we” have, with “our” use of technology, become the “astonishment”, and it is 
this state of affairs that DeLillo represents and critiques in Underworld – a mode of 
allegory (and allegorical mourning) inseparable from the commodity-symbolic of 
capitalist production and desire that has become autonomous and complete (in fact, a 
sort of feed-back loop of connection-making, repetition and recycling), an economy 
separated from its debt to memory and Otherness. DeLillo’s critique is of a society 
that cannot achieve the work of mourning, nor value the truth of allegory or the 
tenderness of subjectivity, because of its refusal of irony and consequent failure to 
treat the Other as Other. This section therefore sets out to examine the significance of 
irony for DeLillo in Underworld through an attention to the analysis of allegory and 
allegorical mourning, devoid of irony.108 What shall emerge is, I suggest, a portrait of 
the commodification and reification of allegory and tender-less mourning.  
 
                                                 
107 The role of allegory and naming in the suppression of what DeLillo calls the “the real” (or 
Otherness) is represented for DeLillo in the very act of naming Oswald; when Oswald becomes “Lee 
Harvey Oswald”, he is essentially being turned into an allegory of himself. The use of his three names 
is designed to “produce an early stereotype, a drifter with three first names […] someone superficially 
familiar” (Harper’s, 33). The use of these names signifies Oswald’s death before the actual event of his 
death; allegory ‘kills’ Oswald before he is shot by Ruby, but crucially, before he has any chance to be 
seen as a real person. As DeLillo says, “many people did not want to see ‘the real Oswald’ because 
they were unwilling to grant fully human status to the man accused of murdering the President” (32). In 
this way the case of Oswald becomes another paradigmatic case for the treatment, or non-tendering, of 
Otherness. 
108 The disarticulation of irony and allegory (something, as I have previously suggested, I see as the 
disarticulation of irony proper) is tantamount to the disarticulation of mourning – without faithful or 
ethical mourning (a consequence of this disarticulation), Otherness, difference and the chance of art are 
missed – remembering of course that we can never be responsible for Otherness, only our 
misrecognitions or translations of it.  
 101
(ii) “A Complex Sensation” 
 
     Mourning only becomes what we might call ‘true mourning’ (irony) when we 
recognise the impossibility of its work, that is to say, when we recognise the dilemma 
at the heart of mourning – that the allegorical demand in mourning (the incorporation 
of the dead Other) is as problematic as the ironic imperative of mourning (the refusal 
of the name in respect of alterity). This dilemma, as I have insisted throughout this 
thesis, is what I call irony (in fact, irony and allegory working together). As we have 
seen through my readings of Derrida and de Man, this irony is also the absence or 
spacing at the heart of language (enabling iteration, difference, meaning, the ‘law’ of 
language) that the work of mourning demonstrates. What is more, this irony subtends 
the possibility of what we can consider to be the ethical – the space where we 
recognise the tenderness of being in language, preceded by Otherness, and where, 
with cognisance of the Other, we approach language as providing forms of tender, not 
guarantors of presence, for memory and Otherness. Where language becomes most 
tender, memory and Otherness are most successfully and faithfully tendered, and for 
DeLillo (as well as for de Man and Derrida), this is the qualifying demand of 
literature and art. As I have been suggesting, however, Underworld is a portrait of 
how this irony has been avoided; it resembles a study of a culture’s allegorisation of 
Otherness by way of its failure to perceive the irony at the heart of mourning. 
      The movement between modes of mourning, allegorical or ironic, in relation to 
memory, history and Otherness, is something the novel articulates through the 
thoughts of Klara Sax in a passage relating to the sense of nostalgia for the politics of 
the Cold War, and its clearly defined “Other”. In the two quotations that follow, we 
find Klara, in the first, meditating on notions of allegory, associated with the past, and 
in the second, considering irony and the present. Furthermore, we note the theme of 
anchoring that distinguishes the two passages: the first associating the consideration 
of the Other from a position “at anchor”, where one is able to “measure things”, the 
second associating the experience of the present with things coming “unstuck”, 
slipping anchor. If the first passage calls for irony to question and “disarm” the 
massive force of a constructed and allegorical sublime Other, the second calls for the 
necessity of allegory to balance against a descent into the valueless-ness of 
relativisms: 
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War scared me all right but those lights, I have to tell you those lights were a complex sensation. 
Those planes on permanent alert, ever present you know, sweeping the Soviet borders, and I 
remember sitting out there rocking lightly at anchor in some deserted cove and feeling a sense 
of awe, a child’s sleepy feeling of mystery and danger and beauty. I think that is power. I think 
if you maintain a force in the world that comes into people’s sleep, you are exercising a 
meaningful power. […] Power meant something thirty, forty years ago. It was stable, it was 
focused, it was a tangible thing. It was greatness, danger, terror, all those things. And it held us 
together, the Soviets and us.  Maybe it held the world together. You could measure things. You 
could measure hope and you could measure destruction. Not that I want to bring it back. It’s 
gone, good riddance. (75)  
 
When Klara refers to “awe” she is referring specifically to a constructed sublime – the 
Other aestheticised and turned into an object of the sublime. In this instance, the 
sublime becomes a category of allegory. The “power” Klara respects, even admires, 
is, then, this power of an aestheticised Other; it is the power of a compelling allegory, 
and as an aesthete she recognises and responds to this power, crediting it as the 
invention of a sublimity sufficient to the requirements of an entire economy and the 
needs of a culture, even if it is built on “greatness, danger, terror”. Intervening 
between this period of allegory and the 90s of the ‘present’ in the next quotation, is 
that period of radical undoing DeLillo has spoken of in relation to the “American 
Absurd”. The ‘present’, as Klara sees it, seems in thrall to the force of irony, and 
certainly this seems to be what she means when she says the following: 
‘Many things that were anchored to the balance of power and the balance of terror seem to be 
undone, unstuck. Things have no limits now. Money has no limits. I don’t understand money 
anymore. Money is undone. Violence is undone, violence is easier now, it’s uprooted, out of 
control, it has no measure anymore, it has no level of values. […] I don’t want to disarm the 
world,’ she said. ‘Or I do want to disarm the world but I want it to be done warily and 
realistically and in the full knowledge of what we are giving up’. (76) 
 
Klara’s call here in this last sentence is for the ethical consciousness; by my own 
terms, such an awareness is dependent on an understanding of the relationship of 
allegory and irony. If allegory, as associated with the first quotation, is a mode of 
armament (remembering, as the text often points out, that “all technology refers to the 
bomb” (467)), then irony is to be seen as disarmament. But at what cost do we disarm 
our allegories? This appears to be the caveat implicit in Klara’s injunction to “disarm 
[…] warily”. Essentially, Klara’s concern is to strip back allegorical assumptions 
while holding on to allegory, recognising in truth what it represents. Without an 
understanding of what is given up in the ironisation of allegory, we run the risk of 
asserting the meaninglessness of irony. And so there emerges the suggestion of a 
dilemma here for Klara: a desire for the “full knowledge” of the allegorical along with 
the disarmament of allegory as well. Indeed, then, we have returned to the trope of 
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mourning here and, in so doing, to the qualifying concerns in Underworld of art and 
the ethical: the dilemma of irony. What seems apparent in Klara’s concerns is that a 
theory of irony, for an artist such as Klara, must contain the full knowledge of 
allegory, and this is what this section is designed to provide – what is given up by the 
ironization of the culture’s dominant allegories. Moreover, this section needs to be 
seen as a preparation for the demand expressed by the text to see allegory and irony as 
constituent forces to irony proper. 
 
(iii) Responsible Living 
 
 
Klara’s considerations arise in the context of her art-work in the desert with the B52 
bombers, and though Nick’s later viewing of the finished work effectively changes his 
conception of himself and others, as well as his ideas about loss and irony, before this 
viewing Klara’s ideas about representation and allegory appear as anathema to Nick’s 
personal philosophy. An expression of Nick’s philosophy is made when he considers:   
It is interesting to think of the great blaze of heaven that we winnow down to animal shapes and 
kitchen tools. 
   I watched TV in my motel.  
   I lived responsibly in the real. I didn’t accept this business of life as a fiction, or whatever 
Klara Sax had meant when she said that things had become unreal. […] 
   I believed we could know what was happening to us. We were not excluded from our own 
lives. (82) 
 
What Nick lacks is a sense of how one might think through this notion that things had 
become “fiction” while, at the same time, holding onto a meaningful notion of the 
real. Essentially, he needs to see how the fictional nature of things is what makes 
them real (tender), and what gives them life in the economy Derrida has outlined. 
Nick comes to this realisation by the end of the novel, but until then he stays within 
the confines of his broadly Platonic philosophy. Such a “Platonic” allegory qualifies 
Nick’s belief in allegory itself, and we can see how, for example, the television thus 
becomes the shadows on the wall of the cave, the hotel becomes a sort of hosting 
allegorical reality for impressions of the world twice removed from the real. By this 
logic, one’s own life becomes merely an allegory for a reality well beyond it. And so 
Nick’s rejection of life as ‘fictive’ seems to contradict the sort of allegorical or 
fictional reality he nevertheless subscribes to with his Platonic sympathies. 
Nevertheless, what Nick means by his phrase “responsible living” is an adherence to 
such an allegory. What we see here is the likeness of the allegorist and the Platonist. 
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Moreover, Nick’s anxieties betray a pervasive rejection of notions of postmodern or 
poststructural subjectivity. What remains of subjectivity for such characters is 
something shrouded in privacy and quietude. And yet, ‘I watch TV, therefore I am’ is, 
in effect, the sort of postmodern cogito ergo sum in operation here, ironically enough, 
implied by a character who has just finished rejecting the ‘fictive’ world of the 
postmodern. 
     To go with his philosophy there is also a geography of the “real” Nick lives 
“responsibly” in, and it is one that demonstrates allegorical control: living in Phoenix, 
for Nick, means living within the order and bounds of allegory. The Tower Nick 
works in is at the hub of connections, hooked up to the network and technologies of 
allegory. The “real” for Nick thus becomes a location, a conceptual space, connected 
to other phenomena, where history and memory can be placed, treated, and contained. 
As Nick says of Phoenix: “I liked the way history did not run loose here. They 
segregated visible history. They caged it, funded and bronzed it, they enshrined it 
carefully in museums and plazas and memorial parks” (86). History in Phoenix is 
reified in both the sense of its being made concrete (the bronzing and enshrining Nick 
mentions) as well as the sense of its incorporation within a system. The way in which 
he feels ‘history’ is treated in Phoenix appeals to Nick, not least because it mirrors his 
own hopes for the management of his own personal waste – his history of loss, the 
disappearance of his father, his conviction for manslaughter, both of which are linked 
to his experience of Otherness. Nick needs to have things in their place, and a sense of 
the control Nick requires is given in the details of his daily routine and his running 
paraphernalia: 
I drank soy milk and ran the metric mile. I had a thing I clipped to the waistband of my running 
trunks, a device that weighed only three and a half ounces and had a readout showing distance 
travelled and calories burned and length of stride. I carried my house keys in an ankle wallet 
that fastened with a Velcro closure. I didn’t like to run with house keys jiggling in my pocket. 
The ankle wallet made me feel there were people out there in the world of product development 
and merchandising and gift cataloguing who understood the nature of my little nagging needs. 
(86) 
 
What appeals to Nick is the idea that history and memory might also be tied down, 
and in this passage it is consumer desire (the satisfaction of all those “nagging needs”) 
that performs this containment. In the capitalist system, one’s needs, as expressed by 
allegories of containment, become, and are met by, commodities of containment. 
Measurement and containment are thus the two criteria allegory is reduced to in the 
commodity-symbolic. Things cannot be allowed to “jiggle”; distance, calories etc, 
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must be measured; even the details of this passage resemble the sort of list-making or 
collecting Nick, like Marvin, is addicted to, acquiring throughout the novel books, 
objects, words, and impersonations. As spokesperson for waste management (the 
collection of waste) Nick is also spokesperson for collection, for re-collection, or a 
certain approach to “memory”.  
     Re-collection (memory) as a process of waste management, as a purpose of 
recycling, can be seen as an articulation of the system’s fetishizing of connection – 
collecting and recycling memory and Otherness as “something else”. As a result, we 
see how memory becomes subordinate to the allegorical impulse behind connection. 
And amid the interconnecting grids of telecommunications in the bronze tower, 
memory is further subjected to containment and control, as something to be monitored 
or “spied on”. 
   In the bronze tower I looked out at the umber hills and felt assured and well defended, safe in 
my office box and my crisp white shirt and connected to things that made me stronger. In the 
bronze tower a fellow executive cleared his throat and I heard something go by in the small 
hoarse noise, a secret linger of childhood, the game he played inside his life. Maybe it was a 
hundred and eight degrees out on the street. He was spying on himself. The third person watches 
the first person. The “he” spies on the “I”. The “he” knows things the “I” can’t bear to think 
about. Maybe it was a hundred and twelve, telephones warbling in modulated phrases. The third 
person sends his nobody to kill the first person’s somebody. (119) 
 
Memory, or what we can refer to as being-in-memory, is something Nick experiences 
as “a secret linger of childhood, the game he played inside his life”, and though this is 
an insight directed at a “fellow executive” there is, on Nick’s part, a transference at 
work here;109 Nick is seeing himself as someone else, an allegory of himself. Memory 
and Otherness are then reduced to something detached and allegorical. The force of 
allegory is something concentrated in the Tower, as hub of connection and 
technology, as we note the sense that it is the Bronze Tower that has made the hills 
umber, lending them its colour through its translation and filtering of the world. 
Clearly, the sense of being connected is what makes Nick feel real, though there is 
also the sense that the “real” itself remains uncertain; the outside world is referred to 
through the equivocating “maybe”, and the measurement of the street temperature 
                                                 
109 The line: “he was spying on himself” suggests this of course, though the pronoun is deliberately 
ambiguous here, serving to highlight the distance and uncertainty of Nick’s allegories of self – his 
disorientation among the subject positions in language, and, more generally, the self disoriented by the 
Other. Nick’s connection of memory and childhood is also significant here, pointing to the moment of 
radical disruption in his own autobiography (the moment of irony and Otherness associated with the 
disappearance of his father) that severs his sense of selfhood. The “nobody” sent to kill Nick’s 
“somebody” also remembers the suggestion that his father’s disappearance is the result of a mob “hit”, 
but the disappearance of the father is also to be seen here as the defining experience of Nick’s loss of 
authority in language – and again, the ambiguous use of pronouns in this passage indicates this as well. 
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appears only as a rumour. But this is consistent with Nick’s Platonism, and here again 
we note the sense of a definite division of inside and outside, and this boundary is 
extended from consideration of the world in the tower, with the world of the street, to 
the notion of the self, split between an interior and exterior, a scheme of seeing and 
seen, a first person “I” and a third person “he”. In the absence of a mourning of 
Otherness that conceives of Otherness as the possibility of subjectivity, Nick becomes 
riven between the “he” and the “I” of subjectivity – a relationship governed by a 
suspicion, bordering on paranoia. Nick perceives no continuity between these 
positions, nor between those positions and what he considers the real world. This split 
between word and world again recalls the Platonic overtones mentioned earlier, and is 
related to Nick’s later search for a “pure word”, explaining also his addiction to the 
collecting (and memorization) of words.  
     Nick believes memorizing words and their meanings is the way to “escape the 
things that made you” (543) such as, in Nick’s case, abandonment, loss and death. Yet 
Nick’s attention to language has to be placed in the context of his sponsorship of a 
petition in support of Senator McCarthy’s desire to purge America of the communist 
Other. Here the “he” spying on the “I” resembles the paranoid, self-monitoring vision 
of the 1950s inspired by McCarthyism that internalises the cold-war logic of “us” and 
“them” within the conception of an American self. And this spectre of McCarthyism 
is telling in regard to Nick’s nascent philosophy of language, illustrating a desire to 
purge the unknown and unknowable qualities of the Other as they might manifest 
within the borders of the self. Nick’s memorising of names, while seemingly 
indicative of a faith in language, is, in fact, an aspect of his simulation of being-in-
language, where iteration (the action of difference within repetition) is replaced by 
mere repetition, perseveration. By clinging so closely to language in this manner, 
Nick, in fact, makes himself vulnerable to the ironies of the economy of language; in 
fact, he lacks a theory of irony. In the absence of a mode of mourning or irony 
responsive to the demands of both allegory (naming) and Otherness, Nick 
supplements his collection of names, his language-philosophy, with paranoia, and this 
is a response, as J. Edgar Hoover is able to recognise, lodged deep in the sub-
conscious of the wider culture as a “deeper form of truth”. Hoover, master of allegory 
and information control, explains this with his gloss on the merits of the dossier:  
In the endless estuarial mingling of paranoia and control, the dossier was an essential device. 
[…] The dossier was a deeper form of truth, transcending facts and actuality. The second you 
placed an item in the file, a fuzzy photograph, an unfounded rumor, it became promiscuously 
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true. It was a truth without authority and therefore incontestable. Factoids seeped out of the file 
and crept across the horizon, consuming bodies and minds. The file was everything, the life 
nothing. […] Where the current of one’s need for control met the tide of one’s paranoia, this 
was where the dossier was reciprocally satisfying. You fed both forces in a single stroke. (559)  
What Hoover has to say about the dossier can be seen to resemble a definition of, or 
analogy for, the dominant mode of allegory (as well as theory) sponsored by the State. 
Where control meets paranoia it is the appearance of irony or the Other that is the 
subject, and that is to be controlled. Hoover understands the promiscuity of “truth”: 
that it is an invention and that it therefore shares with irony the mourning of an 
Otherness it can never completely apprehend. But it is precisely this knowledge of 
language’s incomplete or tender aspect (its relationship to irony, the possibility of 
irony deep in its structure) that Hoover abuses in the service of ideology and thus sets 
out to control and manipulate, sublimating irony as paranoia, subordinating it to 
allegory – the dossier. What emerges here is the arrangement the State – as 
exemplified by Hoover – has with its constituency, and how the culture is 
manipulated by a mode of allegoricity (made metaphor by what Hoover says about 
the dossier) that both simulates control and Otherness (paranoia). Indeed, the 
relationship, as Hoover points out, between control and paranoia, is one of reciprocity 
– a structure expressed in the logic of the Cold War where the simulation of the Other 
sanctions certain imperatives of control that further serve to dissemble both the power 
of the State and the quality of simulation in the first place; the actual Other is never 
met, is, from the very beginning, repressed so deeply, so efficiently, that no encounter 
with it is either necessary or possible.110 Such a state of allegorical control, of course, 
precludes the possibility of true mourning, as with the successful simulation of 
Otherness irony too becomes incorporated (simulated) within the “estuarial mingling” 
of the State’s semiotic economy. 
     The understanding Hoover articulates about the power of the dossier to 
manufacture consent (what he refers to as those “factoids” that consume and are 
consumed by the culture’s bodies and minds) through its arrangement of simulation 
and dissemblance is also the understanding DeLillo extends to his assessment of 
                                                 
110 Perhaps in considering this last notion we can see how the whole point of the Cold War is that it 
never happens, but rather, is designed to remain a perennial deterrent. As DeLillo appears to suggest, 
the power of the war on the minds of Americans relied on its never happening. Indeed, as Marvin says, 
“everything depends on the superpowers hanging a threat over your head” (182), and as Hoover’s 
quote suggests, such a “threat” – such a power – derives from the astonishing ability of the 
system/economy to signify allegories of Otherness, indeed to simulate an excess beyond the allegorical 
symbolic that, in truth, is controlled and produced for consumption via the allegory of paranoia. 
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allegory as it is manifested within the commodity-symbolic. Indeed, the capacity for 
the economy to signify through the commodity-symbolic the appearance of waste, 
excess, Otherness or error is something apparent in DeLillo’s recreation of the 
aesthetics of the game of baseball. As the game-commentator Russ Hodges calls the 
game he keeps an eye on the advertisement for Chesterfield cigarettes whose first “E” 
lights up to indicate when an error has been committed in play. It is, then, commodity, 
advertising, and the laws of consumption, that control the appearance of “errors”. 
Errors, such as they appear within this system, serve to mask the reality of the error-
state (or irony) within which commodification operates. By making a sign of errors in 
this way the system attempts to contain the excess and Otherness that underlie the 
production of all allegorised reality, and maintain its power in the world. This idea, of 
course, reminds us of both McCarthy and Hoover, who appear to share a similar 
semiotic fetish: the signalling of an “Other” within the system so as to maintain 
notions of purity, inviolability and stability. Thus the baseball game, and this is 
perhaps why DeLillo devotes such attention to it, operates in the text as a sort of 
macrocosm of the dominant mode of American mourning – America’s “organizing” 
of its “loneliness” through an economy of signs and commodity, exemplified by its 
adherence to allegory, to the exclusion of irony and Otherness. DeLillo’s 
representation of the baseball game allows him to represent America’s technologies of 
representation, its relationship to language and world. 
 
(iv) Inoculation and Collection 
 
 
Essentially, the game is supplanted by the allegory of the game. Hodges is thus one of 
the first allegorists we meet in the text, and his commentary on the game can be read 
as a commentary on the allegorising and inventing of the ‘real’. Hodges not only 
presents the game but also its tropes of representation, its iconography and cultural 
history, its romantic-ideals, and its allegorical commonplaces. He presents a 
representation of the game: not just what happens out on the field, but also a 
representation of the game’s relationship to allegorisation. 
Somebody hands you a piece of paper filled with letters and numbers and you have to make a 
ball game out of it. You create the weather, flesh out the players, you make them sweat and 
grouse and hitch up their pants, and it is remarkable, thinks Russ, how much earthly disturbance, 
how much summer and dust the mind can manage to order up from a single Latin letter lying 
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flat. […] When he was doing ghost games he liked to take the action in to the stands, inventing a 
kid chasing a foul ball, a carrot-topped boy with a cowlick (shameless, ain’t I) who retrieves the 
ball and holds it aloft, this five ounce sphere of cork, rubber, yarn, horsehide and spiral 
stitching, a souvenir baseball, a priceless thing somehow, a thing that seems to recapitulate the 
whole history of the game every time it is thrown or hit or touched. (25) 
 
What we read here amounts to an allegory about the invention of allegory, and its 
relationship to baseball and consumption in the novel. With the force of what Hodges 
calls “recapitulation” (in this instance, the force of allegory, and the “history of the 
game”) comes the consolation and comfort of repetition. Russ’s invention pre-empts 
the actual and engenders a narrative that misses the complications of race, power, 
class, dissembling, and conflict constantly at work in and around the game – those 
forces, differences, negotiations, etc., that baseball, in this instance, and as 
manifestation of the commodity-symbolic, serves to mask.111 The faux self-awareness 
of Russ in his moment of invention (“shameless, ain’t I”) sets up a double resonance: 
the overly idealised and sentimental Rockwellian tableau he conjures (the “carrot-top” 
with a “cowlick”), as well as the falseness of his own ironic self-awareness (that 
weak, bracketed “I” that is in fact entirely without “shame”) that, in fact, expresses 
the shameless nature of his allegory.  
     What we see here in the aestheticisation of the baseball game, is nothing less than 
the workings of the commodity-symbolic and its system of false mourning that 
reduces history to the consumption of allegory-commodities. In the text, the 
memorabilist and Baseball historian Marvin Lundy serves as historian of consumption 
and allegory;112 his mourning, and its motivations, his blindnessess and forgettings, 
speak directly to those of the system itself. His failures of re-collection (highlighted 
by the elisions and perseverations of his speech) are indicative of a mode of mourning 
                                                 
111 John Duvall makes and extends this reading of the baseball game in his text A Reader’s Guide to 
Underworld. 2002. 
112 Early on in the novel we are given an image for this coupling of allegory and consumption and its 
effect on difference and Otherness through the juxtaposing of two racially ‘Other’ figures: here the 
blackness of the Peanut vendor is contrasted to the blackness of Cotter Martin, a kid (and emblem of an 
Otherness outside the symbolic of the dominant culture) who has skipped school and stolen his way 
into the game. The Peanut Vendor represents an allegory of blackness most familiar to the crowd; he 
presents a performance of his blackness: “a coin-catching whiz”, “black and rangy”, “magnet skinned, 
circus-catching dimes on the wing and then sailing peanut bags into people’s chests. It’s a thrill a 
minute show…” He is a “popular Negro and crowd pleaser” (20). The Vendor is popular because of his 
visibility, and as a consequence of his employment of this aesthetic of ‘blackness’ (blackness as 
allegory) he is a success in the business of vending; in effect, the vendor sells ‘blackness’ as well as 
peanuts, and his is a history, image, and “Otherness” people are prepared to “buy”. By this notion 
DeLillo, quite deliberately it appears, runs together allegory and consumption. The point, it seems, is 
that combined with the logic of consumption, allegory creates and maintains a credulous population; 
allegory is used as a way of controlling the appearance of the real, managing and containing Otherness. 
In the capitalist economy allegory becomes a commodity, a consumable. 
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that turns out, in fact, to be unfaithful to allegory as well as memory. By way of 
compensation for his failings and forgettings, Marvin substitutes an addiction to 
collection: 
People collect, collect, always collecting. There’s people they go after anything out of wartime 
Germany. Naziana. This is major collector’s looking for big history. Does that mean the objects 
in this room are total trivia? What’s the word I’m looking for that sounds like you’re getting 
injected with a vaccine in he fleshy part of your arm? […] Innocuous. What am I, innocuous? 
This is history, back-page. From back to front. Happy, tragic, desperate. (174) 
 
The word that Marvin searches for is “innocuous”, but by the way he tries to 
remember it, he recalls the word “inoculation”, and the point for DeLillo, it seems, is 
that you cannot, in fact, inoculate yourself against the slippage of the sign, (or 
difference) in language, and yet, it is this very slippage that Marvin has just 
demonstrated in moving from “innocuous” to “inoculation”. Despite his best efforts, 
he is subsumed by this irony. But history does become innocuous without its relation 
to this notion of slippage, as this is the possibility of Otherness – difference, 
resistance, interpretation, possibility itself. Marvin’s collection addiction reduces 
history to trivia, reduces Nazi history to Naziana, the history of 1950s America to 
condomology.113 The collection-addiction can thus be seen as an attempted 
inoculation against the real Otherness of history. The passage from Nazi history to 
“Naziana” is precisely that prescribed to allegory within the commodity-symbolic’s 
mode of mourning. Thus Marvin’s collection addiction describes his addiction to 
allegory, but allegory as modelled by the grand narrative of the Cold War. As Marvin 
says, 
You need the leaders of both sides to keep the cold war going. It’s the one constant thing. It’s 
honest, it’s dependable. Because when the tension and rivalry come to an end, that’s when your 
worst nightmares begin. All the power and intimidation of the state will seep out of your 
personal bloodstream. You will no longer be the main – what do I want to say? […] Point of 
reference. (170) 
 
When Marvin refers to the need to keep the Cold War going, he is referring to the 
need to maintain a narrative, an allegory, the “one constant thing […] honest […] 
dependable”. In fact, this is the role allegory is consigned, or limited, to, and, in part, 
this is because allegory delivers the “dependable” in being a category of narcissism – 
something evident in the assertion of that “you” towards the end of the quotation. This 
                                                 
113 See Duvall (ibid.). In fact, Condomology is the name of a condom-store franchise whose stores 
appeal directly to the nostalgia and kitsch of the 1950s. In this way we see how history is reduced to a 
commodity form (an allegory) that, in the case of the condom, is specifically designed for containment, 
emblematising as a result, both the collection of waste as well as an inoculation against excess, or 
infection, that characters such as Marvin, Nick, Sister Edgar, and Hoover all express in their treatment 
of memory, history and Otherness.  
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“you” puts the subject at the centre of things and as such establishes a premise for the 
efficacy of paranoia and the reappropriations (by the subject) it sanctions. For 
paranoia to work, one needs very clearly defined notions of self and Other, and this, 
of course, is what the cold-war allegory structure provides, while at the same time 
obscuring the subject to the conception of the self as Other and Others as selves. 
     In a sense, Marvin is in mourning for the passing of (an) allegory, for the passing 
of a time of allegory (the 50s of the Cold War) and innocence before the ironies of the 
sixties and poststructuralism when history seemed less problematically allegorical. 
Essentially, Marvin mourns by translating memory into material allegories, making 
memory concrete; he assuages his experience of loss and Otherness by “naming” the 
losses with the objects he collects. This is, then, an allegorical and materialist 
approach to mourning. By making something concrete in this fashion, Marvin is 
repeating the action of the commodity-symbolic as it functions under capitalism. In 
this schema, the object is cathected by the ego, is incorporated and thus not 
considered as object or Other, but as a self-object – repeating the metaphysics of 
presence. Marvin actually lacks a materialist theory that might in fact redeem his 
objects (as Other-objects) because of his misrecognition of allegory, his failure to 
grasp irony.  The objects become his history – his “inoculation” against loss and 
Otherness. By replacing internal elisions and lacunae with material objects, his 
mourning is essentially one of incorporation – he takes the material world (as 
translation of Otherness, loss and memory) within himself. In this way, Marvin 
unconsciously mimics the incorporation and connection-making of the commodity 
system. In doing so, he denies the object its alterity, and himself the opportunity for a 
lesson in finitude the object might provide as metaphor for human being-in-the-world.  
     In contrast to any such lesson of human finitude, the tenderness of being-subject is, 
for Marvin, replaced by a paranoid grand narrative by which the Otherness of 
memory, loss and the real is not merely controlled, but avoided. If subjectivity is 
made subordinate to the imperatives of the economy and desire made autonomous, 
then at least (as Marvin sees it) one can know oneself in history:  
And when the cold war goes out of business, you won’t be able to look at some woman in the 
street and have a what-do-you-call-it kind of fantasy the way you do today. […] You don’t 
know that every privilege in your life and every thought in your mind depends on the ability of 
the two great powers to hang a threat over the planet? […] And you don’t know that once this 
threat begins to fade? […] You’re the lost man of history. (182) 
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The suggestion here is that to be “lost” to history is to experience the failure of the 
allegorical as someone like Marvin has too narrowly conceived of it, the failure of 
history to be expressed through, or knowable as, allegory. Marvin is, however, one of 
history’s “lost men”, and indeed this explains his massive investment in collection 
and his addiction to allegory. In a sense, Marvin is a modernist battling against a 
certain postmodern condition characterised by a pejorative and limited notion of 
irony. Throughout all his collecting, Marvin is attempting to recuperate or return to a 
prelapsarian moment, some point in time before things began to ‘fall apart’. Against 
this drive, moments of memory loss, word-searching (perseveration; see also pp. 175; 
179; 188; 192), appear more and more frequently. Without the allegorical structure of 
the Cold War binary – essentially a framework within which the Other was assumed 
to be translatable and reconcilable – Marvin experiences erosions of memory and 
diminishment of his powers of articulation, his grip on language.  
     Marvin’s anxieties about memory are crucial to his capacity to mourn because they 
are anxieties born of irony and Otherness, the very work of memory (as Derrida has 
explained). His anxieties about loss mean that he is unable to mourn faithfully, and as 
such avoids the impossibility at the heart of mourning. When he takes things inside 
himself (through incorporation, into memory), as all mourners must, he loses them, 
and thus repeats the loss of his wife, Eleanor, all over again.114 He is incapable 
therefore of leaving to the lost object (Eleanor) its sense of Otherness and alterity, and 
to this degree he fails to undertake tender mourning. In a sense, it is the material 
world that Marvin hopes to hang on to, even though it can never be enough. Although 
he translates memory into objects, he is never in fact faithful enough to allegory (its 
relationship to loss that defines its capacity for representation) for his objects ever to 
become anything more than “exhausted objects”. All that remains for Marvin is the 
appeal of collecting, that is, “[the] lure of every addiction, [which] is losing yourself 
to time” (319). Marvin’s addiction offers him “stupefied hours” where time no longer 
needs to be mourned, or consciously passed. Within the parameters of his allegorical 
                                                 
114  
“For years he didn’t know why he was chasing down exhausted objects. All that frantic passion 
for a baseball and he finally understood it was Eleanor on his mind, it was some terror working 
deep beneath the skin that made him gather up things, amass possessions and effects against the 
dark shape of some unshoulderable loss. Memorabilia. What he remembered, what lived in the 
old smoked leather of the catcher’s mitt in the basement was the touch of his Eleanor, those 
were his wife’s eyes in the oval photographs of men with handlebar moustaches. The state of 
loss, the fact, the facticity in its lonely length.” (191) 
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world Marvin is able to lose “[him]self to time” through the temporality of narrative, 
and in this way what Matt Shay refers to as “time’s own esthetic”(459) (the time of 
the Other) is avoided. Addiction offers a way of avoiding Otherness; it offers a means 
of avoiding the experience of temporality, that messianic structure of subjectivity we 
can also think of as delay or deferral.115 The implication here is that modern consumer 
society – the system of capital – proceeds on the fashioning and sanctioning of 
various addictions – indeed, to the purpose of taking the subject out of the experience 
of time proper (Other time) and placing the subject in allegorical time. To this end, 
the Internet, for DeLillo, appears as the systemic articulation par excellence with its 
translation of time to the temporality of the connection, where “[a]ll human 
knowledge [is] gathered and linked” (825) and “[t]here is no space or time” (825). 
The Internet is to be seen, therefore, as allegory for the impossible collection, the 
perfect allegory designed to replace the world – the “miracle” (808) or “astonishment” 
– the final systemic, technological, correction of, or inoculation against, the Otherness 
of being. Such an allegorical system can be seen as a correction of space and time 
through the medium of a dissimulatingly transparent rhetoric, a “rhetoric of 
blindness”. 
 
(v) The Corrections 
 
     When Nick says, “[t]he minute I entered correction I was a convert to the system” 
(502), in a sense, he is referring to the wider phenomenon and philosophy of 
correction that the juvenile correctional facility he is sent to after shooting George 
Manza is merely a symptom of; Nick is a convert to the “stern logic” (502) of the 
corrective system of consumption and commodity capitalism, a convert to a 
philosophy of language-as-allegory (correction, as I have said) that propounds a 
theory of naming as a mode of “waste management”, containment and control. 
Correction, as a metaphor for waste management, can be seen to define the sort of 
allegory (as I have been discussing it) that is blind to its relationship with Otherness 
and irony. Correction thus explains something of the force of translation or recycling 
                                                 
115 This is the theory of someone who feels left behind (who has become waste by virtue of an 
experience of loss), who has no use for time, and for whom depression is keyed to the vastness and 
insistence of every living second and its demand to be accounted for. Time has become a tyranny for a 
person like Marvin.  Marvin’s suggestion is, then, that addicts are interested in “wasting” time as a way 
of managing it. The addict longs for “wasted” time (being intoxicated, or out of time), so that time can 
be missed or turned into something else, used time. 
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in allegory; it signifies the turning of one’s “bad beginnings” (502) into “something 
else”, and so can be seen to express something of the possibility of recovering from 
experiences of radical loss, irony and Otherness. Through allegory, Nick hopes to 
recycle himself, to correct himself and drain away the excess “sedimentary stuff of 
who I was” (502).116  
     Nick’s faith in correction – as a force of allegory – stems from his desire to 
mediate or translate loss. Allegory is powerfully seductive in this regard, as we see in 
Nick’s thoughts regarding his wife’s affair with Brian Glassic: 
Brian thought I was the soul of self-completion. Maybe so. But I was also living in a state of 
quiet separation from all the things he might cite as the solid stuff of home and work and 
responsible reality. When I found out about him and Marian I felt some element of stoic 
surrender. Their names were nice together and they were the same age and I was hereby relieved 
of my phony role as husband and father, high corporate officer. Because even the job is an 
artificial limb. Did I feel free for just a moment, myself again, hearing the story of their affair? I 
watch him sleep, thinking how satisfying it would be, ten serious smashes to his prep-school 
face. But it was also satisfying, for just a moment, to think of giving it all up, letting them have 
it all, […] [n]one of it ever belonged to me except in the sense that I filled out the forms. (796)  
Nick’s earlier claim that he lives “responsible in the real” (his rejection of what Klara 
described as the point when life became “fictional”) seems less certain here, and with 
the word “phony” Nick demonstrates that he is capable of insight into the tenuous and 
factitious quality of the particular allegorical dimension he clings to. And yet he 
cannot refuse allegory either; despite the longed-for period of destructive behaviour 
and freedom, Nick can’t help but be attracted to the logic of allegory, of connections 
and similarity, and so the rhyme of the two names as well as that of their ages 
contributes, for Nick, to the sense that Brian and Marian belong together. 
                                                 
116 It’s no coincidence then that Nick moves in his life from the correctional facility to a job as a 
spokesperson for a waste management company; he is an allegorist or aesthete of waste. And it is also 
no coincidence that he lives in Phoenix either, a geography of correction, and as its name suggests, a 
place named in memory of a mythical act of allegorisation or recycling. Nick defines the appeal of 
Phoenix against his experience of California: 
 
Phoenix is a neater package for me. I needed a private life. How could you have a private life in 
a place where all your isolated feelings are out in the open, where the tension in your heart, the 
thing you’ve been able to restrict to small closed rooms is everywhere exposed to the whitish 
light and grown so large and firmly fixed that you can’t separate it from the landscape and sky? 
(341) 
 
As Nick says, California is “too interesting” (340), with its “edge-of-everything quality that creeps into 
innocuous remarks and becomes the vanguard of estranged feeling” (340). [emphasis added] This 
feeling is, of course, something we can think of as Otherness, like ironies “creeping” or seeping into 
language, making history turn from being innocuous to being haunted by alterity and memory. As Nick 
says, “when I shot George Manza I began to understand the nature of this kind of feeling” (341). As I 
will show in the next section, this means that Nick is talking about irony. Allegory, as Nick appears to 
suggest with his commentary on Phoenix, is aligned, and limited to, a force of “restriction”, restricting 
Otherness and memory to the “small closed rooms” of the self. 
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 (vi) Todo y Nada 
 
In many respects the whole question of Nick’s faithfulness to allegory and Otherness 
is to the fore in the scene where he relates his reading of the theological text, The 
Cloud of Unknowing, to the stranger (Donna) he meets at a conference and sleeps 
with. This act of marital infidelity is developed by DeLillo as a metaphor for Nick’s 
relationship to Otherness, specifically, the faithful regard for Otherness and the Other 
as expressed in the scene’s economy of contexts: Nick’s reading of The Cloud and his 
search for the “pure word” (allegory) of God, Nick’s relation of his secret history of 
loss and Otherness (the loss of his father, the shooting of Manza) to Donna, and the 
Otherness of Donna herself. Nick himself appears aware of the Otherness of the 
occasion, though for him it is inseparable from his excitation and desire. As he says of 
Donna: “I didn’t want to understand her too quickly” (294). In a sense, Nick hopes to 
stall the processes of allegory, so as to allow the Otherness of Donna, and of their 
liaison, to wash over him; when Nick tries to kiss Donna, her evasion of the kiss 
places him “on the outer brow of the perceivable” (294) and we see how Donna’s 
brief act of resistance, a flash of her Otherness, becomes merely an aspect of flirtation 
– a sort of frisson Nick appears to enjoy. The agenda for this encounter, and thus its 
significance in Underworld is set thus: it is an exercise in, and a flirtation with, the 
experience of Otherness, and Nick’s treatment of this scenario (Donna, his memories, 
the “todo y nada of sex”) bears directly on what DeLillo has to say about Otherness, 
irony and the negative state of loss, and their intersection with the rhetorical.  
     In many regards, the lesson of The Cloud is one that represents what we can see as 
DeLillo’s own philosophy of irony and Otherness, and this is apparent even in Nick’s 
response to the text:  
This is what I respected about God. He keeps his secret. And I tried to approach God through 
his secret, his unknowability. […] And so I learned to respect the power of secrets. We approach 
God through his unmadeness. We are made, created. God is unmade. How can we attempt to 
know such a being? We don’t know him. We don’t affirm him. Instead we cherish his negation. 
[…] And we try to develop a naked intent that fixes us to the idea of God. The Cloud 
recommends that we develop this intent around a single word. […] With this word I would 
eliminate distraction and edge closer to God’s unknowable self (295). 
 
Though The Cloud appears to validate the negative state of irony with such emphasis 
on “unmadeness”, “unknowability”, and “negation”, indeed its association of faith, 
the very possibility of being faithful, with God’s absence and withholding, Nick reads 
the text as a lesson about “the damage people do when they bring certain things into 
 116
the open” (294) – which is to say, he reads The Cloud as a parable of containment, a 
defence of secrets. Where The Cloud recommends meditation on God’s (the Other’s) 
unknowability through the word, Nick searches for the “correct” word, the “pure 
word, without a lifetime of connotation and shading” (296), to translate God’s 
absence into a linguistic presence. Essentially, Nick is searching for a word without a 
history, a word cut off from its referentiality (or memory) – the word as origin, as 
opposed to The Cloud’s teaching of origin as deferral or withholding (irony). Nick’s 
word must be one that has never been “wasted”, a word existing before the possibility 
of (its) death (the possibility of its iteration, its “afterlife” of difference and 
signification), and so not a word at all.117 The “pure word” that Nick searches for is 
like no word that could exist; it is a search against language and its structures of delay 
and deferral, and he misses the fact that this is, in fact, the lesson of The Cloud. By 
not being faithful to the condition of unknowing he is unfaithful to both irony and 
allegory. Unknowability isn’t containment, just as irony isn’t merely silence or a 
secret, rather both, as terms assumed by Derrida’s proposition, différance, are deeply 
implicated in the possibilities of expression, naming, and iteration. God, as Other, we 
might say, keeps his secret so that we might have language, and moreover, understand 
what it means to have language – to understand, in The Cloud’s language, the tender 
“wretchedness” of our fallen state. And this, of course, is the irony Nick crucially 
misses: in attempting to search for the “pure word”, he has had to commit to the 
impure and fallen word by trawling through other languages and texts, by 
remembering other words, older words, and family words (his father’s “auito”); Thus, 
Nick actually experiences “being-in-language” because of the withholding of the 
Other-word. Moreover, Nick is able to articulate the details of his private and secret 
history for the first time to another person because of the absence at the heart of 
allegory. In fact, Nick’s narrative or allegory (about the search for the phrase todo y 
nada) demonstrates the vitality and necessity of absence in the allegorical, the virtues 
of ‘blindness’ of allegory, though this is something he himself is blind to. 
     Nick’s blindness and commensurate unfaithfulness to language are thus acted out 
in another performance of infidelity in his seduction of Donna. Despite his theory 
about the Otherness of sex – the “one secret we have that approximates an exalted 
state and that […] two people share wordlessly […making it…] powerful and 
                                                 
117 Nick is hoping to find with such a word the narcissistic reflection of his own condition: he is 
someone who wishes he hadn’t a history, and that he could ‘junk’ his memory. 
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mysterious and worth sheltering” (297) – Nick insists on his attempt to discover 
Donna’s essential, ‘correct’, and secret “sex-grubbed dug-up self” (300), fixing it, as 
he does so, as an effect of origin. The moment of sexual climax for Nick, is thus, 
inseparable from the desire for allegorical “mastery”, for naming: “I said her name” 
(300). With this ironic climax DeLillo completely undermines the ‘mystery’ of sex 
(the todo y nada that is Nick’s allegory for Otherness) Nick hoped to shelter. What we 
are left with are the ironies of Nick’s misreading of The Cloud, his unfaithfulness to 
his own theory of God and Otherness, his unfaithfulness to both Marian and Donna, 
but significantly, his unfaithfulness to allegory through his failure to recognise its 
ironic imperative. Indeed, the whole scene develops around such ironies, all the while 
presenting Nick’s story about allegory (the search for the “word” is of course an 
allegory about an allegory – a “pure word”). As such it is irony, as is the case for the 























Part Three: The Underworld of Irony. 
 
(i) Irony: the Movie Version 
 
1951, for DeLillo, stands in the text as the inaugurating year of loss; with the 
detonation by the Soviets, somewhere within their borders, of a nuclear bomb (an 
event Hoover immediately catalogues with Pearl Harbour (24)), something of the 
inviolability and unchecked primacy of American reality is punctured. 1951 becomes 
one of those nodal points in the history of the American lives that DeLillo records, 
radiating the shock waves of deeply embedded detonations in an underworld of 
Otherness that will no longer be contained, and that will begin to return with more 
frequency in the coming years. 1951, for Underworld, we might say, inaugurates 
American mourning and “loneliness”; it is a year of presentiment. In this year, for the 
characters of the novel, reality begins to unravel, becomes less reliable, “unstratified” 
and more like “fiction”.118 What Underworld presents is, then, the ironization of a 
culture and its forms of history, knowledge, and self-knowing, by an unceasing 
exposure to Otherness, compensated for by new and improved technologies of 
connection and allegory, new products, more consumption.  
     Vietnam is one of those interruptions DeLillo talks about, one of those moments in 
which American culture, its history (and its allegories) undergoes ironization and 
questioning. Matt Shay, remembering his time in Vietnam, and how he sometimes 
tossed a Frisbee for a “Gook dog”, presents the reader with one of Underworld’s more 
explicit considerations of irony: 
In the movie version you’d freeze the frame with the dog in midleap about to snare the Frisbee. 
A park on a summer’s day somewhere in America – that would be the irony of the shot, with a 
solo guitar producing the bitter screech of feedback. This is what happens when a part of a 
system’s output is returned to the input. (462) 
This is the defining experience of irony for most in Underworld, and such an 
understanding of “irony” (in fact, as I explain, a false irony) is vital to understanding 
DeLillo’s portrait of America and his critique of representation as practiced within 
capitalism. The implication here is that irony results from a loop system. Irony is 
                                                 
118 In contrast to such a vision of history is the view held by J Edgar Hoover’s secretary in 
Underworld, Clyde Tolson, whose longing for non-ironic history belies his concerns with a present that 
threatens 
 
a continuation of the Kennedy years. In which well-founded categories began to seem irrelevant. 
In which a certain fluid movement became possible. In which sex, drugs and dirty words began 
to unstratify the culture. (571) 
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reduced to this “bitter screech” when there is no differentiation in the system between 
input and output.119 This notion of “irony” represents a dominant or common cultural 
understanding of its occurrence, use, or context; irony, in this instance, a type 
recognizable from the “movie version”120 of American culture, is a product of 
technologies of connection. As “feedback” this “irony” becomes what it is through the 
system’s “recycling” of “output” as “input” – that is to say, through the 
homogenisation of difference. The point is that irony is misrecognised, and that this 
misrecognition is a feature of the commodity-symbolic recorded in Underworld. The 
technology of connection, what I have been referring to as the commodity-symbolic 
(the systemization of allegory), is what produces this false irony, but as we see, 
without the circuit-breaker of Otherness (precluded by this model of recycling) the 
irony cannot be irony as such. This irony fails, and as we see later, the dog doesn’t, in 
fact, even go for the Frisbee. Indeed, DeLillo has ‘set up’ this “irony” of the loop (of 
consumption) so as to document its failure. What we see in DeLillo’s handling of this 
episode is something he in fact explores throughout the text: the consideration of 
irony through the demonstration of what it is not. In this way, DeLillo uses irony – as 
a negative in Underworld – to explore the allegorical functioning of the culture and its 
relation to itself and Otherness. Which is to say, that the compensations of connection 
and consumption, aspects of the commodity-symbolic of capitalism and its 
management, containment, and simulation of Otherness, are manifest, for DeLillo in 
Underworld, in the culture’s relationship to irony. For this reason, and as I will show, 
DeLillo explores irony throughout the text by way of its misrecognition or simulation 
in the commodity-symbolic. By showing us how irony is misconstrued and avoided, 
DeLillo extends his portrait of the tender-less allegories and false mourning of late 
Twentieth Century America. 
 
(ii) Irony, Wasted. 
 
As I have suggested in the opening paragraphs of this section, the management of 
Otherness is paralleled in Underworld by the management of irony in a culture 
                                                 
119 What results here is a kind of non-ironic irony resulting from the loop-system, the seamless victory 
of the allegorical, in fact a simulation of irony by allegory.  
120 This phrase, so casually used here, in fact serves to place into relief the other films in Underworld 
that DeLillo uses to further tender his ‘theory’ of irony, namely: Eisenstein’s Unterwelt, the Zapruder 
film, the home movie taken of the ‘Texas Highway Killer’, and Robert Frank’s Cocksucker Blues. 
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dominated by its commodity-symbolic – not surprising, perhaps, for a culture so 
governed by its media of representation. In Underworld the treatment of irony – 
indeed, the whole question of irony – is therefore inseparable from the constellation of 
waste, memory and Otherness. When Brian Glassic travels to see the Fresh Kills 
Landfill on Staten Island, he is confronted with a mountain of waste sufficient to such 
a constellation; the massive garbage heap is a composition of “human behaviour, 
people’s habits […] their uncontrollable needs and innocent wishes, maybe their 
passions, certainly their excesses and indulgences but their kindness too, their 
generosity” (184). Presented here is the excess of memory, everything that falls from 
the present. To be confronted with this is, then, to be confronted by Otherness, and the 
question such a confrontation poses for Brian is thus a question about mourning, but 
one that also articulates the wider culture’s anxieties about this excess: “[…] how to 
keep this mass metabolism from overwhelming us” [?](184). For such a culture, the 
Other becomes an “omnivorous movie terror filling […] doorways and windows” 
(185). Out of fear the Other is allegorised and ignored: “no one talked about it but the 
men and women who tried to manage it” (185).  
     What this means (noting the buried irony here) is that the allegories of the 
dominant culture come from, and are in fact a response to, waste, Otherness and 
irony. Waste, in Underworld, is the phenomenal manifestation of Otherness that 
explains the possibilities of paranoia and systems of connection, of theory in general 
that are the means devised by a culture to control this Otherness. In a sense, waste 
substitutes as Otherness; waste is the memory, on layer on layer of which, as the 
garbage theoretician Jesse Detwiler graphically explains, civilization is built. 
Moreover, what is made apparent in the following is how waste precedes us in an 
analogy for the way, as Derrida has explained, Otherness (and the Other) precedes us 
and, as such, the present and the moment of naming are remembrances of things past.  
[…] [C]ities rose on garbage, inch by inch, gaining elevation through the decades as buried 
debris increased. Garbage always got layered over or pushed to the edges, in a room or in a 
landscape. But it had its own momentum. It pushed back. It pushed into every space available, 
dictating construction patterns and altering systems of ritual. And it produced rats and paranoia. 
People were compelled to develop an organized response. This meant they had to come up with 
a resourceful means of disposal and build a social structure to carry it out – workers, managers, 
haulers, scavengers. Civilization is built, history is driven – [...] 
   See, we have everything backwards […] garbage rose first, inciting people to build a 
civilization in response, in self-defense. We had to find ways to discard our waste, to use what 
we couldn’t discard, to repress what we couldn’t use. Garbage […] forced us to develop the 
logic and rigor that would lead to systematic investigations of reality, to science, art, music, 
mathematics. (287) 
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As we see here, Otherness is taken as justification for our allegories, but our response 
to Otherness (through allegory) is confined to a language of consumption and product 
production. “[C]onsume or die” says Detwiler,  
[t]hat’s the mandate of the culture. And it all ends up in the dump. We make stupendous 
amounts of garbage, then we react to it, not technologically but in our hearts and minds. We let 
it shape us. We let it control our thinking. Garbage comes first, then we build a system to deal 
with it. (287) 
 
And so we have returned to the looping circuit of “irony” we began with: 
consumption that creates waste that we react to with more consumption. This 
feedback loop or tautology – not an irony, but in fact, the result of an absence of irony 
in the system – is, nevertheless, signalled by the unseen ironies of its spokesperson. 
Detwiler, the former “garbage guerrilla”, has himself been recycled – “remade, 
retooled” (286) – into an “industry maverick” (288). The sense of the oxymoronic 
about this last phrase is telling: Detwiler is both inside the industry and yet also a 
maverick to the industry. Though he may signify excess or irony with his “japing [of] 
every complacent rule of belief” (286), he is, in fact, a “guy in firm control, with a 
work-out coach, and a nice line of credit, in a black turtleneck and designer jeans” 
(286), who talks like a “talk-show” host (“get to know your garbage”). In DeLillo’s 
hands, the ironist has become an irony. 
     Despite the fact that irony, or waste, engenders the allegorical system, the 
commodity-symbolic nevertheless controls the appearance of irony and Otherness 
through its systemic misrecognition of irony (as “feedback” and tautology). What then 
happens to irony in such a symbolic? As Matt Shay, in his own paranoid fashion 
(again) suggests, irony becomes simulated as paranoia, which is itself an imitation of 
excess:121  
 [H]ow can you tell the difference between orange juice and agent orange if the same massive 
system connects them at levels outside your comprehension? And how can you tell if this is true 
when you’re already systemed under, prepared to half believe everything because this is the 
only intelligent response? [...] When you alter a single minor component, the system adapts at 
once. (465) 
 
The “screech of feedback” mode of irony Matt articulated earlier is here seen as 
inseparable from what we can consider to be pure recycling, pure repetition. Any time 
difference is asserted, the system “adapts”, turning one thing into another – translating 
and connecting. Through the sheer force and scope of the system’s massive 
allegorical functioning, the impression of an outside-inside structure is simulated. By 
                                                 
121 Paranoia, sometimes seen as the voice of the ironist, an insight or tool to decode or break the 
system, is in fact, a code of the system. 
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this necessary compensatory act – the created impression of something in excess of 
the system – issues of difference and resistance (the possibilities inherent in irony) are 
controlled. As we have already seen in Nick’s formulation of his “I” and “he”, like the 
“Us” and “Them” (51) of a Hoover or McCarthy, the idea of an inside-outside 
opposition (self and Other) is false, and is, in fact, designed to miss irony and 
Otherness and thus “organise” American “loneliness” through the economy of 
paranoid connection-making.  Of course, for Hoover, the desired effect of this control 
of irony is the maintenance of a certain inviolability (expressed for DeLillo through 
that sense of the autonomous and “astonishing” work of the commodity-symbolic, the 
economy of capitalism), that for Hoover – like his namesake, Sister Edgar – is 
associated with a fetishistic concern with cleanliness, purity and the maintaining of 
certain boundaries and borders. As we see with Sister Edgar, the rhetoric of 
commodity is also the rhetoric of cleanliness, and yet this language, sponsored by the 
capitalist economy DeLillo critiques, is not entirely sufficient; the language cannot 
control irony, and instead tends towards regression:  
How can hands be clean if the soap is not? This question was insistent in her life. But if you 
clean the soap with bleach, what do you clean the bleach bottle with? If you use scouring 
powder on the bleach bottle, how do you clean the box of Ajax? Germs have personalities. 
Different objects harbor threats of various insidious types. And the questions turn inward 
forever. (238) 
 
Indeed, irony itself, we might say, supersedes here, as it is the resistance of irony to 
language (this language of allegory as a precession of commodity – soap, bleach, 
scouring powder, Ajax), the excess that cannot be cleaned away, that in fact 
engenders the modes of “irony” (infinite regression and paranoia) that become the 
dominant ‘theories’ of irony in the system. This translation, of irony to infinite 
regression, fails irony by its failure of allegory; that is to say, in not proposing the 
tenderness of allegory, such a ‘theory’ of irony becomes a version of commodity 
(something within the system), reified, systemic. 
     Perhaps the most profound example of this systemic production of “irony” (the 
system’s simulation of irony as paranoia, infinite regression, connectivity) as a 
response to Otherness and waste, is to be found in the recycling system of nuclear 
waste. In the nuclear waste disposal business, as modelled in Underworld by Viktor 
Maltsev’s company “Tchaika”, nuclear weapons are used to destroy nuclear waste. 
Herein lies the tautology or regression: the waste produced by the production of 
nuclear weapons to destroy nuclear waste must, in turn, be destroyed by nuclear 
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weapons. In a sense, DeLillo is here suggesting the moebius-strip quality of 
capitalism itself; all the force of irony as expressed, say, by Derrida’s insights into the 
functioning of language, and that, in effect, propose forms of waste, excess, death and 
loss as integral to production and generation of signs in the economy, is here reduced 
to a simulation of itself, reified in a self-sealing circuit. Capitalism operates ‘like’ a 
language, but a language, for DeLillo, whose relationship to irony and Otherness 
resembles a “false faith” (825) predicated on the simulation of irony through 
outrageous connection, repetition and regression.122 What DeLillo suggests in 
Underworld is that the most powerful simulation of Otherness – in effect, the 
transcendental signified by which all difference, delay, and irony are made 
subordinate, as aspects of a dissembling and simulacral economy – is the bomb. In 
effect, the bomb is the great mid-century metaphor for the radiation of capitalism, the 
metastasising force of commodity production and dissemination – its spreading of 
technology, information, desire and allegory. What such a metaphor reveals is that the 
power of the bomb, the efficacy of capitalism, is a result of capitalism’s semiotic 
structure – its simulation of the structure of language. To drop the bomb on another 
culture is to detonate one’s own referent within that culture. It means contaminating 
that culture with your own sign system. The radiation that lingers through generations 
is the radiation (or seepage) of signs: a semi-urgy propelled by the explosion of the 
referent’s semiotic. This becomes apparent when Viktor takes Brian and Nick to the 
“museum of misshappens” and the local “radiation clinic” (799). Here DeLillo insists 
on making a comparison between the effects (and consequences) of actual radiation 
and semiotic radiation, and by doing so suggests the deforming violence of the latter 
by the observation of the former. The effect is heightened by the incongruous 
appearance of the hospital’s patients who wear T-shirts recycled from a “Gay and 
Lesbian festival in Hamburg” (800). DeLillo brings together here the deformations of 
                                                 
122 With this simulation of irony the Other becomes incorporated, an allegory, a testament to the 
system’s astonishing power of representation. Such incorporation is, then, the achievement of what I 
have been referring to as a mode of (allegorical) mourning where Otherness is not in fact mourned as 
Otherness but reduced to a sign in the system. The context explaining this state of mourning in 
Underworld is the disappointment held by a generation of Americans (the generation Underworld’s 
main characters are drawn from) regarding the “failure” of the Cold War. The 1950s is remembered as 
a period of perceived stability because it mourned the presence of an Other (Communist Russia; 
nuclear apocalypse) it expected to arrive. The failure of this arrival, tantamount to a kind of messianic 
disappointment, robbed the culture of its dependable allegory of Otherness. What DeLillo portrays 
throughout Underworld is thus a culture’s mourning for its lost Otherness – not in fact Otherness itself, 
but an allegory of Otherness. The system responds by generating an economy that takes its capacity for 
technology, representation, connection-making and recycling (allegory) as its own sublime, proposing 
as referents of this sublime, the bomb and, latterly, the Internet. 
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the symbolic with the bodies of the victims of radiation. This “importing ploy gone 
awry” (800) rhymes the leakage of the capitalist-symbolic with the leakage of 
radiation. The T-shirts signify meaninglessness, and in particular, a meaningless form 
of irony that is the product of the colonization of resistance and difference (Gay T-
shirts – themselves once a signifier of difference – in an increasingly Islamic country). 
It is by such consideration of irony as seen in DeLillo’s rhyming of the leakage of 
radiation with the seepage of the capitalist symbolic (the T-shirts), that DeLillo is able 
to highlight distinctions between the capitalist symbolic and the economy of language 
it is designed to simulate, between the transcendental signified (the bomb) of 
capitalism and its simulation of Otherness. In the “museum of misshapens” Nick finds 
himself well positioned to perceive such irony; in effect, he is positioned in the gap 
between the capitalist semiotic and what such a semiotic is designed to mask: an 
Otherness embodied in the deformed specimens and patients Nick sees, produced by 
the ‘nuclear-force’ of capitalist allegoricity.  We begin to note a pattern emerging here 
in DeLillo’s depiction of irony in relation to the economy of commodity and 
connection. Within the system of connection, the seemingly ‘ironic’ quirk of these T-
shirts, turning up at this outpost of (capitalism’s) empire, serves to present a 
simulation of irony whose purpose is the suggestion of something outside the circuit 
of the symbolic. In effect, those shirts represent a sort of illusion of Otherness, an 
intimation of something unmasterable, entirely within the system, but designed to 
signify something ‘outside’, be it fate, chance, or irony. 
     So if we see here how Otherness (a certain experience or simulation of it) is keyed 
to a certain mode or understanding of irony, we find with Sister Edgar’s “helpmeet” 
Gracie, a further connecting of irony and Otherness tantamount, for DeLillo, to yet 
another examination of these terms and their relation. The context for this ‘discussion’ 
is provided in a scene where Gracie considers a busload of tourists in the Bronx 
whose bus bears the title “Surreal Tours”. On seeing the bus and its logo, Gracie 
bridles:  “It’s not surreal. It’s real, it’s real. Your bus is surreal. You’re surreal” (247). 
These tourists are, ostensibly, visitors to the “underworld” of the Bronx, though, as 
Gracie suggests, it is in fact the community of the Wall that is the “real”.123 So there 
is a kind of inversion at work in DeLillo’s vision of the underworld, and this is made 
                                                 
123 The Wall is, in fact an index to reality in America, and DeLillo makes a play of its name later in the 
novel when the children of the Wall manage to tune a TV to a channel carrying details of the stock 
market. The Wall, it seems, is more properly “Wall Street”, a more accurate index to poverty, race, 
class, culture, memory and Otherness than the indices of commodity.   
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graphically evident when we are made witness to the emergence of commuters from 
under the road, escaping a subway fire. The figures from the subway are simply more 
tourists in the real, shocked and at a loss – that state that resembles an encounter with 
Otherness so often precipitated and triggered by a plunge into some state of 
emergency. When Gracie says, “you’re surreal” she is making a statement about an 
Otherness opposed to the manufactured irony of “surreal tours”. We note an inversion 
at work here also, as it is not the denizens of the Bronx who emerge spectre-like from 
under the earth, but rather commuters from the city, figures from the system who 
appear like shades from the Underworld: 
   She thought she understood the tourists. You travel somewhere not for museums and sunsets 
but for the ruins, bombed-out terrain, for the moss-grown memory of torture and war. 
Emergency vehicles were massing about a block and a half away. She saw workers pry open 
subway gratings in billows of pale smoke and she knew she ought to say a fast prayer, an act of 
hope, three years’ indulgence, but she only watched and waited. Then heads and torsos began to 
emerge, indistinctly, people coming into the air with jaws skewed open in frantic gasps. (248)124
So what the tourists (those from outside the community of the Wall) spectate on, is in 
fact, the spectacle of “Others” also from outside the wall, emerging from the 
underworld; the spectators are not seeing the Other, they are seeing versions of 
themselves (people from the city), they are their own spectacle, they are as much a 
part of an “underworld” of Otherness as the constructed “Others” of the wall. With 
the image of these tourist spectators, DeLillo gives us a presentation of blindness 
where Otherness is missed by a vision circuit or loop that feeds back into a vision of 
the same, the self – again, a model for narcissism supported by the logic of connection 
in capitalism. “Output” is returned to “input”, DeLillo gives us an irony of “irony”; 
the ironising of the notion of “irony” as such a looping vision that in truth leaves 
Otherness unmourned.  
 
(iii) Shoot and Repeat 
 
Underworld is a novel about connection, in fact, a portrait of sorts, depicting 
connection as a system radiating out from a constructed, but no less astonishing or 
sublime, referent. This referent, of course, is the bomb. The economy it “spawns and 
                                                 
124 This scene is meant to recall the closing scenes of Eisenstein’s Unterwelt (discussed in the next 
section) where the mutilated prisoners escape from the underground caves into the light of day. 
DeLillo, again, suggests with this association that the difference between the underworld figures and 
those ‘surface-dwellers’ of the system is delusional; the point, for DeLillo, is to draw attention to the 
idea that the construction of an ‘Other”, as with the division of Others from selves, is factitious, 
motivated, and ideological. 
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skeins” (51) is the mode of capitalism exemplified by the connection-logic of the 
Internet. “Everything’s connected,” (289) we are told, and “all technology refers to 
the bomb” (467), though it is exactly the vulnerability of a society to such dogma of 
connection that DeLillo sets out to critique or ironize. The way he does this is by 
associating connection with the bomb, illustrating how a certain desire for connection 
tends, in the capitalist mode, towards a certain reification of desire and Otherness, in 
fact, the replacement of desire and Otherness with repetition, simulation and 
consumption. The point is, DeLillo represents this sort of connective activity through 
his negative accounting of irony – that is to say, through his depiction of irony’s 
absence and misprision, its being forgotten. The scene involving Nick and George 
Manza, is exemplary in this regard, as it presents us with an account of such 
misprision and misreading of irony.125
     Nick is who he is for the majority of the novel in part because of the experience of 
shooting George Manza; his encounter with radical Otherness, made present to him in 
this experience, becomes one more of those nodal points in the novel that serve to 
represent the irruption of Otherness and conditions for mourning. The shooting, for 
Nick, is, then, the third “shot heard around [his] world,” and how he responds to the 
Otherness of this occasion is indicative of the wider culture’s capacity to mourn, 
which, as I have been saying, is also an index to this culture’s relationship to irony. 
The moment of the shooting is itself a synchronic moment – the presenting moment 
and force of irony – that forever unsettles Nick’s relation to meaning, language, self 
and Other. After the sudden disappearance of his father, the shooting compounds 
Nick’s retreat into allegory. When he speaks to Donna of his desire to find a “pure 
word” alive with “naked intent”, it is because of his exposure to irony and is, more 
particularly, a consequence of his inability to mourn the moment – “a gesture without 
a history” (509) – of his exposure to Otherness. This is the case for Nick, I suggest, 
because of his failure to attend to irony. Relating the shooting to Donna, Nick isolates 
the experience for certain qualities: the feeling of not being sure “whether the intent 
was express or implied” (299) speaks closely to the experience of irony, as does his 
attempt to resolve it in allegory: “I retain the moment. I’ve tried to break it down, see 
                                                 
125 We note here a technique typical to DeLillo where, in the actions of a single character, Nick, the 
tendencies, motives, desires, and blindnesses of the wider culture are represented; to make this point 
DeLillo sets up the phrase “the shot heard round the world” to rhyme with, and thus, associate, Nick’s 
experience of shooting Manza and the culture’s ‘experience’ of the Soviet nuclear test, if not also the 
later ‘shot’ heard around Dealey Plaza.  
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it clearly in its component parts. But there are so many whirling motives and 
underlying possibilities and so whats and why nots” (299). 
     It is precisely Nick’s lack of an understanding of irony that leads to the shooting. 
The violence is not because of the ironic detachment of nihilism, but the opposite, a 
complete naïveté about the structure and relationship of difference and Otherness at 
work in our responsibilities and our decisions, our moral codings of value and ethics, 
and, at the level of subjectivity, the distinction between self and Other. At the level of 
information, Nick has difficulty distinguishing “input” from “output”, and without 
this awareness – something irony enforces by way of its lessons in difference and 
Otherness – Nick responds nihilistically, as a relativist: 
at some point, with my finger already moving the trigger, at some micropoint in the action of the 
mind and the action of the finger and the trigger-action itself, I may have basically said, So 
what. I’m not really sure. Or, Why not do it and see what happens. (299)126
 
This experience of Otherness, this “[un]rehearse[d] reality […] a thing outside the 
limits of experience” (509) eventuates, as it does, because of Nick’s misreading of 
what is ostensibly an ironic “contract”, initiated by Manza, between him and Nick. 
Certainly, violence and destruction are not precluded from irony – indeed, they 
represent certain necessary outcomes of irony, necessary to the differentiation of 
other, less violent outcomes – and irony does run this risk, but only in so far as it 
foregrounds the possibilities of decision and reading (and misreading) in the name of 
possibility itself. However, a misrecognition of the irony-contract, that is to say, a 
failure of good-reading (and, presumably also, good decision-making consequent on 
such reading) is almost always at the heart of violence, and, in this regard, DeLillo’s 
presentation of the scene of George’s death is exemplary in terms of the requirements 
for tendering irony – reading well. Nick misses this, though not entirely: he does 
recall “[t]he way the man said no when he asked if it was loaded […] the man said no 
and the smile was all about the risk, of course, the spirit of the dare of what they were 
doing”(780).127 This “of course” stands out as a phrase earned by experience, a 
marker of retrospection on Nick’s part indicating his recognition of this irony as an 
adult, but as a young man Nick fails to recognise that the “contract” he signs with 
                                                 
126 Another way of reading this, again related to the premise of Nick’s lack of irony, suggests that he 
pulls the trigger precisely because he is curious about Otherness, curious enough to want an experience 
of Otherness. Nick’s desire for a repetition of his Father’s absence seems a persuasive reading, and 
certainly the conjunction of repetition with desire, in fact the translation of desire as repetition, seems a 
product of a symbolic economy Nick is a constituent of.  
127 A ‘good reading’, here, is thus one that (remembering de Man) is also a misreading, that is, an ironic 
reading that “reads” Manza against what he actually says. 
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Manza when he asks to hold the shotgun is one written in irony, in the language of the 
unsaid; the outcome, of course, is George’s suicide. Despite George’s ‘ironic’ quip 
that “you shoot with both eyes open” (780), which is as much about the handling of 
the shotgun as it is about his handling of the situation, Nick fails to recognise and 
negotiate the irony. 
     Nick’s experience of this moment is marked by repetition. In the text certain 
details recur time and again: the slyness of George’s smile, his answer, “no”, when 
asked if the gun is loaded, the feel of the shotgun in Nick’s hands, the pull of the 
trigger (780-81), and throughout Nick’s passage in the text from the 1990s back to the 
1950s and the 90s again, details of this event return and repeat. The repetition impulse 
is essentially of the same structure that American culture (DeLillo seems to be 
suggesting) begins increasingly to fixate on as the Twentieth Century progresses. 
DeLillo himself spells this out when he writes about crime caught on video-tape. 
DeLillo is interested in how “the tape is played and replayed exhausting all the reality 
stored in its magnetic pores”, and how the drive to imitate and repeat becomes “the 
means [a culture] has devised to disremember the past” giving you, as compensation, 
“another set of images for you to want and need and get sick of and need nonetheless, 
[…] separat[ing] you from the reality that beats ever more softly in the diminishing 
world outside the tape”.128 Consequently, repetition compensates for the “failure” to 
mourn; the Other and memory are by-passed along with an interrogation of irony, by 
the reduction of allegory (reduced by the absence of its relation to irony) to a 
component of imitation and repetition. The more that repetition comes to replace the 
appearance of the Other, the more closely repetition becomes conflated with, almost 
supplanting, desire.  
     For DeLillo (and he has addressed this directly outside his novels)129 the central 
moment of “American absurd[ity]” from which such repetitions flow and to which a 
certain desire attaches, is the assassination of Kennedy. As I have already suggested, 
Oswald presented America with an utterly unrecuperable experience of Otherness; for 
DeLillo, it seems, this was an Otherness to which a culture has largely avoided the 
trial of mourning, instead reacting through a ‘false’ mourning composed of the 
                                                 
128 “The Power of History”, New York Times Magazine. September 7, 1997. 
129 See “The American Absurd”: “But think of the outrages and atrocities that flowed from the psychic 
disorientation of the 1960s – the assassinations, the cult members, the mass suicides. It was surely the 
assassination of President Kennedy that began to give us a sense of something coming undone”. 
Harper’s Magazine. February 2004. p.34. 
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compensations of the allegorical – an investment in the proliferation of signs and 
commodities (in fact, a conflation of commodity with signs); the consolation of 
paranoid narratives and plots; the retreat into the addictions of systems, sciences and 
statistics (Matt, Bronzini, Marvin); retreat into silence (Nick); and the institution of 
repetition, imitation, and consumption as culturally validated forms of desire.130      
This last notion, in particular, seems apparent to Klara when she and Miles attend a 
gathering at which a looped version of the previously unseen Zapruder film screens. 
The way the film is experienced by those gathered at the screening correlates closely 
to a culture’s failure of irony, its avoidance of mourning. 
     The film is screened in three different rooms, in front of three different groups of 
people, with a five second delay separating the first frames of the looped twenty 
second film shown in the first room from the second room, another five second delay 
separating the second from the third room. From the initial “ohh[s]” of shock and 
disbelief at seeing something “completely new” the film sequence re-maps the 
experience of Otherness (delay and deferral) and the consequent avoidance of it 
through repetition. The temporal delay structure of the screening and the apportioning 
of difference in spatial terms (the different rooms) are quickly diminished as people 
get up and begin to “mix” throughout the rooms. With this detail DeLillo, quite self-
consciously it seems, presents the reader with a mini-act of the avoidance of mourning 
and the conquering of irony through the flattening-out of difference and delay; 
DeLillo shows us the relationship between repetition and the conquering of 
différance, the economic principle of Otherness, while further connecting to this the 
                                                 
130 Of course, the other, unmentioned reaction to the Kennedy assassination is the formation of the 
‘counter-culture’ movements of the 1960s, and indeed this too represents a kind of mourning: one that 
recognises certain possibilities of irony presented in this moment of Otherness, for a critique of culture, 
history and power. But DeLillo seems equivocal, in Underworld, about the success of such movements. 
The portrayal of Detwiler is enlightening in this regard (see earlier). Detwiler, a product of the 60s, 
reminds Nick of those at the swingers convention, not only for his rhetoric of disinhibition, his making 
public the private stuff of waste, but for the way he can ‘swing’ from being a so called “garbage 
guerrilla” to a simulacral figure of the system he once rebelled against. If Detwiler represents a form of 
irony, it is a form of relativism that Klara recognises still at work in the art of the 70s, a form that 
resembles a mimicry or empty repetition of an irony separated from Otherness, a form of irony 
estranged from itself, from the work of mourning. Here the “moment” is “heroic”, meaning that 
synchronic moment of irony, separated from allegory, and what results is irony without memory, 
without any tie to history. This is Klara’s commentary on the art of the seventies, postmodern art: 
 
   Art in which the moment is heroic, American art, the do-it-now, the fuck-the-past – she could 
not follow that. She could look at it and respect it, envy it, in a way, but not, herself, place hand 
to object and make some furious now, some brilliant jack-off gesture that asserts an 
independence. (U., 377) 
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constituent forces of allegory (notice Miles’s paranoid quip about the significance of 
the number thirteen in the film’s reel number 313, and his allusion to conspiracy 
theories (495)) and desire. Indeed, the shock and Otherness of the film are quickly 
diminished and replaced by a compensatory paranoia. Thus we notice, as Klara does, 
a group passing a joint, watching the film, amazed “that there were forces in the 
culture that could out-imagine them” (495). The film becomes commodified as the 
viewers become “tourists” (495) and Klara notes a “man and a woman […] seemingly 
stoned and not especially noticeable, remotely making out” (495). The film runs on 
amid supposedly “ironic” ideas about “the secret manipulation of history” (495) 
which have more to do with the allegorisation of irony (as paranoia) than irony itself, 
while others inure themselves to the effects of the film through the consumption of 
cannabis (itself a kind of “ironic” commodity). Even details of Klara’s narrative begin 
to repeat (she notes the couple making out “remotely” once again), as attention 
quickly returns, despite the grisly depiction of the “terrible mist of tissue and skull” 
(596) to consumption: “let’s go eat, or whatever people say when a thing begins to be 
over” (496). As Klara notes, the film itself marks the beginning of the sixties and the 
“conceptual end” of the Fifties – the film is the thing that tells us something has 
“beg[un] to be over”, heralding an age of consumption and repetition. 
     As is evident in DeLillo’s treatment of the screening of the Zapruder film, the 
experience of Otherness by subjects within the commodity-symbolic is quickly 
diminished; Otherness is translated into the signs of a symbolic system where such 
signs are fused with commodity. The result is a miraculous and seemingly complete 
connecting-away of excess. An understanding of irony (and its relationship to 
Otherness) is, then, what, for DeLillo in Underworld, we cannot afford to lose. As 
DeLillo’s text suggests, such irony is indissociable from the requirements of faithful, 
ethical art, and demonstrates the tenderness of even the most reified of commodity 
allegories, even the grand commodity: the bomb. By irony, we may tender the bomb, 
and to do this means thinking again about allegory (its instances of commodity and 
technology, its force of translation and connection), especially the role of irony in all 
our allegorical translations and compensations. The genius of the bomb, like that of 
the Internet, lies in its capacity to approximate, articulate or translate as Otherness 
itself. The bomb represents the most “astonishing” achievement of our technologies 
because it was, for a time, the closest we could come to a reproduction of Otherness – 
in this instance it belongs to the same genus as the army of the dead in Bruegel’s 
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painting. But, like the painting, the bomb is only a reproduction, in fact, a simulation 
of Otherness, and its success in “out-imagin[ing]” (76) the mind is keyed to its status 
as a created sublime referent. The bomb therefore is designed to simulate and, as 
such, replace Otherness. In creating the bomb as a referent of an “outside” Otherness, 
we create the sense of a coherent and connected society or world. We can think of it, 
within its time in history, as the ultimate expression of a failure to treat Otherness, via 
mourning. As such, its massive force – beyond imagining – is the inevitable product 
of a culture of containment and allegorical control. Because the purpose of the bomb 
is, as Matt says, to “redefine the limits of human perception and dread” (422), the 
work of the bomb lies in the allegorising of Otherness. But in all of this the bomb is 
itself an allegory, a sign, and as such, if ironised, can be re-read, re-written. This is 
essentially what Klara does with her allegorization of the B52s, as we shall see in the 
next section. Of course Otherness is constantly being mastered and translated. What 
DeLillo is proposing, therefore, is not an avoidance of translation, but to make those 
translations as tender as possible – in Klara’s words, that we “disarm” in “full 
knowledge”. But this only happens when one sees the irony of allegory, that is to say, 
when one understands the irony that is the work of mourning. This irony of allegory is 
what I suggest Benjamin describes as the turning-about-itself of allegory in the abyss 

















Part Four: Impossible Work and the Art of Irony. 
(i) Klara’s Art Work 
  
By what impossibility do DeLillo’s artists (and here I discuss Klara, Eisenstein, and 
Ismael Munoz) negotiate a mourning that is faithful to Otherness while at the same 
time broaching the reproduction, translation, and allegorisation of this Otherness in a 
way that resists commodification? The challenge for the artist is how to reproduce the 
Other, to translate Otherness, in such a way as not to foreclose on such possibilities as 
difference, iteration, and resistance, forces of which Otherness is composed and that 
are constituent to irony. As we have already seen in The Body Artist, to be faithful to 
one’s art is to practice a mourning of Otherness through a practice that amounts to an 
impossibility – the reproduction of a work’s own relationship to its reproducibility, 
that is to say, the irony of the work of art. Indeed, for DeLillo, one can suggest that 
irony is, in fact, the work of art, and if it is this idea that is to be found (as I suggest it 
is) in the work of Underworld’s artist figures, it is because we find it in DeLillo’s own 
comments about representation, language and fiction. 
      The context for this discussion comes with DeLillo’s consideration of the writing 
of history.131 For DeLillo it is irony and Otherness, as forces that explain and help 
define the possibility of fiction, that are necessary to the “suspension of reality that 
history needs to escape its own brutal confinements” (62). As such, it is irony (“the 
swerve from the usual arrangements” (62)) and Otherness that qualify his 
philosophies of language and writing. Crucial to DeLillo’s “unnarrowing of the basic 
human tubing” (U, 538) is his recognition of Otherness as ‘origin’ to language: “[t]he 
writer wants to construct a language that will be the book’s life-giving force. He 
wants to submit to it. Let language shape the world. Let it break the faith of 
conventional recreation” (62). Language informs the writer, not the other way around, 
and this is the experience of language coming from the Other.132 But there is a 
paradox (or irony) here and it is one we should be familiar with as the dilemma of 
mourning: though it is by language that we may ‘record’ such an Otherness, this can 
                                                 
131 See “The Power of History”. Ibid. 
132 This is what DeLillo has said in the passage I have already mentioned from “in the Ruins of the 
Future”: “language is inseparable from the world that provokes it” (34). In saying this DeLillo is 
situating Otherness (or the “world”) as the a priori condition of subjectivity and language. 
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only occur at the point at which language (allegory) becomes, and is acknowledged 
as, mortified by this relationship to Otherness. The experience of this mortification is 
what we call irony or mourning. For DeLillo, I suggest, this mourning is to be seen as 
the demand of tenderness: the articulation of Otherness and the name, the transaction 
of irony and allegory at the root of imagining, and what I have referred to as irony 
itself. For DeLillo it is through this mournful articulation that “consciousness is 
extended and human truth is seen new” (63). As we will see in the work of the artists I 
discuss in this section, “human truth” – the irony at work in all allegory, in ‘truth’ 
itself – is what defines, for DeLillo, the work of art, and, moreover, the relation of 
such art to questions of faith and the ethical.  
     One of the things that signals for the reader that Klara is to be read as one of 
DeLillo’s artist-figures, in fact one of his ‘ironists’ or faithful mourners, is the fact 
that her work represents a treatment of death, a reworking of death to the purpose of 
exposing the viewer of her art to Otherness and difference.133 In effect, her work 
becomes an articulation of the impossibility of mourning, the very work of irony – as 
we shall see – performed or articulated within the language of technology, allegory, 
violence, and consumption it ostensibly critiques. Her work is tender for this reason, 
acknowledging that there is no outside of textuality, no outside place from which to 
critique the capitalist system or the allegorical economy of language. In a sense, she is 
working with the dead (with death) against technologies of death, and we have 
already seen in the last section something of the ethos that informs her work that, as I 
have pointed out, resembles the process of mourning. 
     Because Klara is someone who recycles junk and works with “castoffs” (70), her 
job is, in effect, one of waste management; her work is done through remembering, 
and in treating the material that she does she is working in memory (with memory, 
objects of the past, of history) and with the dead. In her use of the B-52s she is also 
literally working with the technology of death. As an act of memory, however, 
Klara’s work is not merely a repetition of the past, but a remembering differently – 
that is to say, Klara is performing an iteration. To this end she is an ironist; her work 
makes its subject the possibility of reproduction, and, as we’ve seen with Lauren in 
The Body Artist, what this means is situating reproducibility in the work of art. For 
Klara, however, this is done via the ironic method of the parergon, an effect I have 
                                                 
133 The relevance of death to Klara’s work is there to be seen in her own appearance; we note the rouge 
on her cheeks that makes her look “deathly” (67). 
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previously associated with the punctum of the Bruegel painting, where the viewer 
becomes aware that they are ‘looking at looking’.134 The method of irony referred to 
here as the punctum or parergon is, for DeLillo, I suggest, what qualifies art against 
commodity reproduction. The parergon is, then, another name for the impossibility of 
irony – the impossible work of art. That Klara’s work is about the work of art is 
something she appears to indicate when asked about her desert-piece:  
This is an art project, not a peace project. This is a landscape painting in which we use the 
landscape itself. The desert is central to this piece. It’s the surround. It’s the framing device. It’s 
the four-part horizon. (70) 
 
The desert is the subject of her work, not the bombers, and, as Klara says, it is 
“central to the piece”, even as it is also the “framing device”.135 Clearly, then, Klara’s 
artwork (ergon) is about what lies outside the work, or more accurately, the work’s 
own Otherness, what is par-ergon. In so far as the desert represents Otherness, waste, 
and death, the desert-artwork is “about” the roles of death and Otherness in 
representation or art.  
     The desert in the context of Klara’s composition functions as a parergonal space 
making the artwork incomplete, impure and supplemental, and as an evocation of 
absence and sheer capacity, a site of awe, terror and unknowability, the desert is also 
to be seen as metaphor for Otherness and memory. In being ‘about’ the desert 
(“central to the piece”), Klara’s artwork is precisely about the work of art, ‘about’ the 
Otherness art is always situated in. On the subject of the desert, Klara catalogues, 
sardonically, the received wisdom about its place in a culture’s imagination and how 
that culture, a technological culture, treats it.  
   ‘It’s so old and strong. I think it makes us feel, makes us as a culture, any technological 
culture, we feel we mustn’t be overwhelmed by it. Awe and terror, you know. Unconducive’ – 
and she waved a hand and laughed – ‘to industry and progress and so forth. So we use this place 
to test our weapons. It’s only logical of course. And it enables us to show our mastery. The 
desert bears the visible signs of all the detonations we set off. All the craters and warning signs 
and no-go areas and burial markers, the sites where debris is buried’. (70)  
 
                                                 
134 In a sense this parergonality shares with the notion of the punctum the opening onto an “abyss” in 
which all allegory (and representation), as Benjamin has it, “turns”, but in my scheme of things the 
play of ergon and parergon, subject and Other, inside and outside, is very much seen in the necessary 
relationship of allegory and irony, that in the artwork constitutes its mourning – the two forces 
instituting a demand to name and represent because of an ironic lack, while, in turn, instituting a further 
demand to name or iterate. 
135 The irony of the parergon can be thought of as the foregrounding and centrality of the frame in the 




The desert, in so far as it is the burial ground and test site for a culture’s systems and 
technologies, is also, therefore, the space (of memory and Otherness) that makes such 
allegorical constructs possible; in this Other-space signs are seen as “burial markers”, 
as carrying within them (as Derrida has shown) the mark of their death. A work that 
takes Otherness as its subject, as Klara’s does, will make this understanding part of its 
revelation. The place of the Other and the place of the sign are, in effect, one and the 
same, since the sign is always a deferral and delay of this Otherness. As we have 
already seen in this thesis, an art-work like Klara’s, in part, earns the title ‘work of 
art’, because of what it reveals about its production and its debt to the impossible 
Other.  In rhetorical terms, this work is articulated through an examination of the 
relationship of irony (Other) and allegory (sign), and when Klara says her work is “an 
art project, not a peace project” she is, in effect, indicating how central this 
relationship of sign and Other is to her work. But she is only able to examine this 
relationship because, in the first instance, she recognises in the desert an ironic space 
par excellence. Thus, in making the desert the “central” (parergonal) focus of her 
work she is able to empty the work of the encumbrances of content (that it is about 
“peace”, or war or landscape) and articulate more ‘economically’ her critique of the 
ways in which Otherness has been treated through the allegories of the dominant 
commodity-symbolic – indeed, the ways in which Otherness has been subjected to a 
semiotic structure (like language) whose greatest allegories are also its armaments and 
weaponry. In the manner specific to irony, Klara uses such weaponry (the B-52s) as 
the ‘language’ in which she performs her critique of the production of such weapons 
or allegories. 
     In this regard, Klara’s artwork resembles an investigation into something like the 
structure of language – the play of naming and repetition, absence and presence, 
towards a concept of mourning. We see, then, that the notion of “unrepeating” is 
important for her as work directed against incorporation, and specifically the 
incorporating technology of the system capable of reproducing the power of allegory 
as weaponry. 
‘See, we’re painting, hand-painting in some cases, putting our puny hands to great weapons 
systems, to systems that came out of the factories and assembly halls as near alike as possible, 
millions of components stamped out, repeated endlessly, and we’re trying to unrepeat, to find an 
element of felt life, and maybe there’s a sort of survival instinct here, a graffiti instinct – to 
trespass and declare ourselves, show who we are. The way the nose artists did, the guys who 
painted pinups on the fuselage’. (77)   
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The B-52s stand in for allegorical language, for a certain philosophy of language that 
has become inseparable from the technology of a culture. Moreover, the bombers 
stand in for the uniformity of the fifties, signifying a period of homogeneity and lack 
of difference. Against this Klara wants to reaffirm the signature, the mark of the self, 
idiosyncratic, and different, the mark of an-Other she refers to as the “graffiti 
instinct”. By hand-painting the aircraft, Klara’s crew are making the bombers 
different from one another, they are unrepeating the repetition of the aircraft’s 
production, ironizing uniformity, conformity, and repetition, and reasserting 
difference in reproduction. By using the bomber, Klara manages an irony – using the 
language of the system (the planes signify as lexical items of this system) to speak to, 
and within, the system. Within the historical fact of the system’s reproducibility (as 
evident in the fields of discarded bombers) Klara inserts difference as an aspect of 
reproduction itself – precisely what she sees as missing within the symbolic or 
language capable of producing such weaponry. Klara’s work thus resembles a version 
of “recycling” that is better described as irony. This notion of recycling is a test for art 
in the text, and a notion to contrast against other motifs and explanations of recycling 
within the connecting system. So, rather than turning junk into product or commodity, 
Klara uses waste to speak about this model of recycling, turning waste (in fact 
composed of the signs, figures of the old technological system – its language) into a 
new language capable of reflecting on itself and its conditions of possibility and 
signification. The Bombers, as commodities and as allegories, are reversed on 
themselves, becoming allegories again in the afterlife of allegory. This afterlife is no 
less than the possibility of the sign’s iteration, the possibility I have been associating 
with the death (and waste) of the sign, the ironic principle that animates allegory in 
the first place.136 The ability of an artist to demonstrate this “afterlife” of a sign, 
allegory, or commodity, its self-reflexivity (its irony), is what separates art and the 
ethical in Underworld from repetition, recycling, and the collection-addiction – is, in 
fact, what qualifies the better (more tender) forms of these. 
                                                 
136 What results from this sort of irony is a kind of melancholy art – a basis for ethical and ‘Otherwise’ 
consideration grounded in meditation on human finitude, consistent with Benjamin’s reading of the 
Trauerspiel, but consistent also with DeLillo’s concluding pages in the novel, especially as evinced 
through Nick Shay (after he and Marion have viewed Klara’s artwork) and his thoughts on the 
tenderness of his objects. No coincidence, then, that Benjamin’s thoughts on the “play of mourning” 
(Trauerspiel) should turn up in a novel of mourning, nor in one so clearly in tune with Derrida’s 
thoughts on memory, Otherness, language and mourning. These considerations shall be the subject of 
my concluding section. 
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     The effect of perceiving such work, as displayed through Klara’s representation of 
the artwork’s relationship to Otherness, loss, impossibility, is revelatory: after seeing 
the work Nick and Marian become aware of the tenderness of allegoricity as never 
before. In fact, they become irony-conscious: “Everything [they] saw was ominous 
and shining, tense with the beauty of things that are normally unseen, even the cars 
gone to canker and rust” (126). Such is the vision afforded the ironist, a vision of 
mourning where “canker” and “rust” are to be read as signs of death (the mortification 
of the sign), of the passing away of presence. The beauty of the unseen is therefore 
exactly the beauty of the lost (the excess, the dead), the beauty of memory (composed 
by such experience), and as such, this beauty qualifies as the strong possibility of 
irony. As we will see in my next section, the experience of seeing Klara’s artwork has 
a profound effect on Nick (and his relationship with Marian), and like the effect 
Unterwelt has on Klara, the experience of Otherness such artworks convey turns both 
Klara and Nick into spokespeople for DeLillo’s melancholic philosophy of mourning. 
Nick, we note, records this experience as being like “some endless sky waking inside 
me” (126). This phrase (recalling the concluding frames of the Eisenstein film) serves 
as one of the most economical expressions of the experience and condition of 
Otherness: as being like both the endlessness of sky that we are situated in, and this 
endlessness internalised “in us” at the same time. For Marian, also, a transformation is 
recorded when she says, “I can never look at a painting the same way again” (126), 
and in truth neither Nick nor Marian will see anything “the same way again”; they 
have been shown something unseen, through the mortification of the allegorical, 
something impossible – like irony. In the visual realm, the unseen or unseeable is 




Some readers of Underworld have seen the challenge or qualification of art, posed by 
DeLillo in his novel, as a proposition framed by the issue of repetition. Specifically, 
that art must, as a critic like Osteen137 asserts, be somehow unrepeatable, but I assert 
that repetition is, in fact, unavoidable, that art will come to be mastered, repeated as 
product or commodity and that what DeLillo is really asking is about a better 
                                                 
137 See Osteen’s American Magic and Dread: Don DeLillo’s Dialogue with Culture. 2000. 
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definition of repetition,138 a definition faithful to Derrida’s distinction between a “dull 
archiving” and an economy of iteration. By this latter understanding we will be 
talking about memory rather than mere repetition, and will have at the same time 
distinguished the ‘bad faith’ of capitalist recycling and repetition. With the inclusion 
in Underworld of films such as the Zapruder film, or the footage of the “Texas 
Highway Killer”, DeLillo is, in effect, asking the reader to make a comparison 
between these films and Eisenstein’s Unterwelt (so clearly validated as ‘art’ in the 
text), and more generally, with the other “artworks” of Underworld such as Klara’s 
‘B52s’, Ismael’s graffiti and billboard painting of Esmeralda, Rodia’s Watts Towers, 
and Bruegel’s The Triumph of Death. To make such a comparison is to the purpose of 
an investigation of this issue of repetition, and specifically because, at some level, the 
assassination of Kennedy – its footage – shares an unrepeatable realness with these 
other events, performances, or works we label art. What DeLillo seems to be 
suggesting is that a tender theory of art (of art’s articulation of Otherness) might well 
be made through a certain examination of the qualities of repetition as enshrined 
within the commodity-symbolic. Moreover, a test case for this might be made in the 
consideration of how ‘works of art’ in Underworld repeat Otherness differently from 
the way the Zapruder film does.  
     The Zapruder film will be lost to repetition (and, as we’ve seen, Underworld 
records the film’s translation into commodity), but this is not because of the film 
itself. As Klara notes, the film on its own terms has an unmasterable quality that bares 
the viewer to an Otherness later associated with the effect of viewing Unterwelt. The 
film becomes commodified because of the culture’s failure to mourn the Otherness 
represented in the film; the film is turned into an occasion for the misprision and 
mastery of Otherness through repetition. In this regard the film becomes an exemplary 
instance of the commodity. A theory of repetition that doesn’t define itself against its 
commodity form, and that assumes a definitive place in the proposition of what art 
might or might not be, will fail to distinguish the film of an assassination or murder 
from the film of an artist such as Eisenstein; it will – and this is precisely what Osteen 
misses and DeLillo critiques – make equivalent, and thus diminish, the difference 
between random violence and the imagining of Otherness I have associated with the 
                                                 
138 What I suggest DeLillo seeks is a definition of repetition that sees it as a mode of reproduction 
within the postmodernism of late capitalism that retains a relation to aura and Otherness without having 
to resort to a transcendental theory of art, but, rather, conceives of Otherness as a possibility within the 
same system or economy that produces the commodity. 
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ethical and with art. Without this distinction, irony becomes merely relativism, 
meaning that irony, in fact, ceases being ironic, or cannot be perceived as irony. What 
results, as we have seen, is the sort of absurd violence Nick experiences when he fails 
George Manza’s ‘test’. This is the risk of irony and precisely the reason why this issue 
of repetition is crucial to DeLillo’s investigation of irony and its links to memory, 
representation, language and Otherness. The issue of repetition and the tendency for 
iteration to be turned to commodity production is, for the question of irony, within the 
period of late capitalism, the most pressing issue. As such, I argue, and this is also 
what I suggest DeLillo intuits, it is also the issue for art in the so-called postmodern. 
How can art, in late capitalism (and this is the question Osteen does importantly pose 
in his reading of DeLillo’s texts), avoid becoming commodified? The answer, as I 
will come to suggest, lies not so much with an avoidance, but with a Benjaminian re-
evaluation of commodity, as better or worse, tender or less tender (which is to say, 
ironised) instances of allegory.  
     For DeLillo, it seems, the assassination of Kennedy is to the experience of 
everyday American reality what the lurch into the poststructural is to the experience 
of language and, consequently, the “self”. Arguably, Underworld historicises this 
“lurch” as the ironic force of undoing which the dominant culture seeks to ‘manage’ 
through its technologies of allegory. Although, as I argue, DeLillo appears to 
celebrate the poststructural for its lessons about human tenderness, such a view relies 
on a return to that irruptive moment on Elm Street, in particular, to the work of 
distinguishing between Otherness and commodity that, by virtue of the very 
reproducibility of this moment (the Zapruder film) we must perform.  No surprise, 
then, to find one of DeLillo’s principal artist figures (Klara) considering the Zapruder 
film: 
But the movie in fact was powerfully open, it was glary and artless and completely steeped in 
being what it was, in being film. It carried a kind of inner life, something unconnected to the 
things we call phenomena. The footage seemed to advance some argument about the nature of 
film itself. The progress of the car down Elm Street, the movement of the film through the 
camera body, some sharable darkness – this was a death that seemed to rise from the streamy 
debris of the deep mind, it came from some night of the mind, there was some trick of film 
emulsion that showed the ghost of consciousness. Or so she thought to wonder. She thought to 
wonder if this home movie was some crude living likeness of the mind’s own technology, the 
sort of death plot that runs in the mind, because it seemed so familiar, the footage did – it 
seemed a thing we might see, not see but know, a model of the nights when we are intimate with 
our own dying. (495) 
 
The Zapruder film, while not intended as a work of art, becomes important to the 
novel for what it nevertheless communicates to Klara about the work of art, and this is 
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because, in a sense, the film captures the central experience of Otherness America 
mourns throughout the second half of the Twentieth Century. Ostensibly, this 
‘mourning’ is the subject matter of Underworld, and though precipitated, for example, 
by the 1951 Soviet nuclear test, the events of that November day in 1963 represent 
perhaps the most singular and condensed expression and experience of Otherness, 
changing indelibly the culture’s conception of reality and irony; it is a poststructural 
moment before poststructuralism, and this is what is articulated, as we have seen, by a 
character like Clyde Tolsen in Underworld.  
     Moreover, the Zapruder film demonstrates something about the workings of the 
artist’s mind and the relation of unconscious and Other forces to issues of 
consciousness and representation. Through Klara’s eyes, the Zapruder film exhibits an 
irony – a self-awareness (an “argument about film itself”) as well as an ironic absence 
– a hole or punctum or parergonal quality (like that “trick of film emulsion” an effect 
of mortification, showing the “ghost of consciousness”), as we have seen, that Klara 
later turns into the ‘subject matter’ of her own artwork. Klara produces a tender 
reading of the film, a tender repetition we might say, notably, contrary to the 
repetitions observed by many of those other party-goers she watches the film with. 
Essentially, with her viewing of the film, Klara demonstrates a sort of reversal of its 
commodity status (even as, in another sense, with its looping repetition she is witness 
to its diminishing aura): she ‘unrepeats’ the film by attempting to see it as a thing-in-
itself (as allegorical) and, in so doing, discovers its “inner-life” (what we might think 
of as the source of its “after-life”) notably “unconnected” to the phenomenal. 
DeLillo’s use of that word (“unconnected”) in a novel that so often repeats its 
opposite (“everything connects”) is conspicuous, and with this word he is, in effect, 
locating in the Zapruder film what Klara’s desert artwork, along with Eisenstein’s 
Unterwelt, demonstrates, a kind of irony (I’ve described above as a punctum) that 
addresses an Otherness that we can “not see but know” (495). This unseen 
‘something’ is what the fool in Bruegel’s painting is also looking at, an absence 
gestured to by the film, a hole in its representing that is a part of its representing, that 
at the same time draws attention to both a sense of itself (as film, a self awareness), as 
well as an Otherness (that looks at the film and looks at the film’s looking) from 
beyond its frames. 
     As Klara sees it, this is a film that advances an argument ‘about’ film, but also, I 
suggest, an argument about irony and art; and all the more so since it appears to 
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allegorise the workings of the artist-mind and that mind’s necessary relationship to 
possibility itself, death. The film139 displays the “mind’s own technology” – that is to 
say (remembering how technology is associated throughout Underworld with 
allegory), the working of allegory – itself keyed to “the nights where we are intimate 
with our own dying”. Death and the unconscious, both passwords for Otherness in 
this case, have dominion here; note DeLillo’s inversion where it is “consciousness”, 
not the unconscious, that is “ghosted”. So the film, to Klara’s eyes, is about the role of 
death in imagining and representation. The film reminds Klara how representation, 
and allegory, for example, rely on, or are necessarily related to, death, finitude, and 
limitation; this is the insight I attributed to Bruegel’s great work, but is also the basis 
for DeLillo’s politics of art, as I shall explain in my next section. The film illustrates, 
in a sense, how history can become a commodity, but also how this process elides the 
“unconnected” essence (irony, Otherness) at the core of the film (and history). That 
“everything connects” needs to be seen, after Klara’s reading of the film, as 
epiphenomenon of the possibility of “unconnection”, and allegory, as possibility of 




Unterwelt presents DeLillo’s reader with one of the novel’s chief examples of 
impossible or ironic mourning as art. In a sense, we ‘read’ Unterwelt, not only as an 
advancement on DeLillo’s association of irony and Otherness treated through 
representation, but also as yet another artwork by which to glean the philosophy of 
DeLillo’s own ethics of art and writing. Unterwelt speaks to the condition of being-in-
Otherness, and its valorisation in the novel is the result of what I see as DeLillo’s 
endorsement of Eisenstein as ironist, and Unterwelt as a dramatization of the 
possibilities of irony.140 A sense of the ironies to follow in the film begins with the 
                                                 
139 We note a sort of anthropomorphism at work here, too, where the camera body becomes the human 
body, the head perhaps; the film itself becomes the “streamy debris” of the unconscious occasionally 
“ghosted” by consciousness – the mind. 
140 In a sense Unterwelt can be usefully compared with Robert Frank’s Cocksucker Blues. Ostensibly a 
record of the ‘ironic’ and ‘rebellious’ members of the Rolling Stones attempts to defy anything that 
might be considered normative, conservative, or consumerist behaviour, the Frank film is, in fact, a 
record of the band’s capitulation to behaviour entirely consistent with the world of commodity and 
consumption. If Cocksucker Blues records the way the band and its ideas of resistance become 
consumed by allegory, then Unterwelt moves in the opposite direction, beginning from a “state” of 
allegorical control and repression and moving to scenes of exposure and transgression of such control, 
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choice of the film’s venue: Radio City Music Hall, a testament to the Art Deco 
dreams of technology and control with its “burnished steel and chrome […and] 
machine-age completion” (423), is also home to an underworld of kitsch seen in the 
mural in the lobby depicting “[a]mber mists, a cloaked old man with a staff, a cluster 
of flamingos standing in the alpenglow” (423).  Such a display of excess sets the tone 
for the screening of a film whose themes of transgression, dissembling, inversion and 
contradiction are enlisted in its investigation of Otherness, of “people living in the 
shadows” (424).141 Thus, Klara notes: “[t]here was an ambivalence that vitalized the 
crowd […] [y]ou were here to enjoy the contradictions. Think of the relationship 
between the film and the theatre in which it was showing – the work of a renowned 
master of world cinema screened in the camp environment of the Rockettes and the 
mighty Wurlitzer” (425). The film, a “subversive venture” (426) and “cross-dressing 
event” (428), is thus preceded by a floor show of “farcical bravado”: the Rockettes 
appear, though they may in fact be “female impersonators”, bearing “slave collars and 
doing routines with such pulsing sexual rhythm” (428). When a live video shot of the 
dancers taken from a camera in the flies is projected on a back screen, the audience is 
shown how “a crowd is reconfigured, teased into methodical geometry, into slipknots 
and serpentines” (428), and this anticipates what the film articulates about State 
control and repression through allegorical configurations – allegories Unterwelt 
attempts to transgress and complicate. 
     The film itself depicts the work of a “mad scientist” who conducts experiments in 
an underground cave system on a group of prisoners. The scientist’s experiments, 
designed, it seems, to transform or mutate his patients, have produced deformities and 
mutilations. The allegory here (transfiguration) is, of course, one about allegory itself 
– turning something into something else – and can be read as a commentary on the 
State’s philosophy of correcting dissidence, deviance, and difference.142 In their 
monstrosity, these figures represent not so much Otherness as the mutilating force of 
allegory gone awry – the result of the State’s attempt to allegorise Otherness out of 
public consciousness. Later in the film the prisoners manage to escape their cave-
prison and emerge into a landscape “shocked by light, pervasive and overexposed [...] 
                                                                                                                                            
suggesting a sort of revelation of Otherness through the irony of Eisenstein’s technique. Both films are 
about irony, we might say, but each film pursues opposite trajectories. 
141 State repression of artistic expression and homosexuality are, of course, the films major themes, 
though these are the specificities of what is more generally a film about Otherness.  
142 In effect, this is something like the notion of correction that appeals to the young Nick as the virtue 
of a “correctional institution”. 
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fires in the distance, the horizon line in smoke and ash” (442) (Bruegel, again), and 
with this, Eisenstein more fully begins his complication of the film’s treatment of this 
“movie terror” Otherness.143 This seems apparent in what amounts to a debunking of 
the Platonic allegory of reality since the deformities of the prisoners, until this point 
confined to the cave, match the devastated reality of the landscape; what has been 
repressed in an underworld is in fact a truth of the overworld. The point is that 
Otherness persists beyond the dictates of the sort of definitive and carceral allegory 
the scientist and State apply to the prisoners. Despite the deformities that ostensibly 
signify the prisoners as Other, Eisenstein, as Klara notes, imagines these “creatures” 
as “fully human” (430). Indeed, in a brief moment of tenderness that disrupts the sort 
of allegorical containment of Otherness the film represents, the division of scientist 
and Other is collapsed when the scientist touches one of the prisoners “tenderly on the 
cheek” (432). The moment is fascinating to Klara, as it so clearly ironises the 
allegorical stratification of ‘us’ and ‘them’, underworld and overworld. But also 
because the scientist’s gesture, as Klara considers it, represents a “shrouded” 
reference to Eisenstein’s homosexuality, his own Otherness or difference that is 
encoded, or exists, underneath his use of allegory. The effect of Eisenstein’s film is to 
suggest that Otherness is the environment or landscape in which we live, and that the 
Others Eisenstein depicts in this film live in excess of allegory: 
   These deformed faces, these were people who existed outside nationality and strict historical 
context. Eisenstein’s method of immediate characterization, called typage, seemed self-parodied 
and shattered here, intentionally. Because the external features of the men and women did not 
tell you anything about class or social mission. They were people persecuted and altered, this 
was their typology – they were an inconvenient secret of the society around them. (443) 
In effect, Eisenstein eschews his own allegorical method, “typage”, in a film that sets 
out to present the audience not with more allegories, but with irony – the film is a 
presentation designed to constantly undermine its representing force of resistance, 
difference, distance and Otherness. As Klara notes, “the camera angle is a kind of 
dialectic. Arguments are raised and made, theories drift across the screen and instantly 
shatter – there’s a lot of opposition and conflict” (429). The “shattering” of allegory 
(theories) explains Eisenstein’s problematization of narrative and content in the film: 
there is “no plot” (430), but rather a dialectic of seeing and being seen. The 
                                                 
143 The phrase comes from Brian Glassic’s assessment of the Otherness of the waste mountain, but ties 
in with Klara’s connection of Eisenstein’s film with the “radiation monsters of Japanese science-fiction 
movies” (430) and the American monster movies of the 1950s that came to allegorise, make 
metaphorical, and rehearse for the culture, a mastery of Otherness.   
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claustrophobia that results from the film’s embedding of the “viewpoint of the 
prisoners” implicates the audience as Others themselves.144 Such is the film’s ironic 
presentation that Klara wonders “[h]ow and when it would reveal itself”, but of course 
the film (a silent film) is designed to leave its viewer in the very space of the unsaid, 
the unexplained of irony – this is its theme, its mode of addressing Otherness. 
     After the film Klara emerges (like one of the prisoners) into the real ‘daylight’ 
world of the city with a feeling of her Otherness – estranged from her own norms of 
seeing, her own schedule and catalogue of allegories of the world.145 The film is 
“printed on her mind” and she wears it “instead of a skirt and blouse” (445). Klara 
experiences a detachment and distance from the world and those around her, not being 
in the present with her friends, and unable to join in the conversation her friends are 
having, but realizing that what the film was about, Otherness (Otherness beyond the 
pronouns of “us” and “them” (444)), was now, like the movie, “all around her” (445). 
This sensation is the triumph of Eisenstein’s art – an ironization of the everyday, of 
“being”, and of the forms, systems and technologies that mediate the real and the 
Other. Klara feels the sensation of a new way of seeing and thinking – all of the 
givens of allegorical consciousness have been ironized. 
   All Eisenstein wants you to see, in the end, are the contradictions of being. You look at the 
faces on the screen and you see the mutilated yearning, the inner divisions of people and 
systems, and how forces will clash and fasten, compelling the swerve from evenness that marks 
a thing lastingly. (444) 
 
The “contradictions” here are perhaps those that reveal how one is a you, an other and 
an I as well as collectively an us and a them. Eisenstein’s point is thus to show how 
this is contradicted by a certain sense of ontology and its allegorical expression. 
“Mutilated yearning” is another expression of the “longing” that DeLillo records 
throughout Underworld, and that he associates with the making of history (11). What 
this reference suggests is that all history – as with all allegory – is a form of 
                                                 
144 The effect of the film, resulting from the claustrophobia generated by the director’s control of the 
point of view, gives Klara’s friend Jack reason to comment: “I bet you’d give a hundred dollars to 
stand in the rain right now and smoke a cigarette” which DeLillo rhymes with the film’s “figures 
moving upwards through gouged tunnels into a dark rainy night” (441). The film is shown to 
demonstrate to the audience their own membership as the transfigured and allegorised masses 
(something the camera shot of the dancers also demonstrates) as Others themselves.  
145 Klara records this sense of Otherness as like that “curious loss you used to feel as a child when you 
walked out of a movie house into the middle of the day and the streets were all agitation and nasty 
glare, every surface intense and jarring, people in loud clothing that did not fit” (445). 
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mutilation, misprision, and transfiguration.146 Indeed, we might say that such 
“mutilated yearning” describes the ‘truth’ of our attempts to represent ourselves and 
others; yearning is mutilated because it is mediated by language, by delay and 
deferral, but rather than repressing this knowledge, Eisenstein’s film achieves its 
effect – that “swerve from evenness” – because of it. For this reason, the film ends 
with the image of a prisoner’s face shedding its deformities, and undergoing a further 
“transfiguration”, appearing to heal, grow younger, paler, and finally, dissolve into the 
landscape. This second transfiguration stands for the iteration of allegory, its turning, 
once again, into something else, suggesting the afterlife of allegories when conceived 
of in their relation to irony, as tender for Otherness. With this final scene the film’s 
point of view (previously “embedded” in the ‘looking’ of the prisoners) is reversed 
with the close-up of the dissolving face, and as such the ‘Other’s’ face gazes back 
down the camera to the audience, leaving them with the vision of a landscape (what 
Nick describes as the “endless sky waking inside me”) – the world as Other that looks 
back. 
     This “looking back”, that amounts to the tender appraisal of our representational 
assumptions (our ‘looking at looking’) is now familiar to us as the punctum or irony 
DeLillo associates with his works of art, and again it is what we find in perhaps the 
most hidden artwork of the text – Munoz’s “Esmeralda”. People gather around an 
empty billboard when it is discovered that, when lit from behind by a passing train, 
the face of the dead Esmeralda appears and then vanishes again with the train’s 
passing. The ‘apparition’ of Esmeralda is, I suggest, one more act of graffiti by Ismael 
painted on the undersheet of a billboard, designed to be as impermanent as the rest of 
his work – “the art that can’t stand still” (441). Indeed, Ismael’s previous work with 
trains, and his penchant for using the tools of the system to serve as medium and 
canvas, would appear to support this suggestion. As Ismael recognises: the trains 
enable his work to be “everywhere in the system, and you get inside people’s heads 
and vandalize their eyeballs” (435). Moreover, Ismael has a kind of ownership of the 
trains, and we come to expect that the train that illuminates the billboard “was one of 
his” (433). The billboard presents as yet another punctum moment for the reader of 
Underworld. For DeLillo, it seems a self-conscious strategy designed once again to 
                                                 
146 In effect, the ‘dialectic’ of Eisenstein’s montage, and his control of perspective, resembles a critique 
of the dialectic of history as evinced by a teleology that elides Otherness and creates an underclass in 
the process.  
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highlight the subordinate nature of content or presence to irony. In doing this, the 
billboard, despite how one might read it, or what one might take it to mean, serves as 
a reminder of the work of art: it is intended147 to operate as, or represent, a sort of 
irony at work in the text’s mourning. Superficially, this is apparent in the fact that 
people gather around the blank billboard to see the apparition of Esmeralda’s face and 
mourn her through the appearance of an allegorical representation. But less 
superficially, the sign is intended by Ismael as a site for the mourning of meaning or 
representation – what I have called the work of art depicted here as the absence or 
lack (the apparitional nature of the image of Esmeralda), that, as an irony, dramatises 
the process of allegory-making, of interpretation, as well as the afterlife of art. The 
billboard thus exists somewhere between faith (“unstoppered belief” (821)) and 
commodity (advertising) – indeed, the poles explored by Underworld more generally, 
and between which DeLillo explores the possibility of art. 
     The billboard is Ismael’s Unterwelt, an act of irony ‘about’ irony, a representation 
without representation: the billboard is intended as a sign of a sign, it is about what in 
Sister Edgar’s words is referred to as “words [signs] playing upon themselves”. What 
qualifies Ismael’s “Esmeralda” as an artwork doubles as DeLillo’s definition of art: 
art as irony, resistance, Otherness (artworks ‘about’ the work of art), work that not 
only “vandalize[s our] eyeballs” (435), making us see the previously unseen, but in 
reflecting on the “mutilations” of our allegories, makes us view language and 
subjectivity as tender, as a process of tendering. Which is to say that the billboard 
serves for DeLillo as a metonym for the novel. Ismael’s “Esmeralda”, ephemeral and 
impermanent, is designed as a critique of the consumer culture that by falsely 
mourning Esmeralda’s death gives death to her once again. As a figure of Otherness – 
never apprehended until her death – Esmeralda loses both her life and Otherness at the 
point where she is incorporated into the allegorical-symbolic. Her death is inseparable 
from the connection-making of the Internet (see U, 817-818), and the news of her 
murder on television; her death, as Ismael perhaps sees it, coincides with her 
becoming a sign or commodity, and as such, this informs his use of the billboard (a 
sign for commodities) as his canvas. Through this act of ironic-representation, Ismael 
gives Esmeralda an “afterlife” by demonstrating a faithfulness to allegory and the 
                                                 
147 As all writers are aware, a blank space such as this billboard, occurring in a novel, much less a novel 
about representation, is never merely a naturalistic or mimetic detail, and, in this case, it is to be seen as 
a signifier of signifying, a writer’s irony. 
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sign, showing how it is always a sign of something missed or lost and thus tender. 
With the arrival of vendors (commodity) and TV trucks (mediation and connection) at 

































Part Five: Tenderness and the Impossibility of Irony. 
 
(i) Undiminishable Loss 
 
If, through Klara’s narrative, Underworld can be seen to observe the form of the 
kunstleroman, with Nick’s narrative, the text can be seen to develop in the manner of 
the bildung; its crowning moment is seen in the conjoining of Nick’s ‘education’ (or 
maturation) with the text’s final elaborations on irony. Indeed, it is my suggestion that 
DeLillo’s inquiry into irony, Otherness, and what I have referred to as mourning, 
reaches a state of denouement when Nick, at the end of the text, comes to terms with 
the undiminishable nature of loss and Otherness. Such an understanding, for Nick, 
signals a philosophical turn, away from the astonishing technologies of connection 
and translation (the reification of allegory in the commodity symbolic), to a phrōnesis 
premised on the quintessential knowledge of irony: its impossibility articulated by the 
simultaneous and reciprocal demands, within irony, of its ironic and allegorical 
imperatives. For Nick it is by his meditations on certain objects (as well as on the 
object condition of language) that his melancholy and mournful philosophy is won. 
For DeLillo, what such a philosophy – built on the sense of tender, human finitude – 
represents is nothing less than the posing of faith and ethics as questions (as the work) 
to qualify, define, and make distinct, the tender or less tender reproductions and 
representations we make in “address[ing] the world” (538).  
      As we shall see, a ‘theory’ of irony as impossible, of Otherness (and loss) as 
undiminishable, is what, for DeLillo, rescues allegory from its commodity version. In 
the manner of Benjamin, allegories are to be seen, as Nick does at the end of the 
novel, as “ruins”, tender and mortified traces of irony and Otherness. For Nick, as for 
all those characters in Underworld whose lives (their desires, needs, and losses) have 
been translated into the commodity-symbolic, and for whom the language of 
connection, consumption, and recycling has become a flawless language of presence 
and completion, the idea that loss, Otherness or excess cannot be fully translated or 
allegorised represents a radical rejection of the prevailing symbolic system.148 Such 
                                                 
148 Such a rejection and relinquishing of the dominant mode of allegorical control I have been 
documenting is prefaced in the text by Nick’s confession of his private history to his wife Marian: 
 
I tell her about the time I spent in correction and why they put me there and she seems to know 
it, at some level, already. She looks at me as if I were seventeen. She sees me at seventeen. We 
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an awareness comes to Nick when he once again considers the disappearance of his 
father. 
   The earth opened up and he stepped inside. […] I think he wanted to go under. He lived day-
to-day and step-to-step and did not wonder what would become of us or how she would manage 
or how tall we grew or how smart we became. I don’t think he spent a minute thinking these 
things. I think he just went under. The failure it brought down on us does not diminish. (808) 
 
Absent here are the allegories or narratives of violence (a “mob hit”) and coercion that 
have, up to this point, “carried” Nick’s mourning of his father; what remains is a 
candid statement about a person (the father) who had little regard for the Other – his 
‘beloved’ others. And though one might suggest that it is the father’s failure of 
tenderness and imagination that leads to this “loss”, the ‘fact’ of the undiminishable 
nature of “failure” (loss and Otherness) is crucial to the conception of tenderness and 
irony that marks Nick’s maturation and, through the text, DeLillo’s philosophy of 
language, art, and writing.  
     The undiminishable nature of loss correlates, then, as a certain understanding of 
Otherness and suggests the impossibility of irony, that is, the impossibility of irony 
ever finding semiotic settlement sufficient to its resistance to settlement. This 
resistance is what we can think of as irony’s faithfulness to Otherness. And yet there 
is no irony without the trace of a settlement, without allegory. This mourning quality 
is for Nick, a sort of definition of the experience of being-in-language. As he says, 
“[m]ost of our longings go unfulfilled. This is the word’s wistful implication – a 
desire for something lost or fled or otherwise out of reach” (803). This is perhaps 
DeLillo’s clearest formulation yet of irony’s role in the economy of language, in the 
word, and the connection of irony to experiences of subjectivity and mourning as 
evinced throughout Underworld. At once, then, this is a description of irony as our 
experience of the word that, at the same time, also suggests that the impossible nature 
of irony is a consequence of its nature as “longing” or mourning. Indeed, the point is 
                                                                                                                                            
take long walks along the drainage canal. All the hints and intimations, all the things she spied 
in me at the beginning of our time together – come to some completion now. If not for me, then 
for her. Because I don’t know what happened, do I? (807) 
 
Here Nick allows the material of his “secret” self to “seep” out, beyond the containment and control 
characterised by his “life” metaphors of correction, waste management, and allegory.  He allows 
himself to be allegorised by another – that sense of his being brought to some state of “completion” for 
another – knowing that because he cannot “know what happened” neither can she. In a sense, Nick is 
consenting to the tenderness of allegory, to the construction of a tender allegorical version of himself. 
This is the most significant confession Nick makes in Underworld. The final rhetorical question serves 
to make tender (ironize) all the allegories, names, memorizations that, up to this point, he has used to 
try to contain, and correct irony (and Otherness) with.  
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that something like the condition of mourning is also a condition we can think of as 
true to the word, and this is the suggestion made by DeLillo with his ambiguation of 
the sentence-subject in the above quote. Is it the “word” or the word “longing” Nick is 
referring to here? The resulting effect of this punning play (something DeLillo does 
often) is the splicing together of the (experience of) word with the experience of 
“longing” – irony, as mourning, is thus the truth of being-in-the-world, and the 
premise of DeLillo’s philosophy of language. As DeLillo appears to suggest, if, by the 
word (allegory), we are able to glimpse also the longing of the word (irony) – the 
richness entailed in its undiminishable incompletion – then we have glimpsed the 
tenderness of allegory. In the simplest sense, perhaps, this is the contract DeLillo 
tenders with language whenever he writes; through the ironies of his allegories, that 
which DeLillo most esteems in his texts – memory, Otherness – is articulated, though 
only through the most tender, and tenderly renovated language. With this tenderness 
comes the sense of finitude and limit, the “fallen wonder” of subjectivity. As I will 
show, Nick learns to recognise the melancholy condition of the fallen subject in the 
object – the few rare objects of his possession that for him come to represent the 
process of tender recollection at work in allegory, an experience of tenderness that is, 
as allegory for our being ‘allegorical beings’, allegorical of our being-subject to 
memory and Otherness. Such objects, as I shall to come to insist, represent the true 
nature of allegory by revealing the absence or loss posited at their core in the same 
way Derrida has shown us death, absence, or loss, comported in the sign. Though its 
purpose is to flesh out my theory of melancholy tenderness availed by irony as a 
mode of mourning, this section also aims to address the notion of connection and the 
meaning of that ambiguous word, “peace” the novel finishes with, upon which many 
readers and commentators have mistakenly, I suggest, conferred the redemptive 
qualities of the novel. 
 
(ii) Everything Connects 
 
As a statement about the irony at work in language, and as an aphorism relating 
DeLillo’s own philosophy of language and representation, Nick’s phrase about the 
“word” brings to the fore, once again, the conflict central to Underworld and my 
reading of it: the conflict between Otherness and the massive forces of incorporation 
(the technologies of commodity) that serve to control and name such Otherness. This 
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conflict, as I have seen it, sets out the concerns at work in mourning.  For the 
distinction I have made between irony and tender-less allegory in the realm of 
rhetoric, DeLillo offers us the distinction between the word’s longing – its ironic 
structure – and the functioning of the commodity-symbolic (allegory reified as 
commodity). Nowhere in the text is DeLillo so clear about this function of this 
symbolic economy as at the beginning of the novel’s final section, Das Kapital:  
Capital burns off the nuance in a culture. Foreign investment, global markets, corporate 
acquisitions, the flow of information through transnational media, the attenuating influence of 
money that’s electronic and sex that’s cyberspaced, untouched money and computer-safe sex, 
the convergence of consumer desire – not that people want the same things, necessarily, but that 
they want the same range of choices. […] 
   Some things fade and wane, states disintegrate, assembly lines shorten their runs and interact 
with lines in other countries. This is what desire seems to demand. A method of production that 
will custom-cater to cultural and personal needs, not to cold war ideologies of massive 
uniformity. And the system pretends to go along, to become more supple and resourceful, less 
dependent on rigid categories. But even as desire tends to specialize, going silky and intimate, 
the force of converging markets produces an instantaneous capital that shoots across horizons at 
the speed of light, making for a certain furtive sameness, a planning away of particulars that 
affects everything from architecture to leisure time to the way people eat and sleep and dream. 
(785) 
 
What should be apparent, by this account, is how the circuit of commodity production 
operates as a symbolic system, as a language. Indeed, the commodity-symbolic, 
through its mimicry of language, appears to usurp the economy of language: 
subordinating the sign to the commodity, reducing deferral and difference to the 
“same range of choices”, translating combination as the “interaction” of product 
“lines in other countries”, while the principles of deletion and substitution are 
confined to the “fad[ing]” and “wan[ing]” of certain products. As I have been 
suggesting throughout this chapter, the system even simulates irony or Otherness, in 
the first instance, through the way it “pretends” to reject “massive uniformity” and 
“rigid categories” by becoming “supple”, “going silky and intimate”, but in another, 
deeper way, through its sheer force of connection. With the connection of the 
system’s structure and function to the “personal needs” of the individual, the subject 
(local and specific) is connected to the global (as Matt has suggested with his 
intimations on paranoia); the result is the astonishment of a created sublime, 
unimaginable to the individual, that simulates Otherness, in a sense (as DeLillo has 
said) replacing God. The effect of such a connecting system, capable of generating its 
own sublime referent, is that there is no longer the possibility of loss, Otherness, or 
death within the system – only the “death of death”. For this reason, we find Sister 
Edgar, after her death, trapped in cyberspace purgatory (825).   
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     With what is described as the burning off of “nuance”, not only difference is lost, 
but Otherness and unknowing are also diminished. DeLillo suggests this with his 
word choice: “nuance” derives from the Latin “nubes”, or cloud, which, in turn, 
recalls The Cloud of Unknowing, that lesson about irony, Otherness and God. Of 
course, the other cloud “nuance” is designed to remember is the mushroom cloud, and 
in this regard we are meant to contrast the references with one another. What such a 
connection suggests is that it is a mistake to read these references as connecting 
unproblematically, or without irony and, indeed, in a passage (785) that so heavily 
foregrounds connection, it is connection-making itself that is ironized by this 
submerged reference (“nuance”) to Otherness. Beneath the surface of interacting lines 
and instantaneous, unseen reticulations, exists an underworld of irony and Otherness 
by which we are given cause to consider such connections for what they mourn or 
miss, and to consider the ethics and faith of their configuration. Without such 
tendering of connections we are left with the sort of worldview Matt articulates when 
he concludes that “everything connects in the end, or seems to, or seems to only 
because it does” (465).149 Such is the state of utility and connectivity that connection, 
as an effect of the system, appears to subordinate the imagining of things to the 
condition of the connections among things. All the possible tenderness evoked by a 
word such as “seems” – with its suggestion of imprecision, and ambiguity, the 
uncertainty that invites imagining – is dismissed and replaced with the concrete 
“because it does”. The place of irony in what one might have seen as the “seem[ing]” 
world thus becomes untenable – as does belief when, in Matt’s words, one can no 
longer “tell the difference between syringes and missiles if you’ve become so pliant, 
ready to half believe everything and to fix conviction in nothing” (466). 
     In a sense, the portrayal of the connecting system of capitalism, as previously 
quoted, is to be read also as a description of the Internet. The “instantaneous capital 
that shoots across horizons at the speed of light” is meant to recall not only the 
temporality of Bruegel’s dead – that force of allegory that falls upon the living – but 
also the flash of nuclear detonation; from this constellation of references (allegory, 
technology, and the “speed of light”) we are meant to see the Internet as the 
combining, culminating form of capitalism. The Internet can be seen as the 
manifestation of the culture’s dominant mode of mourning, premised on the sublime 
                                                 
149 We note here, also, a certain consistency in DeLillo’s attention to this word “seems” as it occurs in 
The Body Artist, and that suggests the continuity of DeLillo’s engagement with allegoricity. 
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of the connection-fetish seen as the work of capitalism. Not surprisingly, DeLillo’s 
critique of connection (tender-less allegory, commodity capitalism and its sanctioned 
acts of blindness and violence) finds its most focused expression in his treatment of 
the Internet, particularly where the rape and murder of Esmeralda is spliced together 
in the text with the keystrokes and search commands of an Internet user. In a sense, 
Esmeralda’s rape is a possibility explained by the logic of the Internet. Sister Edgar, 
floating in her cyberspace purgatory, feels something of the force of this logic: 
There is no space or time out here, or in here, or wherever she is. There are only connections. 
Everything is connected. […] [S]he feels the grip of systems. This is why she’s so uneasy. […] 
She senses the paranoia of the web, the net. (825)  
 
The possibilities of making meaning, of connecting – without space or time, without 
difference or Otherness – thus correlate to the meaningless sexual connection of the 
rape. In the way the text combines the Internet search-prompt with the description of 
the rape there is the sense that the rape is made available to anyone with an Internet 
connection, and if this implies that everyone is, in some way, complicit with the 
murder, it also suggests that no one is responsible for it; this is, after all, the appeal of 
the Internet, of being “unseen” (808) and “everywhere at once” (808), and the logic of 
the “lurker” (808) (a non-posting internet user) who, like the “sidler type” (817) the 
murderer is described as, “doesn’t like to be looked at” (817). In so far as the rape is a 
possibility of the net (a violent connection between two people – reduced to signs – 
brought arbitrarily together), then it is a possibility that needs to be placed in the 
context of the other connections endorsed in the commodity-symbolic that may well 
also elide a glaring lack of connection. 
     Elision itself, however, much less the subjects or objects elided, becomes invisible 
in a system such as that described as the “fusion bomb” (826) of capitalism’s 
symbolic economy. Within such an economy, 
   Everything is connected in the end. 
    Sister and Brother. A Fantasy in cyberspace and a way of seeing the other side and a settling 
of differences that have less to do with gender than with difference itself, all argument, all 
conflict programmed out. 
   Is cyberspace a thing within the world or is it the other way around? Which contains the other, 
and how can you tell for sure? (826) 
 
Thus, irony and Otherness (here “difference”) are “programmed out”; the whole 
system proceeds on the controlling of difference and irony through fusion and 
connection. Where there is no perceived difference or resistance between “input” and 
“output”, and thus, between “Sister and Brother”, what results is a kind of “fantasy” 
 154
of illicit and incestuous connection. Within this boundary-less state there is, 
seemingly, no possibility for an underworld, an Other-world, indeed, no way of telling 
the difference between world and its allegorical simulation, cyberspace. For DeLillo 
the way to reassert difference in the economy is by stepping back from the miraculous 
and seamless allegory evidenced by the Internet, and re-asserting a theory of allegory. 
If “everything connects”, then allegory is no longer possible, since there is no longer 
the possibility of ascertaining the difference that marks one thing as a representation 
of another (this is the problem posed by the question in the quotation). Cyberspace, as 
allegorical technology replaces the world, asserts this border-less state, because by 
diminishing and controlling irony, it renders allegory untenable. 
     Thus, to answer to the culture’s diminishment and false mourning of Otherness is 
to return to the evaluation of language and allegory, the structure and trope the 
commodity-symbolic has simulated and misrecognised. DeLillo’s gaze thus returns 
from his larger systemic questions to the question of a single word, a single instance 
of language and allegory: “Peace”. In returning to the consideration of the word, he is 
able to propose again the truth of all allegory, sign and commodity – that they are 
mortified objects, composed by irony as traces for an Otherness they can only mourn 
through the nature of their finitude, contingency and fallen tenderness. DeLillo’s 
critique of the false mourning of the commodity-symbolic thus, in the concluding 
pages of Underworld, moves from all the connections that cyberspace can link to this 
“single seraphic word” (“peace”), to the consideration of the world “offscreen” – the 
“binding touch” of objects, the “argument of things” and their “thick lived tenor” 
(827). For DeLillo such phrases act as a metaphor for tenderness (an abstraction) by 
their appeal to the material world. Indeed, that sense of phenomena and the 
phenomenal so apparent in the following passage, is metaphor for the mortification of 
language (its relationship to death), the fallen and object conditions of allegory in 
light of the Other.  
 [Y]ou look at the things in the room, offscreen, unwebbed, the tissue grain of the deskwood 
alive in light, the thick lived tenor of things, the argument of things to be seen and eaten, the 
apple core going sepia in the lunch tray, and the dense measures of experience in a random 
glance. The monk’s candle reflected in the slope of the phone, hours marked in Roman 
numerals, and the glaze of the wax, and the curl of the braided wick, and the chipped rim of the 
mug that holds your yellow pencils, skewed all crazy, and the plied lives of the simplest surface, 
the slabbed butter melting on the crumbled bun, and the yellow of the yellow pencils, and you 
try to imagine the word on the screen becoming a thing in the world, taking all its meanings, its 
sense of serenities and contentments out into the streets somehow, its whisper of reconciliation, 
a word extending itself ever outward, the tone of agreement or treaty, the tone of repose, the 
sense of mollifying silence, the tone of hail and farewell, a word that carries the sunlit ardour of 
an object deep in drenching noon, the argument of binding touch, but it’s only a sequence of 
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pulses on a dullish screen and all it can do is make you pensive – a word that spreads a longing 
through the raw sprawl of the city and out across the dreaming bourns and orchards to the 
solitary hills. 
   Peace. (827)  
  
     A writer appears here, in this last passage of the novel, and taking in their 
surroundings, appears to address the limits of their language: account for these 
“things”, the author of the passage appears to ask, work them into some system of 
connections that can settle the nature of their nuances, their distinct thing-ness, their 
materiality; account for the “plied lives of the simplest surfaces” the writer seems to 
ask of themselves (and the reader, “you”) in taking language to the limits of 
description, revealing its object-like state when its effect is to reflect on itself, on its 
own reflecting: “the yellow of the yellow of the pencils”. But, of course, language 
does account for these “things”, but only in so far as it is used by an “author” who 
recognises the irony involved in the work of accounting for things, the work involved 
in allegory. Which is to say, language is adequate to reality when it is perceived as a 
delay or deferral of that reality, and when, because of this mourning-quality, language 
itself (its signs, allegories) lives on in an “afterlife” of iteration. For this reason, it is 
not the content (the things named in) this passage avails that DeLillo celebrates, but 
what it signifies about language’s relationship to loss and irony, illustrated here 
through the very materiality of language – its tender finitude through which Otherness 
remains always yet to be tendered. The very persistence with which the writer of this 
passage attempts to render the things seen before them operates as an index to the fact 
that these objects still escape their allegorisation or representation. 
     Thus, the word and the object are brought together, and we see this in the phrase 
that describes the word that appears on the screen: “a word that carries the sunlit 
ardour of an object”. The word (not merely “a word”) for DeLillo “carries” the world 
like an object carries an “argument of binding touch”. Thus associated, we begin to 
glimpse what perhaps allegory might faithfully aspire to: the condition of the “ruin”, a 
thing marked like Nick’s collected objects, by its thingness, its tenderness as 
materiality, by limitation, a death composed within itself, and, so, tender as the “tone 
of hail and farewell” – a word that is not merely the placeholder for a connection, but 
rather tender for a difference it can only contingently “carry”: like a “whisper of 
reconciliation”, like “a word extending itself ever outward”, through deferral and 
difference, and like a tendering, a “tone of agreement of treaty”. In drawing our 
attention to the things listed in this passage, DeLillo draws our attention to both their 
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thing-ness and to their word-ness, their nature as mortified signs. DeLillo uses objects 
to highlight the object nature of language as something to celebrate (a way of 
recognising the work of irony, the importance of loss), illustrating as he does so what 
the Internet and the commodity-symbolic cannot connect or translate. The very 
limitation of the word, its composition in loss and irony, is what we have to 
acknowledge about the word, and as Ira Nadel has written (about “peace”), we have to 
“admit its weakness and that its meaning might be lost.”150 Indeed, the tenderness (or 
“weakness”) of the word (both the word, and the word “peace”) is what DeLillo 
insists on, and is why he clouds the apparition of this word “peace” with an irony. The 
word is, thus, only a “piece”, only a fragment or ruin.151 So it is then that “peace” is a 
“word that spreads a longing”; it is a word like all words (and their “wistful 
implication”), that expresses a loss, a mourning through the nature of its being 
incomplete – exactly, a piece or fragment – which means it remains a sign for signs 
(hence the pun on “peace” – language referring to itself), suggesting the ruin as the 
truth of allegory.  
     Because the world or Other always escapes the word, this means that the world or 
Other is always still to be tendered. The act of naming is how we tender this 
Otherness, but because this Other is, perversely, always Other, then the “thing named 
escapes” the name.152 What this means is that language, while being the necessary 
tool with which we tender the Other, is, itself, a vulnerable, limited, contingent and 
fallen tool – it is, to use my language, itself tender, a form of tenderness. Words, 
names, signs are thus always in a state of mourning; words mourn the world by trying 
to retain a piece of it, even though such a piece is only the trace of the world’s 
disappearance from it. With this recognition (something DeLillo awards to his artists 
and ironists) of the loss that constitutes the word, the word bares us to a relationship 
with death. There is a tenderness here that DeLillo celebrates in language (as a 
modelling of the demands of art, and a qualifying of what art might be in the 
postmodern), but this is a tenderness, as the word (“tenderness”) suggests, vulnerable 
to misprision and abuse. For DeLillo, what appears to make language (the word) 
“seraphic” is its exposure to the ironies constitutive of mourning, its “fallen” quality 
that, after Benjamin, I have been referring to as mortification. For language, this 
                                                 
150 See Nadel in Underwords. 2002. p.197. 
151 This is an idea suggested in the text with its fragment: “fasten, fit closely, bind together” (827), that 
reads as part of a possible definition of the word “piece”.  
152 See David Cowart. Don DeLillo: The Physics of Language. 2003. p.2. 
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means seeing its allegories as beautiful ruins, and for DeLillo, this is explored in 
Underworld through Nick’s and Matt’s meditations on objects. 
 
(iii) The Tenderness of Mourning: Between the Straight-up and the 
Slanted 
 
In effect we find a metaphor for mortified allegory, for allegory as ruin, in the bunker 
Matt and Janet spend a night in while in the desert. Moreover, as a metaphor for 
allegory, the bunker can be seen to express also the tender condition of being-in-
language.  
There was something irresistible about the building, of course, even an unyielding ruin such as 
this, slabbed private and tight. It stood alone here, with the mountains behind it, and carried the 
tilted lyric of a misplaced object, like some prairie drive-in shut down for years with the audio 
hookups all askew and the huge screen facing blankly toward a cornfield. It’s the kind of human 
junk that deepens the landscape, makes it sadder and lonelier and places a vague sad subjective 
regret at the edge of your response – not regret so much as a sense of time’s own esthetic, how 
strange and still and beautiful a chunk of concrete can be, lived in fleetingly and abandoned, the 
soul of wilderness signed by men and women passing through. (459) 
 
The possibility that this insensate slab of concrete might be so expressive of allegory 
and the tender experience of subjectivity is, in part, explained by its situation: the 
bunker, as an object of “human junk”, a ruin, is surrounded by Otherness (the desert, 
in DeLillo’s texts, always serves to represent this) and is exposed to the temporal 
evocation of Otherness – “time’s own esthetic”. As well as this, however, we are 
inclined to consider the tenderness of the bunker as a feature of its distance and 
removal from the commodity-symbolic (hence, “unyielding”). In a sense, the bunker 
expresses something of the aura of allegory because of its “misplaced” relation to its 
former utility. Once an observation post for the testing of weapons (commodities), the 
bunker serves now, in the wider context of the desert, to offer observation on itself as 
a man-made object or sign, a contingent allegory (signed by people “passing 
through”), “lived in fleetingly and abandoned”, a sign reversed on itself in a sense, 
mourning the nature of signs and allegories rather than observing the weapons and 
technologies allegory may produce. At once the bunker expresses the “irresistible” 
quality of allegory – we must “address the world” (538) – but also the mournful 
nature of allegory that can be seen as the “vague sad subjective regret” that exists at 
the edge of our responses to the world, the Other. If such a mourning presents 
something of the truth of our being-in-language, as I’ve been suggesting, then we may 
see now how all our allegories are “misplaced objects”, and how subjectivity 
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resembles a “tilted lyric”. Indeed, as Matt’s phrase appears to suggest, subjectivity (a 
lyric) with all its “strange[ness]” and “beaut[y]” is made possible by this misplacing, 
and after all, isn’t this also what Nick refers to as the “wistful implication” of the 
word? 
     It is such a sense of loss or being missed that explains Matt’s resort to simile; the 
bunker is “like” another “misplaced object”: an abandoned “drive-in”. Ostensibly a 
detail of the demand for iteration Otherness places on language, the drive-in, as 
simile, expresses something of the allegorical condition of subjectivity where, in light 
of an excess and Otherness we cannot recover, we “sign”, instead, one misplaced 
allegory after another.  The drive-in is perhaps a better allegory for allegory (as ruin) 
than the bunker since it more effectively appears to suggest the auratic quality of the 
ruin. The movie screen, ostensibly a sign (of a sign) in the “wilderness” reflects back 
the “wilderness” (Otherness) in the sign: once looked at (as a placeholder for an 
allegory – the function of all signs), the screen, now imageless (or mortified), looks 
back, at ‘us’, and at our own looking. It is Otherness that looks back through the 
abandoned allegory (or object), and it is this sense that seems to mark for DeLillo the 
object-allegory, or unyielding commodity, as auratic. So there is a kind of reversal at 
work here in DeLillo’s (Matt’s) allegory of the drive-in film screen: the “huge screen” 
looks back, rather than shows, the “audio hookups” listen rather than convey, and 
what it is that is heard and seen is the impossible irony (the unseen, unheard) that 
tenders Otherness. The ruin, as we shall see with Nick’s handling of his objects, 
contains a mortality that coincides with a certain reversibility of its function (evident 
also in the commodity when emptied of exchange value), and thus becomes a sort of 
material irony that, as I have been suggesting, reflects not only the tenderness of our 
allegories, but also our own tenderness to an Otherness we can only mourn through 
irony.  
     For Nick, this sense of mortality – cathected in his rare objects – is what redefines 
his “philosophy” of subjectivity, as articulated by his consideration of language and 
its relationship to loss, Otherness and irony. Through Nick’s meditations, DeLillo 
elaborates the quality of ethical mourning (irony) that in Underworld represents the 
tenderness of being, as expressed by the impossible work of art. A precondition of this 
work is, however, the mortality of its object. Thus,   
[…] I walk through the house and look at the things we own and feel the odd mortality that 
clings to every object. The finer and rarer the object, the more lonely it makes me feel, and I 
don’t know how to account for this. (804) 
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The rarity of the object is a consequence of its distance from the commodity-
symbolic. By evoking this unaccountable mortality the object becomes an object of 
mourning, its very distance from “the drudgery of being useful”153 is key in its 
capacity to signify the mourning quality of all objects, signs, and allegories. Such 
objects serve to reflect, for a character like Nick, their being-object, that is, on the 
condition of allegory as ruin, as composed by a mortality that, in economic or 
systemic terms, resembles an underworld that capitalism represses through its false 
mourning of connection and paranoia, and through its simulation of Otherness, irony 
and dissent.  
     Significantly, Nick’s meditations on objects, as with his past meditations on 
language, usually so wrapped-up in narcissistic mourning, here tender the presence of 
another, his wife Marian. Marian’s Otherness to Nick, something evoked by the 
mortality of his objects, and his new understanding of the limits of allegory and thus, 
subjectivity, comes to express the tender and sombre place of being in the world, and 
of living within the truth of death and loss. 
   The intimacies we’ve come to share, the belated exchange of childhoods and other ferocious 
times, and something else, a firm grip of another kind, a different direction, not back but 
forward – the grasp of objects that bind us to some betokening. I think I sense Marian missing in 
the objects on the walls and shelves. There is something somber about the things we’ve 
collected and own, the household effects, there is something about the word itself, effects, the 
lacquered chest in the alcove, that breathes a kind of sadness – the wall hangings and artefacts 
and valuables – and I feel a loneliness, a loss, all the greater and stranger when the object is 
relatively rare and it’s the hour after sunset in a stillness that feels unceasing. (808) 
 
The tenderness of subjectivity – its finitude – finds expression for Nick in the 
‘mortality’ of his objects, and does so because they convey the tenderness of allegory. 
Against the attempt to control Otherness, repress, contain and simulate it through 
technologies of allegory, through the repetitions, recycling and connection making of 
the commodity-symbolic, Nick comes to recognise and integrate Otherness, death, 
loss and irony into his life, just as these are integrated in the possibility of the sign, 
object, or commodity, as the truth of the possibility of the sign or word. By such an 
integration a sense of his own Otherness, as well as the Otherness of others, notably, 
his wife’s, is reconceived. 
     For Nick, however, the chief object or ruin in which the possibility of allegory 
made tender by irony is expressed is the baseball. Condensed into its memory-
saturated hide and prousted core, into the very phenomenality of its veneer of 
                                                 
153 See Benjamin in The Arcades Project. 1999. [H3a,1]. 
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“generational sweat”, and the stains of the “lives behind it” (131), the ball constellates 
all that DeLillo assumes about the nature of rhetoric (allegory and irony), textuality 
(reading, writing, representing), language (the economy of signs, the system) and their 
relation to Otherness and memory. 
   This is how I came across the baseball, rearranging books on the shelves. I look at it and 
squeeze it hard and put it back on the shelf, wedged between a slanted book and a straight-up 
book, an expensive and beautiful object that I keep half hidden, maybe because I tend to forget 
why I bought it. Sometimes I know exactly why I bought it and other times I don’t, a beautiful 
thing smudged green near the Spalding trademark and bronzed with nearly half a century of 
earth and sweat and chemical change, and I put it back and forget it until next time. (809)  
 
One hears echoes of Emily Dickinson’s “Tell the Truth but tell it Slant”154 here, but 
also an echo within Underworld itself to the earlier reference (of Matt’s) to the “tilted 
lyric” of a “misplaced object”. As previously discussed, such objects (bunker, ball) 
are to be seen as allegories and here, once again, as with the association of lyric and 
subjectivity, we find a slant (or tilted) truth depicted as some truth of being subject, a 
truth all the more tender for the suggestion of its slip or fall from the “straight-up”. 
Truth, we might say, is a slant affair, in Dickinson’s terms, the gradual “dazzle” of 
truth is the tale of allegory, while irony (or Otherness, what irony refers to) is the 
“superb surprise”. The truth of truth is that allegories go astray in the service of 
description, and that this is the force of irony in allegory that, as we see, DeLillo 
comes to celebrate in Underworld.  
     The ball, kept between the “slanted” and the “straight-up” (and not just kept 
between the two, but composed of the two) is thus an object for all I have designated 
by my term tenderness, something tender and tendered between the ironic truth and 
the allegorical truth, in the dilemma of mourning, the condition, it seems, for what 
DeLillo calls a “beautiful thing”, placed between forgetting and remembering 
(“sometimes I know exactly […] other times I don’t”). The ball then stands in for the 
“mystery of loss” – not merely personal loss, but the vital loss invested in allegory (as 
irony’s force), and it is this being at a loss for allegory – between knowing and not 
knowing – that makes the ball beautiful, an object by which to reflect on the 
tenderness of being subjects in language and in the world, just as this ball as tender 
witness of its own loss demonstrates a faithfulness to allegory as ruin, as a sign for 
something Other and in excess of itself – a phrōnesis which for DeLillo is the opening 
and defining question posed by any art that proposes to treat ethically and faithfully 
                                                 
154 Kathleen Fitzpatrick has noted the possible Dickinson reference also. See her article “The 
Unmaking of History: Baseball, Cold War, and Underworld” in Underwords 2002. pp.144-160. 
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the experience of subjectivity and its overwhelming debt to Otherness and memory. 
All of which, we might consider, is smuggled in that phrase of DeLillo’s, “the fallen 
wonder of the world”, that serves as the absent epigraph to all of his writings. The 
fallen allegory or name, represented by Nick in his objects that tell a tilted truth, as 
well as those punctum and parergon moments in the text associated with the work of 






























Chapter Four: Cosmopolis 
 




If, on the subjects of art and the ethical regard for Otherness, both Underworld and 
The Body Artist appear to conclude on notes of wary, if melancholy, optimism, 
DeLillo’s Cosmopolis issues a note of pessimism, all the more evocative for the 
reason that its protagonist wilfully rejects the necessary conditions of what I have 
been referring to as tenderness: Otherness and irony. Eric Packer is, as the text 
reveals, no less capable than Klara, Nick, or Lauren of perceiving tenderness, but 
where these characters permit an articulation of Otherness that effectively re-tenders 
their philosophies of representation and their regard for others, Packer chooses instead 
the “old bio-chemistry of the ego, the saturated self” (208). What we find in 
Cosmopolis is that it is irony, cast here as the pain of the postmodernism of late 
capitalism, that the capitalist system and the commodity-symbolic, as embodied in 
Packer, forcefully argues against. Part of the pessimism apparent in DeLillo’s text, 
indeed, a consequence of his conflation of violence, tender-less allegory, and 
technology, is that the work of mourning – so deeply linked by DeLillo to the 
possibility of difference and the ethical imagining of Otherness – can, as we see in 
Cosmopolis, so easily be made unnecessary to the workings of late capitalism. The 
apparent ease with which Otherness and the work of mourning (irony) can be 
misrecognised, settled, simulated and/or repressed, represents for DeLillo, I suggest, 
the implausible nature of the ethical in the sphere of twenty-first century American 
futurism. In essence, as I shall show, it is this futurism, in fact, a misrecognised mode 
of mourning designed to control and diminish Otherness, that Packer represents. As 
we shall see, the work of irony and mourning – the very demand of pain, memory and 
Otherness – is not, in good faith, attended to, despite the overwhelming evidence of 
loss recorded in Cosmopolis through depictions of the street, the body, the 
anachronism or ruin, that exist as the repressed underworld condition of capitalism. 
Capitalism, as is made clear in Cosmopolis, is to be understood as a response to the 
pain and Otherness of the world through its reification of false mourning and by 
making invisible and natural its modes of representation.  
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     In Cosmopolis it is through pain that the experience of Otherness (be it affirming 
or destructive) is registered. Primarily this notion of pain is an abstraction; certainly it 
is felt, the term contains the obvious somatic context, but in DeLillo’s text it also 
signifies the incomplete project of reification within capitalism, the disguised 
aesthetic deficits of the commodity-symbolic, the rifts in its epistemological and 
ontological allegories where Otherness, irony, and memory lurk in their recalcitrance. 
Pain, we might say, is the ‘truth’ of an excess or remainder that can never be totally 
settled or completely aestheticised by any culture’s modes of representation and 
reproduction. In Cosmopolis, pain manifests as the Otherness that haunts the 
postmodern and in particular, a late capitalism premised on the misrecognition of such 
Otherness. As I have said in my introduction (and as has been my theme in reading 
DeLillo’s novels along the borderline of irony and allegory), the making-absent of 
irony from allegory, the wilful, systemic and motivated misprision of irony in allegory 
(Otherness in representation, difference in modes of production), is precisely a 
procedure DeLillo identifies as capitalist. It has been my suggestion that DeLillo, with 
his texts that survey so broadly the field of cultural production from commodity to art, 
seeks to expose the tendency of capitalist modes of representation towards the status 
of invisibility, the natural, the inevitable. To perform this sort of critique is not to 
make the mistake of assuming irony in allegory, but to set out to ethically re-assert 
irony, Otherness, and its synonym, memory, in representation and cultural production; 
which is what DeLillo does in writing the novels I have discussed that, as I read them, 
propose a certain tender ‘theory’ of art and writing that is also a tendering of irony. 
     As I shall show, the issue of Otherness and irony in the text coincides with 
experiences and expressions of pain, often inscribed in sites of tenderness: scars on 
flesh, the ruined nature of objects, the anachronistic qualities of words, traditions and 
objects, all of which, as markers of pain and Otherness, serve also to represent the 
fallen-ness of subjectivity, of language and being in time. In so far as irony is key to 
recognising Otherness, irony is crucial to the apprehension of pain, not as something 
to repress or destroy, but as a tenderness. But such a tenderness, understood as both 
the split between and the relationship of experience and representation, is missed by 
the primary figures of Cosmopolis; the tender relationship of irony and allegory is 
seen rather as a definitive wound to which Packer, for example, responds by searching 
for an exalted state, the perfect allegory with which to bridge the rift, an “aesthetics of 
interaction”, sacred and ritualised, “a common surface, an affinity between market 
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movements and the natural world” (86).155 The search for such a surface, such an 
intersection of realms, defines Packer’s mourning and his relation to the pain and 
Otherness of being; it defines his wish to transcend the material world of 
anachronism, bodies, the street, and memory through assumption into a state of pure 
‘fleshless-ness’, an immortality forever ahead of the pain of delay and deferral. 
Essentially, Packer’s transcendentalism is revealed to be the triumph of a capitalism 
seen, by DeLillo, as a culture’s response to the pain of being, whereby, through its 
fusing of technology, allegory and commodity, such pain (such Otherness), and with 
it, irony itself, can be avoided. As I shall show, like Underworld, in which late 
twentieth century capitalism is shown as a development springing from the experience 
of loss, Cosmopolis’s Eric Packer too is revealed to be impelled by a profound loss, 
the loss of his father.156
     Benno Levin, the second narrator of Cosmopolis, is, like Packer, also determined 
by certain experiences of loss, and, in a way that has become paradigmatic of certain 
figures in DeLillo’s fiction, seeks to mourn this loss through a theory of allegory. 
Levin’s most succinct statement of his mourning is thus also a statement about his 
failure to tender irony and conceive of allegory as anything other than an 
impoverished mimeticism. As Levin says: “There are dead stars that still shine 
because their light is trapped in time. Where do I stand in this light, which does not 
strictly exist?” (155) In effect, Levin’s question, posed in a metaphor for language, is 
one that addresses the poststructural experience of language: the light from the star is 
like language itself, as provoked by a world, origin, or referent that, with the advent of 
poststructuralism, we now understand is lost, or absent, in fact, was never simply 
present – a “dead star”. The light exists, but its referent does not; the light is not the 
star, but rather a delayed trace of the star, an allegory. Thus, the “light” is metaphor 
for allegory and language, specifically, the tenderness and negative structure of 
language that, in the manner of irony, is composed by a loss, a death, as something 
                                                 
155 This is precisely the sort of consideration DeLillo has characters in Underworld and The Body Artist 
consider also, but to entirely different ends: Lauren’s response to her question about the “intersection” 
of time, space and language, as with Nick’s eventual melancholic appreciation of the fallen beauty of 
language, serves to represent a tender and ethical faith in language and Otherness. In contrast to this, 
Packer’s response to the above consideration defines him as a venal, narcissistic capitalist. 
156 As we have seen with Underworld’s Nick Shay, the loss of a father is, to the son, equivalent to a 
crisis of authority and representation. Such characters as Shay and Packer respond to the ‘emergence’ 
of this absence – in fact, the radical and disruptive discovery of the principle of irony at the heart of 
language – by repressing irony (and with it, Otherness and memory) through the search for the pure 
(irony-disabling) allegory. We note, for example, how Packer ‘kills’ words and technologies before 
they have a chance to become ironic, self-referring, historical, or memoried. 
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other it can never make present. This light (allegory) is trapped in time, fallen we 
might say, but of course a theory of irony’s relation to allegory would see this quality 
of delay in allegory as its vital and tender feature. Levin’s pain consists in his failure 
of this appreciation. 
      In a sense, it is a theory of allegory, as previously rehearsed in The Body Artist 
and Underworld, considered as more or less tender, acknowledged by a culture or 
individuals to be more or less tendered by irony, and as mourned or misprised by 
symbolic economies, that can be seen to define the crucial issues of Cosmopolis: 
temporality and Otherness. In fact, what I will suggest is that temporality and 
Otherness are actually one issue within the commodity-symbolic DeLillo critiques, a 
consequence of the fusing of semiotic and commodity production with the experience 
of time.157 Indeed, this is the constellation crucial to Cosmopolis where temporality, 
as a category of Otherness, is subject to what in my Underworld chapter I described 
as the faithless mourning of the commodity-symbolic. The explication of this rather 
dense paragraph shall comprise much of the work of this chapter that I shall shortly 
commence with, but for one final clarification on the subject and word DeLillo, with 
Cosmopolis, seems most clearly to foreground: “pain”.  
     Pain, it seems, lies at the nexus of the split, within the postmodern, between 
narcissism and tenderness, between the self and the Other. Pain ‘labels’ a 
contradiction as well as an interdependency, and thus restates the irony of postmodern 
subjectivity and representation, namely that the self is experienced as such because of 
a necessary narcissism that is itself only generated by encounters with Otherness, just 
as Otherness can only be experienced through the categories of the self. Otherness can 
only be felt to be Other if it is felt as Other to the self. How do we account for this 
translation of Other to same when the medium of language – itself a system of 
differences – at the instant of our utterance is always a reduction of difference, excess, 
and Otherness to the self/same? The answer (qua Derrida and DeLillo) is to situate 
irony, tenderness and mourning at the root of language as something to recognise as 
the enabling condition of language and meaning, not to the purpose of some 
prosecution of a final and complete settlement, but as an aspect of faith, a form of 
phrōnesis. Cosmopolis, in its own ironic method, makes this clear in not attempting to 
                                                 
157 In this regard Cosmopolis can be read as a fusing of The Body Artist’s investigation of time as 
Otherness and its representation in language, and Underworld’s anatomisation of the semiotic and 
symbolic structure of capitalist modes of reproduction. 
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make it clear, and by pursuing a narrative tethered to the consciousness of a magnate 
such as Packer, who misses such irony; who, despite his several opportunities, and his 
own intuitions, fails mourning in such a way as to make tenderness Cosmopolis’s 
negative state; in a sense, Cosmopolis represents DeLillo’s most ethical and faithful 
treatment of irony and Otherness by presenting the “tenderness of tenderness” in a 
text that presents irony ironically.  
     All of what I have been saying about pain is located also within the subject, 
between consciousness and memory, between the self and the self-as-Other (as 
another), and it is no coincidence that Cosmopolis’s most adored and valorised 
subject, New York city, should also map so closely the relational aspects of fallen 
subjectivity. In a sense Cosmopolis is a love letter to New York, and, as it has been 
observed before, pain (difference, Otherness, the “broken ruins”, and the fallen 
aspects of being-subject) is deeply engraved in DeLillo’s love for the city. In effect, 
Wendy Steiner spells this out in her consideration of DeLillo’s White Noise, a novel 
that 
is built on a generic cacophony suggested in its title. The novel is an exercise in interference, 
exploring at every level from dialogue to genre to plot the static that obscures messages and 
foils attempts at closure. DeLillo associates this static, moreover, with pain, the unifying 
concern of postmodern fiction. In an interview with Thomas LeClair, he described the subway 
arcades beneath 14th Street in New York, where “you hear mostly Spanish and Black English 
with bits of Yiddish, German, Italian, and Chinese, and then there is this strange, broken 
language. The language of the insane is stronger than all the others. It is the language of self, the 
pain of self.” Eliot’s rubble heap of western culture here becomes the cacophony of the city and 
the broken ruins of the self, the individual – the partial, idiosyncratic one. 158  
 
DeLillo’s words here lend an image to what throughout this thesis I have sought to 
describe as memory, as storehouse of difference, as reliquary of ruins, and fallen 
signs, a wonderful, almost miraculous underworld of any given present or presence, 
albeit composed via negativa, which is to say, via the delayed and differing form of 
allegory, but evidenced in the physical, corporeal and fallen world of the material as 
well. We see here how a city can be a model for living memory, composed of 
tenderness(es), ironies, and qualities of mourning to set against the futurism of 
capitalism and its cohort, the violence and memoryless-ness of ritual 
commodification. In Cosmopolis we come to glimpse the tenderness of pain when it is 
set against the misrecognised and simulated pain of capitalism, seeing as we do that, 
                                                 
158 See Wendy Steiner, “Postmodern Fictions: 1970 – 1990” in The Cambridge History of American 
Literature (ed. Sacvan Bercovitch). Vol. 7, 1999. p.497. 
 167
in fact, such a process of misrecognition (a systematic quality of its reifying and 
aestheticising tendencies) is definitive of the capitalism the artist must resist. 
 
(ii) The Street 
 
In Cosmopolis, two ‘categories’ stand out as loci of pain: the street and the body. As 
we will see, both categories are depicted as sites that, through their association, by 
DeLillo, with the ruin, the anachronism, memory, and materiality, contain the 
conditions of tenderness. As such, both the street and the body are depicted as sites of 
an Otherness that capitalism (as evinced through Packer) seeks to repress and 
misrecognise. Thus, the street is where one encounters the Other: 
The place was crowded. He heard stray words in French and Somali seeping through the 
ambient noise. That was the disposition of the end of 47th Street. Dark women in ivory robes 
walking in the river wind toward the UN secretariat. Apartment towers called L’Ecole and 
Octavia. There were Irish nannies pushing strollers in the parks. And Elise of course, Swiss or 
something, sitting across the table. (17)  
 
The point of such a passage is to pay attention to the details of Otherness that are 
inseparable from the composition of the Polis. We live in Otherness, in a Babel of 
humanity, languages, and the pain of “white noise”. 
   People hurried past, the others of the street, endless anonymous, twenty-one lives per second, 
race-walking in their faces and pigments, sprays of fleetest being. They were here to make the 
point that you did not have to look at them. (20) 
 
The street is significant for DeLillo and his concern with Otherness for the way it 
marks a boundary to the ego’s settlement of Otherness. The material of the street, and 
its denizens, exists independently and in autonomy from the self. Indeed, the whole 
issue of “being” is swept up in the word “fleetest” – as something speeding by, and 
also wistful, transient. The street resists the tendency to ontologise, to place the self at 
the centre of the “intersection” of the world and its representation. 
     Not merely the location of Otherness, the street marks the critical association in 
DeLillo’s texts of memory and the ruined, “makeshift” quality of human signs and 
objects, with this Otherness.159 Moreover, the reader is meant to recognise the 
“persistence” of such signs and objects, such tenderness(es) as are composed and 
fated to fall into memory, past-time, obsolescence and anachronism. By this falling of 
meaning from intent, sign from referent, do we find ourselves in the avenues of irony, 
                                                 
159 Indeed, the street is, in Cosmopolis, what the desert is in Underworld and so many of DeLillo’s 
other novels – a space of excess, memory, Otherness and time as it is before we allegorise it. 
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in fact, the avenues of Otherness and memory, where “things” do “persist” and iterate 
and require to be seen once again – even when it is Eric Packer doing the seeing, as 
here, noting in fact how the process of the fall into obsolescence goes “mostly 
unseen”: 
   Heavy trucks went downtown bouncing, headed to the garment district or the meatpacking 
docks, and nobody saw them. They saw the cockney selling children’s books from a cardboard 
box, making his pitch from his knees. Eric thought they were the same thing, these two, and the 
old Chinese was the same, doing acupoint massage, and the repair crew passing fiber-optic 
cable down a manhole from an enormous yellow spool. He thought about the amassments, the 
material crush, days and nights of bumper to bumper, red light, green light, the fixedness of 
things, the obsolescences, going mostly unseen. They saw the old man do his therapeutic 
massage, working a woman’s back and temples as she sat on a bench, her face pressed to a 
raised cushion attached to a makeshift frame. They read the handwritten sign, relief from fatigue 
and panic. How things persist, the habits of gravity and time, in this new and fluid reality. The 
cockney from his knees said, I don’t ask you where you get your money, don’t ask me where I 
get my books. They stopped and looked, browsing his cardboard box. The old Chinese stood 
erect, kneading the woman’s acupuncture points, thumbing the furrows behind her ears. (83)  
 
We find here an image of the street and its associations that DeLillo valorises in the 
text in the details pertaining to cultural difference, bodies, the touch and “crush” of 
the material world of time and gravity, and those contingent variables of 
unknowability, opacity, “amassments” and “obsolescence”, that tend to colour this 
passage as metaphor for the persistence of memory and its agents, the unseen work of 
irony and the negative immanence of Otherness. For this reason we find in this ‘street 
economy’ the work of memory: work that goes “mostly unseen”; there isn’t here the 
pricking of consciousness to estrange any of the details, rather the work continues 
“underneath” surfaces (the work of the acupuncturist) and beneath such consciousness 
(beneath the road). The physical and material nature of this economy (in a contrast to 
Packer’s “fluid reality”) marks it as anachronistic, as an economy within memory, 
within time, and so we note the “obsolescences” as objects subject to the temporality 
of memory, which is where these objects, traditions, bodies etc. are stored and 
“persist”. The whole paragraph, like others DeLillo often writes, is itself an act of 
memory, a recording and keeping of the makeshift, day-to-day materiality of human 
partialities that he associates with memory. Indeed, DeLillo’s point (and here we find 
spectres of Benjamin’s materialism and Derrida’s own thoughts on memory) is that 
memory (what I have throughout been referring to also as Otherness) inheres in the 
material world, the world of bodies and objects, and as something to be found in the 
street. The world of technology must pass through this world, is, in fact, dependent on 
the material world, as in the body labour of the “repair crew passing fiber-optic cable 
down a manhole”. The sublime systems of capitalism, be they semiotic, symbolic, 
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technological or economic, rely on the tenderness of the material, on being tendered 
by labour, bodies, the street etc., for them to function, even as such systems seek to 
dematerialise, aestheticise, and allegorise, the material world out of consciousness.  
     Even Packer’s “prousted”160 limousine, insulated against the street, cannot prevent 
the seepage of street “noise” (pain, Otherness) into the sealed, theoretical, 
technological interior of the limousine. The noise of the street is that of pain, the root 
condition of mourning: “[t]hey sat in the swell of blowing horns. There was 
something about the noise that he did not choose to wish away. It was the tone of 
some fundamental ache, a lament so old it sounded aboriginal” (14). These are 
Packer’s words and what he recognises here is the condition of pain people live in, a 
pain inseparable from the condition of living in history, memory, and living in the 
body, all of which the “futurist” attempts to transcend. Thus, despite himself, the hand 
of a taxi driver, with its missing finger, fascinates Packer: “Eric regarded the stub, 
impressive, a curious thing, a body ruin that carried history and pain” (17). With this 
detail, DeLillo succinctly articulates the sort of constellation that I’ve been suggesting 
is involved not only in his investigation of memory and Otherness, but also, as we 
shall see, in the proposal of a fallen tenderness, that is evinced in Cosmopolis 
ironically, via the presentation of its absence. Thus, the taxi driver’s missing finger 
(again, an absence, a negative) connotes the articulating together of Otherness 
(cultural difference – the driver is a Sikh), pain, memory and history (all “carried” in 
the “ruin”), his emphasis on materiality and bodies, as well as the condition of 
“aboriginal” mourning expressed by the reality of the street. We note also that subtler 
connotation embedded in the word “ache”, that suggests that the body itself is the 
principal object of mourning – the carrier of memory, pain and Otherness – all of 
which such a futurism, as personified by Packer, seeks to dismiss. 
  
 (iii) Bodies 
 
Ibrahim’s collapsed eye fascinated him in a childish way, beyond the shame of staring. […] The 
eye had a kind of autonomy, a personality of its own, giving the man a splitness, an unsettling 
alternative self. (163) 
 
                                                 
160 As with his use of the same term (“prousted”) in Underworld, DeLillo ensures the context of his 
discussion – in this case, the street, the material world – is associated with the word’s own context, 
memory. 
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The ruined eye, the scarred or ruined body, marks a character like Ibrahim, as a body-
irony, that is to say, as an allegory characterised by the deep inscription within itself 
of irony (or Otherness), and this is why Ibrahim is characterised by an “autonomy” 
and “splitness”, an “alternative self”. The ruined aspect of his materiality (his physical 
appearance) inscribes an Otherness in his appearance, just as irony ‘inscribes’ an 
Otherness, and quality of mortification within allegory. The eye indicates to Packer 
that Ibrahim cannot be summed-up by tenderless allegory, and throughout Cosmopolis 
such body-ruins serve to remind us of the limitations of allegory when it is not 
tendered by irony; in semiotic terms, the inscription of the body, this mark of pain, 
represents the tenderness of the word, the mortification and Otherness of an allegory. 
Ibrahim’s “alternative self” signifies also the possibility of “alternative” readings, 
enabling, in turn, the allegorical realm itself. The material nature of the body, 
something heightened or foregrounded by its being “ruined” (its scarring, 
dismemberment, etc., the inscription of pain) is a metaphor for the fallen-ness of 
language; the wounding of the body parallels the wounding of allegory by irony, a 
process I have referred to as tendering.161 Body-ruins stand in for the tenderness of 
language, the tenderness of words, and in this way, because of this knowledge of the 
tenderness of allegory, raise the question of the Other, the “alternative self”, the 
unsaid and unknowable nature of irony. As DeLillo makes clear throughout the novels 
I’ve discussed, we glimpse Otherness at the point where allegory is made tender, and 
it is through this work of mortification that allegory itself is renewed as a “fallen 
wonder”.  
     In this regard we note the continuity between Cosmopolis and The Body Artist, 
where the body ‘offers’ the reader a ‘lesson’ in the semiotics and philosophy of pain 
and the fall. But where in The Body Artist Lauren sought to mourn this pain (the 
Otherness at the root of language, and for DeLillo the irony at the root of art and 
literature) through her body, Packer wants to shed his body. Where Lauren tunes into 
her body and its conduction of Otherness, Packer continually checks his body for the 
first sign of Otherness – cancer – that must then be removed. Although the body 
remains a fascination for Packer (a fascination attributable to the fact that he is 
                                                 
161 In a further qualification we can say that the inscription of pain on the body (scarring and 
dismemberment) stands also for a form of writing that resembles the resistant and unknowable qualities 
of irony attributed, in effect I argue, by DeLillo to literature and art. As we saw with The Body Artist, 
the novel’s qualities as ethical and artistic articulation of Otherness are as a consequence of an author’s 
mortification and dismemberment (ironising) of its form, its status as representation.  
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beginning to have “doubts” (32; 86) about his allegorisation of the world), the body is, 
ultimately, subsumed within his narcissism, its Otherness diminished by being 
encoded within the fetishistic and masochistic scheduling of a daily prostate 
examination. As Packer considers, in the prostate exam, 
[t]he pain was local but seemed to absorb everything around it, organs, objects, street sounds, 
words. It was a point of hellish perception that was steady-state, unchanging in degree, and not a 
point at all but some bundled other brain, a counter-consciousness, but not that either, located at 
the base of his bladder. He operated from within. He could think and speak of other things but 
only within the pain. He was living in the gland, in the scalding fact of his biology. (50) 
 
The possibility of the perception of Others and Otherness (“to speak of other things”, 
to speak from some “other brain”) is a possibility to be found in one’s very own body 
(one’s own Otherness) when it becomes articulate in pain. As Packer later considers 
after shooting himself in his hand, “the pain was the world” (201), and in the present 
quotation we see how it is both “local” and present in everything around Packer – 
“objects”, the street, language. Pain, as I have been suggesting, is significant for 
DeLillo in the way in which it ushers Otherness into our allegorical settlement of the 
world – pain casts a doubt on our allegories, making them tender. Such is the case, it 
appears for Packer who, with his “pants around his ankles and butt flung back” asks 
himself such “large” philosophical questions as “why something and not nothing? 
Why music and not noise?” (50). The painful palpation of Packer’s prostate thus 
coincides with his own probing of certain allegorical assumptions, and in so doing he 
is probing irony – the condition between “something” or “nothing”, “music” or 
“noise”, the différance or Otherness that is their provenance. 
     And it is something like the principle of irony – as force of pain, in fact, 
inseparable from his experience of pain – which Packer begins to understand when 
language (a word “asymmetry”), becomes part of his body. In a sense, the body, as 
site of Otherness and pain, introduces irony into allegory, into language, in the 
process estranging Packer from his allegorical “mastery of ideas and people”.  
   He liked to track answers to hard questions. This was his method, to attain mastery of ideas 
and people. But there was something about the idea of asymmetry. It was intriguing in the world 
outside the body, a counterforce to balance and calm, the riddling little twist, subatomic, that 
made creation happen. There was the serpentine word itself, slightly off kilter, with the single 
additional letter that changes everything. But when he removed the word from its cosmological 
register and applied it to the body of a male mammal, his body, he began to feel pale and 
spooked. He felt a certain perverse reverence toward the word. A fear of, a distance from. When 
he heard the word spoken in a context of urine and semen and when he thought of the word in 




As I have hinted, the principle of asymmetry,162 the “riddling little twist”, is that of 
irony, the said unbalanced by the ‘unsaid’, the sign placed in pain and doubt by the 
counterforces of loss, absence and difference – Otherness. This force intrigues Packer 
as an abstraction, a philosophy of world, and he even grants it the force Derrida grants 
Otherness – the force of invention that makes “creation happen”. But when this word 
is considered from the perspective of a body (his body) in language – and despite his 
futurist hope to transcend his fleshly state, Packer, the text is at pains to point out, is 
still very much a body163 – the word, and the principle it stands for (irony) is 
acknowledged as the source of the fear, doubt, pain that Packer (like the symbolic 
economy he represents) spends his narrative attempting to leave behind and transcend. 
The “perverse reverence” Packer feels for this “fear” is a consequence of his 
association of it with the loss of control and mastery – “limp dick desolation”. His 
response to this fear (of asymmetry, irony) has been to make a ritual out of the 
process of inquiry and information-gathering that the prostate exam represents. 
Indeed, Packer has turned this ritual into an aspect of “superstition”; essentially, a 
mode of mourning (à la paranoia) that relies on the elevation of the allegorical 
(information and technology) to an almost transcendental state, whereby the pain of 
doubt, aporia, opacity, irony and Otherness can be repressed and misprised through 
the force of ‘unreasonable’ and outrageous connection. The mode of mourning Packer 
commits to – his allegorising of pain and Otherness, his recourse to ritualised allegory 
and superstition – is indistinguishable from his desire to transcend his body-state. In 
the “whirling” dance of the mourners in the funeral procession of Brutha Fez, Packer 
sees an expression of his wish to get beyond pain. 
   Because whirl is all. Whirl is the drama of shedding everything. Because they are spinning 
into communal grace, he thought. And because someone is dead tonight and only whirl can 
appease their grief. 
   He believed these things. He tried to imagine a kind of fleshlessness. He thought of the 
whirlers deliquescing, resolving into fluid states, into spinning liquid, rings of water and fog that 
eventually disappear in air. (138)  
                                                 
162 Later it is such a principle (“the importance of the lopsided, the thing that’s skewed a little […] the 
little quirk, the misshape […] the answer […] in your body, in your prostate” (200)) that Levin 
proposes as the type of understanding Packer has missed and that has undone him – his failure to 
perceive irony. 
163 Packer’s body becomes an emphasis in the text by virtue of his complete neglect of it: through his 
displays of food consumption, his increasing body-odour, as well as his increasingly shabby 
appearance, stained with food, crème, alcohol, sweat, sexual fluid. We note also the concordance of his 
passage through New York with his stripping of clothing, and the asymmetrical details of half a 
haircut, and a single shot hand. Packer is marooned in corporeality, and it is through the trope of 
asymmetry that, in part, this is presented in the text. Again, the emphasis on the body equates to an 
emphasis on irony that, for all his supposed mastery, Packer is helpless to control or avoid. 
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This desire to escape the flesh is the same hope Packer holds for his transfiguration 
into pure data. The whirl of the dance is for Packer a whirl of technology – a way of 
voiding this life and its pain and memories, and transcending to some aesthetic state.  
 
(iv) Masochism and False Mourning 
 
It may seem too obvious a remark to linger on, but in a text as consciously shaped 
around one character’s wilful plunge into self-ruin (Packer’s “haircut” – slang for a 
dramatic loss on the share market – as well as his hunting down of his own assassin) it 
needs to be pointed out that Packer’s relationship to what I have been calling pain is 
circumscribed by masochism. The expression of pain is the reason why Packer works 
out as hard as he does, to feel muscle-pain; it is the reason why he asks to be 
electrocuted by his bodyguard, Kendra Hayes, with her stun-gun, just as it is also why 
he enjoys the pain of the vodka she pours on his testicles (114). The point for DeLillo, 
it seems, is that the evocation of masochism explains Packer’s relationship to his body 
and, through the body, his relationship to Otherness and memory. The missing piece 
in this association is cancer (within Packer’s cosmology it is cancer that joins the 
body, memory and Otherness, doubt and pain), the pain or doubt harboured in the 
body and which comports within itself the memory of Packer’s father’s death. 
Packer’s masochism, revealed in this context, appears to be a mode of mourning 
(contra the sort of ethical or artistic mourning I have elaborated previously) designed 
to extinguish the Otherness (pain) of memory and with this, the pain of all non-
coincidence, seen in the world as other people, and, in language, as irony.   
     Something of the quality of this mourning is apparent in the ironies of Packer’s 
relation to pain and the body, through his masochistic treatment and valorisation of 
body pain. In the pain of his prostate exam he is aware that 
He was here in his body, the structure he wanted to dismiss in theory even as he was shaping it 
under the measured effect of barbells and weights. He wanted to judge it redundant and 
transferable. It was convertible to wave arrays of information. (48) 
 
In a seeming contradiction, the pain of exercise translates the body from its corporeal 
state into something more nearly aesthetic, closer to information. As we will see, this 
desire for translation (the dematerialisation of the material into the aesthetic) is 
singularly determining of Packer’s mourning as well as the American futurism 
 174
DeLillo critiques. We note also the connection, in a later scene, DeLillo makes 
between the sensations caused by Packer’s electrocution with the “haircut” Packer 
takes on the Yen.164 Both experiences are acts of masochism and both offer Packer a 
momentary release from “reason” (115), the “influence of his neo-cortex” as well as 
the “need to take inspired action, make original judgments, maintain independent 
principles and convictions, all the reasons why people are fucked up and birds and 
rats are not” (115). Packer uses pain to attain release from the demands of being 
human – and it is this that is behind his dreamed-of conversion of the body into “wave 
arrays of information” (48). In effect, the experience of willed body-pain becomes a 
way of avoiding (as a form of false mourning) the pain of memory and Otherness 
harboured in the body. 
     The pain and sense of “neo-cortex-less” Otherness that Packer appears to ‘enjoy’ 
suffering is, then, to the purpose of diminishing the recalcitrance of pain and 
Otherness as they actually exist. This sort of process of diminishment is further 
modelled in Packer’s exchanges with Kendra, when he meets her for an intimate 
liaison. To Packer, Kendra (a bodyguard, a person with a formalised relationship to 
pain) is a woman of “straps and belts” (114); even when naked she appears as a 
punisher, a dominatrix. Noticeably she is pure image, purely superficial to Packer, her 
Otherness (her body) completely aestheticised: details pertaining to her “coral brown 
skin and well defined cheekbones” (111); the “beeswax sheen to her lips” (111); 
“cinnamon skin, or russet, or a blend of copper and bronze” (112); “her skin […] foxy 
brown” (113), repeat as the treatment of her appearance in the text (“[h]e wanted her 
to move slightly left so that her hip would catch the glow of the table lamp nearby” 
(113)) becomes indissociable from her status as figure of desire and punishment. This 
is entirely consistent with the masochist’s relation to the Other and Otherness (the 
dominatrix)165 where the Other is ‘converted’ into nothing more than a dematerialised 
sign. In this sort of relationship, the subject’s experience of pain acts as a blind behind 
which the operation of power (the control of Otherness through its aestheticisation) 
masks its machinations, and becomes inconspicuous. Packer’s false mourning of pain 
and Otherness thus manifests as a conspicuous performance of pain that, in becoming 
                                                 
164 In this way also we see how DeLillo connects the subjective details of Packer’s masochism and 
mourning with the broader and systemic details of a culture/economy’s mourning. 
165 See Nick Mansfield’s Masochism: the Art of Power (1997), and the interpretation of this 
masochistic model made by Patrick Evans in “Whipping up a Local Culture” in Landfall 209. 2005. 
pp.137-152. 
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ritualised, becomes unquestioned – the result is an aestheticised simulation of pain 
that is designed to replace and mask the Otherness, difference and irony (pain) the 
semiotic cannot successfully allegorise. For DeLillo, it seems, a culture evincing such 
a mourning thus responds to Otherness, loss and memory through the spectacular 
production of allegories that serve to sublimate Otherness. 
      The masochism of Packer, understood as an attempt to diminish the Other, finds 
expression in the culture’s desire to slip the bonds of memory through its assertion of 
a technological/allegorical sublime that is itself a dissembling masquerade of 
Otherness. This is what DeLillo has observed in the following often-quoted passage. 
In the past decade the surge of capital markets has dominated discourse and shaped global 
consciousness. […] The dramatic climb of the Dow and the speed of the Internet summoned us 
all to live permanently in the future, in the utopian glow of cyber-capital, because there is no 
memory there and this is where markets are uncontrolled and investment has no limit.166  
 
A future in ruins is a future that becomes uncertain, doubtful, and painful. Such a 
future becomes, then, one that Americans respond to by way of false mourning – 
through massive consumption and commodity production, through, as DeLillo has 
suggested, the exercise of overwhelming technological (and hence, allegorical) 
power167, a power that Packer is correct to assert works best when there is no 
“memory attached” (184). A future in ruins is then one in which the relationship to 
memory and the past has been severed. The consequence, as Cosmopolis 
demonstrates, and Packer experiences, is what amounts to a crisis of anteriority: the 
future can no longer be anterior (future) when there is no term or temporal condition 
from which to exist in anteriority. As such, the future becomes conflated with the 
present, becomes an anachronism (time “out of joint”), becomes obsolete, becomes 
merely an allegory severed from the possibility of iteration, différance, anteriority, 
marooned in repetition – a sign sliding over other signs, just as commodities repeat, 
                                                 
166 “In the Ruins of the Future”. Ibid. p38. 
167 For DeLillo the response to the uncertainty and pain of the future triggered by 9/11 revealed a will 
to reassert through massive displays of consumption and technology an attempt to occupy a future 
separated from the requirements of mourning, from memory, pain and loss. 
 
I think the curious psychological subtext to the war in Iraq was to return America to its sense of 
the future, a feeling that had been damaged by the events of September 11 […] We’re using our 
technological imperative in order to win a struggle that concerns the past and the future. This is 
not something that’s at all overt, but I think the element exists at some level of our exertions 
against terrorists and the Iraq situation as well. We want to live in the future. (Interview with 
Helena Bertodano, “And Quiet Goes the Don” in The Daily Telegraph, 13/5/03). 
 
This could double as a description of the desires of Packer as it describes the contexts of futurism, 
technology and allegory that are central to Cosmopolis’s exploration of American mourning in 
capitalism. 
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become obsolete and repeat. Allegory without history – its relation to memory, 
Otherness and irony – becomes invisible as allegory. This relationship of allegory to 
temporality – a relationship enabled by the presence of irony and Otherness in 
allegory – is what the next section is about. 
 
(v) Temporality and Allegory 
 
For DeLillo, it seems, the loss of memory and Otherness and the crisis of history in 
the postmodern of late capitalism described in Cosmopolis can be seen to stem from a 
language problem, specifically, the absence of irony in allegory, the reification of 
allegory into a ritualised form. In essence, what this ritualised version of allegory 
represents is the conflation of sign and commodity, self and sign, and with this, the 
assertion of such allegory as adequate to Otherness and temporality (the two, as I have 
said, operating as synonyms for each other here). I shall return to the question of 
temporality shortly. But for now, it is the condition of allegory (the “rhetoric of 
temporality”, as de Man has put it) and its tendency towards ritualisation in DeLillo’s 
vision of capitalism that I shall consider.  
     Allegory loses its vital relationship to anteriority (the possibility of our experience 
of duration in time) in the capitalist symbolic when it becomes ritualised 
(commodified) and severed from the relationship to irony that enables allegory as 
vehicle of iteration and différance. DeLillo, when asked about his interest in ritual, the 
processes of ritualisation and its consequences, provides this useful gloss: 
In The Names my interest was the way in which a mind centered on ritual can so easily slip off 
into violence. I thought that ritual stripped from the world becomes dangerous, becomes violent. 
It loses its connection. It’s almost pure silence devolving into nuclear weaponry, in a curious 
way, in the way a theory, a formula on a blackboard, like E=mc2, progresses into a bomb 
explosion on the other side of the world. It’s a little like that. These people had removed 
themselves from the world. And they were acting out of an impetus of pure mind. I felt this 
could lead to what it did lead to: ritual killings.168
 
What is referred to here, as “ritual stripped away from the world”, is what we can 
think of as allegory stripped from Otherness, language stripped from irony.  
Cosmopolis, with its preponderance of theory and theorists, associates violence 
(Packer and Levin) with such displays of “pure mind”, such allegories, as I have been 
saying, of those who have “removed themselves from the world” – in fact, from the 
                                                 
168From “Writing as a Deeper Form of Concentration”, and interview with DeLillo by Maria Moss, 
conducted on November 14, 1988 in Berlin. Appeared in Sources #6, 1999, pp82-87.  
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pain and Otherness of the world. The process outlined in DeLillo’s quote is pure 
capitalism, the progression of aestheticisation (theory, etc.) to the production of a 
sublime referent (in this case, the bomb). In Cosmopolis, the sublime condition is one 
of pure data, where the body and memory are left behind for a world of information, 
life and immortality on a disk, “an idea beyond the body” (105). 
     Within the futurism of ‘Packerian’ capitalism, commodity production is conflated 
with allegory production in such a way as to make the allegorisation of reality a 
“sacred” covenant. The result, as Packer here witnesses, is pure spectacle, simulation 
divorced from Otherness, a mode of representation divorced from “the world that 
provokes it”.169
   He stood behind her, pointing over her shoulder. Beneath the data strips, or tickers, there were 
fixed digits marking the time in the major cities of the world. He knew what she was thinking. 
Never mind the speed that makes it hard to follow what passes before the eye. The speed is the 
point. Never mind the urgent and endless replenishment. The way data dissolves at one end of 
the series just as it takes shape at the other. This is the point, the thrust, the future. We are not 
witnessing the flow of information so much as pure spectacle. Or information made sacred, 
ritually unreadable. The small monitors of the office, home and car become a kind of idolatry 
here, where crowds might gather in astonishment. (80)  
 
Allegory – signified here by the “tickers” representing commodity information – 
becomes “unreadable” at the point of its ritualisation, which is to say, at the point 
where information replaces reality with itself as referent. In this scheme, the 
relationship of allegory and différance is severed, delay and deferral so crucial to our 
experience of narrative, duration, history and difference are replaced by “blur” and 
“speed” where the “endless replenishment” of signs is a given. With the acceleration 
of allegory – through the fusing of commodity and technology – Otherness is 
diminished and, as compensation, we have the “thrust” into the “future”. The loss of 
the Other, this misprision of Otherness, is what sustains (and produces) Packer’s 
dream of the future, and his (our) credulity towards cyber-capital and technology 
corresponds directly to the acceleration that makes allegory invisible, “unreadable”. 
By this invisibility, the separation of word and world animated in Otherness, irony 
and pain, is missed, and capitalism’s false mourning proceeds. In a sense, then, and 
this explains the religious language of this passage, the “future” replaces the Other 
through its simulation of Otherness; the allegorical future resembles the messianic in 
Packerian capitalism. But only ‘resembles’, since, as Derrida has shown, the future (as 
future) like the messiah and Other, never can return; it never arrives. This is, then, the 
                                                 
169 “In the Ruins of the Future”. Ibid. p.34. 
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negative structure built into capitalism’s appeal to the sublime object or referent – its 
simulation of Otherness is matched by the simulated irony of the Other’s presentation 
– which is to say, specifically, its constant deferral. The irony at work in such an 
economy of simulation is explained by Packer’s “negative theology” where the forms 
of his ‘faith’ – technology, allegory, commodity – have supplanted the object of 
‘faith’: God. Our “astonishment”, as DeLillo has said, is technology, not God, 
allegory itself, ritualised, not the Other(ness) of its provenance or reference. If this 
system appears to operate as a negative structure, in the manner of irony, in truth, this, 
too, is a simulation, since the structure in fact relies on a forgetting of the past, of 
memory, the misprision of Otherness, via an ‘irony’ that it has no need to foreground 
or declare – an irony that in fact is recognised by Levin as “lying”. The Other is 
missed – this is the structural objective of such capitalism – to the purpose of 
commodity and semiotic production, and none of what is produced is designed to 
remember (mourn) this missing, the Other and what I have been referring to as the 
pain of the world and its fallen language.170
     In Cosmopolis, time becomes DeLillo’s main category for the consideration of 
Otherness. The ‘time’ of pain is, we might consider, time itself, unmargined by 
language171, untethered to system or capital; pain is time before and beyond 
technology, the force that mortifies what we think of as the future. This time 
resembles an Otherness I associate with pain but not merely pain as affective state 
(ego-pain), but as allegory for non-coincidence, delay, split, etc.172 Our experience of 
time is keyed to our experience of language. When allegory becomes a commodity, 
then, so too, our experience of time, lacking relation to Otherness (memory) comes to 
be expressed by the economy of the commodity, becomes the constant restatement of 
a present and no new thing. This association of time and allegory helps explain one of 
the more enigmatic considerations of the text, the depiction of temporal discontinuity. 
                                                 
170 Mourning as forgetting is what such commodity production represents. As such, the work of art, the 
work that remembers the conditions of its production, mourning through its remembering of the 
condition of its very reproducibility – Otherness and irony – is thus, by DeLillo’s ‘argument’, to be 
seen as distinct from the commodity. 
171 In a sense Tuttle is DeLillo’s paradigmatic condensation of Otherness, a body, composed of 
memory, and “lost” in time – in a sense, an emissary of time itself – associated with pain, loss, and 
mourning, and whose language use serves to foreground the very fallen nature of our own constitution 
in language as tender allegorists, fallen-language users. 
172 This is not to suggest that time is equivalent to grief, only that time is alien (Other) to our attempts 
at measuring it, though we construct and experience time for ourselves through allegory (de Man) time 
itself remains Other to allegory. Thus, allegories are always delayed. In this chapter pain is the term I 
use for this condition of delay, deferral, non-coincidence, Otherness and irony.  
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The following occurs as part of Packer’s experience of an explosion he witnesses on 
his monitor seconds before it actually happens. 
   His own image caught his eye, live on the oval screen beneath the spycam. Some seconds 
passed. He saw himself recoil in shock, More time passed, He felt suspended, waiting. Then 
there was a detonation, loud and deep, near enough to consume all information around him. He 
recoiled in shock. Everyone did. The phrase was part of the gesture, the familiar expression, 
embodied in the motion of the head and the limbs. He recoiled in shock. The phrase 
reverberated in the body. (93) 
 
By one reading, we can see how the pain of temporal dislocation places in relief 
Packer’s subordination to language, how instinctual his particular mourning is in 
taking recourse to dead language, the cliché, “recoil in shock”, that recovers 
experience as some sort of reflex translation. Marooned in his Other-less, irony-less, 
totalised language economy (the commodity-symbolic) Packer’s experience is 
reduced to the most “familiar” representation of it. But of course, the sensation of this 
disjointed temporality is not so much an effect of Packer (his body) responding to the 
world (the street, in this case, a bomb), but rather his response to a mediated world, to 
the world as translated for him through his technologies of representation (allegory) – 
the computers and cameras in his limousine. The “shock” to which Packer “recoils” 
has its origins not so much in the world, as in the representation of that world; in a 
sense, in responding to his monitor screen Packer is responding to a repetition, and it 
is this conflation of world with representation that, in fact, explains what we can think 
of as the crisis of temporality that results from the failure to mourn the pain and 
Otherness of time itself.173 As Packer says, “time is a thing that grows scarcer every 
day” (69); time’s “scarcity” correlates to the replacement of temporal delay and 
difference (time itself, as Otherness) with repetition. The reason for this is the false 
mourning of time and Otherness I have been considering for the past three chapters, 
so associated with the fusion of allegory, technology and commodity, and expressed 
in the idol status of the personal computer. Technology – thus constellated – 
diminishes pain and Otherness, or, as Kinski puts it, “computer power eliminates 
doubt” (86). 
                                                 
173 Both Lauren and Packer seem adepts of future vision, both seem to be able to read or experience 
events before they happen. For Lauren this is due to her “hyperpreparedness” for imagination, her 
hosting of Otherness. Packer, on the other hand, appears to intuit future events because of his superb 
skill in reading the sublime, mediated world. He doesn’t anticipate the future, or the Other, but rather 
its allegorisation. It is not the real he anticipates but what passes for the real; the mediated event of the 
real is what Packer can anticipate, and it is this that is meant when it is said that he can read the future. 
As representing and translating subjectivities, Lauren and Packer represent two opposites: the artist and 
the capitalist. 
 180
     Without “doubt”, temporality itself becomes an expression of the commodity-
symbolic, where it is reproduced as a “furtive sameness” (U, 786), the result of a loss 
of difference or “nuance” (U, 785). In such a condition, time becomes an experience 
of slippage, like that mirrored in commodity production and the commodity-
symbolic’s production of allegories and signs that, because indistinguishable and 
arbitrary, constantly efface each other, sliding over one another in a constant slippage 
more accurately referred to as repetition – what Benjamin characterises in the Modern 
as the production of novelty without change. The index for this ritualised version of 
allegory is, of course, money, just as it is money that comes to express the crisis of 
temporality in the evacuated, non-tender allegories of Packerian capitalism. Kinski 
(Packer’s high priest of ritualised theory and allegory – note that Packer picks her up 
outside the Church of St. Mary the Virgin (78)) makes this clear: 
[…] money has taken a turn. All wealth has become wealth for its own sake. There’s no other 
kind of enormous wealth. Money has lost its narrative quality the way painting did once upon a 
time. Money is talking to itself […] And property follows of course. (77)   
 
Kinski’s analysis of the condition of money, in fact, doubles as a description of 
allegory without temporality – allegory turned, as money is, into meaningless signs 
that no longer refer to anything other than more signs. Hence the ritualised nature of 
allegory, and hence Kinski’s attempt to explain temporal discontinuity through an 
analogy of the market and a theory of money: 
‘Money makes time. It used to be the other way around. Clock time accelerated the rise of 
capitalism. People stopped thinking about eternity. They began to concentrate on hours, 
measurable hours, man-hours, using labour more efficiently. […] 
   It’s cyber-capital that creates the future. […] 
   Because time is a corporate asset now. It belongs to the free market system. The present is 
harder to find. It is being sucked out of the world to make way for the future of uncontrolled 
markets and huge investment potential. (79) 
 
Money has become self-referring, just as time does for Eric when it begins to rehearse 
or quote itself in his experience – the ritualisation of allegory is central to this. The 
future that Packer wants to occupy cannot exist; it is, in fact, a misrecognised 
(mediated) replay of reality, not a future reality but a loop of allegorised commodity 
reality, which is why it is always mediated by technology – it isn’t that technology 
predicts the future, but that it is “cyber-capital that creates the future” (79) – a future 
that is ‘out of time’, a simulation of time. Packer’s belief that technology reveals the 
future is, thus, a statement about his successful misprision of Otherness and his 
credulity to technologised allegory. This is possible in Packer’s world because of the 
precession of allegories, commodities and money that have replaced time. Without the 
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articulation of memory and difference provided by irony, allegory is made vulnerable 
to the force of acceleration that sees it become a commodity form; allegory loses its 
narrative structure – the quality of duration, history, and memory - in the way that 
Kinski says money has. In a sense, money describes the fate of allegory in the 
capitalist symbolic. 
 
Part Two: Language and Mourning 
 
(i) Packer and the Mirror of Language 
 
Packer’s refusal of memory (his ushering of words into obsolescence) reveals both his 
experience of temporality and allegory, since time (as Otherness and memory) is 
something he seeks to control through his mastery of allegory. Thus, to understand 
Packer’s temporal predicament, we have to consider his “philosophy” of language, 
and what is distinctive about this language philosophy is its refusal of irony and 
différance. Without delay or deferral, Packer is lost in atemporality, time itself is “out 
of joint”, experienced as like the slippage of one sign over another, as like the 
stacking or queuing-up of presents. Without the possibility of difference, the future 
and the present conflate and become indistinguishable. As Packer later wonders: 
“[h]ave all the worlds conflated, all possible states become present at once?” (205). 
As we will see, DeLillo’s portrayal of the travails of Packer is also a portrait of the 
travails of language within the capitalist postmodern. Having established “pain” as 
DeLillo’s evocation of the a priori condition of being-in-the-world (being in New 
York), and after having begun to associate this pain with the ‘street’, the ‘body’, the 
‘Other’ and, of course, time itself, we can now come to the issue of mourning – how 
this pain is regarded, treated, and conceived. From this consideration, we will see into 
the lives and motivations of Packer and Levin, their memories, but also the function 
of capitalism’s symbolic economy. The temporal disruptions Cosmopolis records, 
along with the violence and the intimations of terror the text presents, all return the 
reader to DeLillo’s ethical demand – the mourning of pain, of Otherness and world, in 
the economy of language. What Cosmopolis shows is how this mourning is 
misrecognised and avoided, and how, as a consequence, tenderness and irony too are 
missed. 
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     Specifically, Packer’s philosophy of language misses the tenderness of 
representation itself; he misses the fact that it is our methods of representation 
(allegory) that are tender – underdetermining – when he assumes that what is 
represented is a match for reality. Primarily, the fault lies in his narcissism, where his 
own private and subjective experience of the external world is taken to be definitive 
of the world. Packer’s “self” is thus an effect of his capacity to name and master the 
world, and, vice versa, the world is an effect of his subjectivity, his capacity to ‘know’ 
it.174 Thus, Packer’s existential statement: “when he died he would not end. The 
world would end” (6). But, of course, there is a great fragility implicit in such a 
solipsistic outlook, since the threat of Otherness – the unmasterable, untranslatable 
and ironic – may, if repressed, return to devastate the subject’s relation to self and 
world. The threat of such an Otherness is, of course, as I have shown previously, the 
motor that drives Packer’s philosophy and, more generally, capitalism’s false 
mourning as a systemic misrecognition of the Other. We note, then, a kind of 
desperation and desire at work in Packer’s ‘investment’ in irony-less allegory, and, 
with this, the accuracy of Elise’s assessment of him as “dedicated to knowing” (19), 
the successful fusion of “science and ego combined” (70). The necessity of this fusion 
is explained by the wilfulness with which Packer misprises pain. For Packer this 
misprision of pain is what fuels, and manifests as, his addiction to the 
“astonishments” of technology.  
     Without a theory of tenderness or irony (the capacity to faithfully mourn the 
Other), the painful split between word and world hardens into a binary – what Packer 
calls the “zero-oneness of the world” (24). 
   He looked past Chin towards streams of numbers running in opposite directions. He 
understood how much it meant to him, the roll and flip of data on a screen. He studied the 
figural diagrams that brought organic patterns into play, birdwing, and chambered shell. It was 
shallow thinking to maintain that numbers and charts were the cold compression of unruly 
human energies, every sort of yearning and midnight sweat reduced to lucid units in the 
financial markets. In fact data itself was soulful and glowing, a dynamic aspect of the life 
process. This was the eloquence of alphabets and numeric systems, now fully realized in 
electronic form, in the zero-oneness of the world, the digital imperative that defined every 
breath of the planet’s living billions. Here was the heave of the biosphere. Our bodies and 
oceans were here, knowable and whole. (24) 
 
                                                 
174 We see this in incidental scenes such as when Packer regards a seagull: “he’d been interested once 
and had mastered the teeming details of bird anatomy […] he mastered the steepest matters in half an 
afternoon […] admiring the bird, thinking into it, trying to know the bird” (7). The bird, here, as in The 
Body Artist, stands in for the Other. On another occasion, after his interlude with Didi Fancher, the 
name of a plant he had failed to name returns to him and with it a reconfirmed sense of his identity: “he 
knew who he was …” (32). 
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Of course, what is described here is still an interpretative position of privilege, and 
Packer is one of the few able to determine the “knowable and whole”, since he has, as 
he puts it, the “hereditary script” (38) that enables him to see and predict the future. 
But something of the vulnerability (in fact missed tenderness) of Packer’s philosophy 
of language is apparent in his opening ‘existential’ statement in the text as well. We 
find here not only the basis for his private, denotative language of allegory, but also 
another of DeLillo’s submerged ironies. 
Freud is finished, Einstein’s next. He was reading the Special Theory tonight, in English and 
German, but put the book aside, finally, and lay completely still, trying to summon the will to 
speak the single word that would turn off the lights. Nothing existed around him. There was 
only the noise in his head, the mind in time. (6) 
 
Here the “single word” (a phrase recollecting Nick Shay’s endeavour to edge closer to 
God’s “secret”) is that of the masterful self, capable of speaking the world into (or out 
of) existence. But rather than the ursprung of existence, the word of God framed by 
the existential “nothing” articulated as part of Packer’s messianic egotism (“when he 
died he would not end. The world would end”), the word is simply the noise that turns 
off the lights in his room. The joke is telling, since for Packer, seemingly committed 
to language, his theory of language (allegory devoid of irony) is reduced to a theory of 
noise: the crude and anachronistic technology of voice/noise response, the product of 
an obsolescent theory only one remove from the high kitsch of clap-on/clap-off 
lighting. With this minor irony comes a statement of tragic-irony: Packer’s faith in 
technology for an ‘afterlife’ in cyber-consciousness is undermined by the technology 
(its tendency to anachronism, its tenderness to time) framing his existentialism, tied to 
the solipsism of his language-model lacking Otherness: “there was only the noise in 
his head” – the noise is language, the “mind in time” is allegory. For all his attempts 
to transcend to the timeless realm of pure technology, pure allegory, it is the time of 
the fallen world characterised by the delay and duration of language that he is 
marooned in. The “noise” in his head is also the “noise” of the street that he attempts 
to diminish by prousting his limousine. In both cases, this noise represents the pain of 
memory and Otherness, and, moreover, the association of such Otherness and pain 
with the fallen nature of being-in-language and being-in-time. A “noise” theory of 
language is one where words and signs are reduced to the condition of being merely a 
surface, one that maps or matches reality. In this instance, this surface/noise analogy 
for language explains the lack of depth, iteration, difference and irony in Packer’s 
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conception of language. Language becomes a mimetic surface, something to match 
oneself to, to recognise oneself by, and to map the world with.175
     As I’m suggesting, such a language philosophy offers Packer a sense of contiguity 
with the world by falsely offering both a capacity to see himself in the world and the 
world in himself. The text’s primary expression of this condition comes in Packer’s 
statement of regard for his own apartment tower. Here we find the basis of a 
philosophy of language – limited to mimesis – that explains the inadequacy of his 
mode of mourning. 
He felt contiguous with it. It was eighty-nine stories, a prime number, in an undistinguished 
sheath of hazy bronze glass. […] 
   The tower gave him strength and depth. […] The one virtue of its surface was to skim and 
bend the river light and mime the tides of open sky. There was an aura of texture and reflection. 
He scanned its length and felt connected to it, sharing the surface and the environment that came 
into contact with the surface, from both sides. A surface separated inside from out and belongs 
no less to one than the other. He’d thought about surfaces in the shower once. He put on his 
sunglasses. (8) 
 
We note then the importance Packer attributes to the “bronze” surface of the tower 
with its capacity to “mime” and “reflect” the world. By this ‘bronzing’ a connection 
between surface and environment is made – this is the dream of Packer’s “aesthetics 
of interaction” that reveals the dependency of Packer’s mourning on mimesis. What I 
have referred to as the bronzing of reality is the force of mimetic allegory, and as we 
have seen, the term (bronze) is one developed through Underworld.176 “Bronze” for 
DeLillo is a term that connects capitalism’s symbolic order of consumption and 
technology with the aesthetic imperative of non-tender allegory. In Cosmopolis we 
see references to a bronzed statue of a man hailing a cab – an attempt to both 
aestheticise and encase the life of the street, as well as Packer’s description of the 
interior of his limousine – a haven in “bronzy light” (179).177 We note too the 
concordance of the bronzy light with the “ceiling mural” in Packer’s car that, true to 
the force of mapping, measuring and aestheticising that this word (bronze) represents 
                                                 
175 Packer’s enthusiasm for poetry is significant here: he reads not so much for ‘literary’ reasons, or 
pleasure, as for mimetic considerations, such as the regulation of his breathing set to the spacing 
between words. This also explains his easy dismissal of Freud and Einstein as no longer mimetically 
accurate, and of course, what we see here is the complete lack of a theory of iteration, interpretation 
and memory, as, for Packer at least, these theories simply cease being useful over time, become 
obsolete (anachronistic) as outdated products and terms (like “skyscraper”) he dismisses from 
language.  
176 See references to the tower Nick works in in Phoenix, see also the dominant hue of the Bruegel 
print, the thoughts of the historian and mourner Albert Bronzini (all in Underworld), and see also the 
essay “In the Ruins of the Future” where the term is associated with institutions of capitalism. 
177 And of course, Kendra Hays too, as aestheticised object, is described by Packer as a “blend of 
copper and bronze” (112). 
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for DeLillo, shows “the arrangement of the planets at the time of [Packer’s] birth” 
(179). The bronze surface of Packer’s appartment tower is also the key to the other 
concern of Packer’s meditations on his tower, the relation of “inside” and “out”, 
“one” and the “other”. When allegory is reduced to the quality of a mimetic surface, 
Packer feels he has connected world and self. Not only do we see here, then, Packer’s 
philosophy of language as mirror but, in his connection of self and world, we see how 
he sees himself as indissociable from this surface, himself as mediating data, an 
“embodied” technology of allegory, a monument to capitalism. Thus, in his regarding 
of the World Trade Centre Towers we are not surprised to find Packer identifying, 
even empathising, with these structures:   
   They looked empty from here. He liked that idea. They were made to be the last tall things, 
made empty, designed to hasten the future. They were the end of the outside world. They 
weren’t here, exactly  They were in the future, a time beyond geography and touchable money 
and the people who stack and count it. (36) 
 
The World Trade Centre Towers represent the zenith of the commodity-symbolic of 
capitalism, a monument not just to capitalism, but to its power of allegory; they stand 
as monuments to the power of signification, representation, and the power of an 
economy to assert presence, totality, theory, and allegory. Kinski’s reference to 
Packer’s own tower – “you live in a tower that soars to heaven and goes unpunished 
by God “ (103) – is even more true of the Bank towers that, like the tower of Babel to 
which Kinski refers, attempt, under the aegis of capitalism, the usurpation of the 
“astonishing” power of God – the word, the perfect allegory.  
     What Packer celebrates about the towers, how they signify the “end of the outside 
world” is a consequence of his own belief in an overly denotative, mimetic language 
philosophy. Without the Otherness of an “outside world”, all conception of history 
and memory – and with these the notions of différance and iteration – are lost, 
consigned to obsolescence. We see this in the way in which, for Packer, certain words 
become obsolete when they no longer mirror ‘reality’.178 There is no sense for Packer 
of an “afterlife” for such words, or for words and allegories in general – which is why 
his theory of allegory, lacking irony, is not in fact allegorical at all. There is no sense 
here of words signifying-on in living memory, signifying differently for Others, and 
for this reason Packer’s language philosophy is atemporal and ahistorical, relying on 
the notion that for language to be useful and justified it must fully satisfy, while also 
                                                 
178 Examples can be found throughout the text, including “skyscraper” (9); “airports” (22); “ATM” 
(54); “walkie talkie” (102). 
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proposing the unimpeachable presence of its referent. There is no tenderness here, no 
conception of language as vulnerable because of what it misses or because it is fallen, 
or for the consideration of language as used within a community of users. As 
representative of a sort of language philosophy within the postmodern of late 
capitalism, Packer in fact appears as a kind of poststructural anachronism, entirely 
constructed by language, not so much a ‘self’ as a construct of language. In effect, he 
represents a poststructuralism that lacks a theory of irony and that misprises the 
untranslatable immanence of Otherness. We note the sovereignty that language 
appears to have over Packer in the way that phrases uttered by others (“let it express 
itself”; “recoil in shock”) become almost fated in his actions.179 Packer is as trapped 
in a prison house of language as Levin is “trapped” (155) in the “dead light” of stars; 
both men are trapped in the temporality of dead allegory, a present that is constantly 
recapitulated, constantly feeding back on itself. Without a sense of the irony of 
language – the ironies in language – both men have little sense of the Otherness of 
time (time as immanent memory, as possibility), and consequently, also, both 
misperceive allegory by excluding from it its relation to difference. By repressing 
irony in allegory, allegory, as trope of temporality, ceases to offer either man the 
possibility of imagining a future, and a way of asserting subjective agency.180 Such 
failing of imagination and agency is encapsulated in the ‘artist’ of the novel, Benno 
Levin.  
                                                 
179 For this reason, Levin’s pronouncement on Packer’s death – “he is dead, word for word” (55) – is 
more accurate than he may imagine since Packer himself is all sign, the product of a commodity-
symbolic of repetition, of one sign for another without “nuance” to distinguish between them; the 
phrase Levin uses, “word for word”, meaning to repeat, we note, is also a repetition of Packer’s use of 
the phrase.  
180 Such a failure of agency is most clearly apparent in the fated-quality of Packer’s death-ward drive. 
Fate becomes a sort of non-ironic irony, a substitute for Otherness, a sort of transcendental ideal to live 
by, much in the manner of paranoia and superstition, whereby the demands of others, Otherness, 
memory, and personality, can be overlooked. Throughout all his actions Packer is merely performing a 
predestined script written for him in the commodity-symbolic, by his compulsion to the allegorical 
imperatives of this symbolic. Packer’s theorist, Kinski, articulates this fate when she speaks of this 
symbolic and its allegorical control and manufacturing of time: 
 
   ‘[T]ime is a corporate asset now. It belongs to the free market system. The present is harder to 
find. It is being sucked out of the world to make way for the future of uncontrolled markets and 
huge investment potential. The future becomes insistent. This is why something will happen 
soon, maybe today,’ she said, looking slyly into her hands. ‘To correct the acceleration of time. 
Bring nature back to normal, more or less.’ (79) 
 
This ‘correction’ is, of course, Packer’s fated death. Fate, as such, isn’t fate at all, but merely the 
machinations of the symbolic, and it is one of the great ironies of the novel that Packer, because of his 
refusal of irony, mistakes fate, and mistakes also the possibility of asserting agency and imagination 
and ‘re-writing’ his life.  
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(ii) Levin. “Where do I stand in this light?” 
 
Levin, it seems, is the result of DeLillo’s pessimistic conjecture as to the impact of the 
commodity-symbolic on modes of representation and allegory, and the sort of 
allegories and art that, left to itself, such a symbolic might produce. In simple terms, 
Levin is DeLillo’s imagining of an ‘artist’ as helplessly intricated within the sort of 
language philosophy Packer, as exemplary capitalist, maintains.181 Levin, we might 
consider, is posed by DeLillo as an artist/author figure in Cosmopolis for the reason 
that he represents a set of failures that, in truth, disqualify him from being one of 
DeLillo’s ‘artists’. Chief among these failings are the refusal of Otherness and the 
misrecognition of irony, but also a tendency towards a literalist praxis that includes in 
its repertoire repetition and violence. As author-figure, Levin is revealed to be the 
dupe of a completely impoverished philosophy, something expressed by Levin’s 
question that, chronologically speaking, is the last utterance of the novel: “[s]o what is 
left that’s worth the telling?” (61).  
     How cruel Levin must feel his fate to be that his beloved allegory is not what he 
had thought it to be; not only is allegory the fallen “dead light” of a lost referent, it is 
a light that “traps” him when he is made helpless to, and a victim of, the allegories of 
others (in particular, the allegories others hold of him). Without a theory of the fallen 
and ruined nature of allegory – of the work of irony within allegory – Levin is left, 
philosophically speaking, with no other way to conceive of language but as mimetic, 
and, as a result, he tends towards the assertion of a manic, compensatory and paranoid 
allegorical symbolic. A manifestation of this symbolic can be seen in Levin’s 
response to the perceived ‘deadness’ at the root of allegory. Rather than tendering this 
‘death’ or absence as the force of irony within allegory, Levin attempts to “fix” 
allegory through the performance of an act that will reconnect world and word. This is 
the base motivation behind his ‘work of art’, his impossible book that he refers to as, 
“the literature of a life awake and asleep, because dreams too, and little stabs of 
                                                 
181 Essentially, Levin is a poor, dispossessed, version of Packer, the ‘artist’ to his ‘capitalist’, if you 
like, but both are versions of each other; indeed, both characters are conflated by DeLillo when he 
brings them together in Levin’s apartment. Here Packer and Levin seem less like persons as like words 
when, in the text, they are referred to as the “subject” and the “other” (see: 186, 187, 189, 193, 196, 
199). The effect is one of ambiguation: “subject” and “other” merge and switch, suggesting a sort of 
homogenisation of subjectivity and difference that, in the commodity-symbolic, DeLillo appears to 
suggest, is the parallel experience of the fate of art to become indistinguishable from the commodity. 
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memory, and all the pitiful habits and concealments, and all the things around me 
would be included, noises in the street …” (61).182 Levin hopes for “ten thousand 
pages that will stop the world” (152). Levin’s motivation to fix and control allegory 
through some dreamed-of authorial fusion of word and world is a consequence of the 
fact that Levin is peculiarly vulnerable to a certain limited form of allegory, to the 
mimetic pictures that, within his paranoid state, Levin assumes others hold of him.183  
They always said I was erratic. He is erratic. He has problems of personality and hygiene. He 
walks, whatever, funny. I never heard a single one of these statements but knew they were being 
made the way you sense something in a person’s look that does not have to be spoken. (55) 
 
Levin’s conviction to literalism makes him “pervious” (195) and helpless to language.  
We note here also how irony (the unspoken communication) is reduced to paranoia, 
the reflex of the narcissistic personality.184  
   I was always aware of what they said in words or looks. It is what people think they see in 
another person that makes his reality. If they think he walks at a slant, then he walks at a slant, 
uncoordinated, because this is his role in the lives around him, and if they say his clothes don’t 
fit, he will learn to be neglectful of his wardrobe as a means of scorning them and inflicting 
punishment on himself. (57) 
 
Levin’s masochistic tendencies here correlate to a certain allegorical maladroitness, a 
slavishness to an imagined (because paranoid) semiotic that, as an author, he is unable 
to imagine differently. Ironically, Levin’s belief that his “reality” is entirely in thrall 
to a process of social construction is in fact recognition of the a priori Otherness from 
which the sort of tendering of self and allegory at work in irony and mourning are 
made possible. The perceived helplessness and lack of agency of Levin’s position are, 
however, a result of a fundamental misunderstanding of irony. Without a ‘theory’ of 
                                                 
182 But this is Levin’s wish prior to his shooting of Packer that is chronologically the last and 
unrecorded act of the text. The effect of the shooting is to completely unravel Levin’s desire to write 
his impossible book, and to attempt his salvation and mourning. The act that is supposed to define his 
writing radically ironises his relationship to language and he is left marooned in the silence of irony 
without a conception of tenderness. “What is left that’s worth the telling” (61) Levin asks, as we the 
reader are left with the sense that after such violence there is no need for literature; Levin is left in the 
silence of an irony with no demand to tender allegory, no need for this silence to signify; the death of 
the imagination is thus associated here, by DeLillo, with the crude and literal act of violence. 
183 Moreover, such is Levin’s susceptibility to allegory, and with this, his conviction in the literal 
translatability of word and world that he contracts foreign and culture-specific syndromes from the 
Internet. As if vulnerable to the word “virus” – its Internet context conflated with its real world 
applications – Levin contracts the symptoms of Korean Hwabyung (56), Carribean susto (152), and 
Haitian “delirious gusts in translation” (160). 
184 Of course, both Packer and Levin are models of a narcissism that acts as a substitution for the 
demands of mourning the Other and the pain of non-coincidence between self and world. Whether 
through the recoveries of the grandiose self (Packer) who incorporates the world and Other within his 
expanded, networked and masochistic self (the pun here on ‘corporation’ in light of the capitalist seems 
unavoidable), or the recoveries of the evacuated self whose, again, masochistic suffering at the hands 
of Others (Levin) is a process of his paranoid connection making, both represent the sort of false 
mourning DeLillo situates within capitalism and its linguistic/symbolic structures – its refusal of irony.  
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irony or Otherness (a sense of himself as [an] other, something precluded in the 
compensatory motivations of narcissism), Levin is reduced to a kind of allegorical 
fatalism – a sense of suffering and helplessness for which, as is made clear in 
Cosmopolis, the inevitable outcome is violence. In the end, it is violence that links 
Packer and Levin and defines their experience of being-in-the-world within a 
symbolic such as that of DeLillo’s capitalism. 
     Something of Levin’s misrecognition of irony, and with this, his disorientation in 
the poststructural world of loss and Otherness, is explored when he considers the 
question of truth and its relationship to speaking and writing. Here, also, we find a 
complication to Levin’s conception that his “reality” is made by others, since his 
reality is in fact crucially shaped by his denial of Otherness and explained by 
something like his understanding of the lie: 
   It’s hard for me to speak directly to people. I used to try to tell the truth. But it’s hard not to 
lie. I lie to people because this is my language, how I talk. It’s the temperature inside the head of 
who I am. I don’t aim remarks at the person I’m speaking to but try to miss him, or glance a 
remark so to speak off his shoulder. 
   After a time I began to take satisfaction in this. It was never in me to mean what I said. Every 
unnecessary lie was another way to build a person. I see this clearly now. No one could help me 
but myself. […] 
   They were not lies anyway. They were not falsehoods, most of them, but simple deflections 
off the listener’s body, his or her shoulders, or they were total misses. 
   To speak directly to a person was unbearable. But in these pages I am going to write my way 
into truth. Trust me. (150) 
 
The truth Levin refers to here, along with his injunction “trust me”, based on his self-
professed unreliability as both narrator and author (his lying, his sense of being 
“derived” (60)), presents the reader with the sort of example of irony that DeLillo, as 
with his presentation of Packer, intends to be seen as the ambient condition within 
which both men assert a sort of allegorical violence to the purpose of “missing” 
Otherness and irony. A form of “bad faith” is at work in Levin’s conception of writing 
when in contrast to speaking or talking he conceives of writing as uncontaminated by 
the Other and Otherness; and yet this idea, as appealing as it must be for Levin, is so 
clearly undermined by his own concerns that he is a derivation, that what he writes is 
authored by someone else, and indeed his whole philosophy of mimeticism makes 
plain the simulacral quality of any such writing.185 Rather than accepting Otherness 
(or irony) as a necessary condition of writing – à la Derrida and poststructuralism – 
                                                 
185 In effect, DeLillo fuses the poverty of Levin’s subjectivity with his status as author. This is evident 
in Levin’s confession: “ […] I can only pretend to be someone. And this is why I felt derived at first, 
working on these pages. I didn’t know if it was me that was writing so much as someone I wanted to 
sound like” (60). 
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Levin tries to repress this knowledge, and the way he does this is by translating irony 
(and with this his relationship to the Other) into lying, a tactic of missing, deflection 
and avoidance. 
     The now commonplace existentialism whereby one is ‘defined’ by the gaze of the 
Other and one’s separation from Others (expressed also in the economy of language 
where a ‘thing’ is defined by what the thing is not) is travestied here by Levin’s 
avoidance of the Other (the non-self), despite the fact, and the irony, that he appears 
to mimic this sort of negative-definition process; Levin’s “self”, being not so much a 
product of difference from others, but rather the denial of others, is thus a “person” 
“built” on a lie, on a miss.186 As such, however, we begin to understand something of 
the pathos of Levin’s condition: he is no more than an “allegory”, a lie, a ‘fiction’, 
and he knows this. In contrast, and again this is a feature of his refusal of Otherness, 
those he observes and who surround him in society are also only allegorical persons, 
but persons who seem impervious to the pain of Otherness and loss that defines 
Levin’s experience of being allegorical. 
   There’s nothing in the world but other people […] I had this thought one day. It was the 
thought of my life. I’m surrounded by other people. It’s buy and sell. It’s let’s have lunch. I 
thought look at them and look at me. Light shines through me on the street. I’m what’s the 
word, pervious to visible light. […] 
    I thought all these other people. I thought how did they get to be who they are. It’s banks and 
car parks. It’s airline tickets in their computers. It’s restaurants filled with people talking. It’s 
people taking the merchant copy out of the leather folder and then signing it and separating the 
merchant copy from the customer copy and putting their credit card in their wallet. This alone 
could do it. It’s people who have doctors who order tests for them. This alone. […] I’m helpless 
in their system that makes no sense to me. You wanted me to be a helpless robot soldier but all I 
could be was helpless. (195) 
 
But why “helpless[ness]” and not tenderness? After all, Levin is on the cusp on a 
tender-vision of the constructed and allegorical nature of identity here. In a sense, he 
is right to think of himself as repository of a ‘truth’ about the fallenness of allegory 
underneath its consumer-oriented manifestation. But it must be remembered that this 
vision of Others as merely signs (a signature on a bill, for example) is entirely 
contingent on the terms of Levin’s narcissism; the Otherness of these people is 
reduced to stereotype; Levin can only see them as allegories and so his sense of 
isolation, of insight or ‘truth,’ is entirely a consequence of his narcissistic conceit. 
Without the capacity for the recognition of others (and Otherness) Levin seeks solace 
                                                 
186 When Levin says that “every unnecessary lie was another way to build a person” the person he is 
referring to is himself; the distancing effect of the phrase – its use of the third person – is telling, in a 
sense, there is no such person as Levin. Of course, Benno Levin is a pseudonym, but the point is that 
the fictional quality of this suggests the pseudonymous quality of being Richard Sheets as well. 
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in objects and procedures that reflect back his own philosophy, his own self-image. 
As an artist/author he is thus incapable of producing work, since all such work must 
be a reflection of an ‘identity’ that doesn’t exist, is false or pseudonymous. Levin, we 
note, fails to write anything except for the brief, derivative, inaccurate, and halting 
narrative of Packer’s murder, but we do note the presence of certain ‘art-works’ 
(installations) in his apartment. The exercise bike (149), the large iron writing desk 
(149), and the port-a-loo (190), are all objects Levin identifies with; all are versions of 
other objects they crudely mimic; all are evocative of what we might consider a poetic 
of futility, of inutility, and obsolescence. We note also the somatic intensity with 
which Levin reacts to money; for Levin, the representational and allegorical qualities 
of exchange value are something to embrace and incorporate, as seems apparent in his 
wish to rub Packer’s money on his face (58), and in his licking the “milling” of coins 
(154).  Levin gets a sense of who he is, of being a person, through such interactions 
with mimetic systems, and this explains his relationship with the ATM machine – 
tracking his money through the system of bank branches (149) for the “psychology” 
(60) of the experience, and for the sense, perhaps, of personal continuity in time and 
space such a system might provide. What Levin reports as the “charisma” (60) of the 
ATM machine is attributable to the mediation the machine affords Levin on his 
mimetic weltanschaung, where words and propositions, like the instructions issued by 
the money machine, are either correct or incorrect, true or false. Levin’s Tractatus-
like philosophy of allegory is enshrined in a machine that asks, “is this correct” and 
that “teaches us to think in logic blocks” (150). This idea that propositions are either 
true or false explains Levin’s helplessness to allegory, and to a version of allegory 
devoid of irony, play, iterative possibility and Otherness. It also explains his failure as 
an artist and author. 
 
Part Three: Tenderness of Tenderness. 
(i) Introduction 
For DeLillo, the unavoidable outcome of such an addiction to tenderless allegory – 
this compulsion apparent in both Packer and Levin to mimeticism – is, as is shown in 
Cosmopolis, violence.  We are tempted, I think, to feel for the pathetic Levin 
something like sympathy, even though, against this, we must also reckon with his 
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desire to kill “all those people sitting in their little chairs and drinking at those tables 
on the terrace after work” (201). Packer too, perhaps because of the doubts he is 
beginning to experience, if not also for his capacity to recognise and respect scenes of 
fragility and tenderness, arouses in the reader moments of affinity and empathy, but 
he, too, commits murder.187 Like Levin, the execution of this act originates in 
Packer’s servitude to irony-less allegory. The “aesthetics of interaction” Packer 
searches for in fact culminates in his shooting of Torval, and with this the experience 
of the conjunction of word (in this case, the gun’s name-code: “Nancy Babich”) with 
experience (the shooting itself). The shooting signifies the sort of power of allegory 
Packer searches for so as to re-calibrate the word-world relation; it signifies also both 
Packer’s and Levin’s more general desires to “stop the world” (5, 55) and its endless 
signifying; and as Levin himself says of assassination and murder (and here he is once 
again ventriloquising Packer) “[t]his is the vision of the new day […] it is the violent 
act that makes history and changes everything that came before” (154). 
     The idea of this “new day”, with its messianic overtones, appeals to Levin as the 
promise of the return to the authority of the word and its dominion over the Other and 
the world. In a sense, Levin wishes a reversal of the “zero-oneness” (24) of the world 
back to a state of prelapsarian unity. The dreamed-of moment of revelatory violence – 
encapsulated in Levin’s assassination attempt, that is itself fused for Levin to the 
                                                 
187 Indeed, as the text suggests, Packer is probably responsible for the deaths of many others. 
Reconsidering his murder of Torval we find Packer thinking of “his chief of security flat on the asphalt, 
a second yet left in his life. He thought of others down the years, hazy and nameless. He felt an 
enormous remorseful awareness. It moved through him, called guilt […]” (196). Moreover, the 
constellation of body, pain, Other, and memory (here related to cancer) all connect to trigger for Packer 
his awareness of “tenderness” when, in the middle of his prostate exam, he notices something, a mood, 
a sympathy pass between himself and Jane Melman: 
 
 Something passed between them, deeply, a sympathy beyond the standard meanings that also 
encompassed these meanings, pity, affinity, tenderness, the whole physiology of neural 
maneuver, of heartbeat and secretion, some vast sexus of arousal drawing him toward her, 
complicatedly, with Ingram’s finger up his ass. […]  
   He felt these things. He felt the pain. It travelled up the pathways. It informed the ganglion 
and spinal cord. He was here in his body, the structure he wanted to dismiss in theory even 
when he was shaping it under the measured effect of barbells and weights. It was convertible to 
wave arrays of information. It was the thing he watched on the oval screen when he wasn’t 
watching Jane. (48) 
 
The notions of connection and, as the text soon makes clear, penetration Packer’s feeling of tenderness 
is based on is, however, undermined when we realise that it is Packer himself who is being penetrated 
by the finger of his proctologist. The connection attested to here by Packer is thus reduced to a 





notion of his impossible book, revealed also in Packer’s self-destructive gambit on the 
Yen and his drive towards his own death – is designed to “stop the world” and enable 
some transcendence of it at the same time. Such acts of eschatological wish-fulfilment 
are waged against pain, memory, time and Otherness, but a problem and question 
remain, as Levin puts it, “how to imagine the moment” (154). The death of the 
imagination has still to be imagined, it seems, but, without the necessary 
understanding of irony (in allegory) and limited to the confines of his mimeticism, 
Levin is left “helpless” in light of the sort of Tractatus-like cage of language where 
one cannot speak of what one cannot know. At the end of his narrative we find 
Packer, also, stranded in helplessness as he waits for his death, reported to him 
moments earlier via the camera in his watch that has recorded it. Packer is left, 
stranded in the present tense, waiting for the world to catch up with his knowledge of 
it relayed to him via his techno-allegorical translation of it. But it is his faith in the 
mimeticism of allegory that creates his passivity, his credulity to simulation that 
makes him powerless and, as I will show, it is his failure to incorporate the tenderness 
of allegory (allegory as ruin of irony) that defines his helplessness.  
     In what amounts to an examination of power in the postmodern, DeLillo contrasts 
the sort of language philosophy represented by his two extremists (Packer and Levin) 
against Otherness and tenderness, most notably associated here by DeLillo with New 
York itself and its diverse, memoried, and Other denizens who live beneath, but also 
as the immanence, within which the capitalist symbolic asserts its all-pervasive, 
metastasizing and dominant conceit. In contrast to the two previous novels, Otherness 
is rejected by the protagonist, tenderness and irony do not last for Packer, and 
memory is shown to be an irritant to him, easily dismissed, repressed and cast aside. 
For this reason, there is a definite pessimism implied in DeLillo’s portrait of Capitalist 
America, and the ease with which such considerations, as the ethical and the work of 
art, are misrecognised. Despite DeLillo’s critique of the culture as embodied in 
Packer, and despite his critique of a sort of un-ironic poststructuralism personified by 
Packer (evident in his philosophy of language and his colloquy of theorists), DeLillo’s 
depiction of Packer’s rejection of Otherness is damning. But, as I have suggested, this 
rejection serves DeLillo well in his presentation of irony and tenderness as both ironic 
and tender – that is to say, not reducible to presentation as content. Thus, DeLillo 
evokes irony and tenderness ironically; both terms become the unsaid and unwritten 
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underworld of the text, the ‘tender’ meaning of a text that says something different to 
what it appears to say.   
 
(ii) On Film 
 
In the Twentieth and Twenty-first century we are more ‘on film’ than ever before, and 
perhaps this explains something of the importance of film in DeLillo’s texts; we live 
our lives on film and act as actors, and our consciousness of the world and our selves 
is mediated by the vision of the camera, the affectation of the actor. Living in a 
culture so mediated by this translation of ‘reality’, performing our on-film-ness, can 
become an ironic method of declaring the tenderness, if also the “synthetic” qualities, 
of our being allegorical. Our ironising of film-reality is thus an analogy for an 
awareness of our being-in-language, which is really the underlying experience of all 
mediation. Film bares us to the question of allegory, translation, etc., that texts, irony, 
and philosophers such as Derrida have been drawing our attention to for years.  For 
this reason, the film scene DeLillo places in Cosmopolis can be seen to afford the 
reader (as well as Packer) the possibility of this connection between tenderness and 
allegory. Indeed, in this scene we get a view of allegory (as tendered by irony) to 
contrast against the mimetic allegory that dominates DeLillo’s depiction of the 
postmodern. 
     The point DeLillo appears to be making with this scene is that a vision of tender 
allegory can be found in the apprehension of “America” acting its allegories, can be 
found when we are able to perceive the ironic underworld of all allegory, of all 
symbolic economies. Packer’s revelation of Otherness and tenderness (fleeting and 
ultimately misapplied as it is) comes with his revelation of allegory, specifically with 
his discovery of a scene depicting an allegory caught in the process of its assembly 
(the film set).  However, in a seemingly metatextual move, one that mortifies the 
novel’s own relation to representation, DeLillo appears to suggest that the film crew 
are in fact working on the film that Packer mistakes as his own experience and 
consciousness of the world, as his life. In a sense, this would appear to confirm 
Packer’s narcissistic sense of himself, but it also suggests that all narcissisms are the 
product of a cast of thousands, all produced by one’s being an Other among others. 
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     The sense of Packer’s discovery of his life as a movie is conveyed through the 
suddenness and arbitrariness with which the set is revealed. Just as Packer is 
considering that “something had to happen soon […]” (171), the film set suddenly 
appears:  
   [t]hen lights came on, dead ahead, flaring with a crack and whoosh, great carbon-arc 
floodlights that were set on tripods and rigged to lampposts. A woman in jeans appeared, 
flagging down the car. The intersection was soaked in vibrant light, the night abruptly alive. 
(172) 
 
Despite all the systems of surveillance at Packer’s disposal in the limousine – the 
“micro cameras that monitored the perimeter of the automobile” (171), the “night-
vision display” (170) he enables – it is 
only now that Eric [sees] the heavy trolley with movable boom attached, rolling slowly into 
place. Installed at the high end of the boom was a platform that held a movie camera and a 
couple of seated men. 
   The crane wasn’t the only thing he had missed. When he got out of the car and moved to a 
spot that wasn’t blocked by the lunch truck, he saw the elements of the scene in preparation. 
(172) 
 
It is as though Packer has stumbled across the invention of allegory, the real, before it 
is ready, as though he has discovered the workings of the novel, and with this, the 
unpicking of his conceit, his narcissistic and allegorical construction of the world. In a 
sense, this scene evokes what we can think of as the return of repressed Otherness; 
this cast of hundreds is a sample of the nameless others that comprise the forgotten 
underworld of Packer’s empire, a metaphor for repressed memory. The scene is 
paradigmatic of DeLillo’s articulation of Otherness through irony, in this case, 
through the ironising of Packer’s reality by the metaphorical exposure of the 
constructedness of reality – the cameras, lights, booms and crew are all metaphors for 
the revelation of allegoricity. This revelation, a kind of mortifying vision of Packer’s 
governing assumptions, is associated with those contexts of Otherness as I have 
previously described them: bodies, the street, and the naked vulnerability of 
tenderness. 
   There were three hundred naked people sprawled in the street. They filled the intersection, 
lying in haphazard positions, some bodies draped over others, some levelled, flattened, fetal, 
with children among them. No one was moving, no one’s eyes were open. They were a sight to 
come upon, a city of stunned flesh, the bareness, the bright lights, so many bodies unprotected 
and hard to credit in a place of ordinary human transit. 
   Of course there was a context. Someone was making a movie. But this was just a frame of 
reference. The bodies were blunt facts, naked in the street. Their power was their own, 
independent of whatever circumstance attended the event. But it was a curious power, he 
thought, because there was something shy and wan in the scene, a little withdrawn. A woman 
coughed with a head-jerk and a leap of the knee. He did not wonder whether they were meant to 




What we find here are the beginnings of a ‘definition’ of tenderness that the pages 
concerned with this scene elaborate on. Most immediately, this passage signals 
tenderness in its recording of bare human flesh on the surface of the street;188 
moreover, the very nakedness of the extras represents tenderness as vulnerability and 
exposure – “stunned flesh”, “unprotected”, “withdrawn” and bare. And we find cues 
to the tenderness of allegory here, allegory substituted by bodies (as is DeLillo’s 
theme in the novel, much in the manner of Benjamin) where there is not so much the 
content of a meaningful context with which to reckon such “bareness”, but a 
nakedness of content, only a “frame of reference” but also something else, something 
“withdrawn” in the manner of irony, and independent of such reference. Where, in the 
text, Packer has earlier sought for some intersecting point of word and world, here he 
finds what, but for a conception of tenderness, he might have expected: “a border of 
fallen bodies” (174) – not merely “fallen” allegory, but also the fallen bodies of all 
those “others” made victims by his pursuit of power.189
                                                 
188 A sense heightened by Packer’s reportage of the “textual variation of slubs of chewing gum” (174) 
he feels against the skin of his back as he lies in the street with the others. 
189 The tenderness of such fallen bodies is apparent also in DeLillo’s presentation of “THE LAST 
TECHNO RAVE”. Ostensibly the rave is an occasion for the dissemination of the pain killing drug 
“novo” (126), and the way it spreads throughout the location is to be seen as suggestive of capitalism 
itself (and capitalism’s own attempted mastery or false mourning of fear, pain), like the commodity-
symbolic, in fact, that draws you in: “you caught what they had. First you were apart and watching and 
then you were in, and with, and of the crowd, and then you were the crowd, densely assembled and 
dancing as one” (126).  The dancers themselves are described as moving in a “Cyclonic twirl”, a 
spreading mass of people moving through a theatre “stripped of seating, paint and history” (124). The 
twirl of the dancers is also the whirl characteristic of Packer’s false mourning, his desire to escape the 
body and its pain and to ascend to some fleshless, technological afterlife; not surprisingly, then, the 
music here is that which “took you over, replacing your skin and brain with digital tissue” (126). The 
result is a populace turned into a “blank crowd, outside worry and pain, drawn to the glassy repetition” 
of music described as “loud, bland, bloodless, and controlled” (127). The self is dissipated, the ravers 
“melt […] into each other so they wouldn’t shrivel up as individuals” (127). However, Packer sees the 
other side of the rave – its underside, as I have suggested – when he views the slumped mass of ravers 
beneath the event: 
 
   Sitting and lying everywhere, slumped against each other. […] They could not speak or walk. 
One of them licked another’s face, the only movement in the room. Even as his self-awareness 
grew weaker, he could see who they were in their chemical delirium and it was tender and 
moving, to know them in their frailty, their wistfulness of being, because kids is all they were, 
trying not to scatter in the air”. (127) 
 
Even within capitalism, perhaps more accurately, beneath capitalism, something “tender” persists (and 
this is a tenderness tied to the material (bodies, objects, the street), as DeLillo’s texts make clear), 
though this sense is heightened here by the sense of an ending supplied in the title “the last techno 
rave”. Tenderness, therefore, DeLillo seems to want us to consider, manifests on the cusp of 
anachronism, requiring a sense of history as alive, as an ongoing dialectic of possibilities, one of which 
is the passing of allegory into the memorial time of différance.  
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     The elaboration of tenderness and Otherness in Cosmopolis is contingent on the 
materiality of the body. In the description that follows, so engrossed as it is in its 
recording of this human materiality, we note the poignancy of Packer’s obvious 
enthrallment to Otherness, when confronted by the sight of so much vulnerable flesh. 
And although it is Packer’s wish to “convert” the body into data, to transcend his own 
fleshly state for a realm of pure information, for a fleeting moment, within the context 
of this “scene” – its makeshift, contingent, and highly constructed qualities – and its 
chance-like discovery, he wishes to be “one of them”: 
   It tore his mind apart, trying to see them here and real, independent of the image on a screen in 
Oslo or Caracas. Or were those places indistinguishable from this one? But why ask these 
questions? Why see these things? They isolated him. They set him apart and this is not what he 
wanted. He wanted to be here among them, all-body, the tattooed, the hairy-assed, those who 
stank. He wanted to set himself in the middle of the intersection, among the old with their raised 
veins and body blotches and next to the dwarf with a bump on his head. He thought there were 
probably people here with wasting diseases, a few, undissuadable, skin flaking away. There 
were the young and strong. He was one of them. He was one of the morbidly obese, the tanned 
and fit middle-aged. He thought of the children in the scrupulous beauty of their pretending, so 
formal and fine boned. He was one. There were those with heads nested in the bodies of others, 
in breasts or armpits, for whatever sour allowance of shelter. He thought of those who lay 
faceup and wide-winged, open to the sky, genitals world-centered. There was a dark woman 
with a small red mark in the middle of her forehead, for auspiciousness. Was there a man with a 
missing limb, brave stump knotted below the knee? How many bodies bearing surgical scars? 
And who is the girl in dreadlocks, folded into herself, nearly all of her lost in her hair, pink toes 
showing? 
   He wanted to look around but did not open his eyes until a long moment passed and a man’s 
soft voice called, ‘Cut’. (176)190   
 
The distinction Packer makes, and with which this passage begins, between the 
“here”, the “real”, and its mediated representation “on a screen in Oslo” positions 
once again irony and Otherness – the “cut” or pain that separates word and world – as 
the subject or propositional context of the passage. The tenderness of this proposition 
is there to be seen in the exposed bodies gathered at the “intersection” of world and 
representation as allegory denuded of its mimetic surface, mortified in this regard, in a 
scene that is about the composition of representation. And although he wishes to be 
“one of them”, he cannot tear himself away from his recording of the scene, the visual 
taxonomy of all he sees. He needs to master this tenderness with questions (“how 
many bodies bearing surgical scars”) and convert it into information. 
     In the street, among the bodies, Packer finds himself within the pain of the world, 
the intersection (literally, a street intersection) of allegory and Otherness that I have 
                                                 
190 The film set scene – in the very exposure of its construction – is yet another of DeLillo’s validated 
events or ‘artworks’, validated precisely because its representation is part of its depiction of 
representation; because its mode of reproduction is what is reproduced in the scene of its 
representation. 
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referred to as a site of irony and possible tenderness. But more than the nakedness on 
display here, the vulnerability and exposure of these bodies “nested” in each other, 
seeking some “allowance of shelter” or “wide winged, open […] world-centered”, this 
tenderness is also to be seen as inseparable from the notes of affectation 
(performance, ‘acting’) we find here: “children in the scrupulous beauty of their 
pretending”, a woman’s “red mark in the middle of her forehead, for auspiciousness”. 
Despite his wish to be “all body”, and what seems to be his recognition that in being 
“one of them” he is himself an Other (a pre-condition for the apprehension of 
tenderness), Packer fails to lose himself in the tender ironies of “pretending” that he 
finds himself within on the film set, within this allegory of pretending. As an 
expression or encounter with the conditions of one’s own Otherness, this ought to be 
enough to introduce tenderness into Packer’s narcissism and disrupt his language of 
consumption. But what we see instead is, in fact, Packer’s recourse to a hyper-
mediated (filmic) language – one of romance, possession, and wish fulfilment. 
     Thus, the long awaited coupling with Elise that Packer desires becomes completely 
drenched in overwrought, clichéd, and cinematic language that serves to insert 
distance and falseness into their “act” of love.191 The “two lovers in isolation, free of 
memory and time” (177) conduct their exchange, entirely without self-consciousness, 
in a filmic language that, for example, turns Elise’s laugh into a “cigarette laugh out 
of an old black-and-white movie” (177), and Packer thinks to himself that his 
encounter with Elise resembled “the next scene in the black-and-white film that was 
being screened in theatres worldwide” (177). The note of narcissism apparent in the 
conceited nature of this last remark finds its counterpart in the sense of possession 
Packer evinces in the moment of sexual climax where he says Elise’s name and 
“finally kn[ows] her” (178). Packer’s compulsion to knowledge, naming and 
possession is thus shown to define his relation to allegory and to the Otherness (here, 
figured as Elise) he seeks to repress by his relation to the dead allegorical language of 
clichéd film. Such is the power of Packer’s need to mediate memory and Otherness – 
and the pain this brings – that the rest of the text in which Packer dives headlong into 
                                                 
191 The dialogue exchanged between the two redefines the sort of glib language of romance so tirelessly 
rehearsed in Hollywood films. When Packer informs Elise that he has lost her entire fortune Elise, from 
within their intertwined bodies, replies with a laugh: “‘I lose things all the time […] I lost my car this 
morning […] what do poets know about money? Love the world and trace it in a line of verse. Nothing 
but this […] and this’. Here she put a hand to his head and took him, seized him by the hair […] 
drawing his head back and bending to kiss him […]” (177). 
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his past, the death of this father, his relationship to his mother, and his meeting with 
his would-be assassin, comes to resemble a movie-mediated version. 
     In a sense, Packer internalises the film camera’s gaze, as it seems he must in order 
to orient himself, in order that he not be overwhelmed by the fall into memory and 
Otherness his encounter with Levin and death now promise: “He prepared to fire, eyes 
closed, visualizing his finger on the trigger, in tight detail, and also seeing the man in 
the street, himself, long-lensed, facing the dead tenement” (181). Thus, immediately 
prior to the first exchanges with Levin, Packer experiences once again, and at another 
(street) intersection in the novel, a moment of disorientation, what I refer to as an 
experience of irony and the fall: 
   He stood in the street. There was nothing to do. He hadn’t realised this could happen to him. 
The moment was empty of urgency and purpose. He hadn’t planned on this. Where was the life 
he’d always led? There was nowhere he wanted to go, nothing to think about, no one waiting. 
How could he take a step in any direction if all directions were the same? (180) 
 
Packer is more naked here than he was on the film set; he is stripped of the props and 
allegories – the computers, cameras, the analysis and the information – of his empire, 
and without his technologies of mediation and conversion he loses his sense of 
direction and purpose. In the street (the site of the Other) Packer experiences an 
‘original’ moment: a moment denuded of design, made naked, resembling nothing so 
much as a delay and a deferral – an emptiness of time and space momentarily 
“independent of […] circumstance” (172). Packer finds himself thus in the moment of 
the fall, confronted by an Otherness that underwrites allegory (such as “direction”) 
even as it makes a point about the fallen nature of such allegories, their contingency, 
their tenderness: all directions are the same. We note Daedalus, rendered here by 
DeLillo as a bicycle courier, “bare-chested […] swanning past, arms spread wide [… 
making] a sweeping turn” (181) past the fallen Packer. 
     Any chance that this experience of epistemological and ontological tenderness 
might prove truly enduring or epiphanic for Packer is quashed, however, when his 
assassin, Levin, ironically enough, ‘saves’ Packer from this (original, void-like) 
moment, calling out his name in what Packer recognises to be “trochaic beats” (181). 
Levin has begun shooting at Packer, but, nevertheless, for Packer to hear his name 
returned back to him from his momentary encounter with the semiotic void (and 
aestheticised too, we note) is enough for him to resume his movie-mediated reality. 
But the movie allegory doesn’t work as well for Packer as it did before; rather, as 
mediating medium, it is tainted by self-consciousness and, more importantly, Packer’s 
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memories of attending movies with his mother after the death of his father. Where the 
film allegory once acted as a buffer to pain, Otherness and memory, it now acts as a 
gateway for the overwhelming return of repressed pain and memory that erupt from 
the re-opened wound of Packer’s representational consciousness. 
     Packer is powerless to control the details of the memories that arise as they swirl 
and conflate; and the text mirrors this, as for once the surface of Packer’s character 
and language is punctured and we (the reader) are made privy to an extended passage 
of disorderly interior monologue. Packer’s underworld unconsciousness appears to 
erupt here in a confusing constellation of nouns and pro-nouns (including references 
to Packer’s parents, a well as Torval and Nancy Babich) and references to infidelity, 
and betrayal, love, sex and death, all of which circulate in an atmosphere of pain, loss 
and violence. This pain, for Packer, as always it seems with DeLillo, is located once 
again between experience (the father’s death) and representation (the mother’s movies 
where she takes the young Packer to assuage their loss) where allegory – the seamless 
version of which Packer has dedicated his life to – is ruined, shown to be a ruin. Such 
an awareness of allegory, coming as it does for Packer after the experience of the film 
set and his Icarean experience of the intersection, manifests here in the self-
consciousness with which he finds himself, during his pursuit of Levin, outside a 
door, standing “ramrod straight” (183) with a gun in his hand in classic movie pose. A 
sense of Otherness comes to him through the very rehearsed and performed nature of 
this pose. The ensuing ‘dialogue’, conducted with his pistol, with its effects of self-
consciousness (“I know I’m talking to a gun that can’t respond” (185)) makes 
possible a kind of circuit-break within Packer’s narcissism, and it is memory 
(Otherness) that rushes into the wound or “cut” created here. 
We [Packer and his mother] went to the movies because we were trying to learn how to be alone 
together. We were cold and lost and my father’s soul was trying to find us, to settle itself in our 
bodies, not that I want or need your sympathy. I can picture her in the heat of sex, 
expressionless, because this is a Nancy Babich thing she does, blank-face. I say her name but 
not his. I used to be able to say his name but now I can’t because I know what went on between 
them. I’m thinking is his picture in a frame on her dresser. How many times do two people have 
to fuck before one of them deserves to die? I’m standing here enraged in my head. In other 
words how many times do I have to kill him? These mothers who accept the fiction of kicking 
in a door. What is a door? It’s a movable structure, usually swinging on hinges, which closes off 
an entranceway and requires a tremendous and prolonged pounding before it can finally be 
forced open. (185) 
 
The presentation of Otherness, here, is consistent with the sort of constellated 
elements I have been associating throughout this thesis, namely, memory, loss, the 
body, a certain level of self-awareness, and the presence of the ruin – the archaic 
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pistol Packer holds a conversation with. The development throughout the novel of 
Packer’s sense of doubt is here represented by his immersion in the irony or pain he 
has spent his life repressing and controlling; the slippage, evident here in the 
conflation of identity, is an effect of his inability to tender and relate between irony 
and allegory – a negotiation or relationship suggested by the prominence of the ‘door’ 
motif developed here. The issue at stake here is not merely allegory, but, as I’ve been 
saying, allegorical credulity: the whole “fiction of kicking in a door”. The acceptance 
of this movie-based allegory or narrative element is associated with a sort of escapism 
from the reality of the father’s death, and there is a sense here, attributable to Packer’s 
consciousness, that such an avoidance – through allegory, the acceptance of a 
“fiction” – is, in its failure to mourn death, tantamount to killing the father once again. 
The conflation of Torval with Packer’s father in this passage suggests the association 
of the father’s death with the name-saying act (the allegorical act represented in the 
gun’s firing code) that presages Packer’s murder of Torval. By continuing with his 
life of allegory, Packer is “killing him” (185) (Torval/father) over and over again, and 
this appears to be a sort of hard-won tender awareness of the sort of false mourning 
that has characterised his life – we see it also in his refusal of his body, his desire to 
transcend into some fleshless immortality, and thus avoid mourning and memory, 
when we are told by Packer that his dead father’s “soul” was trying to “settle itself in 
our bodies”. But, of course, up to this point Packer’s mode of (false) mourning has 
taken the form of a mastery of allegory and we find suggestive reasons for this in his 
disgust at the feminine figure in this rant (mother/Babich) who, perceived as passive 
and detached, is guilty of too willingly accepting the false reality of another.192
 
(iii) Untranslatable, Untransferable pain. 
 
At the end of the last section we found Packer considering the pain of loss and the 
relationship of such experiences of loss to the possibility of their representation in 
allegory ( and indeed, the whole question of mourning and irony framed by the 
                                                 
192 Packer’s will to power, a response, I’m suggesting, to his mother’s acceptance of the lies of the 
father (pertaining to infidelity – either an extra-marital affair, or the withholding of the truth about his 
cancer (see 161)), is a response to the feeling that she too easily lived within the allegorical reality of 
another, and that this made her a victim (vulnerable) of the father and of the unknown, making her 
dependent and tender, prompting Packer’s drive to become a powerhouse of media and representation.  
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demand to represent the absent and Other). Packer’s growing doubts about the 
dominion of his empire of capitalist allegory places him in the dilemma of mourning 
(discussed in previous chapters) that Cosmopolis concludes with. In a sense, Packer is 
brought by DeLillo to the threshold of irony, brought, through the experience of pain 
– both body pain and the pain of allegorical non-coincidence, but also the pain of 
memory – to the question of translation: Packer’s two options consist, firstly, of 
embracing Otherness as the necessary condition of all allegory, and, with this, 
accepting the world of the fallen and tender subject, or, secondly, dismissing such 
tenderness for the pursuit of power, an avoidance of Otherness, pain and mourning, 
through a dreamed-of transcendence to a sublime state of fleshless immortality. As 
Packer see it, one either accepts the necessarily incomplete, mortified or ruined nature 
of translation, or one believes in the power of allegory and technology to convert all 
experience into data and knowledge. 
     So Packer is left with a decision to make, and by the authorial conceit apparent in 
the construction of such a ‘decision’, DeLillo is able, once again, to lay out the 
distinction he appears constantly to make in his fiction between the fallen and tender 
conditions of human and ethical subjectivity – the possibility of art – and ideologies 
of bad faith, misprision and commodification – the possibility of power and 
dominance encapsulated in DeLillo’s representations of capitalism. And, again, the 
context for this distinction-making is pain, specifically, the pain Packer inflicts on 
himself during his showdown with Levin when he shoots himself in the hand. For 
Packer, such is the pain in his hand that he begins to recognise how pain is also 
something like a philosophical category, as he says: 
   The pain was the world. The mind could not find a place outside it. He could hear the pain, 
staticky, in his hand and wrist. He closed his eyes again, briefly. He could feel himself 
contained in the dark but also just beyond it, on the lighted outer surface, the other side, 
belonged to both, feeling both, being himself and seeing himself. (201) 
 
And, of course, as DeLillo has been showing us throughout his oeuvre, pain, as 
philosophy of Otherness, is adequate to the subject’s good-faith experience of the 
world, of being-in-the-world. Moreover, pain presents the sort of proposition I have 
been isolating in irony: a notion pertaining to the threshold of self in its relationship 
with Otherness, where the ‘self’ “belong[s] to both”. Companionable to this 
experience of pain, and its tendering of the self as Other, is the understanding that 
language is mortified by an Otherness it both originates in and contains the traces of. 
The tender act in which Levin applies a “cold compress” to Packer’s wounded hand 
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becomes a further occasion for the exposure of the tenderness of language. As Packer 
considers: “It wasn’t a compress and it wasn’t cold but they agreed unspokenly to use 
this term for whatever palliative effect it might have” (197). In this case, DeLillo 
highlights the something that is missing between the term and what it refers to, but to 
the purpose of emphasising how “palliative” language can be despite the fact that it 
misses what it describes. Language is what we have with which to tender the pain of 
our fallen state, and it does this most faithfully, most successfully, when language 
itself is shown to be tender, vulnerable and incomplete. 
     Moved by the idea of allegorical tenderness, Packer considers his wife, Elise, and 
the allegorical myth of her “beauty”.193 Elise, as Packer recognises, is, perhaps, not 
beautiful at all, but “beautiful” is what she ‘is’ by virtue of her being “young” and 
rich, an heiress to a fortune. And though she is not beautiful, Packer entertains his 
wish to lie, anyway, and tell her she is (205). In this moment, he forsakes allegorical 
coincidence for the beauty of a tender lie, at once a recognition of the artificial, 
constructed nature of this particular allegory of beauty, but, also, a use of this allegory 
in full knowledge of its conceptual tenderness. An allegory about beauty thus 
becomes in DeLillo’s text an allegory about the beautiful and ruined nature of fallen 
allegory.  
     But such a tender vision of allegory relies, as I have insisted, on the understanding 
of its relationship to pain – what I have called its ‘ruined’ nature, its composition 
within irony. The sort of phrōnesis all this culminates in is the untranslatabililty of 
Otherness and pain. What is more, this pain, as Packer momentarily recognises, 
defines the self even as, in the same moment, it marks the self as Other: 
[…] his pain interfered with his immortality. It was too crucial to his distinctness, too vital to be 
bypassed and not susceptible, he didn’t think, to computer emulation. The things that made him 
who he was could hardly be identified much less converted to data, the things that lived and 
milled in his body, everywhere, random, riotous, billions and trillions, in the neurons and 
peptides, the throbbing temple vein, in the veer of his libidinous intellect. So much come and 
gone, this is who he was, the lost taste of milk licked from his mother’s breast, the stuff he 
sneezes when he sneezes, this is him, and how a person becomes the reflection he sees in a 
dusty window when he walks by. He’d come to know himself, untranslatably, through his pain. 
                                                 
193 Elise’s beauty is an example of an allegory cut off from the world that provokes allegory; the 
relationship between Packer and Elise is no more than a marriage of allegories and her beauty is the 
term required to finish the allegorical set:  
 
[h]e began to understand that they’d invented her beauty together, conspiring to assemble a 
fiction that worked to their mutual maneuverability and delight. They’d married in the shroud of 
this unspoken accord. They needed the final term in the series. She was rich, he was rich; she 
was heir-apparent, he was self-made; she was cultured, he was ruthless; she was brittle, he was 
strong; she was gifted, he was brilliant; she was beautiful. This was the core of their 
understanding, the thing they needed to believe before they could be a couple. (72) 
 204
He felt so tired now. His hard-gotten grip on the world, material things, great things, his 
memories true and false, the vague malaise of winter twilights, untransferable, the pale nights 
when his identity flattens for lack of sleep, the small wart he feels on his thigh every time he 
showers, all him, and how the soap he uses, the smell and feel of the concave bar makes him 
who he is because he names the fragrance, amandine, and the hang of his cock, untransferable, 
and his strangely achy knee, the click in his knee when he bends it, all him, and so much else 
that’s not convertible to some high sublime, the technology of mind-without-end. (207) 
 
On the verge of such a revelation of pain it seems likely that Packer will abandon his 
longed for conversion (translation) into the immortality of transcendental data, and 
notably, the reflected image that appears before Packer here (as his self-image) is not 
the perfect illusion of the bright reflective surfaces of Packer’s skyscraper or 
sunglasses, but the imperfect or flawed reflection of a dusty window.194 Accordingly, 
allegory, what Packer here refers to as his “hard-gotten grip on the world”, is seen to 
have lost something of its gloss, all the “things” (allegories) Packer has known now 
reflecting back a sense of their Otherness, their “untransferable” nature. And this 
sense of allegory, as articulation of both knowing and Otherness (as irony), comes to 
Packer (in possibly the novel’s most significant sentence) as he realises that “he’d 
come to know himself, untranslatably, through his pain”. This is, then, a “knowledge” 
that can’t be translated or converted to some “high sublime” (208); this is an ‘Other-
knowledge’ that is ‘knowable’ only through pain. Moreover, this passage through 
pain to ‘knowledge’ is itself “unknowable”. But Packer’s sense of his distinctness, his 
difference, both of which the material world of the body (the “wart on his thigh”, the 
“hang of his cock”) teach him about, is inseparable from the untranslatable nature of 
Otherness. 
     As model capitalist, Packer has an insight into the construction of self that reflects 
DeLillo’s insight into the construction of capitalism, which, in the manner of the ego, 
is composed (as an allegory) within an Otherness that exists at the level of a material 
world that capitalism nevertheless blinds itself to via the naturalisation of its ways of 
seeing, its modes of production and representation. Thus, Packer, as we find him 
above, filled with his revelations of untranslatability, the ruined nature of knowing 
and representation, is poised on the very edge of his capitalist conceit, positioned at a 
tender threshold, an intersection, if you like, between two alternatives.  The first, we 
might consider, is that encapsulated in the image of the beetle Packer later watches, 
                                                 
194 This imperfect reflection recalls the mirror in the barbershop of Anthony Adubato where Eric goes 
for his half-haircut; the mirror there “needs silvering” we are told, and in that scene, as in the detail of 
the one above, the ruined nature of the mirror reflects on the partial, idiosyncratic and ruined nature 
(the ‘broken English’ of Anthony) of allegory and language in regard to memory.  
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making its way down a length of cord. The second alternative, seen through the 
camera function of his wristwatch, is a vision of his future – his death – and the 
promise of transcendence: 
   He moved his arm, straightening and flexing, pointing the watch six different ways, but the 
body of a man, in long shot, remained on-screen. He looked up at the beetle moving in its 
specialized slowness down along the warps and seams of the wire, its old dumb leaf eating 
arcadian pace, thinking it is in a tree, and he redirected the camera at the insect. But the prone 
body stayed on-screen. (205) 
 
The image of the beetle that initially appears in real time on the watch is replaced by 
the future vision of Packer’s death, and while the beetle continues to make its slow 
progress down the cord (in real time), Eric keeps an eye on ‘his’ dead body that, as 
presented to him through the watch, makes its way to the morgue. The beetle 
continues in its delusion195 (“thinking it is in a tree”), and in the present of its reality 
long after its image has been lost on the technology of the watch, and this is the point: 
the beetle persists beyond its mediated reality even though Packer seems unable to 
escape his mediated destiny. The watch can only present a version of the future. The 
future, we might say, is only possible, it never is. Whenever it is conceived as such, 
the future can only be an allegory signed in the name of (in the noun-phrase) the 
future. When Packer appears to experience the future before it is due he is in fact only 
experiencing an allegory of the future proposed by his media. It is not that his media 
are able to translate and pre-empt the future, but that media, in effect, create the 
future; the effect is a consequence not of prediction but of Packer’s slavishness to 
allegory – his credulity to representation as strictly mimetic. The future is an allegory 
(of the future), but allegory has become invisible; this is the achievement of the 
capitalist symbolic – the making-transparent its force of aestheticisation, and with this 
the seamless conjoining of allegory, technology, and temporality. 
     As I’ve suggested, such passages represent Packer on the verge of tenderness; they 
represent a tender-world view that, as I have hoped to show throughout my reading of 
his texts, DeLillo appears to endorse. And yet this tenderness is rejected by his 
protagonist as Packer’s wish for posthumous immortality and influence proves too 
powerful:  
                                                 
195The switching between camera shot of an unidentified man and the beetle suggests a comparison is 
intended, and there is an irony here in the image of the beetle and the naïveté or unknowing it evokes, 
“thinking it is in a tree”. Yet Packer’s own ontological and temporal status is unsure according to the 
“metaphysic[s]” of his watch. The arcane and “arcadian” delusion of the beetle is meant to be read as 
an evocation of the creaturely and fallen nature of the human.  
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   He’d always wanted to become quantum dust, transcending his body mass, the soft tissue over 
the bones, the muscle and fat. The idea was to live outside the given limits, in a chip, on a disk, 
as data, in whirl, in radiant spin, a consciousness saved from void. (206) 
 
Despite his experiences of tenderness, his wish for a life with Elise in the knowledge 
of their fallenness in language, allegory and time, and against the prospect of treating 
the as-yet undecided Levin196 with tenderness and thus avoiding his own death, 
Packer chooses a death conceived of as a sublime spectacle; he chooses what he sees 
through the lens of “the old biochemistry of the ego, the saturated self” (208), a life of 
posthumous immortality. As we see, Packer imagines his death – couched in 
narcissistic fashion, preoccupied with surfaces, images, and commodities – as a grand 
capitalist and aesthetic spectacle: 
   He imagined Kendra Hayes, his bodyguard and lover, washing his viscera in palm wine in a 
ceremony of embalming. She had the face for it, the bone structure and skin color, the tapered 
planes. It was a face from a wall painting in some mortuary temple buried in sand for a thousand 
years, with dog-headed gods in attendance. He thought of his chief of finance and touchless 
lover, Jane Melman, masturbating quietly in the last row of the funeral chapel, in a dark blue 
dress with a cinched waist, during the whispery dimness of the vigil. […] He wanted to be 
buried in his nuclear bomber. […] Not buried but cremated, conflagrated, but buried as well. He 
wanted to be solarized. He wanted the plane flown by remote control with his embalmed body 
aboard, suit, tie, turban, and the bodies of his dead dogs, his tall Russian wolfhounds, reaching 
maximum altitude and levelling at supersonic dash speed and then sent plunging into the sand, 
fireballed one and all, leaving a work of land art, scorched earth art that would interact with the 
desert and be held in perpetual trust under the auspices of his dealer and executor, Didi Fancher, 
and longtime lover, for the respectful contemplation of pre-approved groups and enlightened 
individuals under exempt-status section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code. (208) 
 
Unlike the force of death so central to the animating ironies of the art in Underworld, 
in particular Klara’s work with the nuclear bombers in the desert that Packer’s art is 
so clearly designed to remind the reader of, death is turned into a commodity 
spectacle, shot through with desire and the persistence of an ego’s wish for control. In 
truth, Packer’s imagined death is nothing less than a mistaking of death for ego 
perpetuity: the idea of Others’ erotic mourning of the deceased suggests that the Other 
is still tethered to a reality composed completely within the borders of the subject’s 
narcissism; even in death Packer might still control the lives of others, albeit the “pre-
approved”, the “enlightened”, and the wealthy. 
     As if the distinction between Klara’s art (its tendering of death, irony and 
Otherness) and Packer’s “land art” isn’t clear enough, DeLillo closes the text with an 
                                                 
196 As a part of the dramatic irony associated with Packer’s death we notice how Levin, at times, is 
unsure about killing Packer (“either I track him down and shoot him or do not…” (149)). Moreover, 
Levin appears to equivocate on this issue even during his confrontation with Packer. The point is, it 
seems, if Packer had treated Levin with something like tenderness he might have avoided his death.  
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image of Packer’s helplessness, an irony to help define Packer’s real death – his 
stranding in the present. 
   His murderer, Richard Sheets, sits facing him. He has lost interest in the man. His hand 
contains the pain of this life, all of it, emotional and other, and he closes his eyes one more time. 
This is not the end. He is dead inside the crystal of his watch but still alive in original space, 
waiting for the shot to sound. (209) 
 
By showing Packer his future in the present (evoking the continuing present beyond 
the text’s last words) Packer’s watch is also, of course, revealing the past – a “future” 
now made posterior to the present by the fact of its representation. So there is a kind 
of paradox or irony at work here in the final scene of the text. This temporal irony is 
pre-empted, of course, by the dramatic irony presented as the foreknowledge of 
Packer’s death; the effect is to point out Packer’s anachronistic status in the text, to 
highlight, in fact, his tenderness despite his dreamed-of futurism. The “end” of the 
novel leaves Packer stranded in the present, waiting, in fact, in the death that is 
composed by the novel’s refusal of resolution. In effect, Packer waits in the missing 
part of the text’s narrative, the unrecorded absence of what we are given to expect will 
be the shooting. This is the novel’s painful moment (the pain in Packer’s hand, yes, 
but also the pain of a text that is here punctured, riven and exposed, to an absence or 
wounding of its completion) that illustrates how the narrative has been built around a 
few missing seconds (the fatal shot) that are not recorded. For all of Packer’s 
allegorical and technological mastery of the world, we are left, like Packer, with only 
a hole – a gap in his ‘knowing’ of the world, the missing of the experience of death 
that he has been craving for. For Levin this unrecorded moment – in fact, its very 
untranslatability – completely undermines his writing project, leaving him devastated. 
Whereas the text, Cosmopolis, its entire narrative and all the memory it contains, can 
be said to be premised on this Other and ironic (missing) moment, Levin, in 
comparison, without a ‘theory’ of irony, is left in desolation and passivity to wonder: 









Conclusion: What is Left That’s Worth the Telling? 
 
As DeLillo, with Cosmopolis, appears to suggest, the absence of something like doubt 
in the symbolic economy of late capitalism is what makes it possible for ‘us’ (the 
‘elect’ of the West) to live in the future, at least, that is, to live in an allegory of the 
future. The diminishment of doubt, an effect of the false mourning and repression of 
Otherness and irony, as I’ve said, correlates directly to the power of an 
unimpeachable aesthetic wrought by a culture’s fusion of technology and capitalism. 
The product of this fusion is a mode of allegory that has become inseparable from 
ideology, and is revealed as the medium of connection and simulation by which the 
culture maintains its hegemonic force; DeLillo’s texts, thus, assume a certain Marxian 
critique: namely, that where allegory has become ideological, a reflex of the 
superstructure, the result is an aestheticisation of the material, real, and Other that, in 
manipulating reproduction and representation, effectively ‘manufactures’ consent, as 
well as dissent, difference, irony and Otherness. This incorporation (and simulation) 
of difference and irony within the commodity-symbolic is precisely what DeLillo 
observes in Underworld regarding the treatment of irony, and the false mourning of 
Otherness. As is evident in that novel, the power that makes America the world’s 
“super-power” (DeLillo’s phrase) is the power of aestheticisation, brought about by 
the fusing of commodity, technology, and language in the form of allegory. The more 
seamless the aesthetic, the more unquestioned (and untroubled by irony) this 
allegoricity becomes. In the fusion of ideology and reality, irony ceases to be ironic 
and allegory ceases being allegorical because Otherness and difference have been 
excluded from the culture’s semiotic economy, omitted from its loop of references. 
     This diminishment of allegory as properly allegorical, an effect of its 
sequesterment from irony, is something DeLillo critiques in his texts; as allegory 
becomes merely an effect of ideology, the ritual repetition of the production of 
commodity, the culture, as well as its individuals, loses the awareness of itself as 
Other, as a representing and allegorising culture, and, thus, as accountable for the 
ways in which it is seen and for the ways in which it sees. The effects of such an 
etiolation of allegory, as explored throughout DeLillo’s novels, manifests primarily as 
issues of economy, specifically, the symbolic economies by which individuals 
represent themselves and others, measure time, exercise responsibility, and reproduce 
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the ideologies and worlds they live in. Because DeLillo’s texts focus on such 
economic considerations, I argue that the greatest demand faced by the reader of a 
DeLillo text is to tender a reading of the text’s (and DeLillo’s) philosophy of the 
economy of language. This is to say that, with his texts, DeLillo performs a critique of 
various symbolic-economies – public and private – through his investigation and 
representation of what might well be his own assumptions about language and 
representation as validated through the symbolic economies of his artist figures.197 To 
this end, irony, we might say, is his medium of inquiry, art, his illustration. The point 
that DeLillo makes in these three novels is that the most faithful economies, the most 
ethical and artful representations and reproductions are, first and foremost, faithful to 
Otherness.  
      Such a broad overview of DeLillo’s presiding ethical and aesthetic concerns 
enables the DeLillo-reader to pose a series of further questions that tend towards more 
specifically literary and aesthetic considerations, in particular, those, such as I have, 
throughout this thesis, framed by the notion of the work of art. If, as it is suggested in 
Underworld, “everything connects”, whether by paranoid or logocentric allegories, or 
as the effect of some astonishing and created sublime, what, then, to the possibilities 
of loss, doubt, uncertainty, or tenderness? How, within such an economy as DeLillo 
presents it in novels like Underworld and Cosmopolis, are these experiences 
preserved for what they are? Within the “feedback loop” of recycling and commodity 
production what becomes of pain, absence, or resistance? Moreover, in the drive to 
control and repress waste and difference will irony remain possible within such an 
economy? If there is no irony, no experiences of loss, pain, waste, death or doubt (the 
hallmarks of irony and Otherness), and no way of articulating Otherness or memory 
as anything beyond the circuit of presences, connections, and the coincidences of 
                                                 
197 For DeLillo, to make distinct the work of art from the commodity, and from the force of 
commodity-reproduction, means setting the economy of capitalist reproduction against the system it so 
persuasively mimics, the economy of language. This is something DeLillo does in the three novels I 
have read: in The Body Artist we are presented with the account of an artist’s re-tendering of her own 
philosophies of language, representation, and reproduction; in Underworld, we are witness to a 
constant comparison made between the economies of various individuals and artists with the massive 
economical functions of capitalism, commodity, ideology and paranoia, while, in Cosmopolis the 
analysis of the commodity-symbolic, and the economic imperatives of technology, power and wealth 
are fused with theory and allegory to new levels of parodic extrapolation. The Body Artist, with its 
record of an artist’s investigation of her symbolic economy, as well as the work of irony within the 
work of art, is, thus, entirely consistent with the analysis DeLillo undertakes throughout Underworld 
and Cosmopolis; the three texts belong to the same project. 
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ideology, then, “what is left that’s worth the telling”? What becomes of art and 
literature if Otherness and memory have been successfully recycled? 
     The single answer DeLillo’s texts propose is, of course, that ‘everything’ still 
remains to be ‘told’, to be remembered. Despite the management and repression of 
Otherness within the commodity-symbolic, Otherness does persist. Otherness is, 
precisely “what’s left”, and as DeLillo text’s make clear, it is from this Otherness that 
the possibilities of language, art, critique, difference and invention are drawn – 
indeed, it is from “what’s left” that such works of the imagination sufficient to contest 
the parameters of the aesthetic (and of reality) as prescribed in ideology may arise.  
Such contestation of ideology is what is introduced in DeLillo’s texts as questions of 
the ethical that, for DeLillo, are consequent to the treatment of Otherness through 
irony, and evinced in the work of art; this is a work, as I’ve indicated throughout this 
thesis, that is rehearsed in the work of irony – the mourning of Otherness through the 
mortification of allegory by which language and Otherness are both tendered and 
respected. 
     The Body Artist, although the slightest of the three novels discussed, is so clearly 
important for DeLillo, and important to the other two novels, because it elaborates in 
such detail on what I’ve been calling the work of art; the tendering of Otherness and 
with this, the economy of language, allegory, subjectivity and temporality, through 
irony. The Body Artist presents a sort of paradigm for the work of irony in the work of 
art that underwrites all three of DeLillo’s novels, and not least, their critique of the 
aesthetic conditions of ideology. What Lauren’s text represents is, then, an exercise in 
the evaluation of our tools for representation. In the course of this exercise the reader 
glimpses something of our allegoricity, the condition of subjectivity, and the 
tenderness of this condition. The open and faithful exposure of representation to 
Otherness provides for an ethical evaluation of our symbolic economies, and at the 
same time a new imagining called on by the demand to represent the unrepresentable, 
to tender the impossible. Essentially, this is a mourning process, one of recalling from 
memory all that has been lost and that may now be recalled for the purpose of 
representation. The exposure to Otherness is always an occasion for a reminder of our 
being in language, or historicity, our human tenderness, and our need to name. 
DeLillo’s texts furnish their readers with a non-innocent, ironic estimation of the most 
tender artful uses of language that can only be, as such, and, ethical, when seen as 
‘written’ in Otherness, when through the melancholic’s gaze we understand and value 
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allegory for its tenderness, for all it misses, all that is lost and, therefore, all that 
remains to be said, all that remains to be renewed in allegory. The possibility of such 
renewal is also one of mortification, one of loss, death, and absence, as it is by irony, 
the ‘trope’ that installs such loss etc. as the ‘law’ of economy (as in différance) that 
allegory may be renovated, and may articulate difference, resistance, and, ‘tenderly,’ 
Otherness.   
     Through the lens of irony and mourning we see how our allegories, even those 
that have become commodities, are the signs of our redemption, as ruins that suggest 
(in a dialectical manner) the inexhaustibility of memory and Otherness. Moreover, by 
such irony, we recognise Otherness and its deferral within all symbolic economies as 
the very principle of their on-going possibility and operation. Thus, as I’ve said, to be 
faithful to Otherness, world and memory – all of which, as DeLillo has said, “provoke 
language” – is to be faithful to language, to allegory. Only by virtue of such a faith, 
based on such experiences of loss, absence, death, irony etc., may the subject expose 
the commodity-symbolic of capitalism for the hegemonic and ideological force it is. 
Such a faithful subject in a DeLillo text is invariably an artist, but this doesn’t 
preclude DeLillo from writing about bad artists, faithless artists defined, as Benno 
Levin is, by their “perviousness” to ideology. For DeLillo, it is by the profanity of 
allegory that Otherness is faithfully articulated. Which is to say, that it is by irony that 
we, with our all too human allegories can manage successfully not to say what we 
mean; the possibility of going aside of intention is, for DeLillo, something to be 
celebrated as the very possibility of language; allegory, because tender, tenders an 
Otherness it cannot explain, but that we must continue to ‘not explain’, over and over 
again. Within the tender underdetermination of allegory we experience something of 
the immanence of the world (of Otherness, memory and “time itself”), and the 
possibility of what Derrida refers to as “the maximum of things to be said and 
thought”.198 The art that is significant, that is valued by DeLillo, and that, to a large 
extent, his last three novels argue for and examine, will be that which peels back 
allegorical history, opening and questioning allegorical equivalences, structural 
oppositions, connections, totalist-systems, and paranoias. This is why these novels are 
so sympathetic to the work of irony I’ve seen as essential to deconstruction. DeLillo’s 
                                                 
198 See Points. p.144. 
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texts perform a deconstruction of ideology – uses of representation, allegory, and the 
aesthetic – to the purpose of the renovation of allegory and the aesthetic. 
     Indeed, what Derrida has said of deconstruction holds true for DeLillo’s texts as 
well: deconstruction “tempts itself, tenders itself, and attempts to keep itself at the 
point of the exhaustion of meaning”(emphasis added).199 The maintenance of 
‘deconstruction’ at the “point” of the “exhaustion of meaning” is possible because 
‘deconstruction’ is constantly caught up in that process of ‘somersaulting’ Benjamin 
described in his discussion of allegory – the ‘somersaulting’ I’ve described as the 
force of irony within allegory, that enables ‘tendering’: a process of making tender – 
as in mortification, criticism, exposure and revelation – counter posed with the 
resulting tendering of further meanings, readings and theories. Meaning becomes 
“exhausted”, continuously, by virtue of its very mutability, which is to say, its 
openness to the impossible force allegory mourns – Otherness. However, the 
exhaustion of meaning is only ever revealed through the act of utter fidelity to the 
singularity of an event, its specific, contextual, and intense presentation of Otherness. 
And indeed, one way of contextualising this phrase of Derrida’s, the “exhaustion of 
meaning”, is as what DeLillo refers to in his essay, “In the Ruins of the Future”, a 
“singularity”. The immediate context for the application of this term is as a quality of 
experience in response to the destruction of the World Trade Centre Towers. For 
DeLillo, this event, as with any event in which our relationship to language is made 
strange and our understanding of the rapport between word and world problematic, 
serves as a focus for a writer to evaluate what it is that writing might be about – 
indeed, an occasion in which to consider “what’s worth the telling”. Regarding the 
events of the eleventh of September DeLillo writes: 
In its desertion of every basis for comparison, the event asserts its singularity. There is 
something empty in the sky. The writer tries to give memory, tenderness, and meaning to all that 
howling space. (39) 
 
By such an event, and by much less traumatic or violent irruptions of the world into 
language, is the writer exposed to the limits of representation. Such an exposure might 
well provide the writer with an opportunity to evaluate false consciousness, a 
questioning of the allegorical imperatives within which we live and assume to make 
the world present and ours, but in this singularity (the concentration of Otherness and 
memory in a specific event or subject) is carried a truth about the relation of all 
                                                 
199 See Positions (trans. Alan Bass). 1981. p.14. 
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writing to space and time – what I refer to as the ironic or fallen nature of language, 
expressed throughout DeLillo’s works as loss, death, pain, and trauma. The ‘event’ 
(the event in general, even that of a paper clip falling from a desk) presents us with 
the chance to evaluate the Otherness we live in and are situated by, and asks us about 
how this Otherness, this “howling space”, or what Lauren in The Body Artist 
describes as the “howling face, the stark, the not-as-if of things” (TBA, 90), is 
mourned and represented. In such a state, for DeLillo it seems, the writer or artist 
must faithfully ask: with what tenderness do we commit to this Otherness, this 
condition of memory, in language? To respond, in language, as much as to the 
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